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BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJNAPRADIPA: SIX CHAPTERS

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Abstract

BHĀVAVIVEKA'S PRAJÑĀPRADĪPA: SIX CHAPTERS

by William Longstreet Ames

Chairperson of the Supervisory Committee:
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This dissertation contains an English translation of chapters three, four, five, seventeen, twenty-three, and twenty-six of Bhāvaviveka's Prajñāpradīpa, as well as an edition of the Tibetan text. The Prajñāpradīpa is Bhāvaviveka's commentary on the fundamental text of the Madhyamaka school of Buddhist philosophy, Nāgārjuna's Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikās. The edition is based on the Peking, Narthang, Derge, and Cone editions of the Bstan 'gyur. For both the translation and the edition, extensive use was made of Avalokitavrata's subcommentary. The dissertation also contains three introductory chapters, which deal with Bhāvaviveka's works, his place in the history of the Madhyamaka, and related matters.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Bhāvaviveka's <u>Prajñāpradīpa</u>: Six Chapters

by

WILLIAM LONGSTREET AMES

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree of

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1986

Approved by ______________________

(Chairperson of Supervisory Committee)

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This dissertation has no intrinsic nature of its own and has originated in dependence on the help and advice of many friends and teachers. I had the privilege of studying for several years with Professor David Seyfort Ruegg, now of the University of Hamburg; and what I learned from him has proved invaluable in writing the present work. I was also fortunate to study with Professor Christian Lindtner, now of the University of Copenhagen, who suggested the topic of this dissertation and who has generously continued to serve as a member of my committee, as well as to provide me with the results of his own extensive research on Bhāvaviveka. Finally, I would like to thank Professors Richard Salomon and Collett Cox for many helpful comments and suggestions.

Part I: Introduction

Chapter 1: Nāgārjuna and the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās*

Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa* is a commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās* (MMK). The MMK is the fundamental text of the Madhyamaka school of Buddhist philosophy. (As a general rule, "Madhyamaka" is the name of the school and its philosophy; a follower of the school is called a "Mādhyamika."[1]) Nāgārjuna was the founder of the Madhyamaka, and Bhāvaviveka was one of the most important figures in its development. The later tradition considered Bhāvaviveka to be the founder of the Svātantrika branch of the Madhyamaka, as opposed to the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka of Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti.

The *Prajñāpradīpa*, like the MMK, has twenty-seven chapters. Chapters three, four, five, seventeen, twenty-three, and twenty-six are edited and translated here; they will be discussed later.

The first three chapters of this dissertation are introductory. In this chapter, we will discuss mainly issues related to Nāgārjuna and his chief work, the MMK. The second chapter will deal with Bhāvaviveka and the works ascribed to him, with the exception of the *Prajñāpradīpa*. The third chapter will examine the *Prajñāpradīpa* and Bhāvaviveka's syllogistic method. Bhāva-

viveka's criticism of Buddhapālita in the Prajñāpradīpa and Candrakīrti's response to that criticism initiated the split between the two main divisions of the Mādhyamikas, the Svātantrikas and the Prāsaṅgikas. Therefore, in the third chapter, we will also consider the major issues which divided these two subschools, as well as other matters related to Bhāvaviveka and the Prajñāpradīpa.

Nāgārjuna's Date and Works

Nāgārjuna's dates, like most dates in ancient Indian history, cannot be established with any precision. Modern scholars have placed him anywhere from the first to the third centuries A. D.[2] In his recent study of the chronology of the Madhyamaka, David Seyfort Ruegg, following Erich Frauwallner and others, concludes that "on balance it seems appropriate to place Nāgārjuna c. 150-200 CE."[3] Jacques May, however, has chosen to follow Étienne Lamotte in citing a date of 243 A. D. for Nāgārjuna's birth and putting his death at about 300 A. D.[4] Lamotte based his opinion on the chronological calculations of Kumārajīva and his school.[5]

Traditional accounts of the life of Nāgārjuna are full of legendary and mythological elements, though they seem to agree in associating him with South India.[6] The situation is further complicated by the fact that the

tradition assumed that Nāgārjuna, the author of the MMK, also wrote a number of Tantric, alchemical, and medical works. Modern scholars generally believe that these works were written by one or more later authors of the same name.[7]

Even setting those writings aside, there remain many works ascribed to "Nāgārjuna." For the most part, they are available only in Tibetan or Chinese translations, though a few survive in Sanskrit. The most elaborate study of the works of Nāgārjuna is Christian Lindtner's recent Nāgārjuniana. He considers thirteen works to be definitely genuine: MMK; Śūnyatāsaptati; Vigrahavyāvartanī; Vaidalyaprakaraṇa; *Vyavahārasiddhi; Yuktiṣaṣṭikā; Catuḥstava; Ratnāvalī; Pratītyasamutpādahṛdayakārikā; Sūtrasamucaya; Bodhicittavivaraṇa; Suhṛllekha; and *Bodhisambhāra[ka].[8] Ruegg also surveys the works of Nāgārjuna in his Literature of the Madhyamaka School in India.[9] He is less inclined to commit himself on questions of authorship, though he does believe that the Bodhicittavivaraṇa is probably the work of a later, Vajrayānist Nāgārjuna.[10]

Nāgārjuna and the Mahāyāna

Nāgārjuna's dates, uncertain as they are, place him in the earlier centuries of the Indian Mahāyāna.[11] The Buddhist tradition is unanimous in considering him to

have been a great teacher of the Mahāyāna; some Mahāyāna sūtras even contain "predictions" of his birth.[12] On the other hand, the MMK and the works most similar to it in style and content - namely, Śūnyatāsaptati, Vigrahavyāvartanī, Vaidalyaprakarana, *Vyavahārasiddhi, and Yuktisaṣṭikā - contain little or nothing that would indicate that Nāgārjuna considered himself to be a "Mahāyānist." Thus A. K. Warder has questioned whether Nāgārjuna was, in fact, a follower of the Mahāyāna.[13]

Most scholars have rejected Warder's contention, pointing out, among other things, that MMK 13-8 clearly alludes to a passage in the Kāśyapaparivarta of the Ratnakūṭa collection of Mahāyāna sūtras and that other works likely to be by Nāgārjuna, such as the Ratnāvalī and the Catuḥstava, contain numerous references to Mahāyāna doctrines.[14] At the same time, no one would dispute the fact that Nāgārjuna many times quotes from or alludes to passages in the sūtras of the early Buddhist Canon.[15] Moreover, there is general agreement that he was opposed not to early Buddhism itself, but to what he saw as the speculative excesses of the Ābhidhārmika schools of his day.[16] In Nāgārjuna's view, many of the theories developed by these schools, above all the Sarvāstivādins' notion of svabhāva, were at variance with the teachings of the Buddha. It is probable, in fact, that the MMK and closely related works have few references to

the Mahāyāna precisely because they are addressed to the Ābhidhārmikas.

Recently, however, David Kalupahana has attempted to revive Warder's hypothesis.[17] To quote Kalupahana, "In the following pages, an attempt will be made to present Nāgārjuna merely as a grand commentator on the Buddha-word and to show that he did not try to improve upon the teachings of the Buddha. His work will be explained as an attempt to destroy the weeds that had grown up around the Buddha's teaching as a result of some of the ideas expressed by philosophers of both the Sthaviravāda and the Mahāyāna traditions."[18]

Kalupahana seems not quite to say that Nāgārjuna was not a Mahāyānist (despite the statement to that effect on the back cover of his book), but to hold that "... even some of the more prominent philosophers of Mahāyāna were really trying to overcome such sectarian interpretations and go back to the non-sectarian form of Buddhism as embodied in the early discourses, without rejecting either the canonical Abhidharma texts that embody positive teachings or the early Mahāyāna sūtras that emphasized the negative aspect of the Buddha's doctrine."[19] While admitting that Nāgārjuna knew the <u>Kāśyapa-parivarta</u>,[20] he says, "I wonder whether the original versions of these texts can appropriately be called Mahāyānistic, even though they were preserved by the

Mahāyāna schools."[21] For him, the full-fledged Mahāyāna is represented by the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, with its sectarian attitude toward the "Hīnayāna" and its disparagement of the arhat ideal.[22] Thus he says, "A careful reading of [Hajime] Nakamura's [Indian Buddhism] shows it to be futile to attempt to discover a pure Mahāyāna text that Nāgārjuna might have been able to depend upon."[23]

To begin with, I think that it is clear that Nāgārjuna did endeavor to show that the Mahāyāna doctrine of the emptiness of all dharmas is not incompatible with the early Canon. For example, chapter twenty-four of the MMK is devoted to arguing that the Four Noble Truths can only be understood in the light of emptiness, whereas they become impossible if things exist by intrinsic nature.

The early history of the Mahāyāna is complex, and little is known for certain. In particular, the dating of Mahāyāna sūtras is difficult. Thus Lamotte, for example, wrote, "In fact, the present state of information does not allow any hypothesis on the terminus a quo of the Mahāyānasūtras."[24] Nevertheless, there are some problems with Kalupahana's account of the texts which existed in Nāgārjuna's day. He seems to put Nāgārjuna in the first or second century A. D.,[25] although Nakamura's Indian Buddhism, which he has cited as his main authority, gives estimated dates of c. 150-250 A. D. for

Nāgārjuna.[26] Kalupahana goes on to say that the Mahāvastu was probably not yet written at that time,[27] even though Nakamura says that it may date from the second century B. C.![28] (Of course, as some reviewers have pointed out,[29] Nakamura's book has to be used with caution; but Kalupahana gives no reasons for his deviations from Nakamura.)

He refers to Nakamura's book as his authority for saying, "In the earliest versions of some of the early Mahāyāna sūtras, such as Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitā and the Kāśyapa-parivarta, there is no mention of a bodhisattva."[30] On the page referred to, Nakamura says, "The scheme of the earliest Mahāyāna sūtras was to mention Jetavana or Veḷuvana as the gathering place for sermons by the Buddha, and to mention 1250 bhikkhus alone; they did not mention bodhisattvas. This scheme was inherited from that of the sūtras of Early Buddhism."[31] Clearly, the statement, "they did not mention bodhisattvas," refers only to the opening of the sūtra and not to the entire text. In fact, the Gilgit manuscript of the Vajracchedikā uses the word bodhisattva repeatedly.

Kalupahana writes, "Before the compilation of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, one can hardly expect to find a carefully executed treatise that would explicate the Mahāyāna philosophy as it is presented by modern scholars. Since

such sophisticated Mahāyāna sūtras were not available to Nāgārjuna, he could not help moving on to the early discourses ..."[32] Later he says, "The *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* ... indicates a gradual growth with the final version assigned to the third century A. D."[33] Now if that is the case, one might well suppose that an earlier version of the sūtra existed in Nāgārjuna's day; and in fact, according to Nakamura, "The prototype of the sūtra now existing was produced in the first century A. D."[34] Thus it is not correct to say, as Kalupahana does, that Nakamura's book shows that Nāgārjuna could not have known any "Mahāyānistic" scriptures.

Finally, although Kalupahana never discusses the question of whether Nāgārjuna wrote all the works attributed to him, he does refer to the *Vigraha-vyāvartanī*[35] and the *Ratnāvalī*[36] as having been written by Nāgārjuna. Verses 4-67 to 4-98 of the *Ratnāvalī* discuss the Mahāyāna, mentioning it several times by name, comparing it to the Śrāvakayāna, and defending it against criticism.[37] Nāgārjuna mentions as distinctive teachings of the Mahāyāna the bodhisattva's vow (*praṇidhi*) and dedication (*pariṇāmanā*) of his practice (*caryā*) (4-90). (That is, he dedicates the merit derived from his practice to the attainment of full enlightenment for the benefit of all beings.) That practice consists of the six perfections (*pāramitā*) (4-82), as well as the ten

stages (bhūmi) discussed in 5-40 to 5-61. Also, only the Mahāyāna teaches the inconceivable greatness (māhātmyam acintyam) of the Buddhas (4-85), and emptiness (śūnyatā) in the sense of nonorigination (anutpāda) (4-86). Nāgārjuna makes it clear that he does not reject the Śrāvakayāna but that he considers the Mahāyāna to be the higher teaching (4-93 to 98). Kalupahana is strangely silent about these verses.

In summary, one can agree with Jacques May: "Certainly Nāgārjuna, unlike certain Mahāyāna-sūtras, shows no willingness to break with the ancient Canon ... But it would be excessive to detach him from the Mahāyāna."[38] Of course, the Mahāyāna was not a monolith. As Gregory Schopen has emphasized, the early Mahāyāna was a complex movement with many different aspects, some of which may originally have been advocated by quite separate groups.[39] Any account of that Mahāyāna which Nāgārjuna followed has to be based on his own works, as has been done, for example, by Christian Lindtner.[40]

Philosophical Questions

On the philosophical side, Kalupahana is at pains to insist that Nāgārjuna does not reject the categories of early Buddhism, but that he does reject the interpretation of those categories in terms of the "substantialist" views of the Sarvāstivādins or in terms of the contrary

views of the Sautrāntikas, who insisted on momentariness.[41] Thus he says, "... Nāgārjuna was not denying either dependently arisen phenomena or dependent arising. He was merely showing the inconsistency in explaining causally conditioned phenomena in terms of self-nature."[42] Likewise, in his commentary on MMK 1-3,4, Kalupahana says, "Thus, unlike Candrakīrti, Nāgārjuna seems to have accepted the Ābhidhārmika theory of four conditions, without characterizing it either as self-causation or as external causation ... there is no outright denial of the 'conditions' (pratyaya) but only of self-nature (svabhāva)."[43]

Kalupahana's views are well summed up in the following passage from his commentary on chapter twenty-five: "In [the first] chapter, there was no denial of a cause (pratyaya) or an effect (artha) and the arising of the latter depending upon the former, so long as these two events and their mutual dependence is not explained on the basis of a theory of self-nature or other-nature. Similarly, in the present chapter, there is no denial of the four noble truths that include the fruit and the ultimate fruit (paramārtha), so long as these are not conceived of in the form of unique entities (bhāva, svabhāva), which was indeed the way in which the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas defined dharma."[44]

Is Kalupahana right about all these matters? To

begin with, there are some points where I think that he is. As has already been pointed out, many scholars think that Nāgārjuna did not want to break with the Buddhism of the early Canon but instead wished to challenge the ontology of the Ābhidhārmika schools. On the other hand, to the best of my knowledge, the early Canon never mentions svabhāva. By building his philosophy around the rejection of this Sarvāstivādin innovation, Nāgārjuna arrives at a point of view which, while not in conflict with that of the early Canon, is not the same, either. He places the emptiness (śūnyatā) of the dharmas, that is, their lack of intrinsic nature (svabhāva), in the forefront. He thereby insists upon a radical "nonsubstantialism" which is far less explicit in the early Canon (sabbe dhammā anattā).[45]

Thus it is as much an overstatement to say that Nāgārjuna was "merely a grand commentator" as it is to claim that he was an iconoclast with no regard for the past. When a tradition finds itself in a changed intellectual environment, innovations may occur; and some may find these contrary to the original spirit of the tradition. This seems to be how Nāgārjuna saw the work of the Ābhidhārmika schools. Any attempt to restore that original spirit, however, will necessarily create something new; and that Nāgārjuna certainly did.

As the foregoing implies, I also agree with Kalupa-

hana's contention that Nāgārjuna did not wish to deny phenomena altogether (which would have been the extreme of *apavāda*, nihilistic negation), but only their existence by virtue of *svabhāva*. Nor did he wish to reject the categories which the Buddhist Canon used to explain phenomena, *on the phenomenal level*. He had no intention of setting up a new description of phenomena to replace the old. He was concerned, above all, that phenomenological descriptions not be used to justify the unwarranted ontological conclusion that there exist real entities which possess their own intrinsic nature.

Nāgārjuna was interested in theories of how the world worked, not for their own sake, but for what they said or implied about the ultimate nature (or naturelessness) of reality. This was so because for all Buddhists, ontological questions are also soteriological questions, since one achieves liberation by correctly and thoroughly comprehending how things really are (*yathābhūtam*). Likewise, misconceptions about the way in which things do or do not exist are not only philosophical errors; they are also obstacles to enlightenment (*bodhi*).

Here Mark Siderits' remarks about Nāgārjuna's arguments and intentions in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* are pertinent. In that work, Nāgārjuna negates the *pramāṇas*, the valid means of knowledge such as perception and inference. Siderits writes, "If [Nāgārjuna's] arguments

are sound, they show only that a theory of pramāṇas cannot be employed in defense of some metaphysical thesis ... His arguments certainly do not show that we are unreasonable in, e. g., relying on perception in carrying out our everyday transactions ... All he has shown is that we cannot regiment our common-sense intuitions concerning ways of arriving at justified belief in such a way as to lend credence to some one or another metaphysical thesis."[46] He concludes that "... there is little reason to suppose that Nāgārjuna means to deny the possibility of there being pramāṇas in any sense of the term."[47]

The Mūlamadhyamakakārikās

Several summaries of the twenty-seven chapters of the MMK have been published.[48] We will summarize only the six chapters translated here. The verse numbers refer to the text of MMK as given in Bhāvaviveka's commentary. When these differ from the verse numbers in La Vallée Poussin's edition of Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā (CPP), the latter are also given. See note 143 to the translation of chapter three and note 59 to the translation of chapter twenty-three for details.

Chapters three, four, and five form a closely related set. Chapter three, drawing on the analysis developed in chapter two, examines the process of perception

by the sense organs (indriya). Nāgārjuna finds that process to be unintelligible if one tries to understand it in terms of entities which possess their own intrinsic nature (svabhāva). As is often the case in the MMK, the word svabhāva is not used and has to be inferred from the context of the work as a whole. Without some qualification such as "by intrinsic nature," a statement such as "... visible [objects] (draṣṭavya) and the visual organ (darśana) do not exist" (MMK 3-7a; CPP: 3-8a) is difficult to explain or defend.

In chapter three, the process of vision is analyzed, and the analysis is then extended to the other sense organs and their respective sense objects. The five physical sense organs plus the mind (manas), together with the six corresponding sense objects, constitute the twelve āyatanas. (Dharmas are the object of mind.)

Chapter four deals with the five aggregates (skandha). Matter (rūpa) is examined in terms of the relation of cause (kāraṇa or hetu) and effect (kārya). This analysis of causality complements the analysis of causal conditions (pratyaya) in the first chapter of MMK. The discussion of matter is extended to the other aggregates and to all entities (bhāva). The last two verses of chapter four (MMK 4-8,9) concern the way in which the Madhyamaka is expounded.

Chapter five discusses the six elements (dhātu).

Space (*ākāśa*) is discussed by means of an analysis of what is characterized (*lakṣya*) and its defining characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*). If defining characteristics and the things they characterize are not possible, then entities (*bhāva*) are not possible; and without an entity, one cannot have its absence, a nonentity (*abhāva*). Thus space cannot be a defining characteristic, a thing characterized, an entity, or a nonentity. The same applies to the other five elements. The concluding verse (MMK 5-8) states that those who see entities and nonentities do not see the quiescence (*upaśama*) of the visible (*draṣṭavya*). This mention of the visible harks back to the subject-matter of chapter three.

Thus chapters three, four, and five examine three sets of categories, the *āyatanas*, the *skandhas*, and the *dhātus*. These categories are fundamental to the Buddhist analysis of phenomena. (Note that in chapter five of MMK, *dhātu* refers to the six elements, not the eighteen *dhātus*. The latter are the twelve *āyatanas* plus the six corresponding sense cognitions.) In each chapter, the analysis is made more specific by singling out a particular member of the set for detailed treatment. It is then pointed out that the same analysis applies to the other members of the set as well.

As we have seen, one could also say that chapter three deals with perception, chapter four with causality,

and chapter five with the characteristics by which we define and identify the constituents of the world. From this point of view, also, the subjects treated in these three chapters are both important and interrelated.

Chapter seventeen deals with a topic fundamental to the Buddhist world-view, and indeed to the Indian world-view: action (*karman*) and its result (*phala*). Nāgārjuna first reviews the karma-theories of various Buddhist schools (MMK 17-1 to 17-20). He then shows that unacceptable consequences follow if action is conceived of as possessing intrinsic nature (MMK 17-21 to 17-25). The same is true of the result of action, as well as the agent (*kartṛ*) of action and the experiencer (*bhoktṛ*) of the result (MMK 17-26 to 17-30). These are all like magical emanations (*nirmita*) creating further emanations, or like cities of the *gandharvas*, mirages, or dreams (MMK 17-31 to 17-33).

Nāgārjuna states in MMK 17-26 that "the afflictions are not real (*tattvataḥ*)." (The afflictions (*kleśa*) are desire (*rāga*), hatred (*dveṣa*), and confusion (*moha*).) He returns to this theme in chapter twenty-three, where he explains that the afflictions are not real because they do not exist by intrinsic nature. They do not exist by intrinsic nature because they occur in dependence on the errors of (apprehending things as) pleasant (*śubha*) or unpleasant (*aśubha*) (MMK 23-1,2). Moreover, the

afflictions belong to a self (<u>ātman</u>); but neither the existence (<u>astitva</u>) nor the nonexistence (<u>nāstitva</u>) of the self is established (MMK 23-3,4).

The remainder of chapter twenty-three is largely devoted to an examination of error (<u>viparyāsa</u>), [illegible] the topic of the afflictions recurs from tim[illegible] The errors of (apprehending things as) plea[illegible] unpleasant do not exist by intrinsic natu[illegible]. In the first place, this is so because, as shown in chapter three, the objects of the six senses are "isolated" (<u>kevala</u>), i. e., without intrinsic nature. Therefore, like action, they are similar to a city of the <u>gandharvas</u> and so on, and cannot be considered as either pleasant or unpleasant (MMK 23-7 to 23-9). Moreover, the pleasant and the unpleasant exist only in relation to each other (and not by intrinsic nature) (MMK 23-10,11). Without the pleasant and the unpleasant, how can desire and hatred arise (MMK 23-12)?

Nāgārjuna next considers a traditional set of four errors, such as holding the impermanent (<u>anitya</u>) to be permanent (<u>nitya</u>), and applies a similar analysis. He shows that impermanence, for example, exists only in relation to permanence (and therefore not by intrinsic nature) (MMK 23-13,14 and 20,21; CPP: 21,22). Even the one who holds such errors and his holding of them do not exist (by intrinsic nature) (MMK 23-15 to 19). Thus

ignorance (avidyā) ceases because of the cessation of error; and because of the cessation of ignorance, the remaining members of the twelvefold dependent origination cease (MMK 23-22; CPP: 23-23). Nāgārjuna concludes by pointing out that if the afflictions existed by intrinsic nature, they could not be abandoned; but if they were nonexistent by intrinsic nature, there would be no question of abandoning them (MMK 23-23,24; CPP: 23-24,25). Thus if the existence and nonexistence of things is conceived of in terms of intrinsic nature, liberation is unintelligible.

It becomes particularly clear in chapter twenty-three that Nāgārjuna is doing two things at once. On the one hand, he is discussing ontology and showing that it is untenable to hold that things exist by intrinsic nature. Rather, their mode of existence can be compared to that of dreams or mirages. Thus they are also not totally nonexistent.

On the other hand, he is describing a process by which one changes one's way of experiencing the world. If one sees things as real entities which are either desirable or undesirable, this perception gives rise to desire and aversion and the actions resulting from them. If one then tries to rid oneself of desire and aversion, one finds that it is impossible as long as one perceives the world in this erroneous way. One has to see that

things and their desirable and undesirable qualities are not given as such but instead are conceptually constructed (see MMK 23-7), and that these concepts have meaning only in relation to each other. In fact, even error itself and the one who perceives the world erroneously do not exist intrinsically.

According to the traditional Buddhist formula, the cessation of ignorance results in the cessation of the remaining members of the twelvefold dependent origination. This "cessation" is interpreted here not as the ceasing to exist of some real entity called "ignorance" or "error," but as the realization that all things, including even error and ignorance, do not exist by intrinsic nature.

Chapter twenty-six of the MMK is concerned with the twelvefold dependent origination (pratītya-samutpāda). We have seen that it is clearly referred to in MMK 23-22 (CPP: 23-23). A truncated version is also alluded to in MMK 3-7 (CPP: 3-8). Moreover, the twelvefold dependent origination is a particular formulation of the general principle that things originate in dependence on other things. This principle is fundamental to the Madhyamaka system, where it is held to imply that things lack intrinsic nature. (See, for example, MMK 23-2.) In MMK 24-18, Nāgārjuna says, "What dependent origination is, that we call emptiness (śūnyatā)."

It may be surprising that in chapter twenty-six, the twelvefold dependent origination is expounded in a traditional Buddhist fashion, without any attempt to show that its members are empty of intrinsic nature. Nāgārjuna may have thought it appropriate to include a restatement of this important Buddhist doctrine, since so much of his philosophy is based on it. This chapter might also have been intended as an oblique demonstration that the Madhyamaka is not in conflict with earlier Buddhism and indeed is implicit in it.

Āryadeva and Buddhapālita

Before discussing Bhāvaviveka and his *Prajñāpradīpa*, we must briefly mention two major figures in the history of the Madhyamaka who preceded him, Āryadeva and Buddhapālita. Āryadeva was Nāgārjuna's student and direct successor; thus his dates are dependent on Nāgārjuna's.[49] Some have identified him with a monk named "Deva" whom the *Dīpavaṃsa* and the *Mahāvaṃsa* mention as having been in Śrī Laṅkā during the latter half of the third century when the Vetullavāda (i. e., the Mahāyāna) was widespread.[50] Lamotte has used this identification to bolster his case for Nāgārjuna's having been born in 243 A. D.[51] Āryadeva's major work is the *Catuḥśataka*.[52] He did not write a commentary on the MMK, unless, as some have supposed, he is the author of a commentary extant

only in Chinese and ascribed to one "Blue-eyes" (Ch'ing-mu).[53]

Buddhapālita[54] lived c. 500 A. D.[55] He is of more direct concern to us here than is Āryadeva, since his sole surviving work is a commentary on the MMK[56] which Bhāvaviveka criticizes in his Prajñāpradīpa. In fact, there are at least twenty places in the Prajñāpradīpa where Bhāvaviveka criticizes Buddhapālita: three times in his commentary on MMK 1-1 and one time each in his commentary on MMK 1-4a, 1-7, 1-8ab, 1-9cd, 2-1ab, 2-2, 2-22cd, 2-23cd, 3-2, 3-3ab, 5-3ab, 6-5, 7-34, 9-8, 10-12, 16-3, and 18-7.[57] Most of these criticisms are directed against faults which Bhāvaviveka sees in Buddhapālita's explanation of a particular verse, but some have a more general bearing. The latter will be discussed in the third chapter of this introduction, and Buddhapālita's views will be described in that context.

Notes to Chapter 1

[1]See David Seyfort Ruegg, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School in India, Vol. VII, Fasc. 1 of A History of Indian Literature, ed. Jan Gonda, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981 [abbreviation: Ruegg, Literature], p. 1 and n. 3. Earlier Western scholars tended to use the term "Mādhyamika" in both senses.

[2]See Ruegg, Literature, pp. 4-6 n. 11, and David Seyfort Ruegg, "Towards a Chronology of the Madhyamaka School," in Indological and Buddhist Studies: Volume in Honor of Professor J. W. de Jong on his Sixtieth Birthday, ed. L. A. Hercus, F. B. J. Kuiper, T. Rajapatirana, and E. R. Skrzypczak, Canberra: Faculty of Asian Studies, 1982 [abbreviation: Ruegg, "Chronology"], pp. 505-7 (with notes).

[3]Ruegg, "Chronology," p. 507.

[4]See Jacques May, "Chūgan," in Hōbōgirin: dictionnaire encyclopédique du bouddhisme d'après les sources chinoises et japonaises, Fasc. 5, ed. Paul Demiéville, Tokyo: Maison Franco-Japonnaise, 1979 [abbreviation: May, "Chūgan"], p. 478.

[5]See Étienne Lamotte, L'Enseignement de Vimalakīrti, Bibliothèque du Muséon, Vol. 51, Louvain: Institut Orientaliste, 1962, pp. 71-7, and Le Traité de la grande vertu de sagesse, Vol. III, Louvain: Institut Oriental-

iste, 1970 [abbreviation: Lamotte *Traité* III], pp. xl, liii.

[6]See Ruegg, *Literature*, p. 4, the sources cited *ibid*. pp. 4-6 n. 11, and Christian Lindtner, *Nāgārjuniana: Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of Nāgārjuna*, Indiske Studier 4, Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1982 [abbreviation: Lindtner, *Nāgārjuniana*], pp. 21 n. 66.

[7]See, for example, David Seyfort Ruegg, "Le *Dharmadhātustava* de Nāgārjuna," in *Études tibétaines dédiées à la mémoire de Marcelle Lalou*, Paris: Adrien Maissonneuve, 1971 [abreviation: Ruegg, "*Dharmadhātustava*"], pp. 448-53, esp. p. 452 and n. 24; Ruegg, *Literature*, pp. 104-5 (with notes); and Lindtner, *Nāgārjuniana*, pp. 11 n. 12 and 17-8 n. 47.

[8]Listed in Lindtner, *Nāgārjuniana*, p. 11. For details, see *ibid*., pp. 24-249.

[9]See Ruegg, *Literature*, pp. 8-33 and 104-5.

[10]*Ibid*., pp. 35-6 and 104-5.

[11]See, among many other discussions of the early Mahāyāna, Étienne Lamotte, *The Teaching of Vimalakīrti*, tr. Sara Boin, Sacred Books of the Buddhists, Vol. XXXII, London: Pali Text Society, 1976 [abbreviation: Lamotte, *Vimalakīrti*], pp. lxxxiv-lxxxvii, xcviii. (This is a translation of *L'Enseignement de Vimalakīrti* cited in note 5). More recently, see Karen Lang, *Āryadeva on the*

Bodhisattva's Cultivation of Knowledge and Merit, unpublished dissertation, University of Washington, 1983, pp. 15-21. (This dissertation will be published in the Indiske Studier series.)

[12]See Ruegg, "Dharmadhātustava," pp. 449-51 (with notes).

[13]See A. K. Warder, "Is Nāgārjuna a Mahāyānist?" in The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedānta, ed. Mervyn Sprung, Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1973, pp. 78-88.

[14]See May, "Chūgan," p. 473; Ruegg, Literature, pp. 5-7, esp. p. 6 nn. 12 and 13; Lindtner, Nāgārjuniana, p. 21 n. 67 and pp. 260-4; and Lang, op. cit., pp. 21-37.

[15]See Warder, op. cit.; Ruegg, Literature, p. 7 (with notes); Lindtner, Nāgārjuniana, pp. 251-60; and Lang, op. cit., pp. 21-8.

[16]See Warder, op. cit.; Ruegg, Literature, p. 6 n. 13; Lindtner, Nāgārjuniana, pp. 28 and 252-3; and Lang, op. cit., pp. 35-7.

[17]David J. Kalupahana, Nāgārjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way, Albany, N. Y.: State University of New York Press, 1986.

[18]Ibid., p. 5.

[19]Ibid., p. 6.

[20]Ibid., p. 8.

[21]Ibid., p. xiv.

[22]*Ibid*., pp. xiv, 3, 4, 6, 24, 25.

[23]*Ibid*., p. xiv.

[24]Lamotte, *Vimalakīrti*, p. xcviii.

[25]Kalupahana, *op*. *cit*., pp. 23-4.

[26]Hajime Nakamura, *Indian Buddhism: A Survey with Bibliographical Notes*, Osaka: Kansai University of Foreign Studies, 1980, p. 235.

[27]Kalupahana, *op*. *cit*., p. 24.

[28]Nakamura, *op*. *cit*., p. 130.

[29]See the reviews by Wilhelm Halbfass, *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 28 (1984), p. 227, and Christian Lindtner, *Indo-Iranian Journal* 28 (1985), p. 298.

[30]Kalupahana, *op*. *cit*., p. 24 with p. 95 n. 60; see also p. xiv.

[31]Nakamura, *op*. *cit*., p. 159.

[32]Kalupahana, *op*. *cit*., p. xiv.

[33]*Ibid*., p. 24.

[34]Nakamura, *op*. *cit*., p. 186.

[35]Kalupahana, *op*. *cit*., p. 92.

[36]*Ibid*., p. 165.

[37]See the discussions in Lindtner, *Nāgārjuniana*, pp. 262-4, and Ruegg, *Literature*, p. 26. The Sanskrit text of chapter four of the *Ratnāvalī* was edited by Giuseppe Tucci, "The *Ratnāvalī* of Nāgārjuna," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1936), 423-35. It is reprinted in P. L.

Vaidya, ed., Madhyamakaśāstram, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 10, Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1960, pp. 304-10. (The recent edition by Michael Hahn (Bonn, 1982) is not available to me.)

[38]May, "Chūgan," p. 473: "Certes Nāgārjuna, au contraire de certains Mahāyāna-sūtra, ne montre nulle volonté de rompre avec l'ancien canon (Warder, p. 84). Mais il serait abusif de le détacher du Mahāyāna."

May goes on to say that Warder did not mention the parallels found by Robinson between the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā and the MMK. Neither does Kalupahana. See Richard Robinson, Early Mādhyamika in India and China, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967, pp. 177-80.

[39]Gregory Schopen, lectures at the University of Washington, October, 1983 to March, 1984.

[40]See Lindtner, Nāgārjuniana, esp. pp. 19-22, 260-9, 277.

[41]Kalupahana, op. cit., p. 21-3.

[42]Ibid., p. 50.

[43]Ibid., p. 107-8.

[44]Ibid., p. 77.

[45]See Ruegg, Literature, p. 7 n. 16.

[46]Mark Siderits, "The Madhyamka Critique of Epistemology I," Journal of Indian Philosophy 8 (1980), p. 320.

[47]Ibid. One might wonder whether Siderits' statement on the same page, "... [Nāgārjuna's] arguments are meant to demonstrate that the phrase 'the ultimate nature of reality' is a non-denoting expression," contradicts what I have said about Nāgārjuna's concern with ultimate reality. I think that it does not if one recalls that for Nāgārjuna, ultimate reality obviously could not be some intrinsic nature which things possess. The ultimate reality of things has to be their naiḥsvābhāvya, their lack of intrinsic nature. On the idea that the intrinsic nature of things is the fact that they have no intrinsic nature, see my paper, "The Notion of svabhāva in the Thought of Candrakīrti," Journal of Indian Philosophy 10 (1982), pp. 161-77.

[48]See, e. g., Ruegg, Literature, pp. 9-18.

[49]On Āryadeva, see, e. g., May, "Chūgan," pp. 479-80; Ruegg, Literature, pp. 50-4; and especially, Lang, op. cit.

[50]See May, "Chūgan," p. 479; Lang, op. cit., pp. 50-4; and Ruegg, Literature, p. 50.

[51]See Lamotte, Traité III, p. 1373 n.

[52]Edited and translated in Lang, op. cit.

[53]See May, "Chūgan," pp. 480-1; Lang, op. cit., pp. 70-2; and Ruegg, Literature, pp. 48, 50.

[54]On Buddhapālita, see, in the first place, Akira Saito's dissertation (bibliographical information in

Appendix B). Also, see May, "Chūgan," p. 482; Ruegg, Literature, pp. 60-1; Christian Lindtner, "Buddhapālita on Emptiness," Indo-Iranian Journal 23 (1981) [abbreviation: Lindtner, "Buddhapālita"], pp. 187-217; Judit Fehér, "Buddhapālita's Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti: Arrival and Spread of Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika Literature in Tibet," in Tibetan and Buddhist Studies Commemorating the 200th Anniversary of the Birth of Alexander Csoma de Kőrös, ed. Louis Ligeti, Bibliotheca Orientalis Hungarica, Vol. XXIX/1, Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1984, pp. 211-40; and my "Summary of the Buddhapālita-Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti," to appear in a future volume of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, ed. Karl H. Potter.

[55]See references in note 54 and Ruegg, "Chronology," p. 512.

[56]Saito edited the entire text (which is extant only in Tibetan) and translated the first sixteen chapters into English. Lindtner, "Buddhapālita," contains an edition and English translation of chapter eighteen. Fehér, op. cit., contains an English translation of the first chapter; a Sanskrit reconstruction of that chapter is given in Indumati Datar, "A Study of the First Chapter of Buddhapālita Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti," Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 26 (1951), 129-39. A portion of chapter two was edited and translated into English by Musashi Tachikawa, "A Study of

[redacted]

Buddhapālita's Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti (1)," Nagoya Daigaku Bungakubu Kenkyū Ronshū 63 (1974), pp. 1-19.

[57]These were located by checking the notes to Saito's translation of the first sixteen chapters of Buddhapālita's commentary; my own translations of chapters 17, 23, and 26 of the Prajñāpradīpa; Lindtner's translation of chapter 18 of Buddhapālita's commentary; and Eckel's translations of chapters 18, 24, and 25 of the Prajñāpradīpa. I did not search chapters 19, 20, 21, 22, and 27 of the Prajñāpradīpa with Avalokitavrata's subcommentary. Saito mentions that Bhāvaviveka does not criticize Buddhapālita in the last five chapters of BPP, i. e., 23-27. (See Saito, translation, p. xxiii.)

For the places cited, see Saito, translation, pp. 221 n. 2, 222 nn. 4 and 5 (all on MMK 1-1), 224 n. 11 (1-4a), 226 n. 23 (1-7), 228 n. 30 (1-8ab), 229 n.35 (1-9cd), 232 n. 2 (2-1ab), 234-5 n. 7 (2-2), 242 n. 52 (2-22cd), 243 n. 55 (2-23cd), 244 n. 6 (3-2), 244 nn. 8 and 11 (3-3ab), 248 n. 5 (5-3ab), 251 nn. 13 and 14 (6-5), 261 n. 90 (7-34) 266 n. 15 (9-8), 270 n. 35 (10-12), and 284 n. 11 (16-3); Lindtner, "Buddhapālita," p. 216 n. 93 (18-7); and Eckel, Nihilism, p. 259 n. 118 (18-7).

Saito, citing a work in Japanese by Ejima, says, "According to the subcommentary of Avalokitavrata, Bhāvaviveka criticized Buddhapālita more than twenty times in [the Prajñāpradīpa]." See Saito, translation, p. xxiv

and note 1, citing Yasunori Ejima, Chūgan-shisō no tenkai - Bhāvaviveka kenkyū, Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1980, pp. 171-78.

Chapter 2: Bhāvaviveka and his Works

Bhāvaviveka's Name and Date

We have been referring to to the author of the *Prajñāpradīpa* as "Bhāvaviveka." This spelling, which occurs in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*, is only one of the forms of his name. "Bhavya" is also common, while the Chinese transliterations and translations point to "Bhāviveka." The Tibetan translations of the *Prajñā-pradīpa* and Avalokitavrata's *ṭīkā* generally give *legs ldan byed*, corresponding to "Bhavyakara" or "Bhavyakāra," rather than *legs ldan 'byed*, corresponding to "Bhāva-viveka." Of course, *byed* may simply be a mistake for *'byed*, a mistake which somehow became standard in those texts. Likewise, "Bhāviveka" suggests a Sanskrit haplography for "Bhāvaviveka;" but if that is the case, it is surprising that "Bhāviveka" became the standard form of the name in China.[1]

As Yuichi Kajiyama[2] has shown, Bhāvaviveka can be dated to the early and middle portion of the sixth century A. D. (roughly 500-570) through his relationship to Dharmapāla and Sthiramati. Kajiyama accepts Erich Frauwallner's estimated dates of c. 530-561 for Dharma-pāla[3] and 510-570 for Sthiramati.[4] Sthiramati criticizes Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa* in his own commentary on the MMK (extant only in Chinese transla-

tion),[5] while Dharmapāla criticizes the same work several times in his commentary on Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka*.[6] (The latter commentary also survives only in Chinese.) Sthiramati and Dharmapāla wrote from the point of view of the Yogācāra or Vijñānavāda school;[7] the controversy between Dharmapāla and Bhāvaviveka became well known in the Far East.[8]

On the other hand, in the first chapter of the *Prajñāpradīpa*, Bhāvaviveka criticizes an unnamed commentary on the MMK; and Avalokitavrata tells us that the author of this commentary is Guṇamati.[9] Guṇamati was a teacher of Sthiramati,[10] so that Bhāvaviveka comes between the two and is probably older than Sthiramati. According to Hsüan-tsang, Bhāvaviveka sought to have a debate with Dharmapāla; but the latter, who had retired to Bodh Gaya to meditate, declined. Bhāvaviveka then returned to South India,[11] where he died nine years later.[12] If we accept Frauwallner's calculation that Dharmapāla retired to Bodh Gaya in 559 and died in 561, that places Bhāvaviveka's death in 568-570. Thus Kajiyama arrives at his estimated dates of 500-570 for Bhāvaviveka.

It should also be mentioned that Bhāvaviveka cites with approval a commentary on the MMK by Devaśarman called *dkar po 'char ba* (perhaps *Śuklābhyudaya*) in the first[13] and third[14] chapters of the *Prajñāpradīpa*. This

does not help in determining Bhāvaviveka's date, since we have no independent information on Devaśarman's date. (He can scarcely be identical with the Sarvāstivādin Devaśarman, author of the Vijñānakāya, who must have lived much earlier.[15]) Likewise, Buddhapālita's date is dependent on that of Bhāvaviveka, who is said to have been Buddhapālita's younger contemporary.[16]

Works Ascribed to Bhāvaviveka

Turning to Bhāvaviveka's writings, we find six works on Madhyamaka that are ascribed to him: Madhyamakahṛdaya-kārikā (MHK); its autocommentary, the Tarkajvālā (TJ); the *Karatalaratna (KTR); the Prajñāpradīpa (BPP); the Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha (MAS); and the Madhyamakaratna-pradīpa (MRP).[17] We shall discuss each of these works, saving the Prajñāpradīpa for the next chapter. There are also two Tantric works ascribed to "Bhavyakīrti," but these are unlikely to have been written by the author of the Prajñāpradīpa.[18]

The MHK seems to be Bhāvaviveka's earliest work. He refers to it by name in his appendix to chapter twenty-five of the Prajñāpradīpa.[19] It is also referred to in KTR under the name *Tattvāmṛtāvatāra.[20] A number of verses of MHK are taken over by MRP with little or no change,[21] and this work also refers to TJ by name.[22] As Ejima[23] has pointed out, Candrakīrti quotes MHK 3-27ab

and 3-41ab in CPP 33.1,2. Candrakīrti does not name the source, but it is clear from the context that he attributes them to Bhāvaviveka. Thus there is little doubt that MHK is an authentic work of the author of the Prajñāpradīpa.

MHK consists of some 928 verses in the Sanskrit version and 1024 verses in the Tibetan version;[24] it is not available in Chinese.[25] MHK is the only work of Bhāvaviveka's which is extant in Sanskrit (except for one missing folio). The one known Sanskrit manuscript was found in Zha lu monastery in Tibet in August, 1936 by Rāhula Sāṃkṛtyāyana.[26] He was unable to photograph it and made a rapid copy by hand.[27] Sāṃkṛtyāyana gave his copy to V. V. Gokhale, who again transcribed it. Only in 1972 did Gokhale discover on a visit to Rome that Giuseppe Tucci had photographed the same manuscript in Tibet.[28] According to Ejima, the Sanskrit manuscript is written in the "Proto-Bengali-cum-Maithili" script of the eleventh century,[29] while Gokhale says that it is not later than the tenth century.[30] As with TJ, the extant Tibetan translation was made by Atiśa (c. 982-1054) and the Tibetan Nag tsho Tshul khrims rgyal ba in the eleventh century, though, as Gokhale has pointed out, a previous translation existed in the early ninth century.[31]

MHK is divided into eleven chapters.[32] The first two

deal with the bodhisattva path, while the third and longest chapter discusses the bodhisattva's practice of discernment (prajñā) and the nature of Buddhahood.[33] In the context of prajñā, Bhāvaviveka expounds the Madhyamaka at length. The remaining chapters of MHK are mainly concerned with examining and refuting the doctrines of other schools. The Buddhist Śrāvakas and Yogacārins are dealt with in chapters four and five, respectively. Chapters six, seven, eight, and nine take up four non-Buddhist schools, the Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Vedānta, and Mīmāṃsā, in that order. These six chapters, along with TJ, constitute a valuable source of information on Indian philosophy as it existed in the sixth century A. D. The tenth chapter deals with the omniscience of the Buddha, while the eleventh and final chapter consists of three verses of praise.

Gokhale[34] has suggested that MHK originally consisted of the first three chapters alone, under the title Tattvajñānāmṛtāvatāra, and that Bhāvaviveka added the remaining chapters later. As Lindtner[35] has pointed out, the form actually found in the colophon to chapter three of MHK, and in KTR, is Tattvāmṛtāvatāra; and Gokhale has tacitly adopted that form in a recent publication.[36] Lindtner observed in the same note that the references in KTR and BPP must be to the fifth chapter of MHK/TJ, which deals with the Yogācāra. Hence those references do not

support the hypothesis that MHK originally comprised only the first three chapters, although they do not disprove it, either.

The Tarkajvālā is Bhāvaviveka's autocommentary on MHK. It is available only in an eleventh-century Tibetan translation by the translators of MHK, though, as we mentioned in connection with MHK, an earlier Tibetan translation is known to have existed.[37] The Nikāyabheda-vibhaṅgavyākhyāna, treated as a separate work of Bhāvaviveka's in the Bstan 'gyur, is identical with part of chapter four of TJ.[38] Moreover, the Madhyamakabhramaghāta, ascribed to Āryadeva in the Bstan 'gyur, is actually an extract from TJ with three verses from MHK and one new verse.[39]

Ejima has expressed some doubts about whether the entire TJ was written by Bhāvaviveka.[40] He cites the fact that in the present TJ, the term ācārya is occasionally used in reference to the author of the MHK.[41] Since ācārya is an honorific title, one would not expect Bhāvaviveka to use it when referring to himself. Ejima hypothesizes that the present TJ is a revised or enlarged recension of an "Ur-TJ." The Ur-TJ was written by Bhāvaviveka, the author of MHK and BPP. The present TJ (including the part reproduced in the Nikāyabhedavibhaṅgavyākhyāna) was composed by a later writer named "Bhavya," who lived perhaps in the eighth century.[42] As

we shall see later, Ejima's hypothesis also has a bearing on the question of the authorship of MAS and MRP.

Gokhale, on the other hand, has suggested that the sentences containing references to Bhāvaviveka as "ācārya" were explanatory comments by Atiśa which were inserted into the text by his Tibetan collaborator, Tshul khrims rgyal ba.[43] On this supposition, the present TJ would be essentially identical with the original TJ, aside from a few interpolations by the eleventh-century translators.

The *Karatalaratna (KTR) is preserved only in a Chinese translation made by Hsüan-tsang in October of 649.[44] The Sanskrit title is reconstructed from the Chinese; Lindtner has suggested *Hastaratna[45] or *Talaratna[46] as alternative possibilities. KTR was translated into French many years ago by La Vallée Poussin.[47] So far as I know, no one has cared to dispute its authorship.

KTR is divided into three parts. The first two parts are similar to MHK 3-25 to 3-136 in that they demonstrate that all conditioned (saṃskṛta) and unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) dharmas have no intrinsic nature. The method is also the same as in MHK/TJ. A formal syllogism is stated, and objections by opponents from various schools are refuted. (This method will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.) The third

section breaks new ground and deals with the meditative cultivation (bhāvanā) of the insight already gained intellectually through the reasoning described in the first two parts.[48]

The Madhyamakārthasamgraha (MAS) is a short work, so short that Lindtner translated it in a footnote.[49] It is available only in an eleventh-century Tibetan translation by Atiśa's collaborator, Tshul khrims rgyal ba, this time working alone. It elaborates the distinction between two kinds of paramārtha which is made in TJ. (This distinction will be explained in the following chapter.) In addition, it distinguishes between two kinds of superficial reality (saṃvṛti). True (tathya) saṃvṛti has causal efficacy; false (mithyā) saṃvṛti does not. The latter either involves conceptual construction (vikalpa), as when a rope is mistaken for a snake; or it does not, as when one sees a double moon because of some optical defect. The term tathya-saṃvṛti also occurs in MHK 3-7,12, though it is not contrasted with mithyā-saṃvṛti there.[50]

Ejima thinks that the MAS was not written by Bhāvaviveka because "its contents cannot be interpreted without references to other later works by Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and Jñānagarbha ..."[51] He ascribes it to the same "Bhavya" whom he believes to have composed the present TJ. Lindtner, on the other hand, sees it as

being completely consistent with Bhāvaviveka's other works, despite a few new technical terms.[52] Thus he attributes the MAS to Bhāvaviveka, as does Ruegg.[53]

The Madhyamakaratnapradīpa (MRP), like MHK/TJ and MAS, was translated into Tibetan in the eleventh century. The translators were Atiśa and Tshul khrims rgyal ba, joined in this case by Brtson 'grus seng ge. It is not available in Chinese or Sanskrit, though as mentioned earlier, some of its verses are identical to verses of MHK which are extant in Sanskrit. MRP is a work in mixed prose and verse, divided into nine chapters. Lindtner gives the title of each chapter and a detailed summary in his paper, "On Bhavya's Madhyamakaratnapradīpa."[54]

The authorship of MRP is controversial. Schayer[55] and Yamaguchi denied that it was written by Bhāvaviveka, with Yamaguchi holding that it was a later work of the Prāsaṅgika school.[56] More recently, Ruegg has expressed the view that the MRP was composed by a later author named Bhavya.[57] Ejima has a similar, but more elaborate hypothesis, which we have already described in part. According to Ejima, Bhāvaviveka wrote MHK, an Ur-TJ, BPP, and KTR. Then a later "Bhavya," perhaps in the eighth century, composed the present recension of TJ, as well as MAS and MRP.[58] Lindtner, on the other hand, thinks that the sixth-century Bhāvaviveka or Bhavya wrote all the works attributed to him, including MRP in particular.

Lindtner has defended his views at length in his "Adversaria Buddhica."[59]

The arguments and counterarguments have become rather complex, and I shall simply summarize the main points. Against the MRP's being a work by Bhāvaviveka is the fact that it mentions Dharmakīrti twice and Candrakīrti several times. Both of these authors are usually put in the seventh century.[60] Moreover, Candrakīrti is mentioned favorably in MRP, which is surprising in view of his criticism of Bhāvaviveka in the Prasannapadā. Also, the MRP quotes from a number of Tantric works,[61] all of which have authors (such as the Tantric Nāgārjuna) who are usually estimated to have lived in the seventh or later centuries.[62] Tantric elements are absent in Bhāvaviveka's other works.

Besides, there are other doctrinal differences between MRP and the remaining works, such as a different attitude toward logic and a willingness to accommodate Yogācāra ideas as a device in the practice of meditation (bhāvanā), though not as representing ultimate reality. Finally, Ruegg[63] and Mimaki[64] have noted that at least one Tibetan author, Lcang skya Rol pa'i rdo rje (1717-86), expressed the opinion that MRP was by a later Bhavya.

In favor of the MRP's having been written by Bhāvaviveka, there is first of all the traditional ascription

itself, which was obviously accepted by Atiśa when he translated MRP, along with with MHK and TJ, in the eleventh century. More important is the fact that the author of MRP himself says that he wrote TJ.[65] Thus it seems that one must either admit the authenticity of MRP or reject the authenticity of TJ as well.

Among those who think that Bhāvaviveka did not write MRP, only Ejima[66] has attempted to explain this statement by the author of MRP. As we have already mentioned, Ejima proposes that Bhāvaviveka wrote only an Ur-TJ and not the present TJ. This allows us to assume that the author of MRP was referring only to the present recension of TJ when he made his claim of authorship. Ejima's hypothesis also explains TJ's occasional references to the author of MHK as "ācārya," though, as we have seen, Gokhale has another, less radical explanation for that.

Lindtner has advanced a number of counterarguments in favor of Bhāvaviveka's having written the MRP. He points out that the arguments for putting Candrakīrti and Dharmakīrti in the seventh century are far from conclusive, and he has proposed approximate dates of c. 530-600 for Candrakīrti[67] and the same for Dharmakīrti.[68] As for the quotations from Tantric authors, he points out again that the usual estimates of their dates are based on very sketchy information. In fact, the origins and early history of the Vajrayāna in India are still quite

obscure.

Lindtner accounts for MRP's favorable attitude toward Candrakīrti by citing Bhāvaviveka's relatively broad-minded attitude where Vedānta is concerned and taking this as evidence of his magnanimity toward his opponents.[69] In his paper, "On Bhavya's Madhyamakaratnapradīpa," Lindtner points out that Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra is quoted in MRP and argues that Bhāvaviveka might have decided to write MRP as his own "Introduction to the Madhyamaka" in response to Candrakīrti's work.[70]

It is clear that Candrakīrti wrote the Prasannapadā after the Madhyamakāvatāra, since the latter is quoted or referred to a number of times in the former. Moreover, it is the Prasannapadā, and not the Madhyamakāvatāra, which contains Candrakīrti's criticisms of Bhāvaviveka. Thus one might argue that the Prasannapadā (which is not quoted in MRP) had not yet been written when MRP was composed and that therefore Bhāvaviveka would have had no reason to be hostile to Candrakīrti.

Finally, as for the doctrinal differences between MRP and the rest of the works ascribed to Bhāvaviveka, Lindtner takes them as evidence of development in Bhāvaviveka's thinking, rather than as indicating a different authorship.[71] In regard to the Tantric references, Lindtner notes that Hsüan-tsang says that Bhāvaviveka

became a devotee of Vajradhara.[72]

Notes to Chapter 2

[1]On the various names of "Bhāvaviveka," see Louis de La Vallée Poussin, "Madhyamaka," *Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques* *2* (1932-3) [abbreviation: LVP, "Madhyamaka"], pp. 60-1; V. V. Gokhale, "The Vedānta Philosophy Described by Bhavya in his *Madhyamakahṛdaya*," *Indo-Iranian Journal* *2* (1958) [abbreviation: Gokhale, "Vedānta"], pp. 165-6 n. 1; Shotaro Iida, *Reason and Emptiness: A Study in Logic and Mysticism*, Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1980 [abbreviation: Iida, *Reason*], pp. 5-6; and Ruegg, *Literature*, p. 60 n. 183.

[2]See Yuichi Kajiyama, "Bhāvaviveka, Sthiramati, and Dharmapāla," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* *12-13* (1968-9) [abbreviation: Kajiyama, "Bhāvaviveka *et al*."], pp. 193-203, and Yuichi Kajiyama, "Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpaḥ* (1. Kapitel)," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* *7* (1963) [abbreviation: Kajiyama, "BPPl, Part 1"], pp. 37-8.

[3]See Erich Frauwallner, "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* *5* (1961) [abbreviation: Frauwallner, "Landmarks"], pp. 132-4.

[4]*Ibid*., pp. 136-7.

[5]Kajiyama, "Bhāvaviveka *et al*.", pp. 198-9.

[6]*Ibid*., pp. 200-3.

[7]See Jacques May, "La Philosophie bouddhique idéaliste," Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques 25 (1971), pp. 278-9.

[8]See LVP, "Madhyamaka," pp. 61-5; Kajiyama, "Bhāvaviveka et al.", pp. 194-5; and Jay Hirabayashi and Shotaro Iida, "Another Look at the Mādhyamika vs. Yogācāra Controversy concerning Existence and Non-existence," in Prajñāpāramitā and Related Systems: Studies in Honor of Edward Conze, ed. Lewis Lancaster, Berkeley, Calif.: Group in Buddhist Studies, 1977, pp. 341-60.

[9]See Yuichi Kajiyama, "Bhāvaviveka's Prajñāpradīpaḥ (1. Kapitel) (Fortsetzung)," Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens 8 (1964) [abbreviation: Kajiyama, "BPPl, Part 2"], pp. 106-7 and p. 106 n. 5.

[10]See Frauwallner, "Landmarks," pp. 136-7, and Kajiyama, "Bhāvaviveka et al.," p. 198.

[11]Most of the traditional accounts of his life agree that Bhāvaviveka was born in South India. See Iida, Reason, pp. 6-11.

[12]See Kajiyama, "Bhāvaviveka et al.," pp. 199-200.

[13]See Kajiyama, "BPPl, Part 1," p. 37 and n. 2, and "BPPl, Part 2," pp. 116-7 and n. 7.

[14]See note 35 to my translation of chapter three. In both cases, neither Devaśarman's name nor the name of his commentary is mentioned in the Prajñāpradīpa; they

are supplied by Avalokitavrata.

[15]See LVP AK, "Introduction," pp. xxxiii-xxxvi, and Erich Frauwallner, "Abhidharma-Studien II," Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 14 (1970), pp. 70, 88-92.

[16]See Ruegg, "Chronology," p. 512; Lindtner, "Buddhapālita," p. 188; and Iida, Reason, pp. 10-11.

[17]Iida gives a good bibliography of scholarly literature on these six works. See Iida, Reason, pp. 12-19. We shall be adding more recent works (in Western languages only) at the appropriate places. Christian Lindtner summarizes the first five works briefly and MRP in detail in his "On Bhavya's Madhyamakaratnapradīpa," typescript [abbreviation: Lindtner, "MRP"], pp. 2-21. (This paper will appear in Indologica Taurinensia XII. I would like to thank Professor Lindtner for providing me with a copy in advance of publication.) See also Ruegg, Literature, pp. 62-4, 66.

[18]See Ruegg, Literature, p. 106 n. 339.

[19]This appendix deals with the controversy between the Mādhyamikas and the Yogācārins; it is absent in the Chinese translation of BPP. See Christian Lindtner, "Bhavya's Controversy with Yogācāra in the Appendix to Prajñāpradīpa, Chapter XXV," in Tibetan and Buddhist Studies Commemorating the 200th Anniversary of the Birth of Alexander Csoma de Kőrös, ed Louis Ligeti, Bibliotheca Orientalis Hungarica, Vol. XXIX/2, Budapest: Akadémiai

Kiadó, 1984 [abbreviation: Lindtner, "BPP25"], p. 96 and n. 199. The reference must be to the fifth chapter of MHK, which deals with the Yogācāra.

[20]See LVP, "Madhyamaka," p. 95 and n. 2, p. 116. Again the reference must be to the fifth chapter of MHK.

[21]See Christian Lindtner, "Adversaria Buddhica," Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 26 (1982) [abbreviation: Lindtner, "Adversaria"], pp. 178-82. Note also the reference to Ejima's work ibid., p. 178 n. 52.

[22]See Christian Lindtner, "Materials for the Study of Bhavya," in Kalyāṇamitrārāgaṇam: Essays in Honor of Nils Simonsson, ed. Eivind Kahrs, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986 [abbreviation: Lindtner, "Materials"], pp. 186 and 191 n. 17. (I would like to thank Professor Lindtner for providing me with a copy of this paper in advance of publication and later an offprint.)

[23]See Ejima, op. cit., pp. 274, 278.

[24]See V. V. Gokhale and S. S. Bahulkar, "Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā Tarkajvālā, Chapter I," in Miscellanea Buddhica, ed. Christian Lindtner, Indiske Studier 5, Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1985, p. 26 n. 1.

[25]See Iida, Reason, p. 12.

[26]See Rāhula Sāṃkṛtyāyana, "Second Search of Sanskrit Palmleaf Manuscripts in Tibet," Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 23, Part 1 (1937), pp. 1-136.

[27]See Ejima, *op. cit.*, p. 261, and Gokhale, "Vedānta," pp. 165-6 n. 1.

[28]See Ejima, *op. cit.*, p. 262.

[29]See Ejima, *op. cit.*, p. 263.

[30]See Gokhale and Bahulkar, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

[31]See *ibid.*, pp. 76-7 and p. 77 n. 3, and Ruegg, *Literature*, p. 111.

[32]Sanskrit titles listed in Gokhale and Bahulkar, *op. cit.*, p. 76 n. 1. Iida's bibliography, mentioned in note 17, treats each chapter of the combined MHK/TJ separately; see Iida, *Reason*, pp. 12-16. To it should be added Gokhale and Bahulkar, *op. cit.*, which contains an English translation of the first chapter of MHK/TJ, and Ejima, *op. cit.*, pp. 261-361, which contains an edition of the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts of the third chapter of MHK. (The introduction and notes to the edition are in English; the rest of Professor Ejima's book is in Japanese.)

[33]This chapter is summarized in Lindtner, "MRP," pp. 3-4, and in Iida, *Reason*, pp. 53-55. The first 136 verses are translated and edited, with the corresponding portion of TJ, in Iida, *ibid.*, pp. 55-242.

[34]See Gokhale, "Vedānta," pp. 165-6 n. 1, and V. V. Gokhale, "The Second Chapter of Bhavya's *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya*," *Indo-Iranian Journal* *14* (1972), pp. 41-2.

[35]See Lindtner, "MRP," p. 29 n. 20.

[36]See Gokhale and Bahulkar, op. cit., p. 78.

[37]Ibid., pp. 76-7 and p. 77 n. 3.

[38]See Iida, Reason, pp. 13-4, and Ruegg Literature, p. 63.

[39]Lindtner, "Adversaria," p. 173 n. 21, citing information from Per Sørenson.

[40]Yasunori Ejima, letter to Christian Lindtner dated March 31, 1980, quoted in Lindtner, "Adversaria," p. 184.

[41]See, e. g., TJ on MHK 1-21 (in Gokhale and Bahulkar, op. cit., p. 99) and MHK 3-58ab (in Iida, Reason, p. 131).

[42]In that case, it seems likely that the early Tibetan translation would have been of the Ur-TJ, rather than the present TJ.

[43]See Gokhale and Bahulkar, op. cit., pp. 76-7 (where Jayaśīla is the Sanskrit equivalent of Tshul khrims rgyal ba) and pp. 77 n. 4, 99 n. 44.

[44]See Lewis R. Lancaster, The Korean Buddhist Canon: A Descriptive Catalogue, Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1979, p. 204.

[45]See Lindtner, "Adversaria," p. 173.

[46]See Lindtner, "Materials," p. 78.

[47]LVP, "Madhyamaka," pp. 68-146. See also the bibliography in Iida, Reason, p. 18.

[48]For other summaries of KTR, see Ruegg, Literature, p. 63, and Lindtner, "MRP," pp. 5-6.

[49]See Christian Lindtner, "Atiśa's Introduction to the Two Truths," Journal of Indian Philosophy 9 (1981) [abbreviation: Lindtner, "Atiśa"], pp. 200-1 n. 14. To the bibliography in Iida, Reason, pp. 18-9, one should also add the edition of the Tibetan text in Ejima, op. cit. pp. 18-21.

[50]For other summaries of MAS, see Ruegg, Literature, p. 64, and Lindtner, "MRP," p. 8.

[51]Quoted in Lindtner, "Adversaria," p. 183.

[52]See Lindtner, "Atiśa," p. 200 n. 14, and "MRP," p. 8.

[53]See Ruegg, Literature, p. 64 and esp. n. 202.

[54]See Lindtner, "MRP," pp. 8-21. Note also Lindtner, "Materials," pp. 182-98, which contains a translation of chapter three of MRP and an edition of chapter four. Lindtner's "Bhavya's Critique of Yogācāra in the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa, Chapter IV," to appear in Buddhist Logic and Epistemology, ed. B. K. Matilal, will contain a translation of chapter four.

[55]See Stanislaw Schayer, "Notes and Queries on Buddhism," Rocznik Orientalistyczyny 11 (1935), pp. 206-211, where he also translates a few verses of the sixth chapter of MRP.

[56]See the account of Yamaguchi's view and the reference to his book of 1941 in Iida, Reason, p. 19. (More detailed bibliographical information, ibid., p. 14.)

[57]See Ruegg, Literature, p. 66, and "Chronology," pp. 513, 530.

[58]Quoted in Lindtner, "Adversaria," p. 183. (Ejima does not mention KTR there; but he ascribes it to Bhāvaviveka in Ejima, op. cit., p.499.)

[59]See the section called "On the Authenticity of the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa" in Lindtner, "Adversaria," pp. 172-84.

[60]On Dharmakīrti's date, see Frauwallner, "Landmarks," pp. 137-9. On Candrakīrti's date, see Ruegg, "Chronology," p. 513.

[61]Listed in Lindtner, "Adversaria," pp. 175-6, where the quotations from Candrakīrti and Dharmakīrti are also enumerated.

[62]See, for example, Ruegg, Literature, pp. 104-6, and the sources which he cites, p. 105 n. 333. See also Jean Naudou, Les bouddhistes kaśmīriens au Moyen Age, Annales du Musée Guimet, Bibliothèque d'Études, Tome LXVIII, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968, pp. 75-83.

[63]See Ruegg, Literature, p. 66 n. 214.

[64]See Katsumi Mimaki, "Le Commentaire de Mi pham sur le Jñānasārasamucccaya," in Indological and Buddhist Studies: Volume in Honor of Professor J. W. de Jong on his Sixtieth Birthday, ed. L. A. Hercus, F. B. J. Kuiper, T. Rajapatirana, and E. R. Skrzypczak, Canberra: Faculty

of Asian Studies, 1982, p. 374 n. 67, and Katsumi Mimaki, Blo gsal 'grub mtha', Kyoto: Zinbun Kagaku Kenkyūsho, 1982, pp. 160-1 n. 441 and pp. 167-9 n. 458.

65 bdag gis bkod pa rtog ge 'bar ba (P Dbu ma Tsha 335b-3); translated in Lindtner's translation of MRP, chapter 3. (See Lindtner, "Materials," p. 186.)

66 Quoted in Lindtner, "Adversaria," p. 183.

67 See Christian Lindtner, "Candrakīrti's Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa," Acta Orientalia 40 (1979), pp. 90-1.

68 See Christian Lindtner, "Apropos Dharmakīrti - Two new works and a new date," Acta Orientalia 41 (1980), pp. 31-3.

69 See Lindtner, "Adversaria," p. 183.

70 See Lindtner, "MRP," p. 25.

71 See Lindtner, "Adversaria," p. 184, and "MRP," pp. 23-6.

72 See Lindtner, "Adversaria," p. 177-8 and p. 178 n. 51.

Chapter 3: The *Prajñāpradīpa* and the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka

The *Prajñāpradīpa*

When it comes to the authorship of the *Prajñāpradīpa* (BPP), we leave the stormy seas of controversy and enter the calm waters of certainty: Bhāvaviveka is *by definition* the author of BPP. (As already mentioned, "Bhāvaviveka" is the form of the author's name used by Candrakīrti in the *Prasannapadā*.)

BPP, as we noted, refers to MHK and thus was written later. BPP is not available in Sanskrit, except for a few quotations in the *Prasannapadā*. The extant Tibetan translation was made by Jñānagarbha and Cog ro Klu'i rgyal mtshan in the early ninth century[1] and is thus earlier than the extant Tibetan translations of Bhāvaviveka's other works. The same two translators also translated the *Akutobhayā* (a commentary on MMK ascribed to Nāgārjuna but probably not written by him), Buddhapālita's commentary on the MMK, and Avalokitavrata's vast *ṭīkā* on BPP. Although one is only rarely able to compare their translations with the original Sanskrit, they seem to be generally excellent.

According to Ruegg,[2] the translator Jñānagarbha was probably not the same as the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika author of the same name, who wrote the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga*

and seems to have lived a little earlier. Besides collaborating on numerous translations, Klu'i rgyal mtshan may have written a commentary on the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra*.[3]

BPP is the only work of Bhāvaviveka's, other than KTR, to have been translated into Chinese. The translation was made by Prabhākaramitra in either 629 or 630-2.[4] According to Kajiyama, "The [Chinese] translation is, however, bad, unreliable and suppresses many sentences of the original text. On account of these defects, the text has not been well studied by traditional Buddhists in China and Japan."[5]

Chapters three, four, five, seventeen, twenty-three, and twenty-six of BPP are edited and translated here.[6] These six chapters are, of course, Bhāvaviveka's commentary on the corresponding chapters of Nāgārjuna's MMK. As has been indicated in the summaries given previously, these chapters of the MMK deal with some of the most fundamental concepts of Buddhist thought; and the way in which they do so reveals much about the Madhyamaka's philosophical and soteriological point of view. Particularly if one excludes those chapters of the MMK for which Bhāvaviveka's commentary has already been translated into a Western language,[7] these six chapters are among the most important in the MMK.

The specific topics dealt with in BPP are largely

determined by the contents of the text on which it comments, MMK. There, are, however, some exceptions. Thus the twenty-fifth chapter of BPP contains an appendix dealing with the Yogācāra; and the twenty-seventh chapter of BPP has an appendix expounding the idea that for a Mādhyamika, logic is valid conventionally (vyavahārataḥ) but not in ultimate reality (paramārthataḥ).[8] (Both of these appendices are omitted in the Chinese translation.) Likewise, among the chapters translated here, Bhāvaviveka defends the Madhyamaka against the charge of nihilism in his commentary on MMK 5-7. (He reverts to this subject following his commentary on MMK 18-7.[9]) In his commentary following MMK 23-14, Bhāvaviveka discusses the question of whether the "wisdom of emptiness" (stong pa nyid kyi ye shes, śūnyatā-jñāna) causes one to attain liberation.

Even when he is addressing the issues raised by a particular verse or verses of Nāgārjuna's, Bhāvaviveka's syllogistic method and his refutations of opponents' objections tend to lead him rather far afield. His arguments are often complex and subtle, and his language sometimes becomes so laconic as to be incomprehensible without the subcommentary. These and other problems occurring in connection with the six chapters edited and translated here will be discussed in the notes to the translation of each chapter.

Syllogistic Method

We have already referred to Bhāvaviveka's use of syllogisms. Naturally, these are syllogisms of the Indian, rather than the Aristotelian sort.[10] Bhāvaviveka seems to have been strongly influenced by the work of the great Buddhist logician, Dignāga,[11] who was probably his elder contemporary.[12] As far as we know, though, Bhāvaviveka was the first writer to make use of formal syllogisms in expounding the Madhyamaka.

In order to understand Bhāvaviveka's use of syllogisms in BPP, it is helpful to go back to his earliest work, MHK/TJ. Here he introduces the logical method which he will use in the Prajñāpradīpa. That is, Bhāvaviveka states formal syllogisms and and then refutes any faults in those syllogisms which opponents might allege.[13] The first example of a syllogism is MHK 3-26:

> As to that, in ultimate reality (paramārthataḥ), earth and so on indeed do not have the intrinsic nature (svabhāva) of [material] elements (bhūta),
> Because they are contingent (kṛtaka), like cognition, or else because they have causes and so on.[14]

This syllogism is typical of the many others which Bhāvaviveka states in the MHK and the Prajñāpradīpa. The thesis is a negative statement with the qualification "in

ultimate reality." In this case, significantly, it is intrinsic nature which is negated. The Tarkajvālā on this verse explains that the negation is a pure negation (prasajya-pratiṣedha)[15] and that the qualification "in ultimate reality" applies to the predicate of the thesis. (Otherwise, Bhāvaviveka would be asserting that the subject exists in ultimate reality.)

Thus we have a thesis (pratijñā) with a subject (dharmin), "earth and so on," and a predicate (sādhya). This is one member (avayava) of the syllogism. The two remaining members are the reason (hetu), "because they are contingent," and the example (dṛṣṭānta), "like cognition." Here Bhāvaviveka gives an alternative reason; sometimes "etc." (ādi) is added to the example. In either case, it is still considered to be a three-membered syllogism.[16]

Bhāvaviveka also uses the five-membered syllogism associated with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school.[17] The two additional members are the application (upanaya), which states that the reason is indeed present in the subject of the thesis, and the conclusion (nigamana), which essentially restates the thesis, preceded by the word "therefore." Bhavaviveka most commonly uses three-membered syllogisms; nevertheless, there are many examples of both three- and five-membered syllogisms in the chapters of BPP translated here.[18]

Bhāvaviveka also answers possible objections to his syllogisms. In response to the objection that ultimate reality is beyond words and concepts, the *Tarkajvālā* distinguishes two kinds of *paramārtha*. One is supramundane (*lokottara*) and free from conceptual elaboration (*prapañca*). The other is called "pure worldly cognition" (*śuddha-laukika-jñāna*) and possesses conceptual elaboration. (It was previously explained in the *Tarkajvālā* that "*paramārtha*" may be be understood as a *bahuvrīhi* compound referring to "discernment (*prajñā*) in accordance with ultimate reality.")

An opponent charges that the Mādhyamika's argument is mere caviling (*co 'dri ba*) because he refutes another's position (*pakṣa*) without establishing a position of his own. The *Tarkajvālā* replies that the Mādhyamika does have a *pakṣa*: All dharmas are empty of intrinsic nature, and that [fact] is their intrinsic nature.[19]

Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika

Bhāvaviveka's extensive use of formal syllogisms stands in sharp contrast to the method which Buddhapālita used to expound the Madhyamaka in his own commentary on the MMK. Like Nāgārjuna,[20] Buddhapālita never states syllogisms but instead uses *prasaṅga*-arguments. The latter are arguments which show that the opponent's posi-

tion, with its implicit or explicit assumption that things have intrinsic nature (svabhāva), has consequences (prasaṅga) which are unacceptable to the opponent himself. As we have noted, Bhāvaviveka criticizes Buddhapālita many times; but his most important criticisms are those directed against Buddhapālita's failure to state formal syllogisms.

Candrakīrti responded to Bhāvaviveka by defending Buddhapālita and launching his own crticisms against Bhāvaviveka. The school of Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti became known as the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka, i. e., "the Madhyamaka of those who use prasaṅga-arguments." Bhāvaviveka's school became known as the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka because of his use of independent inferences (svatantra-anumāna).[21]

Buddhapālita's commentary on MMK 1-1 is a good example of his argumentation:[22]

> There are not ever any entities (bhāva) anywhere
> Which have originated from themselves, from another,
> from both, or from no cause.[23] [MMK 1-1]

"Here if any entity originated, the origination of that entity would have to be either from itself, or from another, or from both itself and another, or from no cause; but upon examination, [origination] is not possible from any [of these] ... To begin with, entities do not originate from their own selves, because their

origination would be pointless and because there would be no end to origination. For there is no purpose in the origination again of entities which [already] exist by their own selves. If they do originate again even though they exist [already], never would they not be originating;[24] [but] that, too, is not accepted. Therefore, to begin with, entities do not originate from themselves.

"Nor do they originate from another ... because it would follow that everything would originate from everything.[25]

"Nor do they originate from both themselves and another, because the faults of both [alternatives] would follow.

"Nor do they originate from no cause, because it would follow that everything would always be originating from everything[26] and because there would be the fault that all undertakings would be pointless.

"Thus because the origination of entities is not possible in any way, therefore the term 'origination' is a mere conventional expression (vyavahāra-mātra), since origination does not exist."

In the Prajñāpradīpa, Bhāvaviveka criticizes all of these arguments of Buddhapālita's, except for the third argument concerning origination from both self and other. Regarding the first argument, Bhāvaviveka says, "That is not logically possible (ayukta), because no reason and

example are given and because faults stated by the opponent are not answered. Also, because it is prasaṅga-argument, a [predicate] to be proved (sādhya) and a property (dharma) [which proves] that, opposite in meaning [to that intended], [become] manifest by reversing the original meaning. [Specifically, the opponent could say that] entities originate from another, because origination has a result and because origination has an end. Thus [your] doctrine (kṛtānta) would be contradicted."[27]

Bhāvaviveka criticizes Buddhapālita's second argument in the following way: "Therefore, since there is a prasaṅga-argument here, [then] having reversed the [meanings of] the predicate (sādhya) and the reason (sādhana), [one could say that] entities originate from themselves or from both or from no cause, because some [particular] thing originates from some [particular] thing. Thus [your] previous position would be contradicted. Otherwise, [if such an alteration of the predicate and reason is not allowed,] that [statement of yours], 'because it would follow that everything would originate from everything,' is neither a proof (sādhana) nor a refutation (dūṣana); [and] therefore this [argument] is incoherent in meaning (asaṃgatārtha)."[28]

Finally, concerning Buddhapālita's argument against origination from no cause, Bhāvaviveka says, "Since here

also there is a prasaṅga-argument, if the meaning of a statement with a manifestation (vyakti) of the opposite predicate and reason is accepted (iṣyate), [then] that [argument] has stated the following: Entities originate from a cause, because some [particular] thing originates from some [particular] thing at some [particular] time, and because undertakings do have a result. Thus that [explanation of yours] is not logically possible, because of the faults which [we] have stated previously. But if it is otherwise, [that is, if the argument is not reversed,] it is incoherent in meaning, as before."[29]

Thus Bhāvaviveka thinks that Buddhapālita should have provided reasons and examples, i. e., a formal Indian syllogism (prayoga-vākya); and he thinks that Buddhapālita should have answered possible counter-arguments by opponents from other philosophical schools. Moreover, as it is, Buddhapālita's argument against any one of the four alternatives (catuṣkoṭi)[30] can be taken by his opponent to mean that one of the remaining three alternatives must be correct; but this is not what Buddhapālita wants to say. Indeed, Bhāvaviveka seems to hold that if a prasaṅga-argument means anything at all, it has to mean that another alternative is correct.

One might note here that, in the West, reductio ad absurdum arguments are normally used to prove that the second of two possible alternatives is correct.[31] For

example, one can prove that the square root of two is an irrational number by first assuming that it is a rational number and then showing that that assumption leads to a contradiction. In India, the use of tarka in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition is similar;[32] and Bhāvaviveka evidently assumes that Buddhapālita's prasaṅga-arguments must be understood in the same way.

Nāgārjuna, like Buddhapālita, never gives formal syllogisms and often uses prasaṅga-arguments.[33] How then does Bhāvaviveka avoid applying to Nāgārjuna the same criticisms which he has made against Buddhapālita? In his commentary on MMK 18-1,[34] he considers the objection of an opponent who says, "The author of the treatise [Nāgārjuna] did not state the members [of a syllogism], the thesis and so on. Therefore [his] proof has the fault of incompleteness."

Bhāvaviveka replies, "Because [Nāgārjuna's verse] is a succinct statement (don gyi tshig, artha-vākya), there is no fault. For the statements of the ācārya are succinct statements (artha-vākya), because by virtue of [their] meaning (artha), they are held to be the basis of many syllogisms (prayoga-vākya), since [their] words [literally, 'syllables'] are brief but [their] meaning is great."

Nāgārjuna, as the author of an aphoristic treatise, does not have to formulate syllogistic arguments and can

confine himself to terse indications of the intended meaning. On the other hand, Bhāvaviveka evidently felt that commentators like Buddhapālita are obliged to supplement *prasaṅga*-arguments with formal syllogisms and to refute potential counterarguments by opponents from the various Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools.[35] Thus Bhāvaviveka's own commentary on the MMK, the *Prajñā-pradīpa*, has a profusion of syllogisms, as well as opponents' objections with Bhāvaviveka's answers.

Bhāvaviveka was, as far as is known, the first Mādhyamika to use the terms *prasajya-pratiṣedha* and *paryudāsa-pratiṣedha* to distinguish two kinds of negation (*pratiṣedha*).[36] Various translations have been proposed for *prasajya-pratiṣedha*, such as "pure negation," "simple negation," "absolute negation," and non-implicative negation," while *paryudāsa-pratiṣedha* has been called "relative negation" or "implicative negation." Whatever translation is used, the idea is that in *prasajya-pratiṣedha*, one simply negates a proposition without any further implication. In particular, there is no implied affirmation of another proposition. In *paryudāsa-pratiṣedha*, on the other hand, one does implicitly assert the opposite of what is being negated.

In his commentary on MMK 1-1, Bhāvaviveka says,[37] "This negation, 'not from themselves' (*na svataḥ*) should be seen as a *prasajya-pratiṣedha*, because it is

predominantly (gtso che ba, perhaps prādhānya) negation. [This is so] because [Nāgārjuna's] intention is to establish nonconceptual wisdom (nirvikalpaka-jñāna), which is endowed with all cognizable[38] objects (jñeya-viṣaya), by negating the net of all conceptual constructions (kalpanā). If it is taken to be a paryudāsa-pratiṣedha, [then] because that is predominantly affirmation, it would be distinct from [our] doctrine (kṛtānta), since [that paryudāsa-pratiṣedha] would teach nonorigination by affirming that all dharmas are unoriginated. For it is said in scripture (āgama) that if one practices (spyod, root car) the nonorigination of matter (rūpa), one does not practice the perfection of discernment (prajñā-pāramitā)."

Thus Nāgārjuna's negations have to be understood as prasajya-pratiṣedha, in view of what he means to say. Immediately after the passage which we have just quoted, Bhāvaviveka goes on to say,[39] "Here one should specify (avadhārayet) that entities do not [emphasis represents eva] originate from themselves. If one specifies otherwise, one would ascertain, 'Entities do not originate from themselves [emphasis represents eva]. What then? They originate from another;' and likewise one would ascertain, 'Entities do not originate from just (eva) themselves. What then? They originate from themselves and another.' Therefore that is also not

accepted, because it is distinct from [our] doctrine."

In other words, Nāgārjuna's negation of one of the four alternatives does not imply an affirmation of one or more of the remaining three alternatives. Again, this is so because of Nāgārjuna's intention, because of what he wants to say.

Here, as Candrakīrti has pointed out,[40] there seems to be an inconsistency in Bhāvaviveka's criticism of Buddhapālita. When Nāgārjuna negates the origination of entities from themselves, Bhāvaviveka allows that he does not thereby affirm that they originate from another, etc. But when Buddhapālita supports Nāgārjuna's negation with a <u>prasaṅga</u>-argument, Bhāvaviveka holds that this argument must be understood as implying an affirmation of another alternative. As suggested previously, Bhāvaviveka may have been thinking of the usual function of <u>tarka</u> in Indian logic; but it is not at all clear that <u>prasaṅga</u>-arguments have to be understood in this way. Buddhapālita's intention is made plain by the fact that he adduces arguments against all four alternatives, not just one of them. Thus if an opponent were to attempt to convert a <u>prasaṅga</u>-argument against one alternative into a positive argument for another, Buddhapālita could point to the fact that he has given a <u>prasaṅga</u>-argument against that alternative, too. If Bhāvaviveka continues to insist that commentators must give syllogisms, he must

then explain why Nāgārjuna did not do so in his autocommentary on the Vigrahavyāvartanī.[41]

dharma-nairātmya and the yānas

Another issue which divided the Svātantrikas and the Prāsaṅgikas was the question of whether dharma-nairātmya, the absence of self in dharmas, is taught in the sūtras of the Śrāvakayāna. A closely related question is whether the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas realize the absence of self in dharmas. In his commentary[42] on MMK 7-34, Bhāvaviveka first quotes from Buddhapālita's commentary on the same verse.[43] Buddhapālita says, in part, "In [the early Canon's] statement that 'all dharmas are without self,'[44] 'without self' [has] the meaning of 'without intrinsic nature' (ngo bo nyid, svabhāva), since the word 'self' is an expression for 'intrinsic nature.'" Bhāvaviveka criticizes Buddhapālita's explanation, saying, in part, "That [scriptural] source (khungs) cannot show the absence of self in dharmas (dharma-nairātmya), because in the Śrāvakayāna, the meaning of the term 'without self' is to be explained (vyutpādya) as [referring] to the person (pudgala).[45] If it could [show dharma-nairātmya], it would be pointless to embrace another vehicle (yāna) [i. e., the Mahāyāna]."

Similarly, in his commentary[46] on MMK 18-3ab, Bhāvaviveka says that the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas per-

ceive that there is no entity called a "self," but only a collection (*kalāpa*) of *saṃskāras* which arise and cease at each moment. The great bodhisattvas, on the other hand, see that the *saṃskāras* are unoriginated; and they dwell in the practice of discernment free from conceptual construction (*nirvikalpa-prajñā*).

In his commentary[47] on MMK 18-5a, Bhāvaviveka explains that the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* see the absence of self in persons (*pudgala-nairātmya*) and thus are able to remove the obscuration of the afflictions (*kleśa-āvaraṇa*), whereas those who follow the Buddhayāna are able to abandon both the obscuration of the afflictions and the obscuration of the knowable (*jñeya-āvaraṇa*). (The obscuration of the knowable must be removed in order to attain the omniscience (*sarvajñatā*) of a Buddha.) Bhāvaviveka makes the same point in his *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikās*, when he says,

> [The aggregates, *āyatanas*, and *dhātus*] were proclaimed to the *śrāvakas* for the removal of the obscuration of the afflictions.
> [The Mahāyāna was taught] to the compassionate for the removal of the stain of the obscurations of afflictions and the knowable.
> [*Madhyamaka-hṛdaya* 3-24][48]

In his commentary[49] following MMK 18-5d, Bhāvaviveka goes on to say that the removal of the obscuration of the

knowable - which involves ridding oneself of "unafflicted" ignorance (aklista-ajñāna) as well as the afflictions - is achieved by means of seeing the absence of a self in dharmas. Moreover, that is also necessary for uprooting the traces (vāsanā) of the afflictions.

Candrakīrti agrees that only bodhisattvas are able to realize the unexcelled, complete, perfect enlightenment (anuttarā samyaksambodhiḥ) of perfect Buddhas (sambuddha).[50] Nevertheless, he holds that the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas do realize the absence of self in dharmas, though, unlike the bodhisattvas, they are unable to realize it perfectly. Thus it is only beginning with the seventh bodhisattva-bhūmi that bodhisattvas surpass the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas in their understanding of the absence of self in dharmas.[51]

Moreover, like Buddhapālita, Candrakīrti holds that the absence of self in dharmas is taught in the sūtras which teach the Śrāvakayāna. He answers Bhāvaviveka's objection that the Mahāyāna would then be useless by saying that, in the first place, many other things, such as the bodhisattva-bhūmis, the pāramitās, great compassion (mahākaruṇa), etc., are taught only in the Mahāyāna. In the second place, the absence of a self in dharmas is only alluded to briefly in the Śrāvakayāna, whereas it is taught fully and clearly in the Mahāyāna.[52]

Avalokitavrata's Subcommentary

Avalokitavrata's Prajñāpradīpa-ṭīkā is a voluminous work, the longest in the Bstan 'gyur. One-third of it is devoted to the first two chapters of BPP, and one-fourth to the first chapter alone. It is not only invaluable for understanding BPP, but also contains a great deal of interesting information about both Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools. Avalokitavrata once criticizes another subcommentary on the Prajñāpradīpa, written by Guṇadatta.[53] This work has not survived, and nothing else is known of it or its author.

Avalokitavrata quotes the entire Prajñāpradīpa, usually giving a single sentence and then commenting on it. Often his explanations are lengthy, but sometimes they are little more than paraphrases of the text of BPP. He usually identifies the source of sūtra quotations and names the school or author supposed to be making a particular objection. It has been pointed out that his explanations sometimes follow Buddhapālita's commentary.[54] He analyzes each of Bhāvaviveka's numerous syllogisms, breaking them down into subject (dharmin) and predicate (sādhya-dharma) of the thesis, reason (sādhana-dharma), and example (dṛṣṭānta). Sometimes the example is characterized as similar (sādharmya) or dissimilar (vaidharmya). If Bhāvaviveka uses a five-membered syllogism, Avalokitavrata also mentions the application

(*upanaya*) and the conclusion (*nigamana*).

Little is known about Avalokitavrata himself, nor has any other work of his come down to us. Kajiyama[55] has tentatively dated him in the seventh century, apparently on the grounds that he knows Dharmakīrti and Candrakīrti.[56] (Although Avalokitavrata lists Candrakīrti as one of eight commentators on the MMK, he never mentions his criticisms of Bhāvaviveka, a fact which no one has been able to explain.) As we have seen, Lindtner puts Dharmakīrti and Candrakīrti in the sixth century. On the other hand, the Tibetan historian Tāranātha (b. 1575) mentions that Avalokitavrata was a contemporary of an eighth-century Indian king;[57] and May[58] puts him in the eighth century, though without citing any evidence.

Bhāvaviveka's Influence

Let us review what has already been said about the distinctive features of BPP. In the present chapter, Bhāvaviveka's view that the absence of a self in dharmas is not taught in the Śrāvakayāna was mentioned. In this chapter, we also quoted some of Bhāvaviveka's criticisms of Buddhapālita and showed what they imply about Bhāvaviveka's own method of expounding the Madhyamaka. (That method was also discussed in connection with MHK/TJ and KTR.) To summarize, Bhāvaviveka finds *prasaṅga*-arguments inadequate for showing that things do not exist by

intrinsic nature. Instead, he uses formal syllogisms which have a thesis with a negative predicate qualified by the phrase "in ultimate reality" (paramārthataḥ). He specifies that the negation is to be understood as a simple, non-implicative negation (prasajya-pratiṣedha). He also finds it essential to refute possible objections to his syllogisms which might be offered by opponents from other philosophical schools.

As the chapters translated here show, BPP abounds in syllogistic argument. Sometimes Bhāvaviveka even gives more than one syllogism to prove the same point. (There are several instances of this in chapter three, for example.) Also, refutations of opponents from other schools are much in evidence. Even though the MMK was probably addressed only to the Buddhist Ābhidhārmika schools, Bhāvaviveka extends the scope of its arguments to include opponents from non-Buddhist schools as well. In doing so, he goes much farther than earlier commentators.[59]

What motivated Bhāvaviveka to make these innovations? Christian Lindtner[60] has suggested that Bhāvaviveka wished to make the Madhyamaka more "up-to-date" so that it could compete successfully in the arena of sixth-century philosophical debate. In the centuries since Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, a great deal of development had taken place in both Buddhist and non-Buddhist philo-

sophical schools. Within the Mahāyāna itself, the Madhyamaka was being overshadowed by the newer Yogācāra school. The Yogācārins did not reject the work of Nāgārjuna - in fact, Asaṅga wrote a commentary on the MMK[61] - but they interpreted it according to their own theories. Moreover, a new sophistication had been achieved in logic and epistemology. In that regard, the work of Dignāga was especially notable.

Thus Bhāvaviveka may well have felt that he had to argue for the Madhyamaka using the formalism of sixth-century Indian logic. Otherwise, it might have been dismissed as hopelessly antiquated. Likewise, he had to answer objections of the sort which contemporary philosophers would have made, couched in the logically sophisticated language they would have used. To have refuted only the philosophies which existed three hundred years before his time would not have been adequate.

Bhāvaviveka was, in fact, successful in influencing not only his contemporaries but also later philosophers in the Mahāyāna tradition. Within the Madhyamaka, his "Svātantrika" approach was followed and developed by such authors as Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla.[62] The influence of the Prajñāpradīpa, in particular, is shown by the fact that Avalokitavrata considered it important enough (and difficult enough) to justify the composition of his huge subcommentary. As we mentioned

earlier, at least one other subcommentary is known to have existed as well.

Bhāvaviveka's influence is also shown by the opposition which he provoked. Candrakīrti's "Prāsaṅgika" subschool of the Madhyamaka was formed in reaction to Bhāvaviveka's work. Buddhapālita, who wrote before Bhāvaviveka, does not seem to have had the idea that he represented a distinct trend within the Madhyamaka.[63]

In a broader Mahāyāna context, Bhāvaviveka's criticisms of the Yogācāra seem to mark the definitive split between the Mādhyamikas and the Yogācārins. Prior to Bhāvaviveka's time, the Yogācārins sought to assimilate, rather than oppose the Madhyamaka. Once Bhāvaviveka's writings appeared, Dharmapāla and Sthiramati soon responded with Yogācārin rebuttals; and though the Yogācārins never rejected Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, they were thereafter at odds with later Mādhyamikas.

The importance of Bhāvaviveka in the history of Mahāyāna Buddhist thought is thus undeniable. Some may wonder, however, whether in "modernizing" the Madhyamaka, Bhāvaviveka clarified or obscured its basic message. Indeed, the very features which gave Bhāvaviveka's method of presenting the Madhyamaka more contemporary relevance in the sixth century may make it seem all the more dated today. These are questions of taste and judgement which must be answered by each reader of Bhāvaviveka's works.

Edition and Translation

My translation is based on my own edition of the chapters in question, for which I used the Tibetan Peking, Narthang (Snar thang), Derge (Sde dge), and Cone (Co ne) editions. As is well known, the text given in the Peking edition is very similar to that in the Narthang; and on the other hand, the Co ne edition is very close to the Derge. Most of the variants among the four editions seem to be the result of scribal errors, or simply of different conventions concerning spelling and punctuation.[64] Rarely do the variants offer significant alternatives for the meaning of a sentence. I have romanized the Tibetan according to the system devised by the late Turrell V. Wylie,[65] which has the advantage of requiring no diacritical marks.

For both the translation and the edition, I consulted the Peking and Derge editions of Avalokitavrata's subcommentary, which quotes the entire text of BPP. Usually, the text quoted by Avalokitavrata differs no more from the editions of BPP than those editions differ among themselves. Occasionally, however, Avalokitavrata seems to have inserted glosses into his quotations of BPP. For example, in the text of BPP, part of Bhāvaviveka's commentary on MMK 5-4ab is given as: ... <u>zhes bya ba la sogs pas gtan tshigs ji skad smras pa sun 'byin</u>

par 'dod pas mtshan nyid yod pa 'gog par byed pa'i tshig de yang legs par smras pa ma yin no zhes zer ro|| (my edition). Avalokitavrata quotes the same passage as: ... zhes bya ba la sogs pas [kho co cag gi] gtan tshigs [mtshan nyid yod pa'i phyir ro zhes] ji skad smras pa sun 'byin par 'dod pas [kho bo cag gi gtan tshigs] mtshan nyid yod pa [zhes bya ba] 'gog par byed pa'i tshig (P: tshigs) de yang legs par smras pa ma yin no zhes zer ro|| (Ava P81b-3,4; D71a-7 to 71b-1). (The apparent glosses are in square brackets.)

For this reason, and also because the subcommentary is not the work of Bhāvaviveka, I have only occasionally followed the readings of BPP quoted in the subcommentary in cases where they agree with none of the four editions of BPP itself. Places where I have done so are indicated in the notes to my edition. Here it is important to note that the subcommentary, Avalokitavrata's Prajñāpradīpa-ṭīkā, is available only in Tibetan translation. Fortunately, as mentioned already, the translators of BPP also translated the subcommentary, making it easier to compare the Tibetan texts of the two works.

Notes to Chapter 3

[1]See Fehér, op. cit., pp. 211-20.

[2]See Ruegg, Literature, p. 69 n. 224, and "Chronology," p. 515.

[3]See David Seyfort Ruegg, "Autour du lTa ba'i khyad par de Ye shes sde," Journal Asiatique 269 (1981), p. 210 and n. 14, p. 227 n. 57.

[4]See Lancaster, op. cit. pp. 190-1.

[5]"Die Übersetzung ist aber schlecht, unzuverlässig und unterschlägt viele Sätze des Originaltexts. Wegen dieser Fehler ist der Text von traditionellen Buddhisten in China und Japan nicht gut studiert worden." Kajiyama, "BPPl, Part 1," p. 39.

[6]I hope to make a complete edition and translation of BPP, of which these six chapters will then form part.

[7]The first chapter of BPP was translated into German by Yuichi Kajiyama in "BPP, Part 1" and "BPP, Part 2." Chapters 18, 24, and 25 of BPP were translated by M. David Eckel in A Question of Nihilism: Bhāvaviveka's Response to the Fundamental Problems of Mādhyamika Philosophy, unpublished dissertation, Harvard University, 1980 [abbreviation: Eckel, Nihilism], pp. 192-264. (I would like to thank Professor Eckel for sending me a copy of his dissertation.) In addition, I translated chapter 16 of BPP in my M. A. thesis, "Bondage and Liberation

according to the Mādhyamika School of Buddhism: A Study of Chapter Sixteen of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikās and Five of its Commentaries," University of Washington, 1982.

[8]The appendix to chapter 25, dealing with the Yogācāra, is edited in Lindtner, "BPP25," pp. 79-97, and translated in M. David Eckel, "Bhāvaviveka's Critique of Yogācāra Philosophy in Chapter XXV of the Prajñāpradīpa," in Miscellanea Buddhica, ed. Christian Lindtner, Indiske Studier 5, Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1985 [abbreviation: Eckel, "BPP25"], pp. 45-75. The appendix to chapter 27, dealing with logic, is edited in Lindtner, "Materials," pp. 198-202, and translated in Christian Lindtner, "Bhavya the Logician," typescript [abbreviation: Lindtner, "Logician"], pp. 11-16. ("Bhavya the Logician" will appear in the Vidhusekhar Bhattacharya Sastri Commemoration Volume, ed. Sunil Sen-Gupta and Suniti Kumar Pathak. I would like to thank Professor Lindtner for providing me with a copy in advance of publication.) These four works along with Eckel, Nihilism, should be added to the bibliography in Iida, Reason, pp. 16-8. (Note that on p. 16, Iida gives the wrong translators for BPP.)

[9]See Eckel, Nihilism, pp. 227-9 for a translation.

[10]It has been pointed out that the Indian syllogism contains inductive and cognitive elements which make the term "syllogism" not entirely appropriate. See Karl H.

Potter, ed., Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology, Vol. 2 of The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1977, pp. 179, 182-3, and Tom J. F. Tillemans, "Sur le Parārthānumāna en logique bouddhique," Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques 38 (1984), pp. 73-99. Nevertheless, I shall continue to call it a syllogism, for lack of a better word.

[11] See Lindtner, "Logician," pp. 3-4 and p. 19 n. 24.

[12] Frauwallner tentatively assigned dates of approximately 480-540 to Dignāga. See Frauwallner, "Landmarks," p. 137.

[13] See note 27.

[14] tatra bhūtasvabhāvaṃ hi norvyādi paramārthataḥ| kṛtakatvād yathā jñānaṃ hetumattvādito 'pi vā||. See Ejima, op. cit. p. 274.

[15] This term will be explained below, in the context of Bhāvaviveka's remarks in BPP on MMK 1-1.

[16] According to Tom J. F. Tillemans, the three-membered syllogism seems to come from the Nyāyamukha of Dignāga and the Nyāyapraveśa of Śaṅkarasvāmin. In the Pramāṇasamuccaya, Dignāga used a two-membered syllogism which was later followed by Dharmakīrti. See Tillemans, op. cit., pp. 74-7.

[17] The earliest history of the Indian syllogism is obscure. The five-membered syllogism is already present in the Nyāyasūtra of Gautama. It seems to have been

preceded by various kinds of ten-membered syllogisms. See H. Ui, The Vaiśeṣika Philosophy according to the Daśapadārthaśāstra, London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1918, pp. 82-4; H. N. Randle, Indian Logic in the Early Schools, London: Oxford University Press, 1930, pp. 9-18, 161-7; and more recently, Potter, op. cit., pp. 179-89, and Tillemans, op. cit., p. 76 n. 9.

[18] Although Buddhist logicians considered it unnecessary to state all five members, Buddhist writers sometimes use five-membered syllogisms, presumably for clarity of exposition.

[19] Text and translation of TJ on MHK 3-26 in Iida, Reason, pp. 82-90. Discussions in Malcolm D. Eckel, "Bhāvaviveka and the Early Mādhyamika Theories of Language," Philosophy East and West 28 (1978) [abbreviation: Eckel, "Language"], pp. 327-32; Ruegg, Literature, pp. 64-5; and Lindtner, "Logician," pp. 4-5.

The question of whether a Mādhyamika does or does not have a pakṣa or a pratijñā is complex. See David Seyfort Ruegg, "On the Thesis and Assertion in the Madhyamka/dBu ma," in Contributions on Tibetan Religion and Philosophy, ed. Ernst Steinkellner and Helmut Tauscher, Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 11, Vienna: Arbeitkreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, 1983 [abbreviation: Ruegg, "Thesis and Assertion"], pp. 205-41.

[20]See Ruegg, _Literature_, pp. 36, 60, and Lindtner, "Logician," pp. 19-20 n. 26.

[21]The terms "Svātantrika" and "Prāsaṅgika" are reconstructed from the Tibetan. See Ruegg, _Literature_, p. 58.

The nature of the philosophical differences between the Svātantrikas and the Prāsaṅgikas has been the subject of considerable discussion both in Tibet and among Western scholars. See, e. g., Ruegg, _Literature_, pp. 61, 74-80; Lindtner, "Logician," pp. 3, 4, 6-8, 19 n. 26, 22 n. 42; Eckel, "Language," pp. 323-337; and Robert A. F. Thurman, _Tsongkhapa's Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence_, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1984, pp. 89-111. On Tsongkhapa's view, see Thurman, _op. cit._, pp. 265-344 (a translation of the relevant chapters from Tsongkhapa's _Legs bshad snying po_), and Eckel,"BPP25," p. 50 n. 3.

[22]Tibetan text in Saito, 10.4-11.2; my translation.

[23]_na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpy ahetutaḥ_|
utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana||
(CPP 12.13,14).

[24]Quoted by Candrakīrti: _ācāryaBuddhapālitas tv āha_| _na svata utpadyante bhāvāḥ_| _tadutpādavaiyarthyāt_| _atiprasaṅgadoṣāc ca_| _na hi svātmanā vidyamānānāṃ padārthānāṃ punarutpāde prayojanam asti_| _atha sann api jāyeta_| _na kadācin na jāyeta_| _iti_|| (CPP 14.1-3). The

Tibetan text of Buddhapālita's commentary (which I have translated here) is slightly different, corresponding to svātmana(ḥ) for svata(ḥ), utpādānavasthā for atiprasaṅgadoṣa, and bhāvānām for padārthānām.

[25]Quoted by Candrakīrti: ācāryaBuddhapālitas tu vyācaṣṭe| na parata utpadyante bhāvāḥ| sarvataḥ sarvasambhavaprasaṅgād iti| (CPP 36.11,12). (For -prasaṅgād iti in place of CPP's -prasaṅgāt, see J. W. de Jong, "Textcritical Notes on the Prasannapadā," Indo-Iranian Journal 20 (1978) [abbreviation: de Jong, "Textcritical"], p. 32.) Again, the Tibetan is slightly different, omitting bhāvāḥ.

[26]Quoted by Candrakīrti: ācāryaBuddhapālitas tv āha| ahetuto notpadyante bhāvāḥ sadā ca sarvataś ca sarvasambhavaprasaṅgād iti| (CPP 38.10,11). (For -prasaṅgād iti in place of CPP's -prasaṅgāt, see Saito, translation, p. 222 n.5.) Once again, the Tibetan omits bhāvāḥ.

[27]Tibetan text in BPP P58b-8 to 59a-2, D49a-6 to 49b-1. Sanskrit quoted by Candrakīrti: atraike dūṣaṇam āhuḥ| tad ayuktam| hetudṛṣṭāntānabhidhānāt| paroktadoṣāparihārāc ca| prasaṅgavākyatvāc ca prakṛtārthaviparyayeṇa viparītārthasādhyataddharmavyaktau parasmād utpannā bhāvā janmasāphalyāt| janmanirodhāc ceti kṛtāntavirodhaḥ syāt|| (CPP 14.4-15.2).

For prasaṅgavākya, the Tibetan translation of the

Prajñāpradīpa has glags yod pa'i tshig, which would usually correspond to sāvakāśavacana. This does not necessarily mean that the translators had a different Sanskrit text. They may have translated prasaṅgavākya in this way because of the context and because of Avalokitavrata's subcommentary. See Kajiyama, "BPP1, Part 1", p. 50 n. 13, and Ruegg, Literature, p. 64 and n. 203. Also, the Tibetan (which I have translated) has skye ba thug pa yod par 'gyur ba'i phyir (perhaps janmāvasthāvattvāt) for janmanirodhāt.

[28]Tibetan text in BPP P60a-6 to 60b-1, D50a-6,7. Sanskrit quoted by Candrakīrti: ācāryaBhāvaviveko dūṣaṇam āha| tad atra prasaṅgavākyatvāt| sādhyasādhana-viparyayaṃ kṛtvā| svata ubhayato 'hetuto vā utpadyante bhāvāḥ kutaścit kasyacid utpatteḥ| iti prākpakṣavirodhaḥ| anyathā sarvataḥ sarvasaṃbhavaprasaṅgāt| ity asya sādhanadūṣaṇānantaḥpātitvāt| asaṃgatārtham etad iti| (CPP 36.13-37.3). (For etad iti in place of CPP's etat, see de Jong, "Textcritical," p. 32.) Again, the Tibetan has glags yod pa'i tshig for prasaṅgavākya. Also, the Tibetan (which I have translated) corresponds to sādhanadūṣaṇatā-abhāvāt, rather than sādhanadūṣaṇa-anantaḥpātitvāt.

[29]Tibetan text in BPP P64a-5,6,7; D53a-5,6,7. Sanskrit of all but the last sentence quoted by Candrakīrti: atrāpy ācāryaBhāvaviveko dūṣaṇam āha| atrāpi prasaṅgavākyatvāt| yadi viparītasādhyasādhanavyakti-

vākyārtha iṣyate tadaitad uktaṃ bhavati| hetuta utpadyante bhāvāḥ kadācit kutaścit kasyacid utpatteḥ| ārambhasāphalyāc ceti| seyam vyākhyā na yuktā prāgukta-doṣād iti|| (CPP 38.12-39.3). (For atrāpy ācārya ... in place of CPP's atrācārya ..., see de Jong, "Textcritical," p. 32.) Again, the Tibetan has glags yod pa'i tshig for prasaṅgavākya. Also, the Tibetan (which I have translated) corresponds to tena for tadā and omits vyākhyā.

30See David Seyfort Ruegg, "The Uses of the Four Positions of the catuṣkoṭi and the Problem of the Description of Reality in Mahāyāna Buddhism," Journal of Indian Philosophy 5 (1977), pp. 1-71.

31See Ruegg, Literature, p. 36.

32See Ruegg, Literature, pp. 36-7 n. 93; Jadunath Sinha, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, Calcutta: Sinha Publishing, 1956, pp. 555-7; and Potter, op. cit., pp. 203-4, 206-7.

33A few examples are given by Candrakīrti, CPP 24.7-25.2.

34The relevant passage is BPP P223b-7 to 224a-2, D180a-1,2 (pointed out in Lindtner, "Logician," pp. 19-20 n. 26, and translated in Eckel, Nihilism, pp. 197-8; see also Eckel, Nihilism, p. 242 n. 13). Candrakīrti gives a condensed paraphrase of this passage: athārthavākyatvād ācāryavākyānāṃ mahārthatve saty anekaprayoganiṣpatti-

hetutvaṃ parikalpyate| (CPP 25.3,4). (Contrary to de Jong, "Textcritical," p. 30, parikalpya is not confirmed by the Tibetan, which would have to be rtog nas rather than rtog na. Also, parikalpya does not make sense in context.) Unlike Eckel, I have reconstructed don gyi tshig as artha-vākya rather than artha-vāda, in view of Candrakīrti's use of artha-vākya.

[35]Compare CPP 25.4,5: atha syād vṛttikārāṇām eṣa nyāyo yat prayogavākyavistarābhidhānaṃ kartavyam iti||. I have not seen a parallel passage in Bhāvaviveka's own works.

[36]See Ruegg, Literature, pp. 37-8, 65, with p. 38 n. 94, and Yuichi Kajiyama, "Three Kinds of Affirmation and Two Kinds of Negation in Buddhist Philosophy," Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 17 (1973) [abbreviation: Kajiyama, "Affirmation and Negation"], pp. 162, 167-175.

[37]Tibetan text in BPP P58a-3 to 6, D48b-6 to 49a-1. See also Kajiyama, "Affirmation and Negation," p. 168.

[38]Read shes bya'i (D48b-7) for zhes bya ba'i (P58a-5).

[39]Tibetan text in BPP P58a-7 to 58b-1, D49a-1,2. (Note omission in D.) See also Kajiyama, "Affirmation and Negation," pp. 168-9.

[40]See CPP 23.3 to 24.6

[41]Ibid., 25.4-7.

[42]The relevant section is BPP P138b-8 to 139a-6, D113a-6 to 113b-3.

[43]Text in Saito, 118.20 to 119.4; translation in Saito, translation, 118.24 to 119.4.

[44]sabbe dhammā anattā. See Ruegg, Literature, p. 7 n. 16.

[45]Read gang zag gi (D113b-2) for gang zag (P139a-5).

[46]Sanskrit quoted in CPP 351.15-352.6; Tibetan in BPP P228b-7 to 229a-3, D183b-4 to 7.

[47]See BPP P230b-1,2,3; D185a-2,3.

[48]See Iida, Reason, pp. 79-80.

[49]See BPP P231a-3 to 7, D185a-7 to 185b-3.

[50]See his Madhyamakāvatāra 1-1, with the autocommentary. Tibetan text in Louis de La Vallée Poussin, ed., Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti, Bibliotheca Buddhica 9, St. Pétersbourg: Académie Impériale des Sciences, 1912 [abbreviation: MA text], pp. 1-7. French translation in Louis de La Vallée Poussin, "Madhyamakāvatāra," Le Muséon 8 (1907) [abbreviation: MA French], pp. 252-6.

[51]See Madhyamakāvatāra 1-8d and autocommentary (text in MA text, pp. 19-23; translation in MA French, pp. 267-72) and 6-179ab with autocommentary (text in MA text, pp. 301-2; German translation in Helmut Tauscher, Candrakīrti - Madhyamakāvatāraḥ und Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣyaṃ (Kapitel VI, Vers 166-226), Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und

Buddhismuskunde 5, Vienna: Arbeitkreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, 1981, pp. 65-6.)

[52]See the autocommentary on Madhyamakāvatāra 1-8d (references in previous note).

[53]See Kajiyama, "BPPl, Part 1," p. 38, and Ruegg, Literature, p. 67 n. 217.

[54]See Saito, translation, p. xxiv.

[55]See Kajiyama, "Affirmation and Negation," p. 162.

[56]See Kajiyama, "BPPl, Part 1," p. 39.

[57]See Ruegg, Literature, p. 67 n. 215.

[58]See May, "Chūgan," p. 483.

[59]Thus, to the best of my knowledge, Buddhapālita and the author of the Akutobhayā allude to non-Buddhist schools only once, in their commentaries on Nāgārjuna's introductory verses. (See Saito, translation, p. 5.) Of course, the commentaries of Devaśarman and Guṇamati, also prior to Bhāvaviveka, have not come down to us.

[60]See, especially, Lindtner, "MRP," pp. 21-4.

[61]A portion of it has been preserved in Chinese; see Ruegg, Literature, p. 49.

[62]See, e. g., Ruegg, Literature, pp. 67-71, 87-100, and Lindtner, "MRP," p. 26.

[63]See Ruegg, Literature, p. 71.

[64]See Saito, translation, pp. xi-xiii, where he discusses some of these questions in relation to Jñānagarbha and Cog ro Klu'i rgyal mtshan's translation of

Buddhapālita's commentary.

[65]Turrell V. Wylie, "A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription," Harvard Journal of Asian Studies 22 (1959), pp. 261-7.

Part II: Translation of Six Chapters from the Prajñāpradīpa

Translation of Prajñāpradīpa, Chapter Three: Examination of the āyatanas[1]

Now [Nāgārjuna] begins the third chapter with the aim of showing that the āyatanas have no intrinsic nature (svabhāva), by means of negating a particular [instance of] origination, [which would be] a counterexample (vipakṣa) [to nonorigination].[2] Alternatively, he begins the third chapter in order to show that the āyatanas are empty by negating motion ('gro ba, gati or gamana), [which would be] a counterexample [to nonmotion].[3]

When one examines [the āyatanas] in the first way, then the counterexample is adduced (nye bar bzhag pa) [as follows:]

Objection:

[Thesis:] One should grasp that in ultimate reality (paramārthataḥ), the internal (ādhyātmika) āyatanas[4] do indeed originate,

[Reason:] because the [kind of] object is specific (pratiniyata) [to each kind of organ].

[Dissimilar Example:] Here what does not exist has no specific object, as, for example, the āyatanas of a childless woman's son have no specific object.

[Application:] The internal _āyatanas_ do have such a specificity (_pratiniyama_) as to object; namely, the objects of the visual organ (_darśana_),[5] the auditory organ (_śravaṇa_), the olfactory organ (_ghrāṇa_), the gustatory organ (_rasana_), the tactile organ (_sparśana_), and the mind (_manas_) are, respectively, visible forms (_rūpa_),[6] sounds (_śabda_), odors (_gandha_), tastes (_rasa_), tangibles (_spraṣṭavya_), and dharmas.

[Conclusion:] Therefore one should grasp, by means of the stated reason, that the internal _āyatanas_ do indeed originate.

When one examines [the _āyatanas_] in the second way, then because [Nāgārjuna] has said,

> Therefore going (_gati_) and the goer (_gantṛ_) and that which is to be gone over (_gantavya_) do not exist, [MMK 2-25cd]

[the opponent's objection is as follows:]

Objection:

[Thesis:] One should understand that going does indeed exist,

[Reason:] because it is the result of action (_kriyā-phala_),

[Example:] like seeing visible form and so on.

Answer: In answer to both positions [i. e., the two preceding objections], [Nāgārjuna] says:

> The visual organ, the auditory organ, the olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, the tactile organ and the mind
> [Are] the six sense organs (indriya). Their domain (gocara) is the visible (draṣṭavya) and so on.
> [MMK 3-1]

Here it is called "the visual organ" because it sees (lta zhes bya ba ni lta bar byed pa'i phyir ro, paśyatīti darśanam iti?). For the remaining [sense organs] also, [the etymology] is similar. They are called "sense organs" (indriya) because of exercising power (indriyatva) and mastery (bdag po nyid, probably ādhipatya) over that [particular] group [of sense objects], since they grasp visible form and the rest.[7] [As for the word,] "six": The number [of sense organs] is also established by the [preceding] list of [their] individual names; but that [number, six] is specified in order to make it known that even conventionally (vyavahārataḥ), there is no agent who apprehends visible form and so on [and who is] different from those [sense organs].

"Their" (eteṣām) [means] "of those six sense organs." "Domain" (gocara) [means] "object" (viṣaya); the meaning is that [the sense organs] have power (mthu)

over those [sense objects].[8] "The visible and so on" (draṣṭavyādīni) [refers to] objects of vision (draṣṭavya), objects of hearing (śrotavya), objects of smell, objects of taste, objects of touch (spraṣṭavya), and objects of thought.[9]

Moreover, that specific relation (pratiniyama) of organ (viṣayin) and object (viṣaya) is conventional (vyāvahārika), not ultimate (pāramārthika). Therefore, since the reason exists only in the set of all dissimilar examples,[10] [the opponent's reason] has a meaning contrary (viruddha-artha) [to the predicate (sādhya) of the thesis, i. e., origination in ultimate reality].[11]

[Nāgārjuna] will [now] explain this [point, namely] how in ultimate reality, the eye[12] and so on cannot have the relation of organ and object (viṣayi-viṣaya-bhāva). To begin with, with regard to the eye-organ (cakṣur-indriya) alone, [he says,]

> If the visual organ is its own self, that (tat) [eye] does not see that (tam) [own self] at all.[13] [MMK 3-2ab]

"The visual organ" [is so called] because it sees (lta ba zhes bya ba ni lta bar byed pa'i phyir, paśyatīti darśanam iti?); [the term means] "the eye-organ." "If it is its own self (sva-ātman)" [means] "if it has its own

intrinsic nature (svabhāva)." As for "that does not see that at all," why does it not see at all? [Nāgārjuna] clarifies that position by the meaning of the statement which occurs below.[14] Why? Because that (tat) [eye] does not see that (tam) [own self]. The idea is that that [fact] is common knowledge (prasiddhi). The phrase "at all" has the meaning of specification (avadhāraṇa or nirdhāraṇa). Here one should see [i. e., understand] that [the eye] does not see at all. Otherwise, one would understand that it does see another [thing, though not itself].[15]

Objection: In that case, what will you prove? When [you] have said that the eye does not see its own self, then [we] assert that it does see visible form, which is different [from it].

Answer: As for that which you maintain:

> When it does not see itself,[16] how will that [eye]
> see others?[17] [MMK 3-2cd]

The meaning of the sentence is that the eye lacks the very power (mthu) of seeing visible form. As to that, the former half of the verse [i. e., MMK 3-2ab] shows the property (dharma)[18] that the eye does not see its own self; and the latter half [i. e., MMK 3-2cd] indicates the property to be proved (sādhya-dharma),[19]

[namely,] that it does not see visible form. Therefore, because a [property] to be proved and a proving property are adduced, it is considered to be a syllogism (prayoga-vākya):

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the eye-organ does not see visible form at all,

[Reason:] because it does not see its own self,

[Example:] like the ear and so on.

Alternatively, the former half [of the verse], having indicated that the eye-organ is just not graspable (grāhya) [by the eye-organ itself], adduces the eye-organ's own self as a similar example (sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta).[20] The latter half, by showing that the eye-organ does not see visible form, indicates the property to be proved, [the fact] that visible form is not an object of the eye-organ. Here, according to that [explanation], the syllogism is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, visible form is not an object of the eye-organ,

[Reason:] because it is a collection [of atoms] (bsags pa, perhaps saṃcita),

[Example:] like the eye-organ's [own] self.

[The reasons in the two preceding syllogisms, namely, the eye-organ's] not seeing its own self and [form's] being a collection, are mentioned [as] a use of words to imply more than is expressed (mtshan nyid kyi

sgra'i tshul, perhaps lakṣaṇā-śabda-naya).[21] Therefore, in both cases, syllogisms should also be stated [employing] reasons such as "because of having resistance (sapratigha)," "because of being derived from the elements (bhautika)," "because of being derivative matter (upādāya-rūpa)," and "because of belonging to the aggregate of form [or 'matter:' rūpa-skandha]."[22]

Objection:[23] It is correct that the eye does not see its own self, because it is invisible (anidarśana); but (visible) form [i. e., rūpa-āyatana or rūpa-dhātu] is visible; therefore [the eye] sees that [visible form].

Answer: As to that, [you] have established, by that other reason, the reason and example which we have stated; therefore there is no conflict [with our own position].[24]

Objection: The Ābhidhārmikas[25] say: If [you] say that the eye, without [further] qualification, does not see visible form at all, that is establishing what is [already] established [for us] (siddha-sādhana), since [our] position is that an eye which is non-functioning (tatsabhāga)[26] does not see forms. But if you say that the eye's not seeing visible forms is stated about a functioning (sabhāga)[27] [eye], in that case there would be a conflict with what [you yourself] accept (abhyupagata-bādha). For it is said in the Abhidharma,

The functioning (sabhāga) eye sees visible forms;

[visual] cognition which is based (āśrita) on that [eye does] not. [AK 1-42ab]

Answer: As to that, because just the functioning (sabhāga) eye is the subject [of our syllogism] (pakṣīkṛta) here, [our argument] is not an establishing of what is [already] established [for you]. Nor is there a conflict with what [we ourselves] accept, since it is said [in the Ārya-bhava-saṃkrānti-sūtra],[28]

The eye does not see visible form, and the mind (manas) does not know dharmas.

That which the world does not penetrate (gāhate) is the highest truth (paramaṃ satyam).

Because [we] do not maintain that the eye sees visible form in ultimate reality and because of the extensive inferential argument (anumāna) which has been expounded, that [fact that the functioning eye does not see visible form][29] is established. Therefore,

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the functioning (sabhāga) eye does not see visible form,

[Reason:] because it is an eye-organ,

[Example:] like the non-functioning (tatsabhāga) [eye].

Alternatively, [there is no conflict with what we ourselves accept] because [the functioning eye's seeing visible forms] is negated [using the following reason and example:] "because the [eye-]organ is material (rūpin) like the ear."[30] Nor will there be a conflict with

common knowledge (prasiddhi) [i. e., that the eye sees visible forms]. [This is so] because that [common knowledge] has not been abandoned since we have stated a qualified thesis, and because [that objection] has been answered [already].[31]

Objection: The Kāśmīras[32] say: The eye does indeed see [forms] because it is the agent (kartṛ) of vision.

Answer:[33] That is not correct, because [the reason] is one part (phyogs gcig) of the meaning of the thesis[34] and because there is no agreement (anvaya) [with a similar example, since no example is given] and because [we] have [already] refuted [the thesis that the eye sees forms].

Alternative Answer:[35] What the Kāśmīras said is not correct [for the following reasons:] For those who hold that [all things] are momentary (kṣaṇikavādin), action is not possible [for the eye] because it is instantaneous. For those who hold that [all things] are not momentary, also, it is not possible for that same [eye which which previously does not see to become] different from that.[36]

Objection: The Sautrāntikas[37] say: Since conditioned dharmas[38] are inactive, neither the eye nor anything else sees. What then? In a sūtra,[39] it is said that visual cognition (cakṣur-vijñāna) arises in dependence on the eye and visible forms. Therefore your statement that the eye does not se- just establishes what

is [already] establishes [for us].

Answer: Just because of [our] negation of origination [in the first chapter of the MMK], visual cognition is not possible; therefore [we] do not establish what is [already] established [for you]. [Also,] there is no conflict with what [we ourselves] accept (abhyupagata-bādha), because we do accept the meaning of [that] sūtra [as being] in accord with conventional truth (vyavahāra-satya) and because in ultimate reality, there is no reasoning (yukti) [which establishes] the meaning of [that] sūtra.

Indeed, a difference of that [manner in which the eye sees][40] is not possible, because we have negated the origination of the āyatanas of eye and visible form and because [we] have negated [the relation of] seer and seen between eye and visible form. Nevertheless, desiring to enlarge the understanding of the listener, [I] will give just an indication (phyogs tsam, diṅmātra) [of that argument].

> If the visual organ is its own self, that [eye] does not see that [own self] at all. [MMK 3-2ab]

As before, having indicated [the fact] that the eye does not see itself as the reason,[41] [Nāgārjuna says,]

> When it does not see itself, how will that [eye] see others? [MMK 3-2cd]

This sets forth the property to be proved [i. e., that

the eye does not see visible forms whether it is in contact with them or not].[42] Therefore, wishing to refute other conceptual constructions (vikalpa) imagined (parikalpita) by others, [I] will state syllogisms.

In that connection, to those[43] who say that the eye grasps [visible forms] with which it is not in contact (aprāpta), [we reply:] [The eye does not grasp visible forms with which it is not in contact. It knows them only indirectly] because "seeing" has the meaning of "knowing" [not "grasping"],[44] just as kings know from [their] agents[45] [things which they themselves do not see]. [This is so] because [the eye] does not see itself. The meaning of [that] reason is that [the eye] does not know itself.[46]

[Therefore we can state syllogisms such as the following:]

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the eye does not grasp an object with which it is not in contact (aprāpta-viṣaya),

[Reason:] because it does not see [i. e., know] its own self,

[Example:] like the nose and so on.[47]

Likewise,

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, visible form is not graspable (grāhya) by an eye-organ which grasps an object with which it is not in contact,

[Reason:] because it is derived from the elements (bhautika),

[Example:] like odor (gandha) and so on.

[The reasons in the two preceding syllogisms, namely, the eye's] not seeing its own self and [visible form's] being derived from the elements, are mentioned [as] a use of words to imply more than is expressed (mtshan nyid kyi sgra'i tshul, perhaps lakṣaṇā-śabda-naya).[48] Therefore in both cases, inferences (anumāna) should also be given [employing] reasons such as "because of having resistance (sapratigha);"[49] and appropriate syllogisms (prayoga-vākya) should be fully stated.

Alternatively, [one may state the following syllogism:]

[Thesis:] It is not maintained that in ultimate reality, the eye grasps an object with which it is not in contact,

[Reason:] because it has an object of the present [moment] which is [immediately] evident (pratyakṣa),[50]

[Example:] like the nose and the other [physical sense organs].

Objection:[51]

[Thesis:] The eye does [indeed] grasp an object with which it is not in contact,

[First Reason:] because it grasps obstructed visible

form[52] and

[Second Reason:] because there is no difference of effort and

[Third Reason:] because there is no difference of time[53] and

[Fourth Reason:] because it grasps an object greater [in size][54] than itself,

[Example:] like the mind (manas).

Answer: That also is not good, [for the following reasons:] [1] Here "grasping an object with which it is not in contact" has the meaning of "grasping visible form which is obstructed;" and the meaning of [the first reason,] "because it grasps visible form which is obstructed," is also just that. Therefore [the meaning of the first reason] is one part (phyogs gcig) of the meaning of the thesis.[55] [2] Also [the second and third reasons,] "because there is no difference of effort and because there is no difference of time," are not established.[56]

Even if the reason[s] were established, no agreement (anvaya) [with a similar example] is established. [This is so] because in ultimate reality, it is not established that even the mind grasps [an object] with which it is not in contact; [and therefore the example given is invalid]. Alternatively, [the example] also has a contradictory meaning (viruddha-artha).[57]

Objection: The Sāṃkhyas say: [Your proof] that the eye does not grasp an object with which it is not in contact establishes what is [already] established [for us, since we hold that the eye apprehends an object with which it is in contact].

Answer: One should reply: [Just] because [we] have shown that the eye is empty of the property (dharma) of grasping an object with which it is not in contact, [it does] not [follow that we] have shown [that fact] as a consequence of (yogena) proving that it does grasp an object with which it is in contact. Therefore [you] become encouraged without justification (asthāne).

Moreover,

[Thesis:] It is not maintained that the eye grasps an object with which it is in contact (prāpta-viṣaya),
[Reason:] because it is a sense organ,
[Example:] like the mind (manas).

Nor is [that argument] inconclusive (anaikāntika) due to the nose and so on, since those [other sense organs] will also be shown below to be just like that [eye].[58]

Also, what is the meaning of "grasping [an object] with which it is in contact"? If [you] say, "[The eye] goes out from [its own] location [i. e., the eyeball][59] in the direction of the object and grasps [it]," [then we reply:]

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the eye's function ('jug pa, probably pravṛtti or vṛtti) [of grasping its object][60] does not go outward from the location of the "synonym of visual consciousness,"[61]

[Reason:] because it is a function,

[Example:] like the function of the nose-organ and so on.[62]

Likewise,

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, visible form is not graspable (grāhya) by an eye-organ which grasps an object with which it is in contact,

[Reason:] because [visible form] has a cause (hetu),[63]

[Example:] like sound and so on.

Objection: The extensive inferences shown in both cases[64] refute one position by means of the other (phyogs gcig gis gcig bsal ba). Therefore nothing at all has been established.

Answer: Because both [ways of grasping a sense object] do not exist, [our] desire not to establish [either position] is fulfilled (mi sgrub par 'dod pa grub pa, perhaps asiṣādhayiṣā siddhā).

Objection:[65] The eye's rays of light ('od zer) go in the direction of the object and grasp the object.

Answer: To those who have [that] opinion, the following should be said:

[Thesis:] One should understand that even conventional-

ly, the eye-organ does not possess rays of light,

[Reason:] because it is a cause[66] of the apprehension (dmigs pa, probably upalambha or upalabdhi) of visible form,

[Example:] like visible form [itself].

Objection:[67]

[Thesis:] The eye-organ does indeed possess light rays,

[Reason:] because it is an eye-organ,

[Example:] like the eyes of nocturnal animals such as mice.

Answer: That is not right, [1] because the eye-organ is invisible and [2] even if the location[68] of that [eye-organ] possesses light-rays, the example is not established and [3] because there is a contradiction (bādha) due to a counterbalanced [reason] ('gal ba 'khrul pa med pa, viruddha-avyabhicārin).[69]

Enough of [this] extensive deliberation! [We] will deal just with the subject at hand.

If the visual organ is its own self, that [eye] does not see that [own self] at all.
When it does not see itself, how will that [eye] see others? [MMK 3-2]

On this verse, some[70] say:

[Buddhapālita's commentary on MMK 3-2:] Here if the intrinsic nature of entities (bhāvānāṃ svabhāvaḥ) is seen in their own selves, [then] because [they] possess that

[nature], it will also be apprehended in the selves of others. For example, if wetness is perceived [literally, "seen"] in water, [then] because it possesses that [wetness], [wetness] will also be apprehended in earth. If heat is perceived in fire, [then] because it possesses that [heat], [heat] will also be apprehended in water. If a sweet smell is perceived in the jasmine flower, [then] because it possesses that [sweet smell], [a sweet smell] will also be apprehended in clothing.[71] But how will that entity which does not appear to its own self apprehend the selves of others? For if a bad smell is not perceived in the jasmine flower, it will not be apprehended in clothing [perfumed by it], either.

[Buddhapālita continues:] Therefore if the visual organ saw its own self, it would be possible to say, "because it sees visible form, it is the visual organ (rūpaṃ paśyatīti darśanam iti);" but the visual organ does not see its own self. Now how will that which does not see its own self see others? Therefore it is not possible to say, "because it sees visible form, it is the visual organ."

[Buddhapālita continues:] ācārya Āryadeva, also, has said,

> If the intrinsic nature of all entities is seen
> first in themselves,
> Why does the eye not also grasp the eye itself?

[<u>Catuhśataka</u> 13-16]

[Other Buddhists' objection to Buddhapālita's argument:][72] As to that, here our fellow Buddhists (<u>svayūthya</u>) say: If [you] say that just as that vision[73] which apprehends visible form does not exist in the eye, so also it does not exist in visible form, then [that merely] establishes what is [already] established [for us]. For even in that way, it has been said,[74]

> That [visual cognition?] does not exist in the eye
> or visible form; nor does it exist between the
> two.
> That [place?] where that [visual cognition?] abides
> neither exists, nor does it not exist.

[Bhāvaviveka's criticism of Buddhapālita's explanation:][75] If [you, Buddhapālita] say that [the eye] does not have the power of seeing its own self, [then] jasmine flowers are not suitable as an example of that. [This is so] because sweet smells occur in jasmine flowers by virtue of a group (<u>sāmagrī</u>) [of causes and conditions], just as sesame seed oil becomes sweet-smelling through contact with flowers.[76] Also, [this argument is wrong for the following reason:] Since no one maintains that [the eye possesses] the activity (<u>kriyā</u>) of seeing visible form [because it possesses the activity of seeing itself],[77] it is not correct to refute that [position].

But if [you, Buddhapālita] prove that just as the

eye does not apprehend itself, [so] also it does not apprehend others, [then] in that case also, [your] example cannot [prove that]. [This is so] because [your examples,] fire and jasmine flowers, do not grasp[78] [either] their own or others' selves. Therefore that [explanation of yours] is not [logically] possible.

Therefore in that way, since it is not established that the eye sees, origination is also not established; and motion is not established, either, since [in both cases, the alleged] example does not exist.[79] Alternatively, the reason, also, is contradictory.[80]

Objection:[81] Having attributed a [false] meaning to [your own] proof,[82] you say that the eye does not see its own self. By saying that, [you] have shown that if that [eye] lacks power over its own self, it also does not have that [power] over the self of another.[83] Even so, [your reason] is inconclusive (anaikāntika), for although fire lacks the power to burn its own self, [nevertheless] it does have the power to burn the self of another.

Answer:

> The example of fire is not adequate (paryāpta) for establishing the visual organ. [MMK 3-3ab]

[That is,] to charge that [our] reason is inconclusive [by means of the example of fire, is inadequate][84]

for establishing that meaning, [i. e.,] that the eye has the intrinsic nature of a visual organ (darśana-svabhāva). The idea is that [this is so] because in ultimate reality, it is not established that fire burns and because even conventionally, it is not established that [the eye] has the intrinsic nature of a visual organ.

Alternatively,

> The example of fire is not adequate for establishing the visual organ... [MMK 3-3ab]

because of the fault in [your] reason[85] which [will be] stated. The idea is that [this is so] because that [notion that] the intrinsic nature of fire is to illuminate [both] its own and others' selves does not exist even for the opponent's position (parapakṣa),[86] and because even conventionally, it is not established that the intrinsic nature of fire is to burn.[87] "Burning," moreover, is a transformation ('gyur ba, probably pariṇāma or vipariṇāma) of fuel, which is produced by fire; therefore it is not the intrinsic nature of fire.

Moreover,

> The example of fire is not adequate for establishing the visual organ.
> That [example] has been answered, along with the visual organ [itself], by [the examination of] the

> traversed (gata), the untraversed (agata), and
> that which is being traversed (gamyamāna).
> [MMK 3-3]

"Along with the visual organ" (lta bcas, sadarśanaḥ) [means] "together with the visual organ (lta ba dang bcas pa, saha darśanena?). What [is said to be "along with the visual organ"]? The example of fire. What has been done? [The example of fire, along with the visual organ,] has been answered. By means of what? By means of [the examination of] the traversed, the untraversed, and that which is being traversed [in chapter two of the MMK].

Previously, it was explained that in ultimate reality, motion [or "going, traversing:" 'gro ba, gamana or gati] does not exist on the traversed, on the untraversed, or on that which is being traversed. [This is so] because [the traversed] has been traversed [already], because [the untraversed] has not [yet] been traversed, and because that which is being traversed is not cognized apart from the traversed and the untraversed.

In just that way, the [following] syllogisms[88] should be stated successively: In ultimate reality, fire, too, does not burn fuel which has been burned, which has not been burned, or which is being burned. [This is so] because [burned fuel] has been burned

[already], because [unburned fuel] has not [yet] been burned, and because [fuel] which is being burned is not cognized apart from the burned and the unburned.[89] And likewise, in ultimate reality, the eye, too, does not see visible forms which have been seen, which have not been seen, or which are being seen. [This is so] because [the seen] has been seen [already], because [the unseen] has not [yet] been seen, and because [visible forms] which are being seen are not cognized apart from the seen and the unseen.

Here [Buddhapālita[90] explains MMK 3-3 as follows:]

Objection [according to Buddhapālita]: The visual organ and so on are established in the same way as fire. For example, although fire burns, it just burns others; but it does not burn its own self. Likewise, although the visual organ sees, it just sees others; but it does not see its own self.[91]

Answer:

The example of fire is not adequate for establishing
the visual organ.
That [example] has been answered, along with the
visual organ [itself], by [the examination of] the
traversed, the untraversed, and that which is
being traversed. [MMK 3-3]

[The example is not adequate] because that [fire] also does not burn another.[92]

[Bhāvaviveka's[93] criticism of Buddhapālita's explanation:] That is not right, for since the opponent's position (pūrvapakṣa) is quite worthless (asāra) due to [its being] a mere example, it is not right to refute that [position].[94]

Objection:

[Thesis:] The eye does indeed possess the action (kriyā) of seeing,

[Reason:] because it is so taught in the science of grammar (śabda-śāstra).

[Application:] Here, in the science of grammar, [it is taught that] when one uses[95] a primary suffix (bya ba'i rkyen, kṛt-pratyaya)[96] in [the sense of] an agent (kartṛ), [then one says,] "Because it sees, it is the visual organ (lta bar byed pas lta ba zhes bya ba, probably paśyatīti darśanam iti; cf. MMK 3-4c)."

[Similar Example:][97] Whatever is taught in that [science] is so, for example, [it is taught that] when one uses a primary suffix in [the sense of] an agent, [then one says,] "Because one understands (thugs su chud par mdzad pa, bodhati?) or because one understands [by oneself] (thugs su chud par gyur pa, budhyate?), [one is called] 'Buddha' (sangs rgyas, buddha)."[98]

Answer: That proof exists [i. e., is valid] within

conventional truth (vyavahāra-satya); but it does not exist in ultimate reality. Why? Because in this very [chapter], vision (lta ba) [by] the eye has been negated and because [in the first two chapters] the origination of that [vision] has been negated, [the eye] is devoid of vision.[99]

> When it does not see anything, it is not the visual organ. [MMK 3-4ab]

When it does not see a door-bolt or a stool or anything at all, then it is not the visual organ. Therefore,

> How can that [statement] that the visual organ sees be possible?[100] [MMK 3-4cd]

How can that [statement] that the visual organ sees be [logically] possible? The meaning of the sentence is that that is just not possible. Therefore,

> The visual organ simply does not see. What is not a visual organ (adarśana) simply does not see. [MMK 3-5ab]

The idea is [that what is not a visual organ does

not see]

> because it is empty of the power of seeing, like a lump of earth and so on.

Therefore in ultimate reality, the explanation of the word darśana and the word buddha in the science of grammar is simply not correct, because the example [i. e., the Buddha] does not exist. Nor does [the preceding statement] contradict [our] doctrine (kṛtānta), because in ultimate reality, the Blessed One is also without intrinsic nature (svabhāva) and because below [Nāgārjuna] will say,

> That which is the intrinsic nature of the Tathāgata
> is the intrinsic nature of this world.
> The Tathāgata is without intrinsic nature, [and]
> this world is without intrinsic nature.
> [MMK 22-16]

Alternatively, [we can] examine [the meaning of MMK 3-4,5ab] differently: Here, when one uses a primary suffix in [the sense of] an agent, in regard to that [eye] which is a visual organ, [one says,] "Because it sees, it is the visual organ." Or else when one uses a primary suffix in [the sense of] an agent in regard to what is not a visual organ, [one says,] "Because it sees, it is the visual organ." What follows from that?[101] If it is said in regard to that [eye] which is a visual organ, [then]

When it does not see anything, it is not the visual organ. [MMK 3-4ab]

Well, what [is a visual organ]? Just that which sees[102] is a visual organ. Therefore an eye for which the action of seeing has originated sees; [but] in that case, there is that same fault of reason and example.[103]

Objection: Because that [eye] is the agent of the action of seeing, it is indeed the visual organ.

Answer: Then if that [eye] is the visual organ [already], a [second] action of seeing would simply be pointless.[104] Therefore,

How can that [statement] that the visual organ sees be possible? [MMK 3-4cd]

The meaning of the sentence is that it is simply not possible, because [the eye would already] possess the action of seeing.[105]

But even if it is said in regard to that [eye] which is not a visual organ,

When it does not see anything, it is not the visual organ. [MMK 3-4ab]

Then if that [eye] does not have the intrinsic nature of a visual organ, it is devoid of the action of seeing like a lump of earth and so on. Therefore that which is not a visual organ also just does not see.

Therefore, because in that way neither possesses the action of seeing,

The visual organ simply does not see. What is not a visual organ simply does not see. [MMK 3-5ab]

Objection: If there is a double negation [as in MMK 3-5b], the original meaning (skabs kyi don, probably prakṛta-artha) is understood. Therefore an eye for which the action of seeing has originated sees.

Answer: That is not good, because [here] it has been negated that [an eye for which the action of seeing] exists or does not exist is the cause (hetu) [of seeing],[106] like the negation [in MMK 1-6] of a causal condition (pratyaya) for an existent or a nonexistent [thing].

Objection:[107] Having applied [the quality of] being a visual organ [to the eye] figuratively on account of [the fact that it will see in] the future,[108] that [eye] is the visual organ.

Answer: [In that case, the thesis which you] maintain has been lost for the sake of establishing conventional truth.[109]

Alternatively, [one may explain MMK 3-5ab as follows:]

Objection:

[Thesis:] One says that an eye for which the action of seeing has originated sees,

[Reason:] because [that] conventional designation (vyavahāra) of action exists.

[Dissimilar Example:] It is not said that that for which the action of seeing has not originated sees, as [in the case of] the ear.

[Application:] Because the eye possesses the action of seeing, one conventionally designates that the eye sees.

Answer: The ācārya [Nāgārjuna] replies: In that case,

The visual organ simply does not see. [MMK 3-5a]

The idea is that [this is so] because the opponent has not shown that an action of seeing has originated in ultimate reality for any seer, and because before an action of seeing has originated in the visual organ, it is not established as a visual organ.

Because it is difficult to show that what was formerly not a visual organ will later possess the action of seeing,

What is not a visual organ simply does not see. [MMK 3-5b]

Thus the meaning of the reason [in the opponent's last syllogism] is not established, or else it has a contradictory meaning.[110] Therefore the thesis is lost.

Objection: Here the Sāṃkhyas and Vaiśeṣikas say:[111] Because one sees by means of this, it is the visual organ ('dis lta bar byed pas lta ba ste, probably anena paśyatīti darśanam). [This is so] because a primary

suffix is used in [the sense of] an instrument (karaṇa). That one to whom that instrument [of the action of seeing] belongs is the seer. That [seer], moreover, sees by means of that [instrument]. For example, a cutter (chettṛ) cuts (chinnati) wood to be cut (chedya, etc.) by means of an axe; but the axe itself does not cut. Therefore that [statement of yours] that the eye does not see [merely] establishes what is [already] established [for us].[112]

[Thesis:] Instruments have a [corresponding] agent,

[Reason:] because they are instruments,

[Example:] as the axe and so on have a cutter [who wields them].

Answer:

> One should understand that the seer has been explained by means of the visual organ itself. [MMK 3-5cd]

"One should understand that it has been explained" [means] "one should understand that it has been answered." By means of what? By means of the visual organ itself. [The explanation] of what? Of the seer. The idea is that the refutation of the conceptual construction (vikalpa) that there is a seer is also similar.

As there the property (dharma) of the eye [which

proves that it does not see visible forms] is [its] not seeing its own self,[113] so here also the property of the self (ātman) [which proves that it does not see visible forms] is [its] not seeing its own self. [This is so] because it is not possible for the self to see its own self, since acting ('jug pa, probably pravṛtti or vṛtti) on its own self [would be] contradictory. For example, that same edge of a sword does not cut that same sword edge. Thus the inference (anumāna) is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the self, too, is not a seer,

[Reason:] because it does not see its own self,

[Example:] like the ear.

Nor can the opponent spoil (bslad) our argument with the poison of suspicion (āśaṅkā or śaṅkā) that the meaning of [our] reason is not established.[114] Wherever it is explained that the self sees the self, there that [statement] is made conventionally, having imposed the word "self" [in the sense of "mind"] because the mind (manas) is beneficial (phan 'dogs pa, perhaps upakārin).[115]

Here [the reason in the preceding syllogism,] "not seeing its own self" is mentioned [as] a use of words to imply more than is expressed (mtshan nyid kyi sgra'i tshul, perhaps lakṣaṇā-śabda-naya).[116] Therefore inferences with reasons such as the reason[s] "because it is

an entity (bhāva or vastu)," "because it is an object of knowledge (jñeya)," or "because it is an object of speech (brjod par bya ba; abhidheya, vaktavya, vācya, etc.)" and [corresponding] examples such as "like the ear and so on," "like sound and so on," or "like its own self," should be fully stated.

Thus,

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the self does not see visible form,

[Reason:] because it is an entity,

[Example:] like the ear and so on.

Likewise,

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the self does not see visible form,

[Reason:] because it is an object of knowledge,

[Example:] like sound and so on.

Likewise,

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the self does not see visible form,

[Reason:] because it is an object of speech,

[Example:] like its own self.

[Syllogisms] should likewise be stated appropriately in regard to visible form also.[117]

There are also no faults of the thesis and so on,[118] [1] because conventional truth is under discussion (dbang du byas pa, adhikṛta), [2] the self [as] generally

accepted[119] is the subject [of the syllogism] (phyogs su byas pa, pakṣīkṛta), [3] because a property of that [conventional self] is indicated [as the reason in the syllogism], and [4] because that [conventional self] is also adduced as an example.

Likewise, since an axe and so on are not established in ultimate reality, the example [in the opponent's last syllogism] also does not exist. Therefore [when we show that the eye does not see, we] do not establish what is [already] established [for the opponent].

Objection: That very [statement] that the seer does not see nihilistically negates (apa-vad) that meaning [i. e., its own meaning].[120] Therefore there will be a fault in [your] thesis.

Answer: Here [that objection] has [already] been answered [in our discussion of the statement], "dependent origination is without origination (pratītyasamutpādo 'nutpādaḥ)."[121] Therefore it is not necessary to repeat [that answer] again.

Moreover, here that seer either has the intrinsic nature of a seer; or it does not have the intrinsic nature of a seer. In that connection, [let us first suppose that] it has the intrinsic nature of a seer, just as the Sāṃkhyas say that the intrinsic nature of the spirit (puruṣa) is consciousness (caitanya).[122] As to that, if that seer of that [Sāṃkhya] has the intrinsic

nature of a seer, [then] because intrinsic nature is not made [by any causes or conditions], it would be a seer even without a visual organ.[123]

Objection:[124] If that cutter has no axe, it is not possible [for him] to be a cutter. Likewise, [only] if that [self], too, is not apart from[125] the visual organ, should one see [i. e., regard] it as a seer.

Answer: In that case, the self's being a seer is conventional, because a cutter is conventional.[126] If [you] suppose so,

> A seer who is not apart [from the visual organ] does not exist.[127] [MMK 3-6a]

"Because that [self] is maintained to be a seer [only] if it is not apart from the visual organ" is the rest of the sentence. Here, before [the seer, i. e., the self] possesses the visual organ and after it has separated from the visual organ, the visual organ does not exist. If the visual organ does not exist, [the action of] seeing (lta ba) the visible also does not exist. Therefore since it is not possible that [the self] is a seer, the seer does not exist. The sense is that [the self] does not have the intrinsic nature of a seer.

Nor is that [seer] established like fire, because

fire is not established without fuel.[128]

Alternatively, [one can interpret MMK 3-6a by saying that] the rest of the sentence is, "Even if [you] say that [the self] is a seer when the visual organ exists, [nevertheless] the seer imagined (parikalpita) by the Sāṃkhyas does not exist." Here one infers that [something] is a seer because it apprehends and sees visible forms. But that apprehension of visible form also exists [only] if the eye, visible form, light, space, and mental attention (manasikāra) exist. Therefore the collection (tshogs)[129] called "Devadatta" is designated a "seer" [only when he] possesses those conditions; but [a seer] other than that does not exist. [This is so] because even if there were some existence [of a seer] imagined to be different from that [collection], the apprehension of visible form does not exist in the mind (rgyud, saṃtāna or saṃtati, literally, "series") of a blind person. [Therefore the seer imagined by the Sāṃkhyas could not be a seer by intrinsic nature.][130]

Efficient causes (byed pa'i rgyu, kāraka-hetu or kāraṇa-hetu) are conventionally designated as the agent. As in the case of a lamp, it is indeed right [to do so, even though they lack the intrinsic nature of an agent]. For example, even though a lamp has no volition (cetanā), it is said to be an illuminator because it is a cause of

illumination. Therefore even conventionally, that [seer established by intrinsic nature] does not exist.[131]

Objection: [What is called the seer] does not have the intrinsic nature of a seer. As the Vaiśeṣikas say, "When the cognition of visible form has originated from the conjunction (sbyor ba, probably saṃyoga here) of the four [the self (ātman), the mental organ (manas), the sense organ (indriya), and the object (viṣaya)],[132] [the self] sees."[133]

Answer: Even so, there is that same fault [that there is no seer other than the group of factors conventionally called "Devadatta," etc.]. [This is so] because the assumption (brtag pa, kalpanā) that an existence which is not generally acknowledged (ma grags pa, probably aprasiddha) is that [seer], is not possible.[134]

Objection: Accepting [the self] as the common [seer well known in the world], that [self still] exists [independent of the eye, visible form, and so on].[135]

Answer: Even [so, Nāgārjuna] says,

> [A seer] who is apart from the visual organ also
> [does not exist]. [MMK 3-6b]

What is [the meaning of MMK 3-6b]? The context is "the seer does not exist" [from MMK 3-6a]. [This follows] because if it is apart from the power of the visual

organ, [the self] does not have the intrinsic nature of that [seer].

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, it is not possible that that [self] sees visible form,

[Reason:] because it is different from the eye,

[Example:] like a jar.

Thus for neither position is it established that there is a seer.[136]

Alternatively, even if one imagines that [the self] has the intrinsic nature of a seer, [Nāgārjuna replies,]

> A seer who is not apart [from the visual organ] does not exist, nor does one who is apart from the visual organ. [MMK 3-6ab]

The idea is that whether it possesses or lacks a visual organ, [the self] does not have the intrinsic nature of a seer.

To begin with, [suppose that] one maintains the following: "When that seer has an eye, he sees." In that case, the establishment of the apprehension of form [by the seer] exists [only] if the eye exists. Therefore [his] being a seer is conventional, just as burning (bsreg pa nyid) [exists only] if fire exists [and thus is conventional]. [In that case,] one ought to maintain that [the seer] is the eye itself. But if one says, "Even without a visual organ, the self is a seer," [then] since the apprehension of visible form does not exist in

the mind (rgyud, saṃtāna or saṃtati, literally, "series") of a blind person, it is not possible that that [self] is indeed a seer.[137]

Objection:

[Thesis:] One should understand that just that which possesses the action of seeing (lta ba'i bya ba yod pa nyid) is the seer,

[Reason:] because that has an instrument (karaṇa) and an object (karman).

[Dissimilar Example:] Here what has no action has no instrument or object, as a sky-flower [does not].

[Application:] That seer (draṣṭṛ) has an instrument, the visual organ (darśana), and an object, the visible (draṣṭavya).

[Conclusion:] Therefore one should understand that just that which possesses the action of seeing is the seer.

Answer: Because the organ of vision has been completely negated [as existing] in ultimate reality and [because] if the visual organ does not exist, the seer is also not possible, [Nāgārjuna says,]

> If the seer does not exist, how will your visible [object] and visual organ exist? [MMK 3-6cd]

The idea is that [this is so] because that which no

one sees cannot be a visible [object] and because an instrument [of vision] is also not possible, since a seer who sees by means of this [instrument] just does not exist. Therefore the meaning of your reason, "because [its] instrument and object exist," is not established; or else the meaning [of the reason] is contradictory.[138]

Objection: Some[139] among our fellow Buddhists (svayūthya) say: Concerning conditioned dharmas,[140] which are subject to other (paratantra) causes and conditions and are immobile,[141] it is right to say that the eye does not see and that a self different from that [eye?] does not exist as a seer. But,

[Thesis:] [We] do not maintain that visible [objects] and visual organs do not exist,

[Reason:] because their four results, cognition (vijñāna) and so on, exist.

[Dissimilar Example:] That which does not exist does not have the results called "cognition, contact (sparśa), feeling (vedanā), and craving (tṛṣṇā),"[142] just as the eye of one blind from birth [does not give rise to cognition and the rest].

[Application:] Visible [objects] and visual organs have the four results, cognition and so on.

[Conclusion:] Therefore visible [objects] and visual organs do exist.

Answer: If it has been shown, by the method which

[we] have stated, that visible [objects] and the organ of vision are not established, then[143]

> Because visible [objects] and the visual organ do
> not exist, the four, cognition and so on,
> Do not exist. [MMK 3-7ab,cl (CPP: 3-8ab,cl)]

The idea is that [this is so] because [their] causal condition[s] do not exist. Therefore if [cognition and so on] are not established because those [i. e., visible objects and the visual organ] are not established, [then] it is also not possible to establish visible objects and the visual organ [as a consequence of the existence of cognition, etc] because [your] example also does not exist.[144]

Objection:[145] In ultimate reality, cognition and so on do indeed exist, because their results, appropriation (upādāna) and so on, exist.

Answer:

> How will appropriation and so on exist?
> [MMK 3-7c2,d (CPP: 3-8c2,d)]

The idea is that [this is so] because those are also not established, like cognition and so on. "Appropriation" (upādāna) [means those things] "which are to be

appropriated" (upādeya). They are: [1] sensual pleasure (kāma); [2] views (dṛṣṭi); [3] the overestimation of moral conduct and ascetic practices (śīla-vrata-parāmarśa); and [4] the doctrine of the self (ātma-vāda).[146] [The phrase] "and so on" (ādīni) indicates those [items in a list] at the beginning of which [the word preceding ādi stands]. Those, moreover, are saṃsāric existence (bhava), birth (jāti), and old-age-and-death (jarā-maraṇa).[147] Therefore you have that same fault [in your argument].

At the beginning of the chapter, the opponent adduced the auditory organ, etc., and sound, etc., as examples.[148] Now [Nāgārjuna], wishing to show by the method which has been stated that they are similar [to the visual organ in not existing by intrinsic nature], says,

> One should understand that the auditory organ, the olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, the tactile organ, and the mind (manas)
> Have been explained, [along with] the hearer (śrotṛ), audible [sounds] (śrotavya), and so on, by means of the visual organ. [MMK 3-8 (CPP 3-9)]

One should understand that the auditory organ, the olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, the tactile organ, the mind, the hearer, audible [sounds], and so on have

also been rejected (lan ... btab pa, literally, "answered"). By means of what? By means of the visual organ itself. As with the negation of the visual organ, the negation of the auditory organ and so on should also be shown appropriately by means of full inference[s], together with elaboration (prapañca).[149]

Therefore neither origination nor motion, which [the opponent] conceptually constructs (vi-kḷp) from the outset (ārambha) of the chapter, is established.[150] As to that, here the meaning of the chapter [is as follows:] The emptiness (śūnyatā) of the āyatanas has been expounded by means of stating the faults in the proofs offered by opponents.

Therefore [scriptural] statements such as the following are established:[151] [From the Ārya-brahma-viśeṣa-cintā-paripṛcchā-sūtra?,][152]

That which is the internal earth-element (ādhyātmika-pṛthivī-dhātu) and that which is the external (bāhya) earth-element have a nondual meaning (advaya-artha). By means of discernment (prajñā) and wisdom (ye shes, jñāna), the Tathāgata has fully and perfectly realized (abhisambuddha) that that also is nondual, is not divisible into two (gnyis su dbyer med pa), and has a single defining characteristic (eka-lakṣaṇa), namely, no defining characteristic (alakṣaṇa).[153]

Likewise, [from the Ārya-Mañjuśrī-vikrīḍita-

sūtra,][154]

[Mañjuśrī said,] "Girl, how should one see the elements (dhātu)?"

The girl said, "Mañjuśrī, [they should be seen] like this, for example: When the three worlds have been consumed by fire [at the end] of the kalpa, there is not even ash [left behind]."[155]

Likewise, [from the Ārya-bhava-saṃkrānti-sūtra,][156]

> The eye does not see visible form, and the mind (manas) does not know dharmas.
> That which the world does not penetrate (gāhate) is the highest truth (paramaṃ satyam).

Likewise,[157]

He does not know, does not see all dharmas. That [bodhisattva?] does not apprehend, does not ponder (cintayati), does not think of (manyate) even the preacher of the Dharma (chos smra ba, dharma-bhāṇaka).

Likewise, [from the Ārya-Mañjuśrī-vikrīḍita-sūtra?,][158]

Sister (sring mo, bhaginī), the eye does not see, does not cognize (vijānāti) visible forms. Enlightenment (bodhi), too, is free from eye and visible form. The ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind (manas) also do not grasp, do not cognize dharmas. Enlightenment, too, is free from mind and dharmas.

Likewise, [from the Bhagavatī-prajñāpāramitā-

<u>suvikrāntavikrāmi</u>-<u>sūtra</u>,][159]

Suvikrāntavikrāmin, material form[160] is not the domain (<u>gocara</u>) of material form. Feeling (<u>vedanā</u>), perception/conception (<u>saṃjñā</u>), mental formations (<u>saṃskārāḥ</u>), and cognition (<u>vijñāna</u>) are also not the domain of cognition (<u>vijñāna</u>). Suvikrāntavikrāmin, [what is called] "domain" is [the fact] that material form does not know, does not see material form and [the fact] that feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition do not know, do not see cognition. That which is [the state of] not knowing, not seeing form and not knowing, not seeing feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition, is the perfection of discernment (<u>prajñā</u>-<u>pāramitā</u>).

The third chapter, "Examination of the <u>āyatanas</u>," of the <u>Prajñāpradīpa</u>, a commentary on [Nāgārjuna's] <u>Mūlamadhyamaka</u> composed by <u>ācārya</u> Bhavyakara/Bhavyakāra (<u>legs</u> <u>ldan</u> <u>byed</u>)[161] [is concluded].

Notes to Translation of Chapter Three

[1]The twelve *āyatanas* are the six sense organs (the five physical sense organs plus the mind, *manas*) and the six corresponding sense objects (dharmas in the case of mind). This chapter deals mostly with the first six *āyatanas*, the sense organs (*indriya*). Hence in the Sanskrit of the *Prasannapadā*, chapter three is called *cakṣurādīndriya-parīkṣā* (CPP 122.8), while in the Tibetan translation of the *Prasannapadā*, the title is simply *dbang po brtag pa*, *indriya-parīkṣā* (May 331.8). The Tibetan translations of the *Akutobhayā* and Buddhapālita's commentary have the same title for this chapter as the Tibetan of the *Prajñāpradīpa* (Saito, translation, p. 243 n. 1).

[2]This translation of *skye ba mi mthun pa'i phyogs kyi khyad par* (*utpāda-vipakṣa-viśeṣa*?) follows Avalokitavrata's explanation (Ava P2b-3,4; D2a-4,5). The particular instance of origination alleged by the opponent in the following paragraph is the origination of the *āyatanas*.

[3]See Ava P5b-6, D3a-1. Note that chapter one of the MMK deals with origination, while chapter two deals with motion.

[4]That is, the six sense organs.

[5]*darśana* may mean either "vision" or "the organ of

vision." (Note Pāṇini 3.3.115 and 3.3.117.) In his commentary following MMK 3-2ab, Bhāvaviveka glosses it as caksur-indriya; and this seems to be its meaning throughout most of his commentary on this chapter. (The situation is complicated, however, by the fact that the Tibetan word lta ba translates both darśana and dṛṣṭi, as well as some other forms derived from the root dṛś/paś.) Buddhapālita has the same interpretation of darśana (Saito 50.11), as does Candrakīrti (CPP 113.7,8). (Jacques May, though, translates darśana as la vision; see May 78 n. 131.)

Similar remarks apply to the terms for the other four physical sense organs (śravaṇa, etc.). Note that the physical sense organs, being made of translucent matter (rūpa-prasāda), are not identical with the visible eye, ear, etc.; see May ibid. and note 32 to my translation of chapter twenty-six.

[6]rūpa as one of the twelve āyatanas or eighteen dhātus refers to "visible form," i. e., color and shape (varṇa-saṃsthāna); see AK 1-10a. rūpa as the first of the five aggregates (skandha) refers to "matter" in general; see AK 1-9ab and May 79 n. 132.

[7]Compare AK 2-2ab.

[8]See Ava P4-8 to 5a-1, D4b-2,3.

[9]bsam par bya ba, perhaps mantavya here, corresponding to manas.

[10]"Set of all dissimilar examples" translates vipakṣa here.

[11]See Ava P5a-3,4,5; D4b-5,6,7. In other words, the reason (hetu) in fact proves the opposite of the sādhya, since the predicate to be proved (sādhya) is ultimately real origination and the reason applies only to (some) things which are conventional. Such things belong to the vipakṣa because they lack the sādhya. Note that the phrase "in ultimate reality" (paramārthataḥ) is understood as qualifying the predicate (sādhya) of the thesis (pratijñā), not as qualifying the subject (dharmin).

[12]mig, cakṣus will be translated as "eye," śrotra as "ear," and so on; but one should bear in mind that the five physical sense organs are made of subtle, translucent matter (rūpa-prasāda). They are not identical with visible parts of the body such as the eyeball, etc., though they are located on or in them. See note 5 and AK 1-44ab.

[13]The Tibetan of MMK 3-2ab in BPP differs from the Sanskrit and Tibetan of CPP. (See CPP 113.10 and 113 n. 5.) See the discussion in Saito, translation, p. 244 n. 5. As Saito points out, the Tibetan of MMK 3-2a in BPP corresponds to sva ātmā ced darśanaṃ hi or svātmani darśane sati.

[14]MMK 3-2cd, according to Avalokitavrata (Ava P5b-

2,3; D5a-4,5).

[15]The Sanskrit of MMK 3-2b is tat tam eva na paśyati (CPP 113.10). Bhāvaviveka seems to be saying that one must understand that paśyaty eva is meant (but not written for reasons of meter) rather than tam eva, since Nāgārjuna will deny not only that the eye sees itself but also that it sees other things.

[16]BPP has a Tibetan translation of MMK 3-2c slightly different from that of the Akutobhayā, Bp, and CPP. BPP corresponds to yadā plus ātmanam, rather than yad ātmanam. See note 70 and Saito, translation, p. 244 n. 5.

[17]The idea behind this argument seems to be something like the following: If it is the intrinsic nature of the eye to see, then its seeing must be independent of anything other than the eye itself. (Intrinsic nature is independent of other conditions by definition; see MMK 15-1,2.) Therefore the eye's seeing cannot depend on the presence of visible forms. But then the only thing left for the eye to see is its own self. Now it is well known that the eye does not see itself. Therefore the eye does not see by intrinsic nature.

[18]This is the sādhana-dharma, the "proving property," synonymous with the hetu, "reason." See Ava 6ab-4,5; D5a-5,6.

[19]The sādhya or sādhya-dharma is the predicate of

the thesis (*pratijñā*). The subject of the thesis is called the *dharmin*, the "property-possessor."

[20]Similar to the eye's not seeing visible form; see Ava P6ab-4, D5a-5.

[21]On this and the following sentence, see Ava P7a-4 to 7b-3, D6b-4 to 7a-3.

[22] These four reasons apply both to the eye-organ (in the first syllogism) and to visible form (in the second). They have resistance because they are *rūpa*, in the sense of "matter," but are not *avijñapti* (see LVP AK I, pp. 25-27). The terms *bhautika* and *upādāya-rūpa* are synonymous and refer to matter derived from the four great elements (*mahābhūta*), as distinct from the elements themselves. See May 91 nn. 195 and 198, 164 n. 505.

[23]Avalokitavrata identifies the objectors only as *nikāyāntarīyāḥ*, "members of other (Buddhist) schools." He has them cite a scripture which expounds the doctrine of *rūpa* found in the *Abhidharmakośa*; see Ava P7b-4 to 8a-3, D7a-3 to 7b-1.

[24]In other words, as far as the Mādhyamikas are concerned, the opponent's statement that the eye does not see itself because it is invisible simply proves the Mādhyamikas' own contention that in ultimate reality, it cannot see form either. See Ava P8a-3 to 6, D7b-2,3,4.

[25]The name "Ābhidhārmika" seems not to have referred

to a particular school but to mean simply "a specialist in Abhidharma." See LVP AK I p. x and n. 2, p. 39 n. 1, and LVP AK V p. 45 n. 3. Since the objection here ends with a quotation from the AK, presumably the "Ābhidhārmikas" are the Vaibhāṣikas in this case.

[26]On tat-sabhāga, literally, "similar to that," see LVP AK I pp. 75-78.

[27]See the reference in the preceding note.

[28]Identified by Avalokitavrata, who explains that the Mādhyamikas accept that in superficial reality (saṃvṛtyā), the functioning eye sees visible forms but that in ultimate reality, it does not. See Ava P8b-6 to 9a-3, D8a-3 to 7. (This verse is also quoted by Bhāvaviveka near the end of this chapter.)

The Sanskrit of this verse is found in CPP 120.4,5, where it is ascribed merely to the bhagavān. De Jong identifies it as verse 14 of the Bhavasaṃkrāntisūtra, ed. N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Adyar, 1938, p. 6. See J. W. de Jong, "Textcritical Notes on the Prasannapadā," Indo-Iranian Journal 20, (1978), p. 40.

[29]See Ava P9a-4,5; D8b-1.

[30]See Ava P9a-8 to 9b-2, D8b-3,4,5. It seems that one should read gzugs mthong ba bkag pa'i phyir in Ava P9b-1, D8b-4 for gzugs mi mthong ba bkag pa'i phyir.

[31]That is, our thesis is qualified by the phrase "in ultimate reality." Since we accept that according to

superficial reality the eye sees forms, while denying that it does so in ultimate reality, we are not in conflict with what is well known in the world. (Worldly convention makes no such distinction between superficial and ultimate reality.) Moreover, this objection has been answered in the first chapter, where we pointed out that origination exists superficially but not ultimately. See Ava P9b-3,4,5; D8b-6 to 9a-1.

[32]The Kāśmīra-Vaibhāṣikas, according to Avalokitavrata (Ava P9b-6, D9a-11).

[33]kha cig na re, "some say," usually indicates an objection; but according to Avalokitavrata (Ava P9b-8, D9a-3), this is Bhāvaviveka's own view; and the context supports that attribution.

[34]That is, to say that the eye sees and to say that it is the agent of vision amount to the same thing. See Ava P10a-1,2,3; D9a-4,5.

[35]gzhan dag na re, "others say." Avalokitavrata (Ava P10a-5, D9a-7 and P10b-3, D9b-4) identifies "others" as ācārya Devaśarman, who wrote a commentary on the MMK called dkar po 'char ba. This commentary, which Bhāvaviveka also quotes with approval in chapter one of BPP, has not survived. See Y. Kajiyama, "Bhāvaviveka's Prajñāpradīpaḥ (1. Kapitel)," Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens 7 (1963), pp. 37-38 and D. S. Ruegg, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School in India,

Vol. VII, Fasc. 1 of A History of Indian Literature, ed. Jan Gonda, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981, p. 49 and n. 128, p. 62 and n. 187.

[36]If the eye is momentary, it ceases as soon as it has arisen; and it has no time in which to perform an action. If it is not momentary, it must persist unchanged. Therefore it cannot change from a former state of not seeing an object to a subsequent state of seeing it; and hence it cannot perform the action of seeing. See Ava P10a-6 to 10b-3, D9a-7 to 9b-4.

[37]Following AK 1-42, there is a long discussion in the *bhāṣya* on the question of whether the eye sees or the visual consciousness sees; and the positions of various schools are given. (See LVP AK I, pp. 81-86.) The position ascribed there to the Sautrāntikas is identical to that given here.

[38]*saṃskārāḥ*, in the sense of *saṃskṛtā dharmāḥ*. See LVP AK I, pp. 11, 28.

[39]See, e. g., *Saṃyutta-nikāya* II p. 72, IV pp. 32-33.

[40]According to Avalokitavrata, "that" refers to a dispute between the Vaiśeṣikas and the Sāṃkhyas as to whether the eye perceives an object which it has "reached" (*prāpta*), i. e., one with which it is in contact (the Sāṃkhya position), or one which it has not reached (allegedly the Vaiśeṣika position). See Ava

P11b-1 to 6, D10b-1 to 4.

This characterization of the Sāṃkhya position is correct; see, e. g., Jadunath Sinha, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, Calcutta: Central Book Agency, 1952, pp. 60-61; Erich Frauwallner, A History of Indian Philosophy, tr. V. M. Bedekar, Vol. I, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1973, p. 309. On the other hand, it is clear that the Vaiśeṣikas did, in fact, hold that the sense organ perceives objects only through contact with them. See, e. g., Sinha, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 386-7, 470; Frauwallner, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 31-32; Karl H. Potter, ed., Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology, Vol. 2 of The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1977, pp. 161-2.

It is quite surprising that Avalokitavrata should be confused about the position of a major Indian philosophical school on this issue. Perhaps he was misled by the fact that Bhāvaviveka later mentions the Sāṃkhyas explicitly in this context and then, in his commentary on MMK 3-6ab, indicates that the Sāṃkhyas and Vaiśeṣikas held opposing views on the issue of whether the self is inherently a seer. Thus Avalokitavrata might have assumed that they held different views on this issue, too.

In fact, though, it was the Buddhist Abhidharma schools who maintained that the eye sees objects with

which it is not in contact; see AK 1-43cd. It may be that bye brag pa dag, "Vaiśeṣikas," is a mistake (present in both Ava P and D) for bye brag tu smra ba dag, "Vaibhāṣikas." There is an instance in Avalokitavrata's subcommentary on chapter five where Ava P has 'os pa pa dag, "Ārhatas," twice for Ava D's 'ug pa pa dag, "Aulūkyas." See note 68 to my translation of chapter five.

[41] phyogs kyi chos, pakṣa-dharma. A synonym of hetu, "reason," pakṣa-dharma literally means "property of the subject [of the thesis]," i. e., that property which proves the sādhya, the predicate of the thesis.

[42] See Ava P12a-6,7,8; D11a-4,5.

[43] The Vaiśeṣikas, according to Avalokitavrata; see Ava P12b-3, D11b-1 and note 40.

[44] See Ava P12b-5,6; D11b-2,3.

[45] rtog chen. This translation is conjectural. Avalokitavrata lists rtog chen with bya ma rta, "runner, courier," and nyan rna ba, "spy" (Ava P12b-7, D11b-4). The point is that the eye sees only indirectly by way of other conditions (pratyaya) and not directly. Thus its seeing is only conventional (Ava P12b-7 to 13a-2, D11b-3,4,5).

[46] The idea seems to be that conventionally, the eye is said to see visible forms not because it grasps them directly but because it knows them indirectly through

other conditions (such as the presence of light, etc.). Even conventionally, however, it does not "see," that is, "know" itself.

[47]The nose does not smell odors with which it is not in contact (see AK 1-43cd,44ab); and it does not smell itself.

[48]On this and the following sentence, see Ava P13b-3 to 14a-4, D11a-5 to 11b-5.

[49]See the similar discussion of the two syllogisms following MMK 3-2cd and note 22.

[50]See AK 1-44cd. The objects of the five physical senses are simultaneous with them.

[51]According to Avalokitavrata (Ava P14a-8, D13a-1), the objectors are the Vaiśeṣikas; but see note 40.

[52]"Obstructed" by space, according to Avalokitavrata (Ava P14b-2, D13a-3). In the bhāṣya on AK 1-42, it is pointed out that the eye sees visible forms which are obstructed by transparent objects; see LVP AK I p. 83.

[53]If the eye had to go out to its object in order to make contact with it, it would take different amounts of time and effort to see objects at different distances. See Ava P14b-2 to 8, D13a-3 to 7.

[54]See Ava P15a-4, D13b-3; and compare LVP AK I p. 93.

[55]That is, this reason simply restates the thesis in different words and hence is invalid. See Ava P15a-7 to

15b-1, D13b-5,6.

[56]Avalokitavrata gives an argument based on the idea that all things are momentary, so that the process of grasping an object encompasses many different moments of effort and grasping. See Ava P15b-2,3,4; D13b-7 to 14a-2. Bhāvaviveka does not mention the fourth reason here, but Avalokitavrata says that it is refuted simply by MMK 3-2. See Ava P15b-4,5,6; D14a-2,3.

[57]If the example is said to be established in superficial reality, though not in ultimate reality, then it cannot be used to support a thesis which is held to be true in ultimate reality. See Ava P16a-3,4,5; D14a-6 to 14b-1.

[58]The opponent might object that although the mind does not grasp an object with which it is in contact, the nose, tongue, and body do. (See AK 1-43cd.) Thus the reason, "because it is a sense organ," is inconclusive. Bhāvaviveka replies that it will be shown (in MMK 3-8) that the other sense organs, just like the eye, grasp neither an object with which they are in contact nor one with which they are not in contact. See Ava P16b-7 to 17a-4, D15a-1 to 5.

[59]See Ava P17a-5,6; D15a-5,6. The idea is not as ludicrous as it sounds if one recalls that "the eye" is composed of invisible <u>rūpa</u>-<u>prasāda</u> and is not the visible eyeball.

[60]See Ava P17b-1, D15b-1,2.

[61]_mig gi rnam par shes pa'i rnam grangs_, _cakṣur-vijñāna-paryāya_, glossed by Avalokitavrata (_ibid_.) as _mig gi 'bras bu_, "the eyeball."

[62]Here Avalokitavrata argues that if the eye had to go out to its object, then when one opened one's eyes, it would take longer to see the sun or moon that to see the top of a nearby tree. See Ava P17b-2,3,4; D15b-3,4, and note 53.

[63]The idea may be that since visible form has a cause conventionally, it does not exist in ultimate reality.

[64]Or "in [regard to] both positions," _phyogs gnyi gar_. The positions referred to are the view (ascribed by Avalokitavrata to the Vaiśeṣikas) that the eye grasps an object with which it is not in contact and the Sāṃkhyas' view that it grasps an object with which it _is_ in contact. The opponent charges that since the Mādhyamika rejects both positions, he has failed to establish any position of his own. See Ava P18a-3 to 6, D16a-2,3,4.

[65]The opponents here are the Mīmāṃsikas, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P18a-8, D16a-6. In fact, the view expressed was also that of the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas. See Frauwallner, _op. cit._, Vol. II, pp. 32-33; Potter, _op. cit._, pp. 117,119,161.

[66]Ava P18b-2, D16a-7 has _byed rgyu_, _kāraṇa-hetu_ for

BPP's rgyu, hetu or kāraṇa. Here kāraṇa-hetu is used in the narrower (pradhāna) sense of "productive cause." See LVP AK II p. 247, where the eye and visible form are said to be the kāraṇa-hetus of visual consciousness in this sense.

[67] Again, Avalokitavrata ascribes this objection to the Mīmāṃsikas. See Ava P18b-6, D16b-3.

[68] That is, the eyeball. See Ava P19a-3, D16b-8.

[69] See F. Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, New York: Dover, 1962 (reprint of Leningrad: Academy of Sciences of the U. S. S. R., c. 1930), Vol I, pp. 336-7, Vol. II, pp. 220-229.

[70] Buddhapālita, identified by Avalokitavrata as "the commentator (vṛttikāra) Sthavira Buddhapālita." Text in Saito, p. 51 ll. 2-19; translation in Saito, translation, p. 51. See also Saito, translation, p. 244, nn. 5, 6, 7.

As Saito points out, although the text of the Tibetan translation of MMK 3-2ab in Bp agrees with that of BPP, Buddhapālita's commentary seems to reflect the version of MMK 3-2ab found in CPP. Also, Buddhapālita's interpretation of yadātmānam in MMK 3-2c as yad ātmānam, rather than yadā plus ātmānam, agrees with CPP, not BPP. In the latter case, this difference is reflected in the Tibetan text of MMK 3-2c in Bp.

[71] In other words, if water itself is wet, it can moisten earth; if fire itself is hot, it can heat water;

if jasmine itself is sweet-smelling, it can impregnate clothing with a sweet smell.

[72]See Ava P20a-1, D17b-3.

[73]lta ba, glossed by Avalokitavrata as "visual cognition" (cakṣur-vijñāna). See Ava P20a-2, D17b-4.

[74]Identified by Avalokitavrata only as coming from "the common doctrine of [our] fellow Buddhists" (rang gi sde pa spyi'i grub pa'i mtha', probably svayūthya-sāmānya-siddhānta). See Ava P20a-5, D17b-6.

[75]kha cig na re, literally, "some say." Avalokitavrata identifies "some" as Bhāvaviveka himself and says that the following paragraph is his criticism of Buddhapālita's explanation of MMK 3-2. See Ava P20a-6,7; D17b-7.

[76]Avalokitavrata explains that a sweet smell does not exist in jasmine flowers by its own self but by virtue of causes and conditions like seed, earth, etc. Thus it arises adventitiously (glo bur du, probably akasmāt), just as sesame seed oil is not inherently sweet-smelling but becomes so if it comes in contact with flowers. See Ava P20b-3,4,5; D18a-3,4,5.

[77]See Ava P20b-6,7,8; D18a-5,6,7.

[78]'dzin pa, root grah. Perhaps a translation other than "grasp" would be better here, since Avalokitavrata explains that in ultimate reality, fire burns neither itself nor others; and jasmine flowers make neither

themselves nor others sweet-smelling. See Ava P21a-3,4; D18b-2,3.

79This refers to the opponent's first two syllogisms at the beginning of the chapter, in which the fact that the visual organ sees visible forms is used to argue for the existence of origination and motion, respectively. See Ava P21a-5 to 21b-1, D18b-4 to 7.

80If one says that the eye does see visible forms conventionally, it is contradictory to use that conventional fact to support a thesis about ultimate reality. See Ava P21b-2, D18-7 to 19a-1.

81The objectors are identified by Avalokitavrata only as "advocates of origination" (skye bar smra ba dag, probably utpāda- or utpatti-vādinaḥ). See Ava P21b-4, D19a-2.

82See Ava P21b-5, D19a-3.

83Avalokitavrata here glosses "power" as "the power of grasping" (itself or another). See Ava P21b-6, D19a-3,4.

84See Ava P22a-7 to 22b-1, D19b-3,4,5.

85The "reason" referred to here is the notion that fire illuminates both itself and another. See Ava P22b-2,3,4; D19b-5,6.

86Fire does not illuminate itself because there is no darkness in it and hence nothing which needs to be illuminated. See Ava P22b-5,6; D19b-7 to 20a-2.

[87]Conventionally, the nature of fire is heat. See Ava P23a-2, D20a-4.

[88]Although Bhāvaviveka calls these "syllogisms" (sbyor ba'i tshig, prayoga-vākya), they lack examples, which full-fledged syllogisms must have.

[89]Compare MMK 10-13cd. Chapter ten of the MMK is devoted to the subject of fire and fuel.

[90]gzhan dag, "others," identified by Avalokitavrata (Ava P23b-7, D20b-6).

[91]Text in Saito, 51.20-52.1. Translation in Saito, translation, 51.26-52.1.

[92]Compare text in Saito 52.10, translation in Saito, translation, 52.10.

[93]gzhan dag, "others," identified by Avalokitavrata. See Ava P24a-4, D21a-3.

[94]The opponent gives only an example without giving a reason; hence it is enough to point out that his argument is deficient. Buddhapālita's refutation (given in full by Avalokitavrata) is not necessary. See Ava P24a-4 to 24b-4, D21a-3 to 21b-2.

[95]brjod nas, literally, "having uttered," here and below in the same context. The Sanskrit may be a form of abhi-dhā, but there are a number of other possibilities.

[96]The more obvious reconstruction of bya ba'i rkyen would be kriyā-pratyaya. As far as I have been able to determine, this term is not used in Sanskrit grammar,

whereas both lyuṭ (-ana) and kta (-ta) are kṛt-pratyayas. (That is, they are added directly to verbal roots.)

97 For the rather unusual structure of this syllogism, see Ava P24b-6 (where dang sgrub pa'i chos is omitted), D21b-3; P24b-7, D21b-4; and P25a-2, D21b-6.

98 thugs su chud par mdzad pa is transitive. thugs su chud par gyur pa is normally passive, but may represent the Sanskrit middle (ātmanepada) here. The point seems to be that the root budh may be conjugated according to either the first conjugation parasmaipada (bodhati) or the fourth conjugation ātmanepada (budhyate).

Compare Yaśomitra's Sphuṭārthā Vyākhyā on AK 1-1: buddha iti kartari ktavidhānam|... karmakartari ktavidhānam ity apare| svayaṃ budhyata iti buddha ity arthaḥ|... (Shastri edition, Bauddha Bharati Series, Vol. 5, p. 5 - see Bibliographical Abbreviations). Avalokitavrata's subcommentary tends to support the interpretation of thugs su chud par gyur pa as (svayaṃ) budhyate. See Ava P25a-2,3,4; D21b-6 to 22a-1. In this connection, note Pāṇini 3.2.188.

99 See Ava P25a-8 to 25b-1, D22a-3,4.

100 Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti's interpretation of MMK 3-4c differs from that of Bhāvaviveka. See Saito, translation, p. 245 n. 14.

101 des cir 'gyur, probably tena kiṃ bhavati,

literally, "What comes about by means of that?"

[102] lta ba nyid, probably paśyamānam; cf. MMK 3-4a.

[103] The same fault which Bhāvaviveka found in the opponent's last syllogism. See Ava P26b-4,5; D23a-4,5,6.

[104] This is similar to the argument in chapter two that one who is a goer does not go, because he is (by assumption) already a goer and hence has no need to perform an action of going. Moreover, there would be two simultaneous actions of going, that due to which the goer is called a "goer" and that action of going which the goer is said to perform. The point is that "goer" and "going" only exist in relation to each other and cannot be established as independent entities. See especially MMK 2-7 through 11. See also Ava P26b-6,7,8; D23a-6,7.

[105] See Ava P26b-8 to 27a-2, D23b-1,2.

[106] yod pa dang med pa'i rgyu nyid, probably sad-asad-hetutva. See Ava P27a-8 to 27b-3, D23b-6 to 24a-1. Avalokitavrata makes the point that the opponent assumes that the negations in MMK 3-5ab are implicative negations (paryudāsa-pratiṣedha), whereas in fact they are simple negations (prasajya-pratiṣedha).

[107] rtog na, "if [you] suppose."

[108] phyis 'byung ba'i tshul gyis lta ba nyid du nye bar brtags nas, probably something like bhaviṣyad-yogena-darśanatvopacārāt. (upacārāt should strictly be nye bar btags nas; but btags and brtags are often confused in the

texts.) The opponent's idea is that the eye at first does not perform a particular action of seeing and then later performs it. Thus the eye is established prior to and independent of its action of seeing. At the first stage, the eye does not see and thus is not a visual organ; but it is said to be one figuratively because it will see later. See Ava P27b-4,5; D24a-2,3.

[109]Figurative designation may be sufficient to establish conventional truth; but the opponent had wished to prove that the eye sees in ultimate reality, that is, by its intrinsic nature. Since intrinsic nature cannot change, it is impossible for the eye first not to see and then later to see.

[110]The reason, "because [that] conventional designation of action exists," is not established in ultimate reality. If it is asserted as conventional truth, it cannot prove anything about ultimate reality. See Ava P28b-1 to 4, D24b-5,6,7.

[111]Avalokitavrata remarks that up to this point, the position of those who maintain that the eye itself is the seer (<u>draṣṭṛ</u>) has been refuted. Now Bhāvaviveka is going to deal with the position of those who hold that the self (<u>ātman</u>) sees by means of the eye, so that the self is the seer and the eye is the instrument (<u>karaṇa</u>) of the action of seeing. See Ava P28b-4,5; D24b-6,7.

[112]Avalokitavrata makes it clear that what it is

being said here is that the eye is called darśana, "visual organ," not because it is the agent (kartṛ) of the action of seeing but because it is the instrument of that action. The seer (draṣṭṛ), the agent who sees, is the self (ātman). The self sees by means of the instrument of seeing, the eye. See Ava P28b-6 to 29a-5, D25a-1 to 6.

[113]Avalokitavrata (Ava P29b-4,5; D25b-4,5) glosses chos, dharma as lta ba gzugs la lta bar mi byed pa'i sgrub pa'i chos (sgrub pa'i chos = sādhana-dharma, i. e., hetu). See also the following syllogism.

[114]The "suspicion" referred to is that the self might, after all, be able to see itself. See the rest of the paragraph and Ava P30a-2 to 5, D26a-2,3,4.

[115]See Ava P30a-6,7,8; D26a-5,6,7. Avalokitavrata glosses "wherever" as "in our own and others' systems (siddhānta)." He says that the real meaning of this expression is that the mind sees that the self does not exist.

[116]See Ava P30b-2,3,4; D26b-2,3.

[117]Avalokitavrata explains that one should show that visible form is not an object of the self as seer, by means of syllogisms using the same reasons and examples. See Ava P30b-8 to 31a-2, D26b-6 to 27a-1.

[118]According to Avalokitavrata, an opponent charges that [1] the Mādhyamika's thesis (in the preceding

syllogism) is faulty because for the Mādhyamika, conventional designation does not exist in ultimate reality; [2] the subject (paksa) of the thesis is not established because the self is not established for the Mādhyamika; [3] since the self, the subject of the thesis, is not established, the ground (gzhi, probably āśraya) of the reason is not established; and [4] likewise the last example, "like its own self," is not established. Bhāvaviveka answers those four objections in order. See Ava P31a-2 to 5, D27a-1,2.

[119]Presumably meaning the conventional self, which the Buddhists also accept on the conventional level.

[120]Avalokitavrata explains that, according to the opponent, the statement that the seer does not see is "inconsistent with its own words." He gives as an example of such a self-contradictory sentence, the statement, "I am a childless woman's son." See Ava P31b-2,3,4; D27a-4,5.

[121]The reference here is to the two initial verses of the MMK (MMK 1-A,B). Avalokitavrata explains that in superficial reality (saṃvṛtyā), there is dependent origination but that in ultimate reality (paramārthataḥ), there is no origination. Likewise, here what is superficially or conventionally a seer does not see in ultimate reality. See Ava P31b-5,6; D27b-1,2.

[122]Note that in the Sāṃkhya-kārikās, the puruṣa is

said to be a drasṭṛ, "seer." Cited in Chandradhar Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, reprint 1973), p. 156 n. 1. See also Sinha, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 35-6.

123 In other words, since intrinsic nature is not dependent on anything other than itself, then if one is a seer by intrinsic nature, one will see whether he has eyes or not. See Ava P31b-8 to 32a-4, D27b-4 to 7, and MMK 15-1,2.

124 Avalokitavrata ascribes this objection to the Vaiśeṣikas; see Ava P31b-7, D27b-3. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school holds that the self is not inherently conscious but becomes so only through conjunction with the manas. See, e. g., Sinha, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 386-7, 656 and Potter, op. cit., p. 125.

125 ma spangs na, atiraskṛtya, literally, "not having set aside."

126 Avalokitavrata explains that if the self is a seer only through dependence on the visual organ, and not by intrinsic nature, then its being a seer is purely conventional, not ultimate. See Ava P32a-8 to 32b-1, D28a-2,3.

127 Avalokitavrata points out that what is meant here is that something is not a seer in ultimate reality or by intrinsic nature if it must depend on anything else in order to see. See Ava P32b-2,3,4; D28a-4,5.

[128]Avalokitavrata says that an opponent might hold that fire is a burner by intrinsic nature but does not burn unless there is fuel. Likewise, the self is a seer by intrinsic nature but does not see without a visual organ. The answer is simply that intrinsic nature (by definition) cannot depend on the presence of something else. See Ava P32b-7 to 33a-2, D28a-7 to 28b-2.

[129]Glossed by Avalokitavrata as "collection of elements and matter derived from the elements (<u>bhūta-bhautika</u>)." See Ava P33b-3, D29a-1,2.

[130]See Ava P33b-5 to 8, D29a-3,4,5.

[131]On this paragraph, see Ava P33b-7 to 34a-6, D29a-4 to 29b-2. According to Avalokitavrata, Bhāvaviveka here answers an objection that if a seer does not exist by intrinsic nature, even the conventional designation "seer" would not exist. The reply is that the collection of efficient causes, the eye, visible form, and so on, are designated as the seer; but of course they do not have the intrinsic nature of a seer.

[132]See Ava P34b-2, D29b-5.

[133]On the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika account of perception, see Sinha, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., Vol. I, pp. 386-7, 470-1 and Potter, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., pp. 161-2.

[134]See Ava P34b-3 to 8, D29b-6 to 30a-2. Even if one says that there is a seer contingently, and not by intrinsic nature, there is no reason to suppose that it

is the ātman postulated by the Vaiśeṣikas, which the Buddhists do not accept. Rather it is the collection of factors conventionally called a "person" or "sentient being," which everyone accepts on the conventional level.

[135]See Ava P34b-8 to 35a-1, D30a-2,3.

[136]That is, neither the Sāṃkhya's position that a puruṣa who has the intrinsic nature of a seer sees nor the Vaiśeṣika's position that an ātman who does not have the intrinsic nature of a seer sees is established. See Ava P35b-1,2; D30b-1,2.

[137]In other words, if the self can see only by means of the eye, its being a seer is conventional, not intrinsic. If one claims that the self is intrinsically a seer, independent of the eye, that is obviously false since the blind have selves (according to the non-Buddhist schools) but cannot see.

[138]Ultimately, the instrument and object of vision do not exist. On the other hand, it is contradictory to try to use the fact of their purely conventional existence to prove a thesis about ultimate reality. See Ava P36a-8 to 36b-1, D31a-5,6.

[139]Identified by Avalokitavrata as the Sautrāntikas and Vaibhāṣikas. See Ava P36b-1, D31a-6. The position expressed, however, seems to be that of the Sautrāntikas; see LVP AK I p. 86.

[140]'du byed dag, saṃskārāḥ, in the sense of saṃskṛtā dharmāḥ.

[141]gYo ba med pa, that is, "inactive." Because the saṃskāras are momentary, they have no time in which to perform an action.

[142]In the twelvefold dependent origination, the six āyatanas constitute the fifth member (aṅga). Contact, feeling and craving are the sixth, seventh, and eighth members. Cognition (or consciousness) is the third member, but the six āyatanas can also be said to give rise to cognition. See MMK 26-4 and note 39 to my translation of chapter twenty-six. (On the twelvefold dependent origination in general, see chapter twenty-six of the MMK and the notes to my translation.)

[143]CPP's verse 3-7 is a quotation from Ratnāvalī 4-55, mistakenly numbered by La Vallée Poussin as a kārikā of MMK. See J. W. de Jong, "Textcritical Notes on the Prasannapadā," Indo-Iranian Journal 20 (1978), p. 40. Thus BPP's 3-7 corresponds to CPP's 3-8, and BPP's 3-8 corresponds to CPP's 3-9.

[144]Reversing the dissimilar example in the opponent's preceding syllogism, we have as an example a functioning eye which gives rise to cognition and the rest. But we have just shown that cognition, etc., do not exist because their causal conditions, visible objects and the visual organ, do not exist. See Ava

P37a-5 to 37b-1, D32a-1 to 5.

[145]Also from other Buddhists. See Ava P37b-3, D31a-6.

[146]The four appropriations constitute the ninth member of the twelvefold origination. See MMK 26-6cd and LVP AK III, pp. 86-7.

[147]Saṃsāric existence, birth, and old-age-and-death are the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth members of the twelvefold dependent origination.

[148]See the opponent's first syllogism in this chapter.

[149]Avalokitavrata seems to gloss prapañca as "answers to objections." See Ava P39a-1, D33b-1. Avalokitavrata gives arguments for each of the other five senses which parallel the arguments given in the case of vision. See Ava P38b-7 to 39b-5, D33a-7 to 34a-4.

[150]See the first paragraph of this chapter and the opponent's first two syllogisms. See also Ava P39b-6 to 40a-1, D34a-4,5,6.

[151]According to Avalokitavrata, sūtra quotations are introduced at this point in reply to those who might charge, "[The emptiness of the āyatanas] has been established by a mere limited (prādeśika) treatise of desiccated logic (śuṣka-tarka)." The MMK establishes the meaning of such scriptural passages (by means of reasoning) and is, in turn, supported by them. See Ava:

(1) P40a-4,5, D34b-1,2; (2) P40a-7,8, D34b-4; (3) P40b-6,7,8, D35a-2,3; (4) P41a-1,2, D35a-4,5; (5) P41a-5,6, D35a-7; and (6) P41b-1,2,3, D35b-3,4,5.

[152] Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P40a-5,6; D34b-3. I was unable to locate this passage in the Sde dge bka' 'gyur edition of the sūtra.

[153] Avalokitavrata comments that "internal earth-element" refers to the internal āyatanas, i. e., the sense organs, while "external earth-element" refers to the sense objects. They are nondual in that neither exists by intrinsic nature. They cannot be divided into two, because the sense organs lack the quality of being grasping subjects (grahakatva) and the sense objects lack the quality of being graspable objects (grāhyatva). Thus because they are not different by intrinsic nature and cannot be be distinguished as subject and object, they have one and the same defining characteristic; but that is no characteristic (since they have no intrinsic nature).

He adds that they are said to have one defining characteristic in order to reject the extreme (anta) of multiplicity (tha dad pa nyid, perhaps nānātva); they are said to have no defining characteristic in order to reject the extreme of oneness (ekatva). The nonapprehension of both extremes is the perfection of discernment (prajñā-pāramitā). See Ava P40a-8 to 40b-5,

D34b-4 to 35a-1.

154 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P40b-5, D35a-1. This passage is found in the _Sde dge bka' 'gyur_, Mdo sde Kha 230b-2, where instead of ... _bsregs pa na thal ba yang med pa ltar ro_, one has ... _bsregs par gyur pa de bzhin du'o_.

155 Avalokitavrata remarks that similarly, the nonapprehension of any internal or external elements is the perfection of discernment. See Ava P40b-6,7,8; D35a-2,3.

156 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P40b-8, D35a-3. This same verse was quoted earlier in this chapter, in the commentary following MMK 3-2cd. See note 28.

157 Identified by Avalokitavrata simply as being "from other _sūtrāntas_." See Ava P41a-2, D35a-5.

158 Identified by Avalokitavrata only as being "from other Mahāyāna sūtras." See P41a-3, D35a-5,6. This quotation seems to be a rephrasing of a passage found in the _Mañjuśrī-vikrīdita-sūtra_, found in the _Sde dge bka' 'gyur_, Mdo sde Kha 222a-3,4.

159 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P41a-6, D35a-7 to 35b-1. Sanskrit text in Ryusho Hikata, _Suvikrāntavikrāmi-paripṛcchā Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra_, Fukuoka, Japan: Kyushu University, 1958, p. 29. The one major difference between the Sanskrit and the Tibetan is

that the Sanskrit has agocara iti (29.13) where the Tibetan has spyod yul zhes bya ba ni = gocara iti.

[160]rūpa as the first of the five skandhas. See note 6.

[161]On the various names of "Bhāvaviveka," see Louis de La Vallée Poussin, "Madhyamaka," Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques 2 (1932-3), 60-61; V. V. Gokhale, "The Vedānta Philosophy Described by Bhavya in his Madhyamaka-hṛdaya," Indo-Iranian Journal 2 (1958), 165-166 n. 1; Shotaro Iida, Reason and Emptiness, Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1980, pp. 5-6; and Ruegg, op. cit., p. 60 n. 183.

Translation of Prajñāpradīpa, Chapter Four:
Examination of the Aggregates (skandha)

Now [Nāgārjuna] begins the fourth chapter with the aim of showing that the aggregates have no intrinsic nature (svabhāva), by means of refuting a particular counterposition (vipakṣa) [which holds] that the āyatanas exist.[1]

At the end of the immediately preceding chapter, [Nāgārjuna] said,

> One should understand that the auditory organ, the olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, the tactile organ, and the mind (manas)
> Have been explained, [along with] the hearer, audible [sounds], and so on, by means of the visual organ. [MMK 3-8 (CPP 3-9)]

Objection: Therefore our fellow Buddhists (svayūthya)[2] say:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality (paramārthataḥ), the the āyatanas do indeed exist,

[Reason:] because they are included (bsdus pa, probably saṃgṛhīta) in the aggregates.

[Dissimilar Example:] Here that which does not exist is not included in the aggregates of matter[3] and so on, like a sky-flower.

[Application:] The internal āyatanas[4] possess inclusion

in the aggregates, for the ten material (rūpin) āyatanas[5] are included in the aggregate of matter, while the āyatana of dharmas is included in three aggregates and one part of the aggregate of matter,[6] [and] the āyatana of mind is included in the aggregate of cognition (vijñāna).

[Conclusion:] Therefore, by the stated reason, in ultimate reality, the internal āyatanas do indeed exist.

Answer: Here, in brief, matter is twofold: elemental matter (bhūta-rūpa) and matter dependent on the elements (bhautika-rūpa).[7] Bringing all those [kinds of matter], which are different due to distinctions of time and so on, under one [heading], they are called "the aggregate of matter."

As to that, to begin with, [we] will consider [the five aggregates] starting with matter, because the reason [in] the opponent's [syllogism] is held to be [the fact that the material āyatanas,] the eye and so on, are included [in the aggregate of matter], and because [matter] is easy to explain.

> Matter[8] is not apprehended apart from the cause (kāraṇa) of matter. [MMK 4-1ab]

"Matter" is what can be damaged.[9] The cause of that is the cause of matter. What is that [cause]? The four

great elements, earth and so on. "Apart from (nirmukta) those" [means] "deprived of those."[10]

"Matter is not apprehended (upalabhyate)" [means that it is not apprehended] in ultimate reality. What then? For purposes of conventional designation (vyavahāra), one designates "matter" in dependence on the cause of matter, the four great elements.[11]

Thus this [first half of verse one] has indicated the property (dharma) of matter which is to be established (sādhya), [namely,] that it is a mere combination ('dus pa; saṃghāta, etc.) of earth and so on; and [it has also indicated] the property of matter which establishes (sādhana) [that, namely], that the cognition (buddhi) of that [matter] does not exist if [matter's] own cause is not grasped. The examples [are indicated] by virtue of that [predicate (sādhya) and reason (sādhana)]; they are an army, a forest, and so on.[12]

Here the inference (anumāna) is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, matter does not exist as a real substance (dravya-sat),

[Reason:] because the cognition of that [matter] does not exist if [matter's] own cause is not grasped.

[Similar Example:] Here if the cognition of something does not exist when [that thing's] own cause is not grasped, that [thing] does not exist as a real substance, like an army and so on.

[Application and Conclusion:] Likewise, since the cognition of matter does not exist if [matter's] own cause, earth and so on, is not grasped, matter also does not exist as a real substance.

Alternatively, there is also another way of formulation (sbyor ba'i lam, probably prayoga-mārga):

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the cognition of matter does not have as its object (viṣaya) an entity (dngos po, bhāva or vastu) which exists as a real substance,

[Reason:] because it is a cognition,

[Example:] like the cognition of a forest and so on.

Alternatively, there is still another way of formulation:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, this word "matter" does not have as its object a thing (padārtha) which exists as a real substance,

[Reason:] because it is a word,

[Example:] like the word "army" and so on.

Because cognition (vijñāna) and mental factors (caitta) are also of the same sort (rigs mthun pa, probably sajātīya) as [matter] which is to be established (sādhya), they are to be negated in the same way. Therefore it is not the case that [our] reason is inconclusive (anaikāntika).[13]

Objection:[14]

[Thesis:] Matter does exist in ultimate reality,

[Reason:] because the cognition of that [matter] does not cease although that [matter] has ceased.

[Dissimilar Example:] Here if the cognition of something ceases when [that thing] has ceased, that [thing] exists in superficial reality (saṃvṛtyā), like a jar.

[Application:] Although blue matter [or "visible form"] and so on have ceased, the cognition of them does not cease in that way.

[Conclusion:] Therefore matter exists as a real substance.

Answer: That is not good, because there is no agreement (anvaya) [with a similar example].[15]

Thus, to begin with, secondary matter (upādāya-rūpa)[16] has been examined. Now [Nāgārjuna] will explain the subject of elemental matter (bhūta-rūpa).

Objection:

[Thesis:] Secondary matter does indeed exist,

[Reason:] because the cause of that [secondary matter] exists.

[Dissimilar Example:] Here no cause can be grasped for that which does not exist, like a sky-flower.

[Application:] Secondary matter has a cause, [namely,] those [elements] earth and so on.

[Conclusion:] Therefore secondary matter does indeed

exist.

Answer: Therefore [Nāgārjuna] says,

Apart from matter, the cause of matter is also not seen. [MMK 4-1cd]

Here apart from visible forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangibles - which have the defining characteristic of secondary matter - the cause of matter, [the elements] earth and so on, are also not seen and cannot be grasped.[17] Here again, [this half of the verse] indicates the property of elemental matter which is to be established (sādhya), [namely,] that it is a mere combination of visible form and so on, and the property which establishes (sādhana) [that, namely], that if visible form and so on are not seen, those [elements] earth and so on are also not seen. Therefore, by virtue of that [predicate (sādhya) and reason (sādhana)], the example is also manifest.

As to that, to begin with, here [I] will state a syllogism (prayoga-vākya) regarding earth (pṛthivī). Also, because [we] do not show that [the elements] are a mere combination in ultimate reality, [there is no conflict with our position that the elements are unoriginated in ultimate reality].[18] Here the author of [this] treatise [Nāgārjuna], by showing that [the

elements] are a mere combination [according to superficial reality], has shown just the negation of [their] existence as real substances [in ultimate reality], because the negation of that is of great importance (mahārtha). Why is it of great importance? Because lack of intrinsic nature is established [in that way], since that which is a dependent designation (upādāya-prajñapti) conventionally (vyavahārataḥ) does not exist as a real substance in ultimate reality [and] therefore it [ultimately] has no origination.

As it is said in such [passages] as the following from the Ārya-laṅkāvatāra-sūtra:[19]

> Because cognition does not grasp [any] entity, apart from [mere] combinations (samavāya),
> Therefore I say that [an entity] is empty and unoriginated and without intrinsic nature.
> [Laṅkāvatāra 3-88]
>
> Here nothing at all originates or ceases by means of causal conditions (pratyaya).
> Origination and cessation are also just mere causal conditions. [Laṅkāvatāra 2-138 = 10-85]

Here the syllogism is:

[Thesis:] One should understand that in ultimate reality, earth does not exist as a real substance,

[Reason:] because that [earth] is not seen if the cause of that [earth] is not seen.

[Similar Example:] That which is not seen if [its] cause is not seen does not exist in ultimate reality as a real substance, like an army and so on.

Likewise, syllogisms should also be stated as appropriate in the case of the cognition [of earth] and the word ["earth"].

Alternatively, [one shows that] apart from the cause of [secondary] matter, [namely,] those [elements] earth and so on, [secondary] matter which is different from them is not apprehended. The property of [secondary] matter [which proves that] is that it is not grasped if its own cause is not grasped. Here the syllogism is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, [secondary] matter is not different from its own assembled (<u>tshogs pa</u>) parts (<u>yan lag</u>, <u>aṅga</u> or <u>avayava</u>),

[Reason:] because that [secondary matter] is not grasped if that [assemblage] is not grasped,

[Example:] like the own self of [the elements] earth and so on.

It is not the case that [our] reason is unestablished, because here the action (<u>kriyā</u>) is considered to reside in [its] object (<u>karman</u>), so that "not grasping" is a property of cognition.[20]

<u>Objection</u>: The Sāṃkhyas say: Since [we hold that] earth and so on are not different from visible form and so on, that [argument of yours merely] establishes what

is [already] established [for us] (siddha-sādhana).[21]

Answer: That is not good (bzang po, bhadra), because [our] negation of difference does not show nondifference[22] and because [we] do not accept the nondifference held by the opponent, either.

Objection: The Vaiśeṣikas object that our reason is inconclusive, because even though a lamp is not grasped, if [a source of illumination] different from that [lamp] exists, [then] as for a jar, the cognition of that [jar] exists.[23]

Answer: That also is not good. [Our reason] is not inconclusive [1] because [we] have specified [as our reason], "because the cognition of that [matter] does not exist at all [if its parts are not apprehended]," and [2] because [our] reason (sādhana-dharma) does not exist in [your] counterexample (vipakṣa), since the cognition of that [jar] exists even without a lamp, if the light of a jewel, a light-ray, an herb, the moon, or the sun is present. Because we have specified a qualified thesis, "matter is not different from its own assembled parts," a lamp is not a jar's own assembled part[s].[24]

Also, [our reason] is not inconclusive because there is [ultimately] no counterexample [to nondifference], since below [Nāgārjuna] will show,

> A difference of anything together with (sārdham)
> anything is not possible, [MMK 14-4cd]

[and] therefore it is not established that a jar is different from a lamp in ultimate reality.

Objection: Real substances, such as an army, which have parts, are composed [of those parts].[25] Therefore the example in [your] inferences proving that earth and so on do not exist as real substances, is not established.

Answer:

[Thesis:] The parts of an army do not compose a part-possessing real substance called an "army,"

[Reason:] because they are parts,[26]

[Example:] like the parts of a tree, [its] roots, trunk, branches, twigs, and so on.

Alternatively, it is not the case that [our] example does not exist because

[Thesis:] That which is a part of that [elephant], complete in the elephant, does not compose a chariot or a horse, etc.,

[Reason:] because it does not exist in them,

[Example:] like threads (rgyu spun, literally "warp and weft") and so on.

Likewise,

Apart from matter, the cause of matter is also not seen. [MMK 4-1cd]

Here also, one should state inferences extensively, employing the [property] to be established and the

property which establishes [it] as before.[27]

As [the elements] are not different from visible form and so on, so also earth, etc., are not nondifferent from [i. e., not the same as] visible form and so on.[28] [This is so] because below[29] nondifference will also be negated and because, due to [their] being nondifferent, either milk would just be curds or curds would just be milk; but [that] is not possible.[30] Therefore the following [verse from the Ārya-laṅkāvatāra-sūtra][31] is established:

> An entity which is nondifferent or different from the group (kalāpa) [of its causes and conditions][32] nowhere exists
> In the way in which the spiritually immature (bāla) have imagined oneness and difference.
> [Laṅkāvatāra 3-102 = 10-598]

Therefore in that way, the meaning of the [opponent's] reason which was stated in order to establish the āyatanas, [namely,] "because they are included in the aggregates," is not established; or else [its] meaning is contradictory.[33]

It is unintelligible that matter exists even apart from the cause of matter. If [you] nevertheless suppose [so], [Nāgārjuna replies,]

If matter [existed] apart from the cause of matter,

it would follow that

Matter would be without a cause. [MMK 4-2ab,c2]

"The cause of matter" (rūpa-kāraṇa) [means] "the cause of the existence of matter," because the middle word is not manifest,[34] just as "the cause of fire" [means "the cause of the existence of fire"]. "Apart from that (tannirmukte?) [means] "apart from the cause of matter (rūpakāraṇena nirmukte?);" the idea is [that this means] "without the cause which shows the existence of matter." "If matter [existed] (rūpe)" [means] "if one maintains that that [matter] is of such a kind because of a mere assertion (pratijñā-mātra)." "It would follow that matter would be without a cause" means "[it would follow] that there would be no possibility [of matter's existing]." Since that also is not maintained, the stated fault [in your reason] is not avoided.

Objection: Those who hold that [things] have no cause (ahetuvādin or nirhetuvādin)[35] say: Since [we] accept that all entities originate from no cause at all, the establishment of matter is also similar to [the establishment of] those [other entities].

Answer: If there were anything of the kind which you have described [i. e., something which originates without a cause], that [origination of matter without a cause] would also be possible; but

No thing (artha) without a cause exists anywhere.
[MMK 4-2c2,d]

Therefore, since there is no example [of a thing without a cause], that doctrine (vāda) also has no proof. Since [we] refuted those who hold that [things] have no cause also at the very beginning [MMK 1-1], that [contention of theirs] is pointless.

Objection: Those who hope to be learned in the system of the Sāṃkhyas say: Since you have said that earth and so on are not different from visible form and so on, [you] have accepted their nondifference. Therefore,

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, earth and so on can be known to exist as real substances,

[Reason:] because they are not different from visible form and so on,

[Example:] like the own self of visible form and so on.

Answer: Because, by the method which has been explained, nondifference is not established, the meaning of [your] reason is not established. [Your] example also does not exist, because the own self of visible form and so on have been rejected.

Objection:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, earth and so on do indeed

exist,

[Reason:] because their effect exists.

[Dissimilar Example:] Here that which does not exist has no effect which can be grasped, as a sky-flower [has no effect].

[Application:] Earth and so on have an effect, visible form and so on.

[Conclusion:] Therefore earth and so on do indeed exist.

Answer:

> If a cause of matter existed apart from matter,
> It would be a cause (kāraṇa) without an effect (kārya); [but] there is no cause without an effect. [MMK 4-3]

For our position, if a cause of [secondary] matter, [that is, the elements] earth and so on, existed apart from [secondary] matter, therefore it would be a cause without an effect due to the defining characteristic of the effect, visible form and so on. [This is so] because [the cause would be] different [from the effect], like rtsi rkyang[36] and so on.[37] "There is no cause without an effect." The idea is that [this is so] because that [cause] also has the nature (-ātmaka) of a combination of visible form and so on.[38]

Therefore there is the fault that the meaning of the

previously stated reason, "because their effect exists," is not established, since the effect also, like the cause, is not established. If you state [that] as a reason which is commonly known [in the world], [its] meaning is contradictory.[39]

There is also another answer criticizing (*dūṣaṇa*) [the opponent's position]. Here[40] if one conceptually constructs (*kḷp*) a cause of matter, it must be conceptually constructed for either existent or nonexistent matter. [Nāgārjuna] explains that [a cause] is possible for neither:

> Even if matter existed, a cause of matter would not be possible. [MMK 4-4ab]

[This is so] because [matter already] exists, like a jar and a cloth which exist [already and therefore do not need a cause to produce them].

But even if it does not exist,

> Even if matter did not exist, a cause of matter would not be possible. [MMK 4-4cd]

Earth and so on are considered [to be the cause of secondary matter]. The idea is that [a cause of nonexistent secondary matter is not possible] because

[secondary matter] does not exist prior to [its] origination, like [something] different from that [secondary matter].[41] Here the criticism (dūṣaṇa) explained in the chapter on nonorigination (anutpāda) has been repeated; therefore one should understand that [MMK 4-4] is a statement of the [same] criticism [as MMK 1-6].[42]

Objection: Those who hold that [things] have no cause say: A cause just does not exist.

Answer: To them, [Nāgārjuna] replies,

Matter without a cause is not at all (naiva naiva) possible. [MMK 4-5ab]

The idea is that [this is so] because that is not accepted even in superficial reality (saṃvṛtyā).

Alternatively, [one may explain MMK 4-5ab as follows:]

Objection: The Vaibhāṣikas say: Future matter also exists.

Answer: To them, [Nāgārjuna] replies,

Matter without a cause is not at all possible. [MMK 4-5ab]

The idea is that [this is so] because it is not established that the future, which has not appropriated a cause of [its] origination,[43] which has not attained its

own existence,[44] exists even conventionally.

Because in that way matter of the nature of the elements and [matter of a nature] dependent on the elements are not possible in any way,

> Therefore one should not construct (vikalpayet) any conceptual constructions (vikalpa) concerning matter (rūpa-gata). [MMK 4-5cd]

[The verse refers to] one who is wise,[45] [who] wishes to comprehend the reality of dharmas [or "the Dharma," dharma-tattva], which is quite free from conceptual construction, [and whose] eye of right cognition has fully opened. He should not conceptually construct [any of] the many conceptual constructions which have such objects as matter which exists as a real substance, which is different from its cause, or which is not different from its cause, or the distinctions of color and shape of those, etc.[46] [Those conceptual constructions] are like the objects seen in a dream about a son who is not [yet] born, such as the son's [bodily] form and enjoyments, after one has awakened.[47]

Therefore because in that way the cause of matter is not possible, [the reason in the opponent's last syllogism] is not free from the faults which we have stated.

Moreover,

Objection: Here the effect is similar to [its] cause, by the defining characteristic that the qualities of the cause are seen also in the effect, due to a continuous process.[48]

Answer: To them, [Nāgārjuna] replies,

> It is not possible [to say] that the effect is similar (*sadṛśa*) to the cause. [MMK 4-6ab]

It is not possible to teach that the effect is similar to the cause. The meaning is that that cause is just not the effect. Here [the fact] that the alleged cause[49] is not the cause [is adduced as] the property to be established; and the teaching that [cause and effect] are similar is adduced [as] the property which establishes [that]. The example [is indicated] by virtue of that [predicate and reason]: "like a [similar] real substance (*dravya*) in a different series." Here the syllogism is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the alleged cause, blue threads, are not the cause of a blue blanket,

[Reason:] because they are similar [to it],

[Example:] just as [they are not the cause of] a blue blanket different from that [blue blanket allegedly caused by these blue threads].[50]

Objection: Here the Sāṃkhyas say: Since it is not established that the alleged cause of the blue blanket is

not also present in a blue blanket different from that, [your] example does not exist.[51]

<u>Answer</u>: That is not good. [There is no fault in our example] because [we] take as [our] example just what is established <u>not</u> to be the entity which is the cause of that [blanket] which occurs now.[52] Also, there is no fault [in our example] because this negation [in the thesis of our syllogism] has its expressive force (<u>mthu</u>, probably <u>śakti</u> here) used up by just the negation of the meaning to be expressed [by] that word with which it is connected. [This is so] because that [negation] does not indicate a particular quality (<u>viśeṣa</u>) of that [object of negation], as [in the negation,] "He is not a <u>brāhmaṇa</u>."[53]

<u>Objection</u>: [Our] fellow Buddhists,[54] who hold that the effect may be [either] similar or not similar to [its] cause, say: With regard to a subsequent moment which originates from a previous moment with a similar defining characteristic - as in [the flame of] a lamp, a stream of water, and so on - [the moment of the effect] is similar to the moment of the cause; therefore [in this case, cause and effect] are similar. With regard to a subsequent moment which originates from a previous moment with a dissimilar defining characteristic - as in [the origination of] ashes and curds [from] wood and milk [respectively], and so on - [the moment of the effect] is

not similar to the moment of the cause; therefore [in this case, cause and effect] are not similar.

Answer: In that connection, that effect which is similar to its cause has been negated by the very inferences which [we] have [already] stated. Concerning that effect which is not similar to its cause, [Nāgārjuna] says,

> It is also not possible [to say] that the effect is not similar to the cause. [MMK 4-6cd]

Here also [the fact] that [the effect, such as] a sprout, is not an effect of the alleged cause, [such as a seed, is adduced as] the property to be established; and the teaching that [cause and effect] are not similar is adduced [as] the property which establishes [that]. Therefore the remaining member [of the syllogism] is also manifest as before. Here the inference is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, a sprout is not an effect of [its] alleged cause,

[Reason:] because it is not similar [to that alleged cause],

[Example:] like gravel and so on.

Objection:

[Thesis:] The seed (ʹbru, dhānya) is indeed the cause of the sprout,

[Reasons:] because [the sprout] occurs when that [seed] exists or because [the sprout] is conventionally designated by means of that [seed].

[Examples:] like the sound of a kettledrum or a barley-sprout.

Answer: That is not good. Since the origination of [things supposedly] possessing origination (utpatti-mat) has been negated in every way, [your] example is not established. Therefore [your syllogism] has the fault of [being] an incomplete proof.

Objection: Since the effect of the eye, etc., [namely,] visual cognition, etc., is not similar to [the eye],[55] [your] reason, "[because] it is not similar," is inconclusive.

Answer: That also is not good. Because visual cognition and so on are of the same sort (rigs mthun pa, probably sajātīya) as what is to be established,[56] they are likewise to be negated. Therefore since no counter-example (vipakṣa) exists, there is no occasion for inconclusiveness [in our reason].[57]

Alternatively, [the argument against the origination of sprouts from seeds or the origination of visual cognition from the eye] is similar to the method which has been stated, [that is,] "Because the alleged [cause], earth and so on, are not the cause [of secondary matter], visible form is not established. Therefore the meaning

of the reason [in your syllogism preceding MMK 4-3], 'because their effect exists,' is not established or is contradictory."[58]

Objection: The Vaibhāṣikas say: The effect may be either similar of not similar to [its] cause, since [we] maintain that the "nonobstructing cause" (byed pa'i rgyu, kāraṇa-hetu) of [a dharma] conditioned (saṃskṛta) by a nonobstructing cause is every [dharma other than itself].[59] Therefore [your] example does not exist [since gravel, for instance, is a nonobstructing cause of a sprout].

Answer: That is not good, because [we] wish to negate the particular efficacy (sādhanatva) of the special (asādhāraṇa) cause which produces [something] of the same kind [as itself], etc.[60]

Thus that section of the text [i. e., the first six verses of chapter four] has negated elemental matter (bhūta-rūpa) and matter dependent on the elements (bhautika-rūpa); therefore it has been shown that the aggregate of matter is not possible. Now [Nāgārjuna] will show that the negation of [the other aggregates,] feeling and so on, [proceeds by] the same method as the negation of matter.

For feeling (vedanā), perception/conception
(saṃjñā), mental formations (saṃskārāḥ), and mind

(citta),[61]

As well as all entities in general (sarvaśaḥ), the
method (krama) is the same as [for] matter.
[MMK 4-7]

The idea is that [this is so] because the negation of feeling and so on also [proceeds by] the same method as the negation of matter. [Previously,] it was shown that

[Thesis:] in ultimate reality, matter does not exist as a real substance,

[Reason:] because if its own cause is not grasped, the cognition (buddhi) of that [matter] does not exist,

[Example:] like an army and so on.

Likewise one should understand in detail that

[Thesis:] in ultimate reality, feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition (vijñāna) also do not exist as real substances,

[Reason:] because if their own cause is not grasped, the cognition of them does not exist,

[Example:] like an army and so on.

It should be stated appropriately [in each case] that the causes of feeling and so on are contact (sparśa), the eye, visible form, light, space, mental attention (manasikāra), and so on.[62]

[Previously,] it was shown that in ultimate reality,

matter is not different from its own causes because

[Thesis:] in ultimate reality, matter is not different from its own assembled parts,

[Reason:] because if that [assemblage] is not grasped, the cognition of that [matter] does not exist,

[Example:] like the own self of [the elements] earth and so on.

Likewise, it should be stated here also that in ultimate reality, feeling and so on are not different from their own causes. Here [the opponent's] criticisms and [our] answers to [his] criticisms are also as before.

[Nāgārjuna] mentions "all entities," although there is no conditioned dharma different from the aggregates, because he wishes to state a negation of the varieties of those [aggregates]. [Thus he mentions "all entities"] in order to negate [the idea] that conceptually constructed (parikalpita) [things], such as jars and cloths, exist as real substances and are different [from their causes].[63] Here also, as before, syllogisms should be stated as appropriate.[64]

Thus because the aggregates are not established, the meaning of the reason [in the opponent's initial syllogism], "because they are included in the aggregates," is not established; and [his] example does not exist. Why [does his example not exist]? Because it does not exist [i. e., is not true] that [dharmas] which are included in

the aggregates of matter and so on exist in ultimate reality.[65]

Alternatively, the meaning of the reason is also contradictory, because what is included in the aggregates exists just conventionally.[66]

Thus by that reasoning (rigs pa, yukti or nyāya),[67]

> For that [opponent] who would give an answer (parīhāra) when [the Mādhyamika] has made a contention (vigraha)[68] by means of emptiness,
> Everything is [in fact] unanswered. It becomes the same as what is to be established (sādhya).[69,70] [MMK 4-8]

As to the defining characteristic of the examination of reality (tattva), if [the Mādhyamika] undertakes the examination of the ultimately real[71] intrinsic nature of some entity,[72] he makes a contention and disputation ('gyed pa, probably vivāda) by means of emptiness. [That is, he does so] following (parigṛhya) the proof (pramāṇa) that in ultimate reality, the āyatanas are without origination and do not exist as real substances.[73] When [the Mādhyamika thus contends], for that [opponent] who speaks in reply by giving a rebuttal (uttara-pakṣa), all those [contentions] are [in fact] unanswered. [This is so] because [his rebuttal] becomes the same as what is to be

established. The idea is that [the opponent's] rebuttal is not established because the examples and reasons which show that [rebuttal] are equally as unestablished as [the predicate] which is to be established.[74]

Likewise,

> For that [opponent] who would utter a censure (upālambha) when [the Mādhyamika] has made an explanation (vyākhyāna) by means of emptiness,
> Everything is [in fact] uncensured. It becomes the same as what is to be established. [MMK 4-9]

If [the Mādhyamika] shows that the aggregates, āyatanas, and dhātus[75] have no intrinsic nature, he explains and analyzes the formulation[76] by means of emptiness. When [the Mādhyamika thus explains], one whose intellect is contaminated by false sources of knowledge (pramāṇa) utters a censure by [saying], "The aggregates do indeed exist, because they are included in the [Four Noble] Truths[77] and so on," etc. For that [opponent], all those [explanations] are [in fact] uncensured and uncriticized (adūṣita). The remainder of the statement is that [this is so] because it becomes the same as what is to be established. Why? Since [that criticism] is similar to the object of [the Mādhyamika's] criticism, it is the same in general as the unestablishedness of

what is to be established.[78] [Thus ācārya Āryadeva] has said,

> One who sees one entity is considered to see all entities,[79]
> Just that which is the emptiness of one is the emptiness of all. [Catuḥśataka 8-16]

As to that, here the meaning of the chapter is that the aggregates have been shown to be without intrinsic nature, by means of stating the faults in the proof adduced [by the opponent] to show that the āyatanas exist.

Therefore [scriptural] statements such as the following are established.[80] [From the Bhagavatī-prajñāpāramitā-suvikrāntavikrāmi-paripṛcchā-sūtra,][81]

Suvikrāntavikrāmin, that which is a teaching belonging to [the doctrine of] the production (abhinirvṛtti-paryāpanna-nirdeśa)[82] of the five aggregates is not the perfection of discernment (prajñā-pāramitā).[83] Suvikrāntavikrāmin, matter is free from (apagata) the intrinsic nature of matter. Likewise, cognition is free from the intrinsic nature of feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition. That which is free from the intrinsic nature of matter, feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition is the perfection of discernment. Suvikrānta-vikrāmin, matter lacks the intrinsic nature of matter

(rūpa-asvabhāva). Likewise, cognition lacks the intrinsic nature of feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition. That which lacks the intrinsic nature of matter, feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition is the perfection of discernment.

Likewise, [from the Ārya-brahma-viśeṣa-cintā-paripṛcchā-sūtra,][84]

I taught the aggregates to the world, [and] the world came to dwell on them.[85]
One who is wise does not dwell on them; he is not soiled by worldly dharmas.
The world has the defining characteristic of space, and space has no defining characteristic.
Therefore that [wise one] comprehends that; he is not soiled by worldly dharmas.

Likewise, [from the Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitā,][86]

A bodhisattva should not give a gift [while] basing himself (pratiṣṭhita) on visible forms, sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles, and dharmas.

Likewise, [from the Ārya-laṅkāvatāra-sūtra,][87]

The three spheres of saṃsāric existence (tribhava)[88] are mere designation (prajñaptimātra); they do not exist with the intrinsic nature of an entity (vastu-svabhāvataḥ).
Thinkers (tārkika) conceptually construct [them] as

the nature of an entity [which is mere] designation (prajñapti-vastu-bhāvena).
[Laṅkāvatāra 3-52 = 10-83]

If one examines [dharmas?] with the intellect, [their] intrinsic nature cannot be ascertained (nāvadhāryate).
Therefore they are taught to be inexpressible and without intrinsic nature. [Laṅkāvatāra 2-173 = 10-167]

The fourth chapter, "Examination of the Aggregates," of the Prajñāpradīpa, a commentary on [Nāgārjuna's] Mūlamadhyamaka composed by ācārya Bhavyakara/Bhavyakāra (legs ldan byed)[89] is concluded.

Notes to Translation of Chapter Four

[1]See Ava P42a-1, D36a-3,4; read as D.

[2]Ava P42b-2 has _rang gi sde pa dang mdo sde pa bye brag tu smra ba dag_; D36b-3 has _rang gi sde pa dang bye brag tu smra ba dag_. Read _rang gi sde pa mdo sde pa dang bye brag tu smra ba dag_, "our fellow Buddhists, the Sautrāntikas and Vaibhāṣikas."

[3]As pointed out in note 6 to my translation of chapter three, _rūpa_ as the first of the five _skandhas_ is "matter" in general. As one of the twelve _āyatanas_ or eighteen _dhātus_, _rūpa_ has the more restricted sense of "visible form." See the references in the note mentioned.

[4]The internal (_ādhyātmika_) _āyatanas_ are the six sense organs, the five physical sense organs plus the mind (_manas_). The external (_bāhya_) _āyatanas_ are the corresponding six sense objects (with dharmas as the object of mind). See AK 1-39ab.

Oddly enough, the opponent refers here to the internal _āyatanas_ and then goes on to speak of all twelve. Saṃghabhadra mentions a view according to which the sense objects were to be considered as internal in any moment when they serve as conditions for the arising of cognition, and as external in any moment when they do not serve as such conditions. (I would like to thank

Professor Collett Cox for this information.)

[5]That is, the five physical sense organs and the five corresponding sense objects.

[6]The three aggregates referred to are feeling (vedanā), perception/conception (saṃjñā), and mental formations (saṃskārāḥ). "One part of the aggregate of matter" refers to the avijñapti posited by the Vaibhāṣikas. It is considered to be material and thus to belong to the rūpa-skandha; but since it is held to be an object only of the mind and not of the physical senses, it belongs to the dharma-āyatana. See Ava P42b-7,8; D36b-7 to 37a-1. On avijñapti, see LVP AK I, pp. 21, 25-27 and IV, pp. 3, 14-27.

[7]On the four great elements (mahābhūta), earth, water, fire, and air (understood as solidity, cohesion, heat, and motion), and matter dependent on them, see LVP AK I, pp. 21-24, 64-67 and II, pp. 144-149, 313-315. See also May, pp. 88-89, n. 184.

[8]"Matter" is here taken to mean "matter dependent on the elements" (bhautika). Thus the elements are its cause. See Ava P43b-3,4; D37b-3.

[9]gzugs zhes bya ba ni gzugs su rung ba'o , probably either rūpaṇād rūpam iti or rūpyata iti rūpam. On the various interpretations given to rūpaṇa/rūpyate, see LVP AK I, pp. 24-25 and notes.

[10]bstsal is an alternative spelling of bsal. (In

fact, Ava P43b-4, D37b-3 has bsal na for bstsal na.) The Sanskrit may be nirākṛta.

[11]According to Avalokitavrata, matter dependent on the elements is designated in dependence on the elements in the same way that a forest is designated in dependence on its constituent trees. See Ava P43b-5,6,7; D37b-4,5.

[12]In other words, the meaning of MMK 4-1ab is the following, according to Bhāvaviveka: Matter dependent on the elements does not exist by intrinsic nature because it is a mere combination of the elements. This is so because matter dependent on the elements is not apprehended apart from the elements, just as a forest is not perceived if the trees which make it up are not perceived. See Ava P43b-7 to 44a-2, D37b-6 to 38a-1.

[13]According to Avalokitavrata, this paragraph is a response to an objection of the Ābhidhārmikas, who hold that mind and mental factors exist as real substances. They charge that the Mādhyamika's reason, "because it is a word," is inconclusive. Although the word "army" does not refer to a real substance, the words "mind" and "mental events" do. The Mādhyamika retorts that he also negates the ultimately real existence of mind and mental events. See Ava P44b-4,5,6; D38b-2,3. The phrase "of the same sort as what is to be established" alludes to MMK 4-8 and 4-9.

[14]Avalokitavrata attributes this objection to

"fellow Buddhists." See Ava P38b-6, D45a-1.

[15]For the Mādhyamikas, nothing exists as a a real substance or in ultimate reality. Hence there is no example which the opponent can cite.

[16]upādāya-rūpa, "secondary matter," is synonymous with bhautika-rūpa, "matter dependent on the elements."

[17]This may be a reference to the Vaibhāṣikas' theory that matter can only exist in the form of molecules (saṃghāta-paramāṇu) composed of four atoms (dravya-paramāṇu) of the elements and varying numbers of atoms of secondary matter. Thus the elements are also dependent on secondary matter for their manifestation. See AK 2-22 and LVP AK II, pp. 144-149.

[18]See Ava P46a-2,3,4; D39b-5,6,7.

[19]The Sanskrit text is in Bunyu Nanjio, The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, Kyoto: Otani University, 1923 (reprint 1956). Verse 3-88 is on p. 200; verse 2-138 is on p. 84. In 2-138d, the Tibetan has 'ba' zhig, kevalāḥ for the Sanskrit's kalpitāḥ. Note also that Bhāvaviveka quotes only the second two (out of three) lines of 3-88.

[20]According to Avalokitavrata, an opponent objects that since "matter" is the subject of Bhāvaviveka's thesis, the "not grasping" mentioned in the reason must be a property (dharma) of matter; but that is absurd because matter is unconscious and cannot grasp (i. e., perceive) anything in any case. Bhāvaviveka replies that

an action (kriyā) resides in both its agent (kartṛ) and its object (karman). Here the action is "not grasping;" the agent is cognition (buddhi); and the object is matter. Thus "not grasping" is a property of cognition. See Ava P47b-2 to 48a-4, D41a-4 to 41b-5.

[21]Since the Sāṃkhyas hold that everything (except puruṣa) is composed of the the three guṇas of prakṛti, for them all entities are nondifferent in any case. See Ava P48a-5,6; D41b-6,7.

[22]Avalokitavrata points out that the negation here is prasajya-pratiṣedha, not paryudāsa-pratiṣedha. See Ava P48a-8, D42a-1,2.

[23]The Vaiśeṣikas mean that even if the assemblage of its parts is not apprehended, matter might be apprehended by some other means, just as a jar may be seen by means of various sources of illumination. See Ava P48b-3 to 8, D42a-3 to 42b-1. The Vaiśeṣikas hold that wholes are different entities from the sum of their parts. See Jadunath Sinha, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, Calcutta: Sinha Publishing, 1956, pp. 596-6; Erich Frauwallner, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, pp. 117-8; and Karl H. Potter, ed., Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology, Vol. 2 of The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1977, pp. 74-79.

[24]Bhāvaviveka replies that he does not argue that

matter is not different from its causes in general, but specifically that it is not different from its own assembled parts. Unlike the Vaiśeṣikas' example of a lamp and a jar, the apprehension of matter's assembled parts is a necessary condition for the apprehension of matter, whereas a jar can be illuminated by something other than a lamp. See especially Ava P49b-2 to 6, D43a-2 to 5.

[25]Literally, they "possess composition" (rtsom pa, ārambha)." On the Vaiśeṣikas' ārambhavāda, another term for asatkāryavāda, see Frauwallner, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 59 and Potter, op. cit., pp. 14-15, 57-60, 443.

[26]According to Avalokitavrata, because they are parts according to superficial reality, they do not compose a part-possessing real substance in ultimate reality. See Ava P50b-3,4; D44a-2,3.

[27]That is, according to Avalokitavrata, the property to be established is that the elements are a mere combination of visible form and so on; and the property which establishes that is the fact that if visible form and so on are not seen, the elements are also not seen. See especially Ava P49b-8 to 51a-1, D44b-6.

[28]Avalokitavrata points out that the negations of difference and sameness are prasajya-pratiṣedha, not paryudāsa-pratiṣedha. See P51b-6 to 52a-1, D45a-4,5,6.

[29]See, e. g., MMK 14-5cd.

[30]If the negation of difference must imply sameness, then because milk and curds are not different (since curds are a transformation of milk), they would have to be identical; but that is absurd. Compare Ava P52a-2,3,4; D45a-7 to 45b-2 and MMK 13-6.

[31]See Ava P52a-6, D45b-3. The Sanskrit text is in Nanjio, op. cit., pp. 202 and 339. In the first pāda, 3-102a has ´nyo ´nyaḥ (´nyonyaḥ?) while 10-598a has hy anyaḥ. The Tibetan here, gzhan pa ma yin, corresponds to ananyaḥ. Also, both Sanskrit verses have tīrthyair in the fourth pāda, while the Tibetan corresponds to bālair.

[32]See Ava P52a-7, D45b-4.

[33]If the reason refers to ultimate reality, it is not established. If it refers to superficial reality, it is contradictory to try to prove a positive thesis about ultimate reality with a reason which is only conventionally valid. Compare Ava P52b-4, D45b-1.

[34]bar gyi tshig mi mngon pa´i phyir, probably madhya-pada-pralopāt.

[35]"Lokāyatas and the like," according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P53a-8, D46b-3.

[36]rtsi rkyang is defined as rtswa zhig, "a [kind of] grass," in Dge bshes Chos kyi grags pa, Brda dag ming tshig gsal ba, Peking: Mi rigs dpe bskrun khang, 1957.

The idea may be that grass is a purely conventional entity and thus is different from the elements if, as the

opponent holds, they exist in ultimate reality. Secondary matter, too, only exists conventionally and thus would be ontologically different from its alleged cause. See the following note.

[37]Avalokitavrata's interpretation of this passage is as follows: If you (the opponent) hold that the elements exist in ultimate reality, then it follows that they would have no effect. This is so because in ultimate reality, their supposed effect, secondary matter, is empty of intrinsic nature. But if you hold that secondary matter exists in superficial reality while the elements exist in ultimate reality, then one cannot be the cause of the other, because of their (ontological) difference. See Ava P55a-3 to 8, D47a-4 to 7.

[38]Since the elements are a mere combination of secondary matter, visible form and so on, they have no intrinsic nature in ultimate reality. See Ava P55b-1, D48b-1.

[39]Once again, the reason is not established in ultimate reality. While it may be valid conventionally, it cannot prove a positive thesis concerning ultimate reality.

[40]In ultimate reality, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P55b-7, D48b-6.

[41]In other words, consider the time at which the cause allegedly produces an effect. If the effect exists

at that time, its production by a cause is superfluous. If it does not exist at that time, one might as well say that the cause produces a sky-flower, since the effect is nonexistent. Compare Ava P56a-2,3,4; D49a-2,3. Such an analysis depends on the idea that a seed, for instance, is the cause of a sprout only at the moment when it actually produces it.

[42]See Ava P56a-4 to 7, D49a-4,5,6. Although the title of the first chapter of the MMK is pratyaya-parīkṣa in all the commentaries, Bhāvaviveka often refers to it as dealing with anutpāda, as indeed it does.

[43]skye ba'i rgyu ma blangs pa, probably anupātta-utpāda-hetu. An effect is said to "appropriate (upā-dā)" its causes; see, for instance, CPP 259.1-5.

[44]bdag nyid kyi dngos po ma thob pa, probably alabdha/aprāpta-ātma-bhāva.

[45]Or "skillful," mkhas pa. According to Avalokitavrata, this refers to the bodhisattva who has attained receptivity to the fact that dharmas do not originate (anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti). See Ava P57a-1 to 57b-1, D50a-1 to 50b-1. This attainment is said to occur on the eighth bodhisattva-bhūmi. See Étienne Lamotte, The Teaching of Vimalakīrti, tr. Sara Boin, Sacred Books of the Buddhists, Vol. XXXII, London: Pali Text Society, 1976, pp. 290-1.

[46]de dag la sogs pa, that is, matter as conceived of

in those and other ways.

[47]That is, the bodhisattva who has attained anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti has awakened from the sleep of saṃsāra and realizes that the objects which he used to conceptually construct have no intrinsic nature. See Ava P57a-4 to 57b-1, D50a-4 to 50b-1.

[48]snga na yod pa'i rim gyis, perhaps prāg-bhāva-krameṇa, literally, "by the stage[s] of prior existence."

[49]smra bar 'dod pa'i rgyu, probably vivakṣita-hetu, "the cause of which [the opponent] wishes to speak," as, for example, the opponent wishes to say that the elements are the cause of secondary matter. See Ava P58a-1,2; D50b-7.

[50]In other words, the opponent wishes to say that a blue blanket is caused by the blue threads out of which it is woven, because they have the same color. But the threads also have the same color as other blue blankets, and the opponent does not admit that these particular threads are the cause of those other blankets.

[51]After the periodic destruction of the universe, all matter is "recycled;" and on a more mundane level, when Devadatta's blue blanket becomes torn, threads from Yajñadatta's blue blanket may be used to mend it. See Ava P58b-1,2,3; D51a-6,7.

[52]In other words, our example is Devadatta's presently existing blanket; and the opponent must admit

that the threads presently existing in Yajñadatta's blanket are not the cause of Devadatta's presently existing blanket. See Ava P58b-5 to 8, D51b-2,3,4.

[53]When Bhāvaviveka says that in ultimate reality, threads are not the cause of the blue blanket, it is a prasajya-pratiṣedha. It does not imply that the threads exist in ultimate reality as a noncause of the blanket. See Ava P59a-1 to 5, D51b-5 to 52a-1.

[54]The Ābhidhārmikas, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P59a-7, D52a-2,3.

[55]The eye is material (rūpin), and visual cognition is not. See Ava P60b-1,2,3; D53a-4,5.

[56]That is, the origination of visual cognition from the eye and the origination of a sprout from a seed are both instances of an effect's arising from a dissimilar cause. Thus they are both equally in need of proof. See Ava P60b-3,4,5; D53a-7 to 53b-1.

[57]On this line of argument, see MMK 4-8 and 4-9, with Bhāvaviveka's commentary.

[58]See Ava P60b-8 to 61b-1, D53b-2 to 54a-3, for an explicit statement of the analogous argument.

[59]Every dharma is said to be the kāraṇa-hetu of every conditioned dharma other than itself, in the sense that it does not obstruct its origination (necessarily, since we only consider dharmas which exist at some time or other and thus do originate). See AK 2-50a and LVP AK

II, pp. 246-8; see also Ava P61b-2 to 7, D54a-3 to7. One might expect kāraṇa-hetu to mean something like "productive cause;" and the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya tells us that this is its primary (pradhāna) meaning (see LVP AK II, p. 247). All dharmas other than the productive cause are also called kāraṇa-hetu, however, in the extended sense of not obstructing origination.

[60]That is, we are only concerned with the productive cause and not with kāraṇa-hetu in the broad sense. See Ava P62a-1,2,3; D54b-1,2,3.

[61]Here Nāgārjuna uses citta as the name of the fifth skandha, in place of the more usual vijñāna, apparently for metrical reasons.

[62]According to Avalokitavrata, contact is mentioned as the special (asādhāraṇa) cause of feeling. The eye and the rest are mentioned as the special causes of visual cognition and its conjoined mental factors (samprayukta-caitta; see AK 2-23a,34 and LVP AK II, pp. 177-8). The mental factors belong, variously, to the three aggregates of feeling, perception/conception, and mental formations.

[63]Avalokitavrata says that opponents might conceptually construct jars, cloths, etc., and use them as reasons and examples in arguments which attempt to refute the Mādhyamika's arguments concerning the aggregates. Avalokitavrata also adds nondifference [from

the cause] as something which the Mādhyamika negates. See Ava P63b-8 to 64a-3, D56a-6 to 56b-1.

64 Avalokitavrata spells out syllogisms for a jar and a cloth parallel to those already given for matter. See Ava P64a-3 to 64b-1, D56b-2 to 7.

65 In his opening syllogism at the beginning of this chapter, the opponent gives a dissimilar example, a sky-flower, which does not exist and is not included in the aggregates. Here Bhāvaviveka is saying that things which are included in the aggregates do not exist in ultimate reality, either. See Ava P64b-3 to 6, D57a-1,2,3.

66 Again, it is contradictory to try to prove a positive thesis about ultimate reality with a reason which holds only conventionally. See Ava P64b-6,7; D57a-3,4.

67 That is, by the reasoning which has been explicitly formulated here for matter and then extended to all dharmas. See Ava P64b-8 to 65a-1, D57a-5.

68 The Mādhyamika's argument that all dharmas are empty of intrinsic nature is called a "contention" because it is directed against those who hold that entities do have intrinsic nature. See Ava P65a-2,3; D57a-6,7. Candrakīrti is more explicit: _tatra parapakṣadūṣaṇaṃ vigrahaḥ_. He glosses _vigrahe_... _kṛte_ as _sasvabhāvavāde pratiṣiddhe_. (See CPP 127.5,6.)

69 Avalokitavrata gives the following example: An

opponent replies to the Mādhyamika's argument that such-and-such a thing is empty of intrinsic nature by saying that it is not empty because its cause exists. But this is no answer, because the cause is just as empty of intrinsic nature as the thing in question. See Ava P65a-4 to 7, D57a-8 to 57b-3.

[70]MMK 4-8 and 4-9 have been the subject of some discussion by modern scholars, particularly with regard to Nāgārjuna's use of the expression samaṃ sādhyena. See B. K. Matilal, "A Note on the Nyāya Fallacy sādhyasama and petitio principii," Journal of Indian Philosophy 2 (1974), 211-24; Kamaleswar Bhattacharya, "A Note on the Interpretation of Term sādhyasama in Madhyamaka Texts," ibid., 225-30; D. S.. Ruegg, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India, Vol. VII, Fasc. 1 of A History of Indian Literature, ed. Jan Gonda, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981, pp. 12, 22 n. 49; and D. S. Ruegg, "On the Thesis and Assertion in the Madhyamaka/dBu ma," in Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist Religion and Philosophy, ed. Ernst Steinkellner and Helmut Tauscher, Heft 11 of Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, ed. Ernst Steinkellner, Vienna: Arbeitkreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien: 1983, p. 210.

[71]don dam pa, paramārtha, glossed by Avalokitavrata as don dam pa pa, pāramārthika. See Ava P65b-1,2; D57b-

5.

[72]This construction is paraphrased by Avalokitavrata as, "If when he examines the defining characteristic of the reality of all dharmas, he then undertakes the examination of the ultimately real intrinsic nature of some external or internal entity..." See Ava P65b-2, D57b-5.

[73]Avalokitavrata says that the proof of nonorigination is given in chapter one and the proof of not existing as a real substance is given in this chapter. See AVA P65b-3 to 8, D57b-6 to 58a-3. In general, pramāṇa means "source of correct knowledge;" but since the pramāṇa in question here is anumāna, "inference," I have translated it as "proof."

[74]Since no dharma originates by intrinsic nature or exists as a real substance, there is no example and no proof which the opponent can successfully adduce. See Ava P66a-7 to 66b-4, D58b-2 to 5.

[75]The eighteen dhātus are the twelve āyatanas (the six sense organs and the six sense objects) plus the six corresponding sense cognitions (e. g., the eye, visible form, and visual cognition).

[76]sbyor ba rnam par dbye ba byas te| rnam par bshad pa'i tshe, apparently glossing vyākhyāne... kṛte as vyākhyāne prayoga/yoga/vidhi-vibhāge kṛte. Avalokitavrata says that it means analyzing the same

formulation that the Mādhyamika used when he made a contention by means of emptiness. See Ava P67a-6,7; D59a-6.7.

77 See Ava P67b-4, D59b-4.

78 The entities cited by the opponent in his reason and example are included in the Mādhyamika's original criticism that all entities are not established by intrinsic nature. Therefore one can state in general that they are just as unestablished as what the opponent is trying to establish by means of them. See Ava P67b-7 to 68a-3, D59b-7 to 60a-3.

79 The Sanskrit of this ardhaśloka is bhāvasyaikasya yo draṣṭā draṣṭā sarvasya sa smṛtaḥ, "One who is a seer of one entity is considered to be a seer of all" (quoted CPP 128.3,4).

80 See note 151 to my translation of chapter three. Avalokitavrata's remarks here are similar. See Ava P68a-6 to 68b-1, D60a-6,7; P68b-2, D60b-1; P68b-8, D60b-5,6; P69a-5,6, D61a-3; P69a-7,8, D61a-4,5; and P69b-3,4,5, D61a-7 to 61b-2.

81 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P68b-1, D60a-7.

82 Avalokitavrata explains abhinirvṛtti-paryāpanna-nirdeśa as skye bar bsdus pa ston pa, "a teaching summed up in origination." See Ava P68b-2,3; D60b-1,2.

83 The Sanskrit text of this sentence is found in

Ryusho Hikata, Suvikrāntavikrāmi-paripṛcchā Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra, Fukuoka, Japan: Kyushu University, 1958, p. 37. The remainder of the passage is found on p. 29 of the same work.

[84]Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P68b-7, D60b-5. See note 98 to my translation of chapter five.

[85]de la... gnas par gyur. Avalokitavrata glosses gnas par gyur as chags shing lhag par chags par gyur, "becomes attached and clings." See Ava P68b-8 to 69a-1, D60b-6,7.

[86]Identified by Avalokitavrata as the Ārya-triśatikā-[prajñāpāramitā]-sūtra, another title of the sūtra; see Ava P69a-4,5; D61a-2. The Sanskrit text is in Edward Conze, Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā, Serie Orientale Roma XIII, Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 2nd ed., 1974, p. 29.

[87]Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P69a-6, D61a-4. The Sanskrit text is in Nanjio, op. cit. Verse 3-52 is on p. 168; verse 2-173 is on p. 116.

[88]The three bhavas are the same as the three dhātus, i. e., the realms of desire (kāma), form (rūpa), and formlessness (ārūpya).

[89]See note 161 to my translation of chapter three.

Translation of Prajñāpradīpa, Chapter Five:
Examination of the Elements (dhātu)[1]

Now [Nāgārjuna] begins the fifth chapter with the aim of showing that the elements have no intrinsic nature by means of refuting a particular counterposition (vipakṣa) to emptiness.

Objection: Because [Nāgārjuna] stated, in the immediately preceding chapter, that

> Apart from matter, the cause of matter is also not seen, [MMK 4-1cd]

therefore, to begin with, our fellow Buddhists (svayūthya) say: Here the Blessed One taught the defining characteristics (lakṣaṇa) of the six elements called "earth, water, fire, air, space (ākāśa), and cognition (vijñāna)," by saying, "Great king, these six elements are the person (puruṣa)."[2] [Those characteristics are, respectively,] solidity, cohesion, heat, motion, providing room (skabs 'byed pa, perhaps avakāśadāna), and knowing (rnam par shes par byed pa, probably vijñānanā). It is not taught that nonexistent [things] like a sky-flower are the cause of a person. Therefore that assertion (pratijñā) made by the ācārya [Nāgārjuna], that the cause of matter does not exist even in earth and so on, will conflict with what [he himself] accepts

(abhyupagata-bādha).[3]

[The Mādhyamika] may reply that he accepts that the Tathāgata taught that the six elements are the person conventionally (vyavahārataḥ). Therefore there is no fault [in his position].

[If so, we respond that] it is not the case that there is no fault [in the Mādhyamika's position], because it is accepted that [that statement] is taught as ultimate reality (paramārthataḥ).

[The Mādhyamika] may reply that since that is not established,[4] [his alleged fault] is not [logically] possible.

[If so, we respond that] it is not the case that it is not established.

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the elements, earth and so on, do indeed exist,

[Reason:] because their defining characteristics exist.

[Dissimilar Example:] Here that of which the Blessed One has said, "It does not exist in ultimate reality," has no defining characteristic, like a sky-flower.

[Application:] Earth and so on have the defining characteristics of solidity and so on.

[Conclusion:] Thus because their defining characteristics exist, the elements, earth and so on, do indeed exist.

Answer: As to that, here it is easy to show that

the intrinsic nature of space is empty;[5] and it is also easy to negate the remaining elements by showing that that [intrinsic nature of space] does not exist. Therefore, the ācārya [Nāgārjuna] says, with reference just to the element of space,

> There is not any space prior to the defining characteristic of space. [MMK 5-1ab]

The idea is that [this is so] because they are inseparable (dbyer med pa, perhaps abhedya).

Here, since the Vaibhāṣikas teach that space is just nonobstruction (anāvaraṇa),[6] nonobstruction itself is space. But since [they attempt to] establish that that [space] also exists, that which is to be established (sādhya) by the existence of nonobstruction and [the reason] which establishes [it] (sādhana) are [both] not established. For instance, [as in the fallacious proof,] "Sound is impermanent because it is sound," likewise, here also it would be said [in effect] that space exists because it is space.[7]

Alternatively, [one may explain MMK 5-1ab as follows:]

Objection: [Fellow Buddhists][8] who are averse to the system (naya) of the Madhyamaka-śāstra say: [We] do not accept [any] difference of the thing characterized

(laksya) and [its] defining characteristic (laksana), due to which [difference] that [space] would not be possible [either] sequentially or simultaneously [with its defining characteristic]. For example, it is not possible that the great man (mahāpurusa) is different from the marks of the great man. Here [we] say that that is a characteristic (laksana) because it is to be characterized (laksyate?),[9] since a primary affix (bya ba'i rkyen, probably krt-pratyaya) is used in [the sense of] the object of the action (karman).[10]

Answer: Even if those [i. e., the characteristic and the thing characterized] are accepted in that way,[11] [we still say,]

> There is not any space prior to the defining characteristic of space. [MMK 5-1ab]

If space itself is [its own] defining characteristic, to use (nye bar sbyor bar byed pa) [that] in order to establish that [space] by means of that [space] itself cannot be a [valid] reason, because the meaning [of that reason] is not established. Therefore what would establish what?[12]

Objection: It is common knowledge (prasiddha) that conventionally existent space is nonobstruction.

Answer: A reason is not required (isyate) in order to show that [well-known conventional existence of space].

Objection: Because [the existence of space] in ultimate reality is not common knowledge, one should strive to show [that it is] so.

Answer: Even in that [case], there are faults of the reason and example,[13] [so that your syllogism] remains a mere assertion (pratijñā).

Alternatively, [one may also explain MMK 5-1ab as follows:]

Objection: The Vaibhāṣikas and Vaiśeṣikas say: Space exists as a real substance (dravya) and is unconditioned (asaṃskṛta).[14]

Answer: To them, [Nāgārjuna] says,

> There is not any space prior to the defining characteristic of space. [MMK 5-1ab]

[This half-verse] presents the thesis, [understood as referring to space] which is a real substance. [The fact] that that [space] is unoriginated, which is common knowledge to both sides [the Mādhyamika and the opponent], is the property (dharma) [of the subject, space, which proves the predicate, "does not exist in ultimate reality"]. The example is by virtue of that [thesis and reason], [that is,] a hare's horn and so on. Here the inference (anumāna) is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, space does not exist as a real substance,

[Reason:] because it is unoriginated,

[Example:] like a hare's horn.
Likewise, reasons such as "because it has no cause," "because it has no effect," and "because it does not exist" should also be stated.

Objection:[15] Space is the defining characteristic of sound.

Answer: For those [who hold that position], also, since sound itself is space, the fault in the reason is as before.[16]

Objection:[17] If this meaning [which you have explained] were the intention of the author of the treatise [Nāgārjuna], in that case, the author of the treatise would simply have said that

> There is not any space which is different from the defining characteristic of space.[18]

Answer: [Nāgārjuna] establishes the negation of difference just by showing that priority and posteriority are not possible. Therefore that [objection of yours] does not contradict [my explanation].

Objection: The Vaiśeṣikas assert that the thing characterized (lakṣya) and [its] defining characteristic (lakṣaṇa) are different.[19]

Answer:

[Thesis:] If those two [i. e., the thing characterized and its defining characteristic] are different (tayor anyatve), they will sometimes be antecedent

and subsequent,

[Reason:] because they are different,

[Example:] like jars and cloths.

Therefore [Nāgārjuna] says,

> If [space] were prior to [its] defining characteristic, it would follow that it would be without a defining characteristic. [MMK 5-1cd]

"Without a defining characteristic" (mtshan nyid med pa, alakṣaṇa) [means] "having no defining characteristic" (mtshan nyid yod pa ma yin pa, perhaps asal-lakṣaṇa or avidyamāna-lakṣaṇa). The meaning is that that [space] would not be something characterized [by the defining characteristic, nonobstruction, as] alleged [by the opponent].[20]

> If [space] were prior to [its] defining characteristic: {MMK 5-1c]

This [pāda] indicates that difference of time is the property of that [subject, space, which proves the thesis]. Here the inference is:

[Thesis:] Space is not something characterized [by] the alleged defining characteristic,

[Reason:] because it exists at a time earlier than that [alleged defining characteristic],

[Example:] like [something] other that that [space].

Alternatively, [one may explain MMK 5-1cd as follows:][21]

> It would follow that [space] would not belong to [its alleged] defining characteristic (alakṣaṇa). [MMK 5-1d]

"Not belonging to the defining characteristic" (mtshan nyid la med pa, perhaps lakṣaṇasya nāsti) [is the sense of] alakṣaṇa. The meaning is that that [space] would not have [the property of] being something characterized (lakṣyatva).

> If [space] were prior to [its] defining characteristic: [MMK 5-1c]

[Here] "space" is the topic under discussion (skabs, probably prastāva or the like). This [pāda] indicates that the difference of the defining characteristic from the thing characterized is the property of that [subject, the defining characteristic, which proves the thesis]. Here the inference is:

[Thesis:] The alleged defining characteristic cannot characterize the thing characterized, space,

[Reason:] because it is different [from space],

[Example:] like [a defining characteristic] different from that [alleged defining characteristic].

[If the thing characterized and its defining characteristic are different,] it contradicts the opponent's[22] own inference, [since] he does not maintain that the

defining characteristic does not exist in the thing characterized and the defining characteristic.[23] Therefore the conceptual construction (vikalpa) of difference should also be abandoned.

Objection: Because they cannot be turned back [even] with a stick,[24] [our opponents say:] If [we] state a reason pertaining to superficial reality (sāṃvṛta-hetu), it is not the case that the meaning of [our] reason is not established; but it is difficult to avoid [its] having a contradictory meaning.[25] Therefore it is not established that the defining characteristic is a different thing (artha) [from the thing it characterizes] or that it is a nondifferent thing. Therefore space is [an entity] "without a defining characteristic" (alakṣaṇa).

Answer: It is also unintelligible (shes par byar mi nus) that that [space] is an entity without a defining characteristic. For,

> There is not any entity (bhāva) anywhere without a defining characteristic. [MMK 5-2ab]

An ultimately real (pāramārthika) entity [without a defining characteristic][26] is not established anywhere, [neither on] the side (pakṣa) of others or our own side.

Objection:[27]

[Thesis:] The thing characterized, space, does indeed exist,

[Reason:] because the defining characteristic applies to that.

Answer: Specifying that that is also not [logically] possible, [Nāgārjuna says,]

> If an entity without a defining characteristic does not exist, to what does the defining characteristic apply (kramatām)? [MMK 5-2cd]

Since there is no basis (gzhi; ādhāra, āśraya, vastu, etc.) [to which the defining characteristic might apply], the [opponent's] reason, like [that] basis, is not established. [That is,] the reason, [the defining characteristic's] applying [to it], is not established for a nonexistent object (viṣaya). Therefore there will be the fault that the meaning of the reason is not established.

Alternatively, [one may explain MMK 5-2cd as follows:] In the case [where the thing characterized and the defining characteristic] are nondifferent, if the thing characterized and the defining characteristic are nondifferent, that very [thing] cannot characterize that [same thing]. Because a defining characteristic different from that [space] does not exist, space has no

defining characteristic.

Also, in the case [where the thing characterized and the defining characteristic] are different,

[Thesis:] The alleged defining characteristic is not the defining characteristic of the thing characterized,

[Reason:] because it is different [from that thing],

[Example:] like [a defining characteristic] different from that [alleged defining characteristic].

Since a defining characteristic does not exist, by that [argument] also, space has no defining characteristic. If an entity without a defining characteristic, called "space," does not exist, to what will the defining characteristic apply? The meaning is that it is just not established that that [defining characteristic] applies [to anything].

Moreover, the meaning of that reason, "[because the defining characteristic] applies to the thing characterized," [is the following:] Here the thing characterized is known by means of that invariable concommitance (med na mi 'byung ba, avinābhāva) of this defining characteristic with the properties (dharma), existence and so on, of the thing characterized. But when, for our position,

> A defining characteristic does not apply (pravṛtti) to [a thing] which has no defining characteristic nor to one which does have a defining characteris-

tic, [MMK 5-3ab]

then the idea is that [this is so] because a defining characteristic is not established for a nonexistent [thing which has no defining characteristic] and because an entity which has a defining characteristic is also not established.

A thing characterized which is different in kind (vilakṣaṇa) from the sort which has been described,[28] is also not established. Therefore,

> [A defining characteristic] also does not apply to something other than [a thing] which has a defining characteristic and [a thing] which has no defining characteristic. [MMK 5-3cd]

Therefore in that way, the meaning of what you maintain is not established in ultimate reality, because it is not established that a defining characteristic applies to a contradictory (viruddha) entity, and because there is no example.[29]

Alternatively, [one may explain MMK 5-3 as follows:] Because that defining characteristic does not exist in [things] without a defining characteristic, such as sky-flowers, it does not apply [to them]. That [fact] is common knowledge.

Now, [as for] "nor to one which has a defining characteristic" [MMK 5-3b2], that initial mention (*skabs*, probably *prastāva*) of [the idea] that a defining characteristic does not apply to [a thing] which has a defining characteristic, sets forth the thesis. The property of that [defining characteristic, which proves the thesis] is that it is a defining characteristic of [a thing] which is [said to] "have a defining characteristic" if it is characterized by some defining characteristic. The example is by virtue of that [thesis and reason], [that is,] defining characteristics other than that [alleged defining characteristic]. Here the inference is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, nonobstruction is not the defining characteristic of space,

[Reason:] because it is a defining characteristic,

[Example:] like solidity and so on.

Objection: Those who speak in both ways[30] say: A defining characteristic applies to [a thing] which [both] has a defining characteristic and does not have a defining characteristic, according to the mode (*rnam grangs las*, probably *paryāyeṇa*). Therefore there is no fault [in our position].

Answer: In order to refute that [position] also, [Nāgārjuna] says,

> [A defining characteristic] also does not apply to something other than [a thing] which has a defin-

ing characteristic and [a thing] which has no defining characteristic. [MMK 5-3cd]

That, too, is not [logically] possible [1] because an entity which has the nature of both is not possible[31] and [2] because relative determination (ltos pa'i nges pa) will also be negated below in chapter [ten], "Examination of Fire and Fuel,"[32] and [3] because the two faults shown in both cases [separately] will come about.[33]

[Buddhapālita[34] explains MMK 5-3ab as follows:]

A defining characteristic does not apply to [a thing] which has no defining characteristic. [MMK 5-3a,b1]

Here, because in that way there is not any entity without a defining characteristic, therefore if an entity without a defining characteristic does not exist, it is not possible that a defining characteristic applies to a nonexistent basis (gzhi med pa).

Nor to one which has a defining characteristic. [MMK 5-3b2]

Here also, it is not possible that a defining characteristic applies to an entity which has a defining characteristic, either, because it is unnecessary (niṣprayojana).

Answer: That is not [logically] possible, [1] because if a defining characteristic exists, it is

not possible that it does not exist in [that thing] which possesses it and [2] because the thing characterized likewise exists.[35] Also, in [the case of] an established entity which possesses a defining characteristic, it is not contradictory to apply the defining characteristic to the thing characterized in order to remind the opponent.[36] Therefore that [explanation of Buddhapālita's] is not able [to establish that the defining characteristic and the thing characterized have no intrinsic nature].[37]

Therefore, since in that way it is not possible that the defining characteristic applies to the thing characterized,

> If the defining characteristic does not apply [to it], the thing characterized is not possible. [MMK 5-4ab]

[Thus Nāgārjuna] concludes [his refutation of the opponent's initial syllogism][38] by virtue of the meaning which has been shown.

Objection: Here some who have the conceit of hoping to be learned[39] [and] who cannot bear to reflect upon[40] the faults of their own position [as] stated [by the Mādhyamika] say: When [we] said that space exists because [its] defining characteristic exists, you imputed

priority and posteriority to the thing characterized and [its] defining characteristic [in MMK 5-1] and said that the meaning of our reason is not established. [That is like the following example:] To [someone] who says that sound is impermanent because it is made, [someone else] replies, "If the fact of being made (byas pa nyid, kṛtatva) exists before sound has originated, [then] since sound has a variable connection (vyabhicāra) [with the fact of being made], [that fact] cannot be a reason [which proves a thesis about sound]. But if the fact of being made does not exist before sound has originated and exists later, then the meaning of the reason is not established [because there is an interval when sound does not have the property of being made]."

[The opponent continues,] That statement of that [latter person] is not based on valid reasoning (rigs pa dang ma ldan pa, probably ayuktimat), because it states a specious nonestablishment [of the first speaker's reason] (ma grub pa ltar snang ba, probably asiddhy-ābhāsa). Likewise, you wish to criticize [our] stated reason ["because its defining characteristic exists"][41] by saying,

> There is not any space prior to the defining
> characteristic of space, etc., [MMK 5-1ab, etc.]

[But as in our example,] that statement [of yours] negating an existent defining characteristic is also not

well said.

Answer: The defining characteristic is also included in the thing characterized, due to [its] particular property (*viśeṣa*) of being the same or different, etc.;[42] but in ultimate reality, [we] have rejected the ultimately real (*pāramārthika*) existence of those *āyatanas* of the thing characterized. Therefore if the thing characterized is not possible, [its] defining characteristic is also not possible. [Thus we] make no effort in order to negate that [reason of yours, "because its defining characteristic exists"].[43]

Listen also to that which [you yourself] have said, "Having imputed priority and posteriority to the thing characterized and [its] defining characteristic," etc. [We] have indicated a negation of difference [of the thing characterized and its defining characteristic] precisely (*eva*) by showing that [their] priority and posteriority are not possible. Therefore it is not the case that the nonestablishment [of your reason, "because its defining characteristic exists,"] is specious.[44]

Objection:[45] That [property] which is different [from the property to be established] but is related [to it] by the defining characteristic of invariable concomitance (*avinābhāva*), is the reason.[46] Therefore [your] statement that the meaning of [our] reason ["because its defining characteristic exists"] is not established

because [the defining characteristic] is different [from the thing characterized], is also a specious nonestablishment.[47]

Answer: That is not good, because in ultimate reality, [both] difference and relation by the defining characteristic of invariable concommitance are not established [and] therefore [we] wish to get rid of adherence (abhiniveśa) to them. That reason (sādhana) [i. e., that nonobstruction is the defining characteristic of space][48] shows an entity which belongs to conventional truth (vyavahāra-satya); therefore it is in accord with convention [but not ultimate reality].[49]

Enough of [this] digression (zhar la bshad pa, probably prasaṅga)!

Objection:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, space does indeed exist,

[Reason:] because it is a defining characteristic.

[Dissimilar Example:] Here whatever does not exist is not considered to be a defining characteristic, as a sky-flower [is not].

[Application:] Space is a defining characteristic, because [in a sūtra] it is said, "Great king, these six elements are the person."[50]

[Conclusion:] Therefore that [space] does indeed exist.

Answer: Because it has been shown that the thing characterized is not possible, therefore,

> If the thing characterized is not possible, [its] defining characteristic also does not exist. [MMK 5-4cd]

The idea is that [this is so] [1] because the defining characteristic is also included in the thing characterized [and] therefore it is likewise unestablished, and [2] because there is also no example.[51]

Because the thing characterized and [its] defining characteristic are not possible if they are investigated in that way with discernment (prajñā), therefore the author of [this] treatise (śāstra-kāra) [Nāgārjuna] sums up [by saying],

> Therefore the thing characterized does not exist, [and its] defining characteristic does not exist at all. [MMK 5-5ab]

The idea is that [this is so] because there is no inference showing that [existence] and because there is an inference showing that that does not exist.

Objection: The Vaibhāṣikas say:

[Thesis:] Space is an entity (bhāva),[52]

[Reason:] because [the yogin] abandons desire which wishes (chanda-rāga) for that object (viṣaya) [when

he leaves the meditative sphere of the infinity of space (ākāśa-anantya-āyatana) and enters the meditative sphere of the infinity of cognition (vijñāna)],

[Example:] like matter [desire for which is abandoned when one enters the meditative sphere of the infinity of space].[53]

Alternatively, [space is an entity,]

[Reason:] because it is the object (ālambana) of a meditative attainment (samāpatti),[54]

[Example:] like cognition.

Or else [space is an entity],

[Reason:] because it is unconditioned (asaṃskṛta).

[Example:] like nirvāṇa.

Answer: Here if [you] maintain that that space is an entity in ultimate reality, it must be [either] a thing characterized or a defining characteristic; [but we] have shown previously how those [i. e.,] the thing characterized and [its] defining characteristic, are not possible. Therefore, because for our position,

> Apart from something characterized and [its] defining characteristic, an entity (bhāva) also does not exist, [MMK 5-5cd]

therefore without showing an example, there is no

establishment of [the property] to be established. [There is no example of an entity] because it is not established that nirvāṇa or anything else is an entity.

Objection: Those who belong to other schools (sde pa gzhan dag, nikāya-antarīyāḥ) say:

[Thesis:] Space does indeed exist,

[First Reason:] because it is the boundary (yongs su chad pa, pariccheda) of matter and

[Second Reason:] because it is unconditioned.

Answer: This [half-verse][55] has also answered [those] proofs (sādhana) by [showing their] faults. One should also state that the meaning of [each of those] reasons is not established.

Objection: The Sautrāntikas[56] say: Space is not an entity. Then what [is it]? For us, that [space] is the mere absence of a real substance which possesses resistance (sapratigha-dravya-abhāva-mātra).

Answer: Those [reasons given by the Vaibhāṣikas], "because it is the object of a meditative attainment" and "because [the yogin] abandons desire which wishes for that object," excludes [space's having] the intrinsic nature of a nonentity (abhāva). Nevertheless, [Nāgārjuna] wished to state a very clear negation in order to negate those conceptual constructions about space [by] those [Sautrāntikas]; [and he] explained that same [point in a previous verse]:

Matter is not apprehended apart from the cause of matter. [MMK 4-1ab]

Since that [fact that matter is not an entity][57] has been shown, therefore,

If an entity (bhāva) does not exist, of what will there be an absence (abhāva)? [MMK 5-6ab]

If an entity called "matter which possesses resistance" does not exist, of what will there be that absence (abhāva) which you have designated as "space"? Since there is no inference which shows that [absence], that meaning is not established.

Alternatively, one may examine [the meaning of MMK 5-6ab][58] differently:

Objection:[59] [We] have not been able to show that point (artha), [namely,] that space is an entity.[60] You have said that since

> Apart from something characterized and [its] defining characteristic, an entity also does not exist, [MMK 5-5cd]

[therefore] there is no example; and even if an example had been established, [the property] to be proved and [the property] which proves [it] would indeed not be established. Therefore we will establish that same [point with the following syllogism]:

[Thesis:] Matter and so on do indeed possess existence (*bhāva*) [as entities],

[Reason:] because their nonexistence (*med pa*, perhaps *nāstitva*) exists in relation (*ltos pas*, probably *apekṣayā*) [to their existence].

[Similar Example:] Here that which exists has a [corresponding] absence (*abhāva*) in relation [to it], like the nonexistence of flavor (*ro nyid*, *rasatva*) in [some] matter.

[Dissimilar Example:] That which does not exist has no absence in relation [to it], as [one does not speak of the nonexistence of flavor][61] in a horse's horn.

[The Vaibhāṣika continues:] Nor is the meaning of [our] reason unestablished, for you have said more than once that the aggregates, *āyatanas*, and *dhātus* do not exist as [the intrinsic nature of][62] the aggregates and so on. Therefore because their nonexistence exists in relation [to their existence], [their] existence (*bhāva*) [as entities] does indeed exist.

Answer: We have simply made a negation of the existence of entities such as matter; but we have not shown that they do not exist.[63] Therefore if an entity called "matter" does not exist, what will be without flavor? Since that [existence of an absence in relation to an existent entity][64] does not exist, [your] example is not established. Therefore the meaning of what [you]

maintain is not established.

Objection:[65]

[Thesis:] Entities and nonentities do indeed exist,

[Reason:] because their cognizer[66] exists.

[Similar Example:] Here that which has a cognizer exists, for example, dharmatā ("dharmaness," the way the dharmas are).[67]

Answer: That cognizer of entities and nonentities, whom the opponent's fancy (yid la bsam pa, probably manoratha) constructs, must also be [either] an entity or a nonentity. Since the negation of both of those has been shown, it is not established that their cognizer exists.

If [you] suppose that there is some other cognizer, different in kind from an entity or a nonentity, that also is not possible. Therefore [Nāgārjuna] says,

> Who that is different in kind (vidharman) from an entity or a nonentity knows entities and nonentities? [MMK 5-6cd]

The meaning of the sentence is that that [sort of cognizer] simply does not exist.

Objection: One who is different in kind from an entity or a nonentity [and] cognizes them [does indeed] exist, [as] supposed by those who speak of the point of

view (naya) of modes (paryāya).[68] Therefore there is no fault [in our position].

Answer: That is not [logically] possible. [Nāgārjuna's] idea is that [this is so] [1] because two incompatible (mi mthun pa) natures are not possible in one thing and [2] because relativity (ltos pa) is not possible [in this case][69] and [3] because there is no inference which shows that.

Because if one investigates in that way, space cannot bear logical analysis,[70]

> Therefore space is not an entity, not a nonentity,
> not a thing characterized,
> Nor a defining characteristic. [MMK 5-7ab,c1]

Thus [Nāgārjuna] has summed up by virtue of having refuted the criticisms, [that is,] the proofs[71] which have been stated by opponents, showing that [space] is an entity, etc.

> [Those] which are the other five elements are also
> the same as space. [MMK 5-7c2,d]

The meaning of "element" (dhātu) is the meaning of "mine" ('byung khungs, ākara).[72] Like a gold mine, space and so on are also mines of suffering (duḥkha) and

unhappiness (daurmanasya).

Alternatively, the meaning of "element" (dhātu) is the meaning of bearing (dhāraṇa) [its] specific characteristic (svalakṣaṇa) without effort.[73] "The five" [means] "earth, water, fire, air and cognition." [They are called] "other" [or "latter"] (apara) because they are to be negated after space.[74] "[Those] which [are the other elements] are also the same as space" means "those which are the other five elements are also to be negated in the same way as space."

Previously, the negation of space was shown by [the verses] beginning from

> There is not any space prior to the defining characteristic of space, [MMK 5-1ab]

up to

> Therefore space is not an entity, not a nonentity, not a thing characterized,
> Nor a defining characteristic. [MMK 5-7ab,cl]

Likewise, here also one should state in full [the negation of the other elements] beginning from

> There is not any earth, etc., prior to the defining characteristic of earth, etc.,

up to

> Therefore earth, etc., are not entities, not nonentities, not things characterized,
> Nor defining characteristics.

Because those which are the other five elements, earth and so on, also have the same negation as space, one should show that [they] are similar.

The teaching in the Blessed One's discourses (pravacana) that those elements exist in that way, has expounded those [elements]. Through [the Buddha's] compassion (anukampā) for persons to be converted, [what is] common knowledge conventionally (vyavahāra-prasiddha) is included in conventional truth (vyavahāra-satya);[75] but in ultimate reality, the elements do not exist. Because the elements exist [conventionally], there is no conflict with what [we ourselves] accept (abhyupagata-bādha); but neither are the āyatanas established.[76]

Objection: Again, some[77] say: Because you have nihilistically negated (apavādita) all entities in ultimate reality, [you] have [just] repeated the false view (mithyā-dṛṣṭi)[78] which takes the form (tshul can) of nihilistically negating all entities. With a counterfeit discourse of the Blessed One, [you] have made a proof of what the Lokāyatas maintain. Therefore this is not the Blessed One's word and should be abandoned.

Answer: As to that, here the opponents are like those who have ophthalmia resulting from an imbalance of the humors[79] [and who try to] remove unreal hairs, flies, mosquitoes, and so on. For when we stated [our] negation of the existence of the āyatanas, we only made a negation

of [their] having intrinsic nature; but [we] did not say that they are nonentities.[80] As it is said in [the _Laṅkāvatāra-_]_sūtra_,[81]

> As long as there is the object (_gocara_) of the mind (_citta_), there will also be the two extremes of existence and nonexistence.
> When [its] object has ceased, the mind also ceases completely. [_Laṅkāvatāra_ 3-9]

And likewise,

One who has not fallen into [a belief in] entities, does not make any dharma into a nonentity by means of a nonentity.

Likewise, the _ācārya_ [Nāgārjuna] himself has also said elsewhere,[82]

> This is a negation of existence; it is not an embracing (_parigraha_) of nonexistence,
> Just as when one says, "It is not black," one does not express, "It is white."[83]

Therefore both those kinds [of views, existence and nonexistence,] are bad views (_kudṛṣṭi_), because they are an obstacle to the wise one who desires the bliss (_sukha_) of the quiescence (_upaśama_) of every conceptual elaboration (_prapañca_). How [are they an obstacle]? Here [suppose that] in ultimate reality, the realms of desire, form, and formlessness (_kāma_-_rūpa_-_ārūpya_-_avacara_), the supramundane (_lokottara_), and the

wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral (*kuśala-akuśala-avyākṛta*), [all] had the intrinsic nature of coming into existence (*ātma-lābha*) in that way in which they are conventionally designated. Therefore,

[Thesis:] Effort for the sake of producing and not producing wholesome and unwholesome dharmas [respectively] would just be pointless,

[Reason:] because they exist [already],

[Example:] like a jar and a cloth which [already] exist.

Therefore those who are happy would have [their] particular happiness undiminished, and those who are suffering would also have [their] particular suffering undiminished. Like pictures painted on a wall, living beings' particular ages (*vayas*), sizes, and postures (*īryā-patha*) would not increase or decrease.

But if the three realms [of desire, form, and formlessness], the supramundane, and the wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral were nonexistent [by] intrinsic nature,[84] in that case also,

[Thesis:] Effort for the sake of producing and not producing wholesome and unwholesome dharmas [respectively] would just be pointless,

[Reason:] because they do not exist,

[Example:] Just as effort for the sake of sharpening a hare's horn is pointless.

Therefore conventional activity (*vyavahāra*) would be

destroyed (chad par ´gyur).

Therefore this [following verse] is stated. Those whose intellectual eye is impaired by the ophthalmia of bad views, [that is,]

> The weak-minded (alpa-buddhi) who see the existence and nonexistence of entities,
> Do not see the quiescence of the visible, [which is] felicity (śiva). [MMK 5-8]

The meaning is that just as one with ophthalmia, whose sense organ is impaired, sees unreal double moons, etc., [so also] the weak-minded who see the existence and nonexistence of entities do not see the quiescence of the visible, [which is] felicity. [That quiescence of the visible] is the very subtle truth of ultimate reality, the object (gocara) of the eye of noble discernment (ārya-prajñā).

[It is called] "the quiescence of the visible" because here all identifying marks (nimitta) of the visible do not appear. [It is called] "felicity" because it is free from all harm. As it is said in a sūtra,[85]

> When some [view] establishes existence by means of causal conditions, there will be nonexistence.[86]
> [That] bad view, the doctrine of origination, teaches existence and nonexistence.

Because the wise one possesses the eye ointment of the vision and cultivation (bhāvanā) of emptiness,[87] he is free from [any] faults of the intellectual eye; [and his] intellectual eye has fully opened. He sees the true state (ji lta ba nyid, perhaps yāthātathya) of entities. As the Blessed One said [in the Ārya-Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra],[88]

> When one sees the world as neither existent nor
> nonexistent nor [both] existent and nonexistent,
> Then the mind turns back (vyāvartate); and one
> comprehends lack of self (nairātmya).
> [Laṅkāvatāra 3-22 = 10-476]

Likewise, as it is said [in the Kāśyapa-parivarta of the Ārya-mahā-ratna-kūṭa-sūtra,][89]

Kāśyapa, this [view,] "It exists," is one extreme. This [view,] "It does not exist," is also one extreme.

As to that, here the meaning of the chapter [is as follows:] By stating the faults of the reason, "because [their] defining characteristics exist," which was adduced [by the opponent] to show that the elements, earth and so on, exist, [we] have shown that the elements are without intrinsic nature.

Therefore [scriptural] statements such as the following are established:[90] [From the Ārya-brahma-viśeṣa-cintā-paripṛcchā-sūtra?,][91]

That which is the internal earth-element

(ādhyātmika-pṛthivī-dhātu) and that which is the external (bāhya) earth-element have a nondual meaning (advaya-artha). By means of discernment (prajñā) and wisdom (ye shes, jñāna), the Tathāgata has fully and perfectly realized (abhisambuddha) that that also is nondual, is not divisible into two (gnyis su dbyer med pa), and has a single defining characteristic (eka-lakṣaṇa), namely, no defining characteristic (alakṣaṇa).[92]

Likewise, [from the Ārya-Mañjuśrī-vikrīḍita-sūtra,][93]

[Mañjuśrī said,] "Girl, how should one see the elements (dhātu)?"

The girl said, "Mañjuśrī, [they should be seen] like this, for example: When the three worlds have been consumed by [fire at the end of] the kalpa, there is not even ash [left behind]."[94]

Likewise,[95]

One should not adhere (abhini-viś) to that which is formless, invisible, and baseless, which does not appear and is not made known (avijñaptika).[96]

Likewise, [from the Bhagavatī-prajñā-pāramitā-suvikrāntavikrāmi-sūtra,][97]

Śāradvatīputra, all dharmas have the defining characteristic of nonattachment (asaṅga-lakṣaṇa). That which is the defining characteristic of some dharma is a noncharacteristic (alakṣaṇa) of that [dharma]. Therefore

no dharma serves (*pratyupasthita*) for the production (*abhinirvṛtti*) of a defining characteristic.

Likewise, [from the *Ārya-brahma-viśeṣa-cintā-paripṛcchā-sūtra*,][98]

I taught the aggregates to the world, [and] the
world came to dwell on them.
One who is wise does not dwell on them; he is not
soiled by worldly dharmas.
The world has the defining characteristic of space,
and space has no defining characteristic.
Therefore that [wise one] comprehends that; he is
not soiled by worldly dharmas.

Likewise, [from the *Bhagavatī-prajñā-pāramitā-suvikrāntavikrāmi-sūtra*,][99]

Śāradvatīputra, [the fact] that all dharmas have no defining characteristic and no perfection (*pariniṣpatti*) is called "nonattachment."

The fifth chapter, "Examination of the Elements," of the *Prajñāpradīpa*, a commentary on [Nāgārjuna's] *Mūla-madhyamaka* composed by *ācārya* Bhavyakara/Bhavyakāra (*legs ldan byed*)[100] [is concluded].

Notes to Translation of Chapter Five

[1]In this chapter, "element" translates dhātu, in the sense of the six dhātus, earth, water, fire, air, space, (ākāśa), and cognition (vijñāna). In other words, the six dhātus are the four mahābhūtas plus space and cognition. I have also translated bhūta/mahābhūta in chapter four as "element;" but hopefully this will not cause confusion. On the various senses of the term dhātu, see May, p. 97 n. 222 and Franklin Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970 reprint, pp. 282-4.

[2]On the scriptural sources of this quotation, see LVP AK I, p. 49 n. 2. Majjhima-nikāya III, p. 239, has bhikkhu for mahārāja. Candrakīrti gives a Sanskrit version with mahārāja (CPP 129.3,4). Later, Avalokitavrata tells us that the "great king" being addressed is the Buddha's father, Śuddhodana. See Ava P94a-5, D84a-3.

[3]That is, it will conflict with the Buddha's teaching, which Nāgārjuna, as a Buddhist, must accept. See Ava P70b-1,2; D62a-4,5.

[4]That is, as far as the Mādhyamika is concerned, it is not established that that teaching refers to ultimate reality. Thus the fault alleged by the opponent does not exist. See Ava P70b-5,6; D62b-1,2.

[5]*nam mkha'i ngo bo nyid stong pa nyid kyis bstan sla ba'i phyir*, more literally, "because it is easy to show the intrinsic nature of space as being empty (*śūnyatayā* or *śūnyatvena*)." Here, of course, Bhāvaviveka is speaking of the fact that space is (ontologically) empty of intrinsic nature. He is not referring to the physical emptiness of what is commonly called "empty space."

[6]In fact, the Vaibhāṣikas make a distinction between space as one of the three unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) dharmas and space as one of the six *dhātus*. The former is defined as *anāvaraṇa* or *anāvṛti* (AK 1-5d); the latter is considered to be the visible space between objects, a combination of light and shadow (AK 1-28ab). The Sautrāntikas, on the other hand, make no such distinction. For them, space is simply the absence of anything tangible (*spraṣṭavya-abhāva-mātra*). See LVP AK I, p. 50 n. 1 and LVP AK II, p. 279.

[7]The Vaibhāṣikas have attempted to show in their preceding syllogism that the six *dhātus* exist because their defining characteristics exist. For instance, space exists because its defining characteristic, nonobstruction, exists. But the elements are identical with their defining characteristics (see AK 1-12cd). Thus the Vaibhāṣikas' reason is no different from their thesis. See Ava P71a-5 to 71b-1, D62b-6 to 63a-3.

[8]See Ava P71b-2,3; D63a-4.

[9]mtshon par bya ba yin pas mtshan nyid, perhaps lakṣyata iti lakṣaṇam.

[10]See note 96 to my translation of chapter three. Once again, the kṛt-pratyaya in question is lyuṭ.

The opponent rejects the view that lakṣaṇa and lakṣya are different because the former refers to the instrument (karaṇa) of the action of characterizing, while the latter refers to the object of the action (karman). For him, lakṣaṇa also refers to the object and thus is identical with lakṣya. See Ava P71b-5 to 72a-4, D63a-6 to 63b-5.

[11]de dag gi de ltar khas blangs pa nyid la yang, perhaps tayor evam abhyupagatatve 'pi.

[12]Since the reason and the thesis are identical, does the reason establish the thesis or vice versa?

[13]If the opponent seeks to prove that space exists in ultimate reality, his appeal to convention is contradictory (since a conventionally valid reason cannot prove a positive thesis about ultimate reality). Also, there is no example for the ultimately real existence of space, since no entity exists in ultimate reality. See Ava P73a-2,3,4; D64b-1,2,3.

[14]On the Vaibhāṣikas' doctrine of space, see note 6. The Vaiśeṣikas hold that ākāśa (usually translated as "ether" in this context) is an eternal, ubiquitous dravya. See Jadunath Sinha, A History of Indian Philoso-

phy, Vol. I, Calcutta: Central Book Agency, 1956, pp. 372-4; Erich Frauwallner, History of Indian Philosophy, tr. V. M. Bedekar, Vol. II, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1973, pp. 147-8; and Karl H. Potter, ed., Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology, Vol. 2 of The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1977, pp. 90-1.

[15]Avalokitavrata identifies the opponent here as a Sāṃkhya. The Sāṃkhyas hold that ākāśa (usually translated "ether" in this context also) arises from the "subtle essence" (tanmātra) of sound; and thus ākāśa is the defining characteristic of sound. See Ava P73b-7,8; D65a-6. For the Sāṃkhya account of ether and sound, see Sinha, op. cit., Vol. II (1952), pp. 19-20 and Frauwallner, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 279-80.

For the Vaiśeṣikas, the ether (ākāśa) is the substrate, and thus a cause, of sound. See Sinha, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 371-4; Frauwallner, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 147-8; and Potter, op. cit., pp. 90-1, 161-2.

[16]That is, since sound and its defining characteristic are identical, the reason becomes the same as the thesis. See Ava P73b-8 to 74a-2, D65a-6,7.

[17]According to Avalokitavrata, the opponents here are "Vaiśeṣika commentators." See Ava P74a-3, D65b-1,2.

[18]In other words, if Bhāvaviveka's interpretation were correct, MMK 5-1ab should have anyad ākāśalakṣaṇāt

instead of pūrvam ākāśalakṣaṇāt.

[19]For the Vaiśeṣikas, substance (dravya) and quality (guṇa) are distinct categories (padārtha). The qualities of a substance (including its defining characteristic) inhere in that substance but are not identical with it. See Sinha, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 317; Frauwallner, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 141, 152-3; and Potter, op. cit., pp. 49, 84.

[20]See Ava P75a-2,3; D66a-6,7. "Alleged" translates smra bar ´dod pa, probably vivakṣita.

[21]Avalokitavrata points out that Bhāvaviveka´s first explanation of MMK 5-1d leads to a negation of the thing characterized; his second explanation leads to a negation of the defining characteristic. See Ava P75b-7,8; D67a-3,4.

[22]The Vaiśeṣika, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P76a-1, D67a-5.

[23]Avalokitavrata glosses this as "the defining characteristic does not exist in the thing characterized, and the thing characterized does not exist in the defining characteristic." See Ava P76a-1 to 4, D67a-4 to 7. Of course, ... la med pa could also be translated as "does not belong to," as well as "does not exist in."

[24]Like a refractory ox who cannot be turned back with a stick, the opponent may refuse to concede defeat and shamelessly assert that space exists without a

defining characteristic. See Ava P76a-6 to 76b-1, D67b-1 to 4.

[25]Conventionally, space does have a defining characteristic; but that fact cannot be used to prove the thesis in the opponent's initial syllogism, that space exists in ultimate reality.

[26]See Ava P76b-2,3,4; D67b-5,6.

[27]Avalokitavrata identifies the opponents here as "Vaiśeṣikas, etc." See Ava P76b-4, D67b-6,7.

[28]That is, a thing characterized which neither has nor does not have a defining characteristic. See Ava P78a-3,4; D69a-4,5.

[29]The opponent maintains that a thing characterized, such as space, exists because a defining characteristic applies to it. ("The meaning of what you maintain" translates khyod kyi 'dod pa'i don, literally, "your desired meaning.") A "contradictory entity" is one which neither has nor does not have a defining characteristic. Since it has been shown that a defining characteristic does not apply to a thing which has one, a thing which does not have one, or a thing which neither has nor does not have one, there is no example of something to which a defining characteristic applies. See Ava P78a-6,7; D69a-6,7.

[30]rnam pa gnyis su smra ba dag, identified by Avalokitavrata as 'os pa pa dag, ārhatāḥ, that is, the

Jains. See Ava P79a-1, D70a-1 (P has _'os pa daṅ_). On the Jains' _anekāntavāda_, see, e. g., Sinha, _op. cit._, Vol. II, pp. 197-208; Frauwallner, _op. cit._, Vol. II, pp. 199-200; and Chandradhar Sharma, _A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy_, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1973 reprint, pp. 49-54.

[31]An entity with two mutually incompatible natures, like a bird which is half dead and half alive, is not seen in the world. Therefore an entity which both has and does not have a defining characteristic is not possible. See Ava P79a-5,6; D70a-4,5.

[32]The opponent replies that the example of a bird which is half dead and half alive [reminiscent of Schrödinger's cat] is not applicable. Rather it is like the fact that a man is a son in relation to his father and a father in relation to his son. In reply, Avalokitavrata quotes MMK 10-8:

> If fire is dependent on fuel and if fuel is
> dependent on fire,
> Which of the two is established first, in dependence
> on which there would be fire and fuel?

See Ava P79a-6 to 79b-3, D70a-5 to 70b-2.

[33]That is, to say that a thing both has and does not have a defining characteristic is to incur the faults which have been shown for each alternative separately.

In Bhāvaviveka's first explanation, MMK 5-3cd refers

to an entity which neither has nor does not have a defining characteristic. In his second explanation, it refers to an entity which both has and does not have a defining characteristic,

[34]*gzhan dag*, "others," identified by Avalokitavrata as "the commentator (*vṛtti-kāra*) Sthavira Buddhapālita." See Ava P79b-7, D70b-5. Text in Saito, p. 67, ll. 9-13 and 16-18; translation in Saito, translation, p. 67.

[35]Here Bhāvaviveka criticizes Buddhapālita's commentary on MMK 5-3a,b1 on the grounds that he tacitly assumes that the *lakṣaṇa* exists while negating the *lakṣya*. See Ava P79b-8 to 80a-4, D70b-6 to 71a-2.

In fact, Nāgārjuna's own method in chapter five is to reject the ultimately real existence of the *lakṣya* in the first three and a half verses and then to negate the *lakṣaṇa* in MMK 5-4cd. Given his use of *prasajya-pratiṣedha* and the *prasaṅga* method, it does not seem that he must affirm the existence of the *lakṣaṇa* while arguing against the *lakṣya*; and the same is true for Buddhapālita.

[36]Here Bhāvaviveka is criticizing Buddhapālita's commentary on MMK 5-3b2. One can say, "This is the defining characteristic of this thing," in order to remind someone who has forgotten that fact. See Ava P80a-4 to 8, D71a-2 to 5.

It is not clear that this is the sense of "applica-

tion" (pravṛtti) that Nāgārjuna and Buddhapālita have in mind. They seem to be thinking of a logically necessary relationship between the defining characteristic and the thing characterized, rather than of the use of words to communicate a fact.

[37]See Ava P80a-8, D71a-5.

[38]See Ava P80b-4,5; D71b-1,2.

[39]Avalokitavrata describes these opponents as Buddhists and others who falsely consider themselves learned in the science of logic (rigs pa'i bstan bcos, nyāya/yukti-śāstra). See Ava P80b-6,7,8; D71b-3,4.

[40] brnag pa. See Sarat Chandra Dass, A Tibetan-English Dictionary, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970 reprint, p. 773.

[41]See Ava P81b-3,4; D72a-7 to 72b-1.

[42]Avalokitavrata remarks that in superficial reality, the defining characteristic's particular property of being neither the same as nor different from the thing characterized includes it in the thing characterized. See Ava P81b-6,7; D72b-2,3.

[43]See Ava P81b-8; D72b-4.

[44]Avalokitavrata says that Bhāvaviveka's arguments are not comparable to the opponent's example. In the argument, "sound is impermanent because it is made," the words, "because it is made," produce a cognition that sound is impermanent; but the fact that sound is imperma-

nent exists before the reason is uttered. Thus it is incorrect to argue that the reason is not established. On the other hand, Bhāvaviveka argues that the thing characterized and its defining characteristic cannot be different by showing that they cannot exist at different times. See Ava P82a-3 to 82b-5, D72b-6 to 73a-7.

[45]The opponents are those who say that the thing characterized and its defining characteristic are different. See Ava P82b-6, D73b-1.

[46]The reason (e. g., "being made,") must invariably be accompanied by the property to be established (e. g., "being impermanent"). The reverse need not be true.

[47]In his commentary on MMK 5-2cd, Bhāvaviveka gave the following syllogism: The alleged defining characteristic is not the defining characteristic of the thing characterized, because it is different [from that thing], like [a defining characteristic] different from that [alleged defining characteristic]. See Ava P82b-6 to 83a-3, D73b-1 to 5.

[48]See Ava P83b-1,2; D74a-3.

[49]The Mādhyamikas do not reject the invariable concommitance of the thing characterized and its defining characteristic on the level of superficial reality, because to do so would contradict perception. See Ava P83a-6,7; D73b-7 to 74a-1 and P83b-1,2; D74a-3,4.

[50]See note 2.

[51]The opponent cannot cite a similar example, that is something which exists (in ultimate reality) and is a defining characteristic. See Ava P84b-2,3,4; D75a-2,3.

[52]The *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* on AK 2-55cd contains a long debate between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas as to whether the three unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) dharmas, especially nirvāṇa, are *bhāvas* or *abhāvas*. See LVP AK II, pp. 278-87. See also the sources translated in Louis de La Vallée Poussin, "Documents d'Abhidharma," *Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient* XXX (1930), pp. 1-28, 247-98.

[53]See Ava P85a-3 to 7, D75b-2 to 5. For a discussion of the four *ārūpyas*, see LVP AK VIII, pp. 133-44 and LVP AK III, p. 21 n. 1. See also Avalokitavrata's long and interesting discussion in Ava P86a-3 to 87b-6, D76b-3 to 78a-2.

[54]On this term, see LVP AK VIII, p. 182 n. 4 and Edgerton, *op. cit.*, pp. 569-70. The *samāpatti* referred to is again the sphere of the infinity of space, while the example refers to the sphere of the infinity of cognition. Strictly speaking, space and cognition are the objects not of the *samāpattis* named after them, but of the preparatory exercises for those *samāpattis*; see AK 8-4ac.

[55]MMK 5-5cd, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P88a-4, D78a-6,7.

[56]See note 52.

[57]See Ava P89a-4,5; P79a-6.

[58]See Ava P89a-8 to 89b-1, D78b-2,3.

[59]The opponent here is a Vaibhāṣika. See Ava P89b-3, D79b-4. This identification seems justified by the fact that the opponent here alludes to the arguments advanced earlier by the Vaibhāṣikas. The syllogism which follows, however, is reminiscent of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position. On the latter, see Sinha, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 346-53; Frauwallner, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 110-1; Sharma, op. cit., pp. 182-3; and Potter, op. cit., pp. 53, 110, 141-6.

[60]This refers to the Vaibhāṣika's three syllogisms following MMK 5-5ab. See Ava P89b-3,4,5; D79b-4,5.

[61]See Ava P90a-4,5; D80a-4,5.

[62]See Ava P90b-3, D80b-3.

[63]Avalokitavrata points out that the negation of bhāva is a prasajya-pratiṣedha, not a paryudāsa-pratiṣedha. See Ava P90b-8 to 91a-1, D80b-7 to 81a-1.

[64]See Ava P91a-2, D81a-1,2.

[65]Avalokitavrata attributes this objection to both the Sautrāntikas and the Vaibhāṣikas. See Ava P91a-4, D81a-3. In fact, while the Sautrāntikas do hold that both bhāvas and abhāvas can be objects of cognition, the Vaibhāṣikas argue that only a bhāva can be an object of cognition. See LVP AK V p. 62.

66 One would usually translate shes pa as "cognition" (jñāna, etc.); but given kaḥ in MMK 5-6d and Avalokitavrata's subcommentary, it seems to mean "cognizer" (shes pa po; jñātṛ, etc.) here.

67 As the Buddha, the cognizer of dharmatā, exists, so the yogin who cognizes entities and nonentities exists. See Ava P91a-5,6; D81a-4,5.

68 rnam grangs kyi tshul smra ba dag, paryāya-naya-vādinaḥ. On the Jaina doctrine of the modes (paryāya) of a thing and the different points of view (naya) from which it can be considered, see the references in note 30.

Ava P92a-1,2 and 6 identify the opponents as here as 'os pa pa dag, ārhatāḥ; Ava D81b-7 and 82a-4 have 'ug pa pa dag, aulūkyāḥ, i. e., the Vaiśeṣikas. Since the view described here seems clearly to be that of the Jains, 'os pa pa dag must be the right reading.

69 Avalokitavrata explains that although a man may be a son in relation to his father and a father in relation to his son, he cannot be said to be alive in relation to death and dead in relation to life. That is, he must be either alive or dead. Likewise, he cannot be an entity from one point of view and a nonentity from another. See Ava P92a-1 to 8, D81b-7 to 82a-6.

70 'thad pa mi bzod pa, perhaps upapatty-akṣama.

71 One might be inclined to translate "criticisms

[and] proofs;" but Avalokitavrata says the those proofs themselves are also criticisms against the Mādhyamika. See Ava P92b-5,6,7; D82b-3,4.

[72]See LVP AK I, p. 37.

[73]byed pa med par might also mean "without an instrument" or "without activity." For svalakṣaṇa-dhāraṇād dhātuḥ, see Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya on AK 3-3, Shastri edition, p. 385; Pradhan edition, p. 112.

[74]Avalokitavrata explains that Nāgārjuna has negated space first because it is generally believed in the world that space is nothing at all (ci yang ma yin pa, perhaps akiṃcit), whereas earth and so on are considered to be entities, etc. Once space is negated, it can serve as an example in syllogisms negating the other elements. Thus space is dealt with first, despite the fact that earth comes first in the list given in the sūtras. See Ava P93a-6 to 93b-2, D83a-3 to 6.

[75]The syntax from the beginning of the paragraph to here is not entirely clear. For Avalokitavrata's commentary, see Ava P94a-8 to 94b-3, D83a-5,6,7.

[76]Since the elements exist conventionally, the Mādhyamika need not reject the Buddha's teaching on that subject; rather, the Mādhyamika regards it as conventional truth. On the other hand, since the elements do not exist in ultimate reality, the opponent cannot use the purely conventional existence of the elements to prove

that the _āyatanas_ exist in ultimate reality. Compare Ava P95a-1,2; D84b-6.

77 Avalokitavrata identifies the opponents as "some of our fellow Buddhists, Saṃghabhadra and so on." See Ava P95a-4,5; D85a-2. Presumably, this refers to the Vaibhāṣika master Saṃghabhadra who wrote a rebuttal to Vasubandhu's _Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya_. See, e. g., LVP AK I, "Introduction," pp. xxii-xxiii. Parts of Saṃghabhadra's work are translated in La Vallée Poussin, "Documents d'Abhidharma," _op_. _cit_., and _Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques_ _1_ (1931-2), pp. 65-126 and _5_ (1936-7), pp. 1-188.

78 See AK 5-7 and LVP AK V, p. 18.

79 _skyon cha ma mnyam pa_, probably _doṣa-viṣama_. Avalokitavrata glosses this as "an imbalance of the three _doṣas_ of wind, bile, and phlegm;" see Ava P95a-8, D85a-5.

80 Avalokitavrata explains that the Mādhyamika negates the existence of the _āyatanas_ in ultimate reality by means of _prasajya-pratiṣedha_, not _paryudāsa-pratiṣedha_. Thus his negation does not entail the affirmation that the _āyatanas_ are nonentities. Hence the _Madhyamaka-śāstra_ is free from the two extremes of the views of permanence and annihilation. See Ava P95b-7, D85b-2,3.

81 Avalokitavrata does not identify the source of this and the following quotation. See Ava P95b-7 to 96a-

1, D85b-3,4,5. The Sanskrit text of the Laṅkāvatāra verse is found in Bunyu Nanjio, The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, Kyoto: Otani University, 1923 (reprint 1956), p. 147.

[82]Identified by Avalokitavrata as "the śāstra called Loka-parīkṣā composed by ācārya Nāgārjuna himself." See Ava P96a-2,3; D85b-6. This lost work of Nāgārjuna's is known to modern scholarship only from this single quotation. See Christian Lindtner, Nāgārjuniana, Indiske Studier IV, Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1982, p. 14 n. 27.

[83]Avalokitavrata explains that the verse illustrates prasajya-pratiṣedha. See Ava P96a-3,4; D85b-7 to 86a-1.

[84]ngo bo nyid med pa yin par gyur na. One might translate this as "if they were without intrinsic nature," but that translation seems wrong in this context. Also, Avalokitavrata has the gloss kun rdzob tu tshul gang gis tha snyad gdags pa tsam gyi tshul der yang med pa yin par gyur na'o, "if they were nonexistent even in that way in which they are mere conventional designations in superficial reality." See Ava P97b-1, D87a-4.

[85]Avalokitavrata comments on this verse, but he does not identify its source. See P98a-6 to 98b-1, D88a-1 to 4.

[86]When the existent thing has ceased, there will be nonexistence. See Ava, loc. cit.

[87]A reference to the path of vision or seeing

(darśana-mārga) and the path of cultivation (bhāvanā-mārga). In the Mahāyāna, these paths coincide with the bodhisattva-bhūmis. Avalokitavrata explains that the vision of emptiness is the "non-seeing" of the existence and nonexistence of entities, which takes place when one comprehends the supremely profound dependent origination, which is free from the extremes of permanence and annihilation. See Ava P98b-2 to 5, D88a-5,6,7.

[88]Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P98b-5, D88a-7. The Sanskrit text is found in Nanjio, op. cit., pp. 152-3 and pp. 324-5.

[89]Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P98b-8, D88b-2. The Sanskrit text is found in The Kāśyapaparivarta, ed. A. von Staël-Holstein, Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1926, p. 90.

[90]See note 151 to my translation of chapter three. Avalokitavrata's remarks are similar here. See Ava: (1) P99a-4,5, D88b-5,6; (2) P99a-7, D89a-1; (3) P99b-1,2, D89a-3; (4) P99b-3,4, D89a-5; (5) P99b-7,8, D89b-1,2; (6) P100a-2,3, D89b-4; and (7) P100a-8 to 100b-1, to D90a-1,2,3.

[91]Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P99a-5, D88a-7. The same passage was quoted by Bhāvaviveka toward the end of chapter three. I have not been able to locate this passage in the Sde dge bka' 'gyur edition of the sūtra.

[92]See note 153 to my translation of chapter three.

[93]Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P99a-8, D89a-2. The same passage was quoted by Bhāvaviveka toward the end of chapter three. See note 152 to my translation of chapter three. The quotation here differs from that in chapter three in having bskal pas for chapter three's bskal pa'i mes.

[94]See note 155 to my translation of chapter three.

[95]Identified by Avalokitavrata only as being "from other sūtrāntas." See Ava P99b-1,2; D89a-4. The passage is very similar to a sentence which occurs three times in the Kāśyapa-parivarta; see von Staël-Holstein, op. cit., pp. 86-7, 90 (related sentence, p. 144).

[96]Avalokitavrata explains the last two phrases by saying that it does not appear as an object (viṣaya) [of the six senses] and that it cannot be grasped by the cognition of the eye, etc. The referent is paramārtha-satya. See Ava P99b-4,5,6; D89a-5,6,7.

[97]Identified by Avalokitavrata only as Bhagavatī-prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra; see Ava P99b-6, D89a-7 to 89b-1. The Sanskrit text is found in Ryusho Hikata, Suvikrāntavikrāmi-paripṛcchā Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra, Fukuoka, Japan: Kyushu University, 1958, p. 61.

[98]Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P99b-8 to 100a-1, D89b-2. The same two verses were quoted by Bhāvaviveka toward the end of chapter four. The first

two pādas of the first verse are found in the Sde dge bka' 'gyur, Mdo sde Ba 36b-3 (with a slightly different Tibetan translation). For the third pāda, compare byang chub sems dpa' mkhas pa der|| on 36b-4. The second verse is found on 37a-1,2, with a rather different third pāda: de dag de yi 'gro rig nas||. Avalokitavrata remarks that the first two pādas of the second verse also occur in the Ārya-sarva-buddha-viṣaya-avatāra-jñāna-āloka-alaṃkāra-sūtra. See Ava P100a-4, D89b-5,6.

[99]Identified by Avalokitavrata only as "that same Bhagavatī-prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra." See Ava P100a-5,6; D89b-7. The Sanskrit is found in Hikata, op. cit., p. 62.

[100]See note 161 to my translation of chapter three.

Translation of *Prajñāpradīpa*, Chapter Seventeen: Examination of Action (*karman*) and Result (*phala*)

Now [Nāgārjuna] begins the seventeenth chapter with the aim of showing that action and result have no intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) by means of refuting a particular counterposition (*vipakṣa*)[1] to emptiness (*śūnyatā*) as [in the previous chapter].[2] It was shown in the immediately preceding chapter that saṃsāra[3] is possible neither for the saṃskāras[4] nor for a being (*sattva*) nor for a person (*pudgala*). Therefore here the opponents, having superimposed [their own views on][5] the meaning asserted by [Nāgārjuna], the author of the treatise, say [the following]:

Objection:[6] You have stated that saṃsāra is not possible for permanent or impermanent saṃskāras because the fault of permanence or annihilation would occur. You have shown that:

> Nirvāṇa is not possible for the saṃskāras in any way. [MMK 16-4ab]

Therefore, here [we] will prove that [in fact] the faults of permanence and annihilation do not occur but that saṃsāra exists for the saṃskāras.

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality (*paramārthataḥ*), saṃsāra does indeed exist for the internal saṃskāras,

[Reason:] because of the connection of action and

result.

[Dissimilar Example:] Here the connection of action and result is not seen in what does not exist, for instance, the saṃskāras of a "barren woman's son."

[Application:] The connection of action and result exists for the internal saṃskāras.

[Conclusion:] Therefore by virtue of the stated reason, in ultimate reality saṃsāra does indeed exist for the internal saṃskāras.

As to that, [to describe] action first of all:

> The mind which restrains itself and benefits others
> [And is] benevolent is dharma. That [dharma] is the seed of results in this life (iha) and after death (pretya). [MMK 17-1]

"To restrain (saṃyamaka) oneself" is to perform self-restraint correctly (samyak) and to refrain from unwholesome [action]. What is meant [in the verse] is mind which is conjoined (saṃprayukta) with a volition (cetanā) to abandon the unwholesome. "To benefit others" is to perform beneficial actions for others, such as giving and speaking kindly and protecting from danger. What is called "benevolence" (maitra) is benevolence because it arises on account of a friend (mitra). Alternatively, benevolent [mind][7] itself is benevolence

(maitra), because an affix (pratyaya) corresponding with that [base] is used in a pleonastic sense (svārthe).[8] Such volition [of the three kinds mentioned] is dharma.[9]

That [dharma] is the seed, meaning cause (hetu) and causal condition (pratyaya). Of what? Of results. Where? In this [life] and after death, on account of [results'] being experienced in this and other lives. Volition is said to be the seed itself because it sets in motion (samutthāpaka) bodily and verbal action.

The opposite of dharma is non-dharma (adharma). "Non-dharma" and "evil" (pāpa) and "unwholesomeness" (akuśala) are synonyms. The opposites of non-dharma [and its synonyms] are the synonyms of dharma. Neutral (avyākṛta, literally "unexpounded") [volitions][10] are of four kinds: those that have arisen from [karmic] maturation (vipākaja); those relating to the [four] bodily postures, [lying, sitting, standing, walking] (airyāpathika); those related to skills (śailpasthānika); and those connected with magical emanation (nairmita or nairmāṇika).[11] They are neutral because desirable and undesirable maturations do not arise [from them] and because they have not been expounded as wholesome or unwholesome.

Thus those [actions] which are classified as dharma and so on are also twofold:

> The best of sages has explained that action is volition and [what is done after] having willed (<u>cetayitvā</u>).[12] [MMK 17-2ab]

The best of sages is the Blessed One. He is both a sage and best[13] because he has traversed all [paths?] to be traversed and because he is the best of the sages called "śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas." He has explained that actions, which are classified as dharma, non-dharma, and neutral, are twofold: volition and [what is done after] having willed.

> Manifold divisions of that action have been proclaimed.[14] [MMK 17-2cd]

[Such] is the brief explanation. To explain that in detail:

> As to that, that action which is called "volition" is termed "mental." [MMK 17-3ab]

The phrase "as to that" has the sense of specification (<u>dmigs kyis bsal ba</u>, probably <u>avadhāraṇa</u>). That action which is called "volition" is termed "mental." "Mental" means "belonging to the mind (<u>manas</u>)," because [mental action] reaches completion solely by means of the

mind. Bodily and vocal [actions] are not called "volition." Although they are set in motion by volition, they are completed by means of body and speech [respectively].

> What is called [action after] having willed is
> bodily or vocal. [MMK 17-3cd]

"[Action after] having willed" is what is done after the mind has willed [it]. Thus that action which is called "[action after] having willed" is bodily or vocal, because it consists of body or speech and because it reaches completion only by means of them. Thus, to begin with, action is twofold.

How is it manifold?

> Speech and movement and the nonabstentions which are
> called "noninformation" (avijñapti),[15]
> The other noninformations [which are] abstentions
> [and] are also declared in that way, [MMK 17-4]
> Merit which follows enjoyment[16] and demerit of the
> same kind
> And volition: these seven dharmas are declared to be
> manifest as action. [MMK 17-5]

As to that, speech is the clear enunciation of syllables. Movement is motion of the body. As for

"noninformation which is nonabstention": From the moment that one has resolved, "[I] will perform such-and-such an unwholesome [action] by means of my body or speech or mind," even though the agent does not perform that action, [there is a] noninformation characterized by nonabstention, which has arisen because of the unwholesome [resolve] which one has taken upon oneself.

The other noninformations, which are abstentions, are also declared in that way. After a volition in which one has resolved, "I will do such-and-such a wholesome action of body or speech or mind," from then on, even though the agent does not perform that action, [there is a] noninformation characterized by abstention, produced by the volition in which one took a wholesome activity upon oneself. [Both kinds are called] "noninformation" because they do not make their presence known to others although they have the intrinsic nature of [material] form and action.

The phrase "merit which follows enjoyment" should be construed as [meaning], "that merit arose from enjoyment as its cause." The [term] "enjoyment" [refers to] the use [by the recipient] of what has been given to the Three Jewels [i. e., the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha] as objects [of the gift]. "Arisen from that as its cause," i. e., arisen following that, is a synonym of "connection" and "increase."[17] "Merit" (punya) [is called]

"merit" because it purifies (punāti); it is a synonym of "the wholesome." Demerit arisen from enjoyment is also of the same kind, meaning that it has arisen from enjoyment as its cause. Demerit is to be understood as the opposite of merit.[18]

[The word] "volition" indicates mental action. Well, what is that "volition"? It is making up [one's] mind (citta-abhisaṃskāra) because of [one's] good qualities and faults; that is, it is mental action.

Thus those seven, speech and the rest, are dharmas; [that is,] they are dharmas in the sense of bearing [their] specific characteristics (svalakṣaṇa-dhāraṇa). They are "declared to be manifest as action;" [that is,] they are declared to have action as [their] defining characteristic (karmalakṣaṇāḥ). The actions of meditation (dhyāna), reading aloud, etc., do exist; but because they are included in just these, only seven [kinds of action] are specified. The connection which is seen between that [sevenfold] action and [its] result has as [its] defining characteristic the origination of the five aggregates[19] in the five states of existence (gati).[20] Thus by a reason which has as its defining characteristic the connection of action and result, in ultimate reality saṃsāra does indeed exist for the internal saṃskāras. Therefore because bondage and liberation exist, in ultimate reality internal entities do indeed have intrinsic

nature.

Answer:[21] In this case, that action, having originated, would either persist until the time of [its] maturation or else it would cease [after] having originated. As to that, in the first place,

> If it remained until the time of maturation, that action would be permanent. [MMK 17-6ab]

The meaning is [as follows]: That which does not cease as soon as it has arisen, not having the nature of of that [cessation],[22] cannot cease later, either. Therefore it follows that it would be permanent.

Objection: Like plantain trees and reeds and bamboo,[23] that [action] ceases after the maturation of [its] fruit/result (phala). Therefore there is no fault.

Answer: It is not the case that there is no fault, [1] because [we] hold that the cessation of the plantain tree, etc., at each moment is different[24] from [its] cessation due to the breaking of the series [of moments] of the same kind as that, and [2] because in ultimate reality, it is not possible that even bamboo and so on are connected with a fruit/result, as [in the case of] action, and [3] also because it is difficult to show that what did not cease previously would come to have that nature [i. e., impermanence][25] later.

Objection: Even though cessation does not exist prior to the cause of cessation, it will exist later. Therefore even what did not cease before will indeed cease later.[26]

Answer: That, also, is not logically possible, [1] because it conflicts with inference (anumāna-bādha) since

[Thesis:] That which is said to be the cause of the cessation of something is not [in fact] the cause of its cessation,

[Reasons:] because [the alleged cause] is different from that [thing][27] or because [the alleged cause itself] has a cause,

[Example:] like [something] different from that [alleged cause][28]

and [2] because it conflicts with what [you yourself] affirm (abhyupagata-bādha),[29] since it is stated in scripture (āgama) that

> Body, sense organs, and cognitions
> Remain no longer than an instant.

But if, to avoid that fault, [you] should assert that [action] ceases as soon as it has arisen, even so

> If it has ceased, how will what has ceased produce a result? [MMK 17-6cd]

What is meant is that [this is so] because what has ceased simply has no nature of its own. Even if [you] suppose that what is in the process of ceasing (nirudhyamāna) produces a result, [that is not the case] [1] because no matter whether what is in the process of ceasing has ceased or has not ceased, that is not possible and [2] because the questions raised in objection (paryanuyoga) and the answers are the same. Even if [you] suppose that what is in the process of ceasing is "about to cease" (nirodha-abhimukha), [that is not the case] because there will be the [previously] stated fault.[30] Even if [you] suppose that [what is in the process of ceasing] is indescribable [as having ceased or not having ceased], [that is not the case] because it conflicts with inference, since

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, it is not possible for the indescribable to produce a result,

[Reason:] because it is indescribable,

[Example:] like that which is in the process of arising (utpadyamāna).[31]

So that also is worthless (asāra). Therefore there are those same faults [1] that the meaning of [the opponent's] reason is not established and [2] that [its] meaning is contradictory.[32]

Objection:[33] The connection of action and result is indeed possible. Why? Because the result is established

on account of the stream of the [individual] series (rgyud kyi rgyun). Thus for example,

> The series of the sprout and so on proceeds from the seed.
> From that [series] the fruit [proceeds]. Without the seed, that [series] also does not proceed.[34] [MMK 17-7]
> Because the series proceeds from the seed and the fruit arises from the series
> [And] the seed precedes the fruit, therefore [the seed] is neither annihilated nor eternal. [MMK 17-8]

The series - having as [its] defining characteristic[s] the sprout, leaves, stalk, hollow stem (sbu gu), ear (snye ma), husk (sbun pa), awn (gra ma), unripe grains (srus), ripe grains ('bras bu thug po che), etc. - proceeds from a seed which has ceased; and from that series, the fruit proceeds. Without the seed, the series beginning with the sprout will not proceed from it. Because the series proceeds from the seed and the fruit proceeds from the series and the seed precedes the fruit, therefore [the seed] is not annihilated, since it persists by means of the seed's series [i. e., the sprout, etc.]. Nor is [the seed] permanent, because when the

sprout arises, that seed has ceased. Thus that is a statement of a similar example.

Likewise,

> The mind's series proceeds from volition (sems pa, cetas).[35]
> From that [series] the result [proceeds]. Without volition,[36] that [series] also does not proceed. [MMK 17-9]
> Because the series [proceeds] from volition[37] and the result arises from the series
> And action precedes the result, therefore [action] is not annihilated or eternal. [MMK 17-10]

The mind's series, which has the characteristic of going on connectedly, proceeds from that volition which has ceased, which is the benevolent or unbenevolent volition called "action." From that series, the result, characterized by the experience of what is desirable or undesirable, proceeds. Without volition, that series of the mind also will not proceed. Thus that [verse] has shown the property[38] of action, continuing [in a] series.

Because the "series," meaning the "connected series which develops, connected in the relationship (bhāva) of cause and result," proceeds from volition and the result proceeds from the series and action precedes the result,

therefore [action] is neither annihilated nor permanent. What is meant is that [this is so] because, for the reason shown, the series of the saṃskāras produces the result and because [the members of the series] do not persist for a second moment. Thus that is a statement of the conclusion.[39]

Therefore here the inference [is as follows:]

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the connection of action and result does indeed exist for the saṃskāras which are [conventionally] spoken of by the term "[sentient] being,"

[Reason:] because the Blessed One taught those desiring to obtain a particular result a method for obtaining a connection with that [result],

[Similar Example:] like the connection of seed and fruit.

[Dissimilar Example:] Here, as for that which does not exist, the Blessed One did not teach a method for obtaining a connection with that; for instance, [he did not teach a method for obtaining] a garland of sky-flowers.

As to this,

The means of accomplishing dharma are the ten white
paths of action.[40]
The five desirable sense qualities[41] are the result

of dharma, in this life and after death.
[MMK 17-11]

[That is, the five desirable sense qualities are the result] from among the different kinds of results of maturation (vipāka-phala) and results similar to their cause (niṣyanda-phala).[42] Thus the Blessed One taught those desiring a particular result a method for obtaining a connection with that [result]. Therefore, by virtue of the stated reason, the stated meaning is established.[43]

Others[44] say:

If that hypothesis (kalpanā) were [so], there would be many great faults.
Therefore that hypothesis is not possible here.
[MMK 17-12]

If your hypothesis, which has the characteristic that [the fruit] is similar to the series of the seed, were so, many great faults would occur. [Your hypothesis would] conflict with inference since

[Thesis:] The series of a god and so on would not arise from a human's series,[45]

[Reason:] because they are of different kinds,

[Example:] just as the fruit of a mango, etc., does not arise from the seed of a nimba tree.

Likewise, [there would be many great faults] because [your hypothesis would] conflict with the stated inference [since] there would not arise:

[IA] from a wholesome mind,

[1] an unwholesome or

[2] a neutral mind;

[IB] from an unwholesome mind,

[1] a wholesome or

[2] a neutral mind;

[IC] from a neutral mind,

[1] a wholesome or

[2] an unwholesome mind;[46]

[IIA] from a mind belonging to [the realm of] desire (kāma-avacara),

[1] [a mind] belonging to [the realm of] form (rūpa-avacara) or

[2] [a mind] belonging to [the realm of] formlessness (ārūpya-avacara) or

[3] a supramundane (lokottara) mind;

[IIB] from a mind belonging to [the realm of] form,

[1] [a mind] belonging to [the realm of] desire or

[2] [a mind] belonging to [the realm of] formlessness or

[3] a supramundane mind;

[IIC] from a mind belonging to [the realm of]

formlessness,

[1] [a mind] belonging to [the realm of] desire or

[2] [a mind] belonging to [the realm of] form or

[3] a supramundane mind.[47]

Thus it would not be possible to perform the wholesome and abandon the unwholesome.[48] Therefore that hypothesis is not possible here,

Well, how are [action and result] possible? [The following hypothesis is] unsullied by the stain of the faults which have been described:

> I will explain that hypothesis which is [logically] possible here,
> Which was stated by the Buddhas, pratyekabuddhas, and śrāvakas. [MMK 17-13]

And what is that?

> As a debt and the document [on which the debt is recorded], so [are] action and nondisappearance (avipraṇāśa).[49]
> [MMK 17-14ab]

Like the document [on which] a debt [is recorded], the dharma having as its defining characteristic the nondisappearance of action persists. For example,

although that wealth of the loan has been lent,[50] because the document [on which the debt is recorded] exists, the creditor's wealth does not disappear; and principal and interest will accrue [to him]. Likewise, although the momentary action has ceased, because the dharma called "nondisappearance," which has arisen from that [action] as [its] cause, exists, the result of the agent's action does not not disappear; and a specific result will accrue [to him]. Just as when a creditor has called back [his] wealth, the document [on which a debt is recorded] becomes inoperative,[51] so also when the agent has experienced the result, the nondisappearance likewise becomes [inoperative].

> That [nondisappearance] is fourfold according to [its] realm (dhātu).[52] [MMK 17-14c]

That nondisappearance is fourfold according to the division of realms: belonging to desire, form, and formlessness and undefiled (anāsrava).

> That [nondisappearance] is also neutral (avyākṛta) by nature. [MMK 17-14d]

[It is neutral] because it is not explained as being wholesome or unwholesome.

[The nondisappearance] cannot be abandoned through abandonment [of what can be abandoned by means of seeing the Four Noble Truths]. [MMK 17-15a]

[This is so] because it cannot be abandoned through the abandonment of what can be abandoned by means of seeing [the Four Noble Truths:] suffering, origin, cessation, and path.

[The nondisappearance] can be abandoned only through meditation (<u>bhāvanā</u>) or ... [MMK 17-15b]

[This is so] because it is abandoned by means of the path of meditation[53] when one passes [to] a result (<u>phala</u>-<u>vyatikrama</u>).[54] The word "or" has the sense of option (<u>vikalpa</u>): [The nondisappearance] is also abandoned when it has produced [its] result.[55]

Therefore the result of actions is produced by the nondisappearance. [MMk 17-15cd]

That [nondisappearance] is not abandoned through the abandonment of what can be abandoned by seeing [the Four Noble Truths,] suffering and so on. Therefore even though the action - such as the unwholesome action which

can be abandoned by seeing suffering and so on - has been abandoned, the nondisappearance will produce the result of actions.

In that connection, [with regard to] that nondisappearance,

> If it were similar to what can be abandoned by
> seeing [the Four Noble Truths] and to the passing
> away of action,[56]
> Then faults such as the destruction of action would
> follow. [MMK 17-16]

As to that, if that nondisappearance were of the same class (rigs mthun pa, nikāya-sabhāga)[57] as what can be abandoned by seeing [the Four Noble Truths,] suffering, etc. - [that is,] as the propensities (anuśaya)[58] of the afflictions (kleśa)[59] which can be abandoned by seeing suffering, etc. - and [of the same class] as the passing away of action, then faults such as the destruction of action would follow because the result of action would not exist.[60] One should understand that unwholesome action is abandoned by means of the path of seeing [the Four Noble Truths] because a Noble One (ārya) cannot also possess the actions of an ordinary person (pṛthag-jana).[61] Therefore [the nondisappearance] cannot be abandoned in the same way as what can be abandoned by

seeing [the Four Noble Truths] or [in the same way as] action. It is abandoned when one passes [to] a result. [In other words, the nondisappearance] which belongs to [the realm of] desire is abandoned by passing beyond the realm of desire. [The nondisappearances] which belong to [the realms of] form and formlessness, moreover, are abandoned by passing beyond the realms of form and formlessness, [respectively].[62]

> Just that single [nondisappearance] of all the similar and dissimilar actions
> Of the same realm arises at the time of rebirth (pratisaṃdhi, literally, "reconnection").
> [MMK 17-17]

"Of the same realm" [means] "alike as to realm." A similar (sabhāga) action is one of the same class (nikāya-sabhāga). "Dissimilar" (visabhāga) [means] "not of the same class" (nikāya-visabhāga). [As for] those nondisappearances of all those [actions], produced from each [action] in this life: Even though all those cease at the time of rebirth, just a single one arises.[63]

> In this life, that [nondisappearance] of each and every action of [one of] two kinds
> Arises separately; and even when [the action] has

> matured [i. e., produced a karmic result], [the nondisappearance] remains. [MMK 17-18]

In this life, the nondisappearance of each and every individual action, which is of [one of] two kinds, by the division of volition and [what is done after] having willed or [by the division of] wholesome and unwholesome, arises separately. Even when [the action] has matured, [the nondisappearance] remains. That [nondisappearance] does not necessarily cease because of the maturation of the action. Though it remains, it cannot produce a result again because it has [already] produced a result, like a document [on which a debt is recorded] which has [already] been used [to collect the debt].[64]

> That [nondisappearance] ceases when one has passed
> [to] a result and when one has died.
> It should be understood that the division of that
> [nondisappearance] is [into] undefiled (<u>anāsrava</u>)
> and defiled. [MMK 17-19]

The cessation of that nondisappearance of that action is certain in two ways: when one has passed [to] a result and when one has died. As to that passing [to] a result has been explained [in 17-15b]: "It can be abandoned only through meditation or ..." [Its

abandonment at] death has been explained [in 17-17]:

> Just that single [nondisappearance] of all the similar and dissimilar actions
> Of the same realm arises at the time of rebirth.[65]

Moreover, one should understand that that [nondisappearance] of that [action] is twofold according to the distinction of defiled and undefiled action.[66]

Therefore, in that way, if the nondisappearance exists, there will be produced different bodies, sense faculties, colors, shapes, powers, intellects, aspirations (adhimukti/adhimokṣa), dispositions (śīla), enjoyments, and so on of different states of existence (gati), castes, families, places, and times which have arisen from the various actions of living beings.

Therefore,

> Emptiness but not annihilation, and saṃsāra but not permanence:
> The dharma of nondisappearance of actions has been taught by the Buddha. [MMK 17-20]

Thus because action and result are connected, therefore emptiness is possible, since the saṃskāras are empty of the self imagined by the founders of (non-Buddhist) sects (tīrthakara). There is no annihilation, however, because the nondisappearance persists. Saṃsāra,

also, is possible, because [its] defining characteristic, the production of the saṃskāras in different states of exists, exists. Nevertheless, there is no permanence, because action ceases. Actions, moreover, do not disappear, because that dharma called "nondisappearance," which was taught by the Buddha, is also established. Therefore only that hypothesis is possible here.

Therefore it is not the case that the meaning of that previously stated reason, "because of the connection of action and result,"[67] is unestablished; nor do the faults of permanence and annihilation follow.

Answer:[68] For our position (*pakṣa*),

> Because action does not originate,[69] [MMK 17-21a]

Therefore, just like action, in ultimate reality the series of the seed also does not originate. Thus because there is no example, there is the fault of an incomplete proof.[70]

Why does that action not originate?

> Because it lacks intrinsic nature, this is why.
> [MMK 17-21b]

Because action lacks intrinsic nature, therefore it does not originate. Thus, to begin with, the fault [in

his argument] has been explained to the holder of the first position.[71]

Objection: The holder of the second position[72] has said, "The employment of the proof (sgrub pa'i sbyor ba, sādhana-prayoga?) is this: The connection of action and result exists; but the faults of permanence and annihilation do not occur, because the nondisappearance exists."

Answer: In that case, also, for our position,

Because action does not originate, [MMK17-21a]

Therefore, in ultimate reality, the nondisappearance is also not established. For if [action] originated, the nondisappearance of that [action] also would not disappear; but that [action] does not exist since it, too, has not originated. Therefore because that [nondisappearance] [73] also does not exist, the meaning of the reason [i. e., the existence of the nondisappearance] is simply not established. If one expounds the connection of action and result conventionally (saṃvṛtyā), it is contradictory.

What the holder of the second position said to the holder of the first position - "If your hypothesis, which has the characteristic that [the fruit] is similar to the series of the seed, were so, many great faults would occur"[74] - is also not correct. Because of [its] invariably being (avinābhāva) connected by the succession of cause and effect and because of [its] invariably being

neither permanent nor annihilated, the series of the seed is indeed held to be an example [for the connection of action and result]. Moreover, [the holder of the second position's] posing a dilemma (*rnam par rtog par byed pa*, *vikalpana*?) about the particularities of that,[75] which are to be established, is a futile rejoinder (*jāti*) which [merely] seems to be an dilemma (*rnam par rtog pa 'dra ba*). Since the series of the mind and mental factors (*citta-caitta*) arises from their [own] series, the meaning of the reason, "because they are of different kinds," is not established.[76] There is also the fault that the meaning of the reason is uncertain since, for their position, the series of *dūrva* grass would arise from the hair of cows and the wool of sheep; and cane would grow from the horns.[77]

Objection: What is said in scripture is also a logical reason (*liṅga*). The nondisappearance was spoken of by the Blessed One and the fact of neither permanence nor annihilation, which [has the existence] of that [nondisappearance] as its logical reason,[78] is also established. Therefore what [you] stated - "like action, in ultimate reality the nondisappearance is also not established; therefore the meaning of the reason is not established" - is incorrect.

Answer: The Blessed One has said,

Because that [action] is unoriginated,
Therefore it does not disappear. [MMK 17-21cd]

Therefore [we] accept the statement "it does not disappear" in reference to the unoriginated. That [statement], however, is not established for the opponent's position, so that [his own] point (artha) is not established for himself.

Even one who says that intrinsic nature exists certainly must understand that action has no intrinsic nature. If one asserts otherwise,

If action had an intrinsic nature, it would
undoubtedly be permanent. [MMK 17-22ab]

What is meant is that [this is so] because intrinsic nature is unchanging. Therefore,

Action would be unperformed [or "uncreated": akṛta],
because the permanent is not performed [or
"created:" na kriyate]. [MMK 17-22cd]

If one supposes that the result of an unperformed action is experienced,

But if action is unperformed, there would be fear of

> meeting with [the result of an action] which one had not performed. [MMK 17-23ab]

Moreover,

> The fault [of] dwelling in incontinence (_abrahmacarya_-_vāsa_) would also follow in that case. [MMK 17-23cd]

brahman is nirvāṇa. Continence (_brahmacarya_) is practice (_caryā_) for that. To dwell in continence is to dwell in that purpose (_artha_). To dwell in incontinence is not to dwell in continence. As to that, the fault would follow that even one who dwells in incontinence would dwell in continence. What is meant is that even one who has not performed an action leading to nirvāṇa would possess that [action].

Likewise, [as for customary activities] such as "Make pots and cloth!",

> Without a doubt, all customary activities without exception (_vyavahārā_ ... _sarva_ _eva_) would be contradicted. [MMK 17-24ab]

Moreover,

> The distinction between one who does good and one who does evil (puṇyapāpakṛtor) would also not be possible. [MMK 17-24cd]

The distinctions [expressed by saying,] "This one does good; this one does evil," would also not be possible.

> The [already] matured maturation of that [action] will mature again and again. [MMK 17-25ab]

"The [already] matured maturation of that" is its maturation which has [already] matured. [This] means the result of action which has [already] been produced.

Question: Why will the maturation of action mature again and again, even though it has [already] matured?

[Answer:]

> Because if action persists, therefore it possesses intrinsic nature. [MMK 17-25cd]

[The result will mature again and again] because if action persists by intrinsic nature, therefore it possesses intrinsic nature.

Objection: Although that [action] has persisted, it is not able to produce a result again, because it has

produced a result [already], like a document [on which a debt is recorded] which has [already] been used [to collect the debt].

[Answer:] [Such a] used document is also not established in ultimate reality. Therefore that is no answer.

Objection:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, action does indeed exist,

[Reason:] because the cause of that [action] exists.

[Dissimilar Example:] Here a cause is not possible for that which does not exist, such as a tortoise-hair coat.

[Application:] Action has a cause, [namely,] the afflictions (kleśa).

[Conclusion:] Therefore, by virtue of the stated reason, in ultimate reality action does indeed exist.

[Answer:] That is not good.

> This action has the nature of the afflictions, but those afflictions are not real (na tattvataḥ).
> If the afflictions are not real, how could action be made by them?[79] [MMK 17-26]

"This action has the nature of the afflictions" means that this action arose from the afflictions as [its] cause. For instance, [one might say,] "A jar has the

nature of clay." "Those afflictions are not real" means that they lack the intrinsic nature of afflictions. [This is so] because origination has been negated and because in [chapter six,] "Examination of Desire and the Desirous," the intrinsic nature of that [desire] has been negated; or else [it is so] because [the afflictions] will be negated later:

> Those [afflictions] which occur in dependence on the errors of [apprehending things as] pleasant (*śubha*) and unpleasant
> Do not exist because of [any] intrinsic nature. Therefore the afflictions are not real. [MMK 23-2]

Therefore, in that way, if those afflictions really (*tattvataḥ*) lack intrinsic nature, how could that action be made by them? [This] means that the cause of action is not the afflictions. Therefore, the meaning of [the opponent's] reason is not established or is contradictory.

Objection:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the afflictions do indeed exist,

[Reason:] because their result exists.

[Dissimilar Example:] Here a result of what does not exist cannot be apprehended, as, for example, no auditory consciousness [exists] as the result of a

deaf person's auditory sense organ.

[Application:] The afflictions have a result, characterized as action and body.[80]

[Conclusion:] Therefore in ultimate reality, the afflictions do indeed exist.

Thus it is not the case that the meaning of [our previous] reason, ["because the cause of that [action] exists,"] is unestablished or contradictory. Therefore the point (artha) which [we] maintain is established.

[The opponent continues:] Alternatively,

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, action does indeed exist,

[Reason:] because the result of that action exists.

[Dissimilar Example:] Here what does not exist has no result, just as the fruit of a sky-flower [does not exist].

[Application:] Action has a result, characterized as the body.

[Conclusion:] Therefore in ultimate reality, action does indeed exist.

Thus [your] inference [allegedly] proving that action does not exist is refuted by [our just-stated] subsequent argument (uttara-tarka).[81]

Answer:

> Action and the afflictions have been declared to be causal conditions of bodies. [MMK 17-27ab]

What is declared in that way in the treatise[82] are conventional expressions (vyavahārāḥ) but not ultimate reality (paramārtha). In ultimate reality, for our position, by the previously expounded proofs:

> If action and those afflictions are empty, how much more so in the case of bodies? [MMK 17-27cd]

What is meant is that because action and afflictions have no intrinsic nature, bodies are also not established, just like action and afflictions. Therefore the meaning of [your] reason, "because their result exists," is not established. Thus because the [previously] stated fault [in your argument] is not avoided and [your] example is not established, [our inference] is also not refuted by [your] subsequent argument.

Objection:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, action does indeed exist,

[Reason:] because the experiencer who enjoys (longs spyod pa'i za ba po) the result of that [action] exists.

[Dissimilar Example:] Here, as for something which does not exist, there is no experiencer who enjoys the result of that, just as [no experiencer enjoys] a garland of sky-flowers.

In the case of action, the experiencer who enjoys [its] result does exist:

> A being obstructed by ignorance possesses [the
> fetter of] craving; he is an experiencer.
> That [experiencer] is neither different from the
> agent nor the same as that [agent]. [MMK 17-28]

As to that, ignorance (*avidyā*) is the dharma which is the opposite (*vipakṣa*) of knowledge (*vidyā*). "Obstructed" by that [means] "covered." "Being" [means] "living being." In [the phrase] "possessing craving," "craving" [means] "desire." Because that [being] possesses that very fetter (*saṃyojana*), he "possesses craving." The meaning is that he possesses the fetter of craving.

That [being] is the experiencer of the result of action. For it has been said in a sūtra, "Beings obstructed by ignorance possess the fetter of craving,"[83] and likewise "But if you yourself have done this evil action, you yourself must experience the maturation of that."[84] That [experiencer] is neither different from the agent nor the same as that [agent], because he is indescribable as being the same or different. Therefore by virtue of the stated reason, the experiencer who enjoys the result of action exists. Therefore in ulti-

mate reality, action does indeed exist.

Answer: That has been explained in the very first [chapter] of [this Madhyamaka-]śāstra [with regard to] entities (bhāva) in general:

> Therefore [a result] arisen from causal conditions (pratyaya) [does] not [exist], and a result arisen from what are not causal conditions [for it] (apratyaya) does not exist.
>
> Because a result does not exist, how can there be causal conditions or non-conditions (apratyaya)? [MMK 1-14]

Therefore,

> Because this action, arisen from causal conditions or arisen from what are not causal conditions [for it],
>
> Does not exist, therefore the agent also does not exist. [MMK 17-29]

What is meant is that [this is so] because that [agent] also, like that [action], is unoriginated and because the agent has been negated[85] and because [the agent] does not exist as a real substance (dravya-sat). Therefore by the proof thus shown,

> If agent and action do not exist, how could a result

arisen from action exist? [MMK 17-30ab]

Therefore,

But if a result does not exist, how will an experiencer [of the result] exist? [MMK 17-30cd]

What is meant is that [this is so] because there is no cause even for stating the word "experiencer." Therefore the meaning of [the opponent's] reason, "because the experiencer who enjoys the result of that [action] exists," is not established. If one teaches it falsely (or "as false"?: log par ston na),[86] it is contradictory.

Objection: To deny (apavāda) action and result is a false view (mithyā-dṛṣṭi).[87] Therefore for those whose intellectual eye is obscured by the film of defect which is the Madhyamaka doctrine, it is not possible to see reality (tattva).

Answer:

Just as one displaying an emanation (nirmitaka) emanates by means of [his] accomplishment of magical power (ṛddhi)[88]
And [that] emanation emanates another [emanation and] that emanation, moreover, [emanates] others,[89,90] [MMK 17-31]

"Emanates" should be understood [in 17-31d].

> Likewise that [agent of an] action which is performed by an agent is also like the form (<u>ākāra</u>) of an emanation. [MMK 17-32ab]

Likewise that agent of an action which is performed by an agent is also like the form of an emanation, because he is like a nature which has arisen from a succession of causal conditions without beginning. Moreover, that action is like the form of an emanation because it is without intrinsic nature.

> For example, it is like another emanation emanated by an emanation. [MMK 17-32cd]

For example, like another emanation emanated by an emanation of the Tathāgata, that [action] also is without intrinsic nature.

> Afflictions, actions, and bodies, agents and results
> Are like an [illusory] city of the <u>gandharvas</u>; they are similar to a mirage or a dream. [MMK 17-33]

Because they are produced by the group (<u>sāmagrī</u>) of

causes and conditions, [we] accept according to convention (vyavahārataḥ) the requisites for attaining the higher realms [of saṃsāra] and liberation (svarga-apavarga) which are well-known conventionally. Therefore because [we] do not deny action and result, the fault stated [by the opponent] does not exist.

Objection: Because you have denied them [on the level of] ultimate reality, that is no answer.

[Answer:] That [answer] was explained previously:

> If an entity (bhāva) is not established, a nonentity (abhāva) is not established. [MMK 15-5ab]
>
> "It exists" (asti) is a grasping of permanence. "It does not exist" (nāsti) is a view of annihilation. Therefore one who is wise should not rely on existence or nonexistence. [MMK 15-10]

Because of the proof stated there, [we] have not accepted the doctrine that action and result do not exist.[91] Therefore it is not the case that [we have made] no answer.

An alternative [explanation of the last three verses of chapter seventeen is as follows:] Those whose minds are confused think that if things lack intrinsic nature in ultimate reality, [then] action, result, and their connection, as well as agent and experiencer, do not exist; therefore dwelling in continence would be pointless. In order to draw back the curtain of

confusion [covering their minds], [we] teach that action, etc., exist conventionally (samvṛtyā) like the form of an emanation and so on. Therefore [Nāgārjuna] said,

> Just as one displaying an emanation emanates by
> means of [his] accomplishment of magical power,
> And [that] emanation emanates another [emanation
> and] that emanation, moreover, [emanates] others,
> [MMK 17-31]

and so on at length.

In that connection, here the meaning of the chapter [is the following:] By explaining the fault in the reason ["because of the connection of action and result"] stated by the opponent at the beginning of the chapter, it has been shown that action and result have no intrinsic nature. Therefore such [scriptural] statements as the following are established:[92] "That in which neither action nor the result of action exists is enlightenment (bodhi). As is enlightenment, so also is attainment (prāpti). As is attainment, so also is [the bodhisattva's] prediction (vyākaraṇa) [to full enlightenment]. Likewise, in the lineage (gotra)[93] of the Noble Ones,[94] neither action nor the maturation of action exists. In that lineage, action is performed neither by body nor by speech nor by mind."[95]

The seventeenth chapter, "Examination of Action and Result," of the Prajñāpradīpa, a commentary on

[Nāgārjuna's] Mūlamadhyamaka composed by ācārya Bhavyakara/Bhavyakāra (legs ldan byed)[96] [is concluded].

Notes to Translation of Chapter Seventeen

[1]See Ava P19b-5,6; D16b-3 for this meaning of <u>vipakṣa</u>.

[2]See Ava P19b-5, D16b-2,3.

[3]Sanskrit <u>saṃsāra</u>, cyclic existence, the process of death and rebirth, not a static condition.

[4]Here the term "saṃskāras" (<u>saṃskārāḥ</u>) does not refer simply to the fourth aggregate (<u>skandha</u>) but to conditioned dharmas (<u>saṃskṛtā dharmāḥ</u>) which compose what is conventionally called a being or person. These are also called "internal saṃskāras" to distinguish them from the dharmas composing external, insentient things.

[5]That is, the opponents agree that nirvāṇa is not possible for the saṃskāras but hold that saṃsāra is possible for them. See Ava P20b-2,3,4; D17a-5,6.

[6]The opponent's objection continues through the first five verses of the chapter. See Ava P19b-8, D16b-5. The views expressed in MMK 17-1 through 17-5 are clearly those of a Buddhist. Avalokitavrata identifies him as a Śrāvaka- Vaibhāṣika (Ava P34b-7, D29b-1). The other commentators do not place him in any particular school.

[7]See Ava P23a-6,7,8; D19b-2,3,4.

[8]Apparently a reference to the <u>svārthika</u> class of <u>taddhita</u> affixes.

[9]Here "dharma" means wholesome mental action; see Ava P23b-1,2; D19b-4,5.

[10]See Ava P24b-3,4; D20b-4,5.

[11]The same list of four occurs in AK 2-72 as the four kinds of *anivṛta-avyākṛtāni cittāni* belonging to the realm of desire.

[12]Compare *Aṅguttaranikāya* III, 415: *cetanāhaṃ bhikkhave kammaṃ vadāmi; cetayitvā kammaṃ karoti kāyena vācāya manasā*. Quoted in Étienne Lamotte, "Le Traité de l'Acte de Vasubandhu: Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa," *Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques* 4 (1935- 36), 151-288 (abbreviation: KSP), p. 152. See also CPP 306 n. 3. The Tibetan has *las rnams* (*karmāṇi*) for *karma* (CPP 305.12).

[13]In other words, *paramarṣi* is a *karmadhāraya* compound: *ṛṣiś ca paramaś ca*.

[14]Once again, the Tibetan has the plural: *teṣām* ... *karmaṇām* (*las de dag gi*) for *tasya* ... *karmaṇaḥ* (CPP 306.4).

[15]On *avijñapti*, see KSP 156-8 and references in KSP 222-4 nn. 36-43. Avalokitavrata says that it is invisible, nonresistant matter; see, e. g., P27a-3, D22b-6. See also Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma,"* New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, reprint 1970 (abbreviation: Stcherbatsky), pp. 99-100 and also references in CPP 309 nn. 2 and 3.

[16]On *paribhogānvayaṃ puṇyaṃ*, see CPP 309-10 n. 4

and LVP AK IV 15, 20, 244-5 (on AK 4-4ab and 4-121a and 121b).

[17]Compare CPP 310.1,2: anvayo 'nugamo dāyakasaṃtānajaḥ kuśalopacaya ity arthaḥ|| = byung ba ni rjes su byung ba ste| sbyin pa po'i rgyud la skyes pa'i dge ba 'phel bar 'gyur ro zhes bya ba'i don to|| (P49-2-8 to 3-1, D51-4-7 to 52-1-1).

[18]Candrakīrti's explanation of merit and demerit following enjoyment is much clearer. When, for example, someone gives a gift (food, robes, etc.) to the saṅgha, then when the gift is used (enjoyed) by a monk, merit increases for the giver. On the other hand, if someone erects a temple where animal sacrifices are to take place, then whenever a living being is sacrificed there, demerit increases for the one responsible for the erection of the temple. See CPP 309.2-310.5, KSP 270. See also references in note 16.

[19]The five skandhas are material form (rūpa), feeling (vedanā), perception/conception (saṃjñā), mental formations (saṃskārāḥ), and cognition (vijñāna).

[20]That is, gods, men, animals, hungry ghosts, and hell-beings.

[21]Candrakīrti characterizes 17-6 as expressing the view of an opponent: atraike paricodayanti (CPP 311.6). Lamotte regards 17-6ab as expressing the Sautrāntika view, while 17-6cd expresses the Vibhajyavādin view (KSP

270-1). Bhāvaviveka and the other commentators appear to regard 17-6 as expressing Nāgārjuna's own view. See Akutobhayā P75b-5, D64b-4; Saito 223.7; and Ava P34b-7, D29b-1.

[22]See Ava P31a-3,4; D26a-5,6.

[23]Avalokitavrata explains that these plants are uprooted after the maturation of their fruit. See Ava P31a-7, D26b-6.

[24] tha dad par. Ava P31b-5, D26b-6 reads tha snyad par, glossed as kun rdzob kyi tha snyad du (loc. cit., next line). The point is that there is a difference between the momentary cessation of individual dharmas and the conventional cessation of conventional things such as plantain trees. The latter is said to occur when the series of momentary dharmas which make up what is conventionally called a "plantain tree" undergoes a change (conventionally called "the uprooting of the tree") such that the subsequent moments in the series are no longer similar to the moments before the change occurred. See Ava P31b-1 to 8, D26b-3 to 27a-1. Of course, for the Mādhyamikas, the dharmas are themselves conventional. Thus with Avalokitavrata's reading tha snyad par, the passage would mean that the Mādhyamikas accept these two kinds of cessation (only) on the conventional level.

[25]See Ava P32a-4, D27a-4. Note that Ava has sngar

ma zhig pas (loc. cit., previous line) for ... pa.

[26]For example, the cessation of a jar does not occur before its cause, e. g., the jar's being struck by a mallet; but cessation does occur when its cause exists. See Ava P32a-6 to 32b-4, D27a-6 to 27b-1.

[27]According to the first chapter of the MMK, a real entity which possesses an intrinsic nature cannot be caused by another such entity. It would exist by virtue of its own intrinsic nature, unrelated to anything else.

[28]That is, something which even the opponent does not consider to be the cause.

[29]See Christian Lindtner, "Bhavya the Logician," typescript, p. 4 and pp. 20-1 n. 29. (This paper will appear in the Vidhusekhar Bhattacharya Sastri Commemoration Volume, eds. Sunil Sen-Gupta and Suniti Kumar Pathak.)

[30]That is, it must either have ceased or not ceased; and in neither case can it produce a result. See Ava P33b-5 to 8, D28b-1 to 4.

[31]Like that which is in the process of ceasing, that which is in the process of arising is also indescribable as having ceased or as not having ceased; but the opponent does not admit that it produces a result. See Ava P34a-4,5; D28b-7.

[32]Avalokitavrata explains that whether the action is held to be permanent or momentary (the only two possible

alternatives, according to Bhāvaviveka), the reason in the opponent's syllogism, "because of the connection of action and result," is [1] not established ultimately and [2] contradictory conventionally. See Ava P34a-7 to 34b-1, D29a-2 to 4.

[33]All the commentaries agree that verses 17-7 through 17-11 express the views of an opponent. See Akutobhayā P75b-7, D64b-6; Saito 224.4; Ava P34b-6,7, D29a-7 to 29b-1. For Candrakīrti, the opponent is different from the one who spoke in 17-6: tatraike nikāyāntarīyāḥ parihāraṃ varṇayanti (CPP 312.1). Lamotte considers the opponent in 17-7 through 17-11 to be a Sautrāntika (KSP 271-4). Avalokitavrata (loc. cit.) simply says that the opponent here belongs to a school other than that of the Śrāvaka-Vaibhāṣka.

[34]See remarks in CPP 312 n. 3.

[35]From the following commentary (sems pa las su brjod pa), Bhāvaviveka evidently understands cetas as equivalent to cetanā. Candrakīrti, on the other hand, glosses cetaso as kuśalākuśalacetanāviśeṣasamprayuktāc cittāt (CPP 313.9). The translators of the Prasannapadā accordingly translate cetas as sems rather than sems pa (CPP 313 n. 4). The author of the Akutobhayā and Buddhapālita, like Bhāvaviveka, explain sems pa as las su brjod pa, i. e., cetanā (Akutobhayā P76a-6, D67a-4; Saito 225.13).

[36]Here _sems pa_ corresponds to _citta_ (CPP 313.8).

[37]Here _sems pa_ corresponds to _citta_ (CPP 314.1) rather than _cetanā_.

[38]_chos_, _dharma_. Although Avalokitavrata omits _chos_ when he quotes Bhāvaviveka's commentary, in his own subcommentary he appears to gloss it as _sādhana-dharma_ and _hetu_, that is, the reason proving that the connection of cause and result exists. See Ava P36a-8 to 36b-1, D30b-5,6.

[39]That is, that the faults of annihilation and permanence do not occur but that the connection of action and result exists. See Ava P36b-5,6; D31a-3.

[40]On the ten _karmapathas_, see KSP 256, 258-9 and references in 256 n. 137 and 258-9 nn. 145 and 146.

[41]The five _kāmaguṇas_ are the objects of the five physical senses. See, e. g., CPP 315.9,10.

[42]On the _vipāka-phala_ and _niṣyanda-phala_, see AK 2-56,57; 4-85.

[43]That is, because we have shown that the connection of action and result does indeed exist, therefore in ultimate reality, saṃsāra exists for the internal saṃskāras. See Ava P37b-3,4,5; D31b-6,7.

[44]All the commentaries agree in regarding verses 17-12 through 17-20 as expressing the view of an opponent different from the one in the preceding verses. See _Akutobhayā_ P76b-5, D65b-3; Saito 226.11; Ava P37b-8,

D32a-3; CPP 315.12,13. Avalokitavrata (*loc. cit.*) identifies the new opponent as a Śrāvaka-Vaibhāṣika, while Lamotte (KSP 274) calls him a Sāṃmitīya (alternative form: Saṃmatīya).

[45]According to Buddhist doctrine, a being who dies in one state of existence (god, human, etc.) can be reborn in any other state of existence. Thus the preceding hypothesis conflicts with the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth.

[46]The mind of an ordinary, unenlightened being passes easily from any of these states - wholesome, unwholesome, and karmically neutral (*avyākṛta*) - to any other; but this would be impossible on the preceding hypothesis.

[47]The three realms of desire, form, and formlessness (*kāma*-, *rūpa*-, and *ārūpya*-*dhātus*) are different states within saṃsāra. On the three realms and their relation to the five or six states of existence (*gatis*), see AK 3-4ab and LVP AK III p. 11 n. 2. The realms of form and formlessness correspond to meditative states (*samāpatti-dhyāna*) as well as states of rebirth (*upapatti*-*dhyāna*); see AK 8-1. As states of meditation, they can be attained by beings of the desire realm; see LVP AK III p. 8 n. 2. Thus the point made here combines the two previous arguments: The preceding hypothesis leads to consequences which contradict both the doctrine of rebirth

and psychological fact (in this case, the psychology of meditation).

Not included in the three realms are the supramundane dharmas. The term "supramundane" is apparently synonymous with "undefiled" (*anāsrava*). The undefiled dharmas are the three unconditioned dharmas (including nirvāṇa) and those conditioned dharmas which are part of the Noble Path (*ārya-mārga*); see AK 1-5ab.

[48]Since both one's state of mind (wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral) and one's state of rebirth would be invariable.

[49]On the *avipraṇāśa*, see KSP 162-3 and 230 n. 57. On the attribution of this doctrine to the Sāṃmitīyas, see KSP 230 n. 57, 231 n. 60 and André Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, Publications de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient, Vol. 38, Saigon: École Française d'Extrême-Orient, 1955, p. 126 and n. 9. According to Stefan Anacker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu*, Religions of Asia Series no. 4, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984, p. 105 and pp. 140-141, nn. 30 and 31, Sumatiśīla, author of a *ṭīkā* on Vasubandhu's *Karmasiddhi-prakaraṇa*, also ascribes the notion of the *avipraṇāśa* to the Sāṃmitīyas.

[50]*spyad*. For *spyad* = *prayukta*, see CPP 317 n. 6.

[51]*ror 'gyur ba*, literally, "becomes a corpse," = *nirbhukta*; see CPP 318 n. 3.

[52]On the four realms of existence, see KSP 162-3. While the AK discusses the three dhātus (the realms of desire, form, and formlessness) at some length, it says nothing of a fourth dhātu. On the three dhātus and their relation to the five or six gatis, see references in note 47. The term anāsravo dhātuḥ occurs frequently in the literature of the Yogācāra school. See Mahāyāna-sūtra-alaṃkāra 9-20 to 9-37, 11-43,44 and Vasubandhu's Triṃśika, vs. 30. See also Lambert Schmithausen, Der Nirvāṇa-Abschnitt in der Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī der Yogācārabhūmiḥ, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophische-Historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte 264, Band 2, Wien: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1969, pp. 117-8, 144.

[53]According to Bhāvaviveka and Avalokitavrata's subsequent commentary, "meditation" (bhāvanā) here seems to refer both to (1) the supramundane path of meditation (lokottara-bhāvanā-mārga), in which one meditates on the Four Noble Truths after having gained an initial insight into them on the path of seeing (darśana-mārga), and (2) the mundane path of meditation (laukika-bhāvanā-mārga). The supramundane path of meditation enables one to attain the undefiled realm, that is, to become an Arhat. Mundane meditation, on the other hand, only permits one to attain the realms of form and formlessness. For more information on the darśana-mārga and the laukika- and

lokottara-bhāvanā-mārgas, see de La Vallée Poussin, "Note Sommaire sur le Chemin," LVP AK V, pp. iv-xii, and also AK 6-1cd.

[54]On "passing to a result," see the commentary immediately preceding MMK 17-17 and nn. 62 and 65.

[55]This appears to contradict the statement in MMK 17-18d that the nondisappearance remains after the maturation of the result. Avalokitavrata explains that a nondisappearance which has produced its result, does, indeed, remain until one dies or passes to a result by means of the path of meditation, but that it can no longer produce a result and thus is abandoned in that sense. See Ava P41b-6 to 42a-2, D35a-7 to 36b-3.

[56]The Tibetan text of MMK 17-16ab in BPP is: gal te mthong bas spang ba dang|| las ´pho ba dang mthun gyur na||. Ava (P42a-8, D35b-7), however, has spong for mthong, as do the Akutobhayā (P77b-1, D66a-5) and Bp (Saito 229.8,9). CPP has gal te spong bas spang ba dang|| las ´pho ba yis ´jig ´gyur na|| (P121b-4, D106a-3), which, as de La Vallée Poussin points out (CPP 320 n. 8), does not entirely correspond to the Sanskrit (CPP 320.8).

[57]Dharmas to be abandoned are divided into five nikāyas according to whether they are abandoned by means of seeing one of the Four Noble Truths on the path of seeing (four nikāyas) or by means of the path of medita-

tion (one *nikāya*). See AK 2-52-b.

[58]Chapter 5 of the AK is devoted to the *anuśayas*. On the *anuśayas* which are abandoned through the path of seeing and path of meditation, respectively, see AK 1-40, 5-5,6; Erich Frauwallner, "Abhidharma-Studien III: Der *Abhisamayavādaḥ*," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* *15* (1971), 69-102; and CPP 478-9 n. 3, 480 n. 1, 484 nn. 1 and 2.

[59]The *kleśas* are undesirable emotional states. The three most often mentioned are desire (*rāga*), hatred (*dveṣa*), and confusion (*moha*). See MMK 23-1.

[60]Avalokitavrata glosses *las ´pho ba* (*karma-saṃkrama*), "the passing away of action," as *las byas ma thag tu rang ´gag*, "action´s ceasing of itself as soon as it has been performed" (Ava P42b-2, D36a-1). Thus "the passing away of action" refers to its impermanence; "the destruction of action" refers to its having no karmic result.

[61]That is, one who has not yet attained the path of seeing and become an *ārya*. On the abandonment of the actions of an ordinary person by one who has attained the path of seeing, see CPP 319 n. 3.

[62]Avalokitavrata explains, "When one has died in one realm and is born in another, even that single nondisappearance of the former realm which arises at the time of rebirth in the same realm is abandoned; and

another nondisappearance of another realm arises" (P43a-5,6; D36b-2). See the following note.

[63]Avalokitavrata explains, "At the time of rebirth, all those [nondisappearances] arisen from each action [in this life] cease together with the dying (marana-amśika) mind; and just a single one arises together with the mind which is being born (upapatty-amśika)" (P43b-2,3; D36b-5,6).

[64]See note 55.

[65]At this point, it may be useful to sum up certain aspects of the opponent's theory of the nondisappearance (avipraṇāśa) as it is presented by Nāgārjuna, according to Bhāvaviveka's interpretation, as interpreted in turn by Avalokitavrata, and finally by me. When one performs wholesome or unwholesome actions, one nondisappearance is produced for each such action. If the karmic result of that action occurs in a particular lifetime, the corresponding nondisappearance becomes inoperative for the remainder of that lifetime. It continues to exist, however, until death, when it ceases. If the result does not occur before the time of death, it seems (and this is not entirely clear) that all the nondisappearances which have not yet produced a result are "rolled into one" and continue in that form in the next life. (See Ava P44b-8 to 45a-3, D37b-6 to 38a-1 and also note 63).

The path of meditation makes it possible to rid

oneself of nondisappearances which have not yet produced a result. (See Ava P44b-7,8; D37b-6). One may do so by practicing the supramundane path of meditation on the Four Noble Truths, which come after the direct vision of the Truths on the path of seeing. This process is described in Ava P41a-8 to 41b-5, D35a-2 to 6 and in Ava P44b-2 to 8, D37b-2 to 6. One may also do so by being reborn from a lower one of the three realms to a higher one (see note 62). This can be achieved through practicing the mundane path of meditation, though it sometimes occurs when one practices the supramundane path (see note 53).

[66]Avalokitavrata explains that the nondisappearance is neutral (avyākṛta) by nature (see MMK 17-14d) because it is not explained as being defiled or undefiled. Nevertheless, it is classified as defiled or undefiled according to the action which produced it (Ava P45a-3 to 6, D38a-1,2,3).

[67]See the opponent's syllogism stated in the commentary prior to MMK 17-17.

[68]The remaining verses in chapter seventeen express the Mādhyamika viewpoint, except for 17-28, which states an opponent's objection.

[69]In MMK 17-21a, CPP has kasmāt, "why?," for yasmāt, "because." The Akutobhayā (P78b-3, D67a-5), Bp (Saito 232.22), and Ava (P46a-4, D38b-6) all agree with BPP.

[70]This refers to the argument advanced by the opponent whose views are expressed in MMK 17-7 through 17-11. See Ava P46a-5,6,7; D38b-6 to 39a-1.

[71]See the previous note.

[72]That is, the opponent whose views are expressed in MMK 17-12 through 17-20. See Ava P47a-1,2; D39b-1,2.

[73]See Ava P47a-4, D39b-3.

[74]See the commentary following MMK 17-12.

[75]According to Avalokitavrata, "that" refers to the series of the mind and mental factors which the holder of the first position maintains to be similar to the series of the seed, sprout, etc. See Ava P48a-3, D40a-6.

[76]In the commentary following MMK 17-12, the holder of the second position argued that if the holder of the first position were correct and the series of mind and mental factors were similar to the successive stages of growth of a plant, then a human, for example, could never be reborn as a god, because they are different in kind, just as mango trees do not bear <u>nimba</u> fruit. Bhāvaviveka claims that this is a mere <u>jāti</u> because mind and mental factors arise from the preceding mind and mental factors, even in the case where a human is reborn as a god. Thus we do not, in fact, have something of one kind arising from something of another kind.

Avalokitavrata gives the following example of <u>jāti</u>: Someone is told that a jar is impermanent, because it is

created, like sound. He replies that then sound must be visible and so on like the jar. The point seems to be that the example and the dharmin need not be alike in all respects but only in that both possess the hetu and the sādhya. See Ava P48a-3 to 48b-4, D40a-6 to 40b-6.

[77]The point seems to be that if the holder of the second position means to assert, as a general principle, that things can arise from something of a different kind, because, for instance, a human can be reborn as a god, then he would also have to accept such absurdities as cane growing from horns. I cannot follow Avalokitavrata's explanation; see Ava P48b-5 to 49a-1, D 40b-7 to 41a-3.

[78]See Ava P49b-1,2; D41b-2.

[79]In 17-26d, CPP has, "How could action be real?" See CPP 326.17 and 326 n. 3. Also, the Tibetan of CPP has la for na at the end of 17-26a.

[80]That is, the various bodies in which one is reborn as a result of action.

[81]See Ava P53a-3,4; D44b-1,2. On uttara-tarka, see C. Lindtner, op. cit., p. n. 62.

[82]Avalokitavrata glosses "treatise" (śāstra) as "Abhidharma treatise." See Ava P53a-5, D44b-2.

[83]Compare CPP 328.6: avidyānivṛtāḥ sattvās tṛṣṇāsaṃyojanāḥ. (See CPP 604.) The phrase avijjānīvaraṇānaṃ sattānaṃ taṇhāsaṃyojanānaṃ occurs several times in the

Pāli Canon: Saṃyutta-nikāya II 178, 184; III 149, 151; V 226; Aṅguttara-nikāya I 223; Majjhima-nikāya I 294.

84Compare CPP 328.7 and see CPP 328 n. 4.

85Presumably an allusion to chapter eight, "Examination of Agent and Action."

86Avalokitavrata glosses log par ston na as kun rdzob tu, saṃvṛtyā. See Ava P55a-5, D46a-3.

87See, e. g., AK 4-78bc, 79c and LVP AK 4 p. 167 n. 4. Avalokitavrata identifies the objectors here as svayūthyāḥ, i. e., fellow Buddhists. See Ava P55a-7, D46a-4.

88On the nairmāṇikī-ṛddhi, see Har Dayal, The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, reprint 1975, p. 114.

89Nāgārjuna also uses the simile of a magical emanation in Vigrahavyāvartanī 23 and 27 (see Kamaleswar Bhattacharya, E. H. Johnston, and Arnold Kunst, The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,1978, pp. 18, 21 (translation) and pp. 25, 27-8 (text)) and Śūnyatāsaptati 40, 41, 42 (see Christian Lindtner, Nāgārjuniana, Indiske Studier IV, Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1982, pp. 52-3).

90CPP has yathā nirmitakaṃ śāstā nirmimītarddhisampadā| nirmito nirmimītānyaṃ sa ca nirmitakaḥ punaḥ|| (CPP 330.2,3). In 17-31, the Sanskrit and Tibetan (CPP 330 n.1) of CPP are different from the Tibetan of BPP.

CPP's version of 17-31cd gives one further emanation; BPP gives two.

[91]Avalokitavrata remarks that what are involved are simple negations (prasajya-pratiṣedha) rather than implicative negations (paryudāsa-pratiṣedha). See Ava P56a-8, D47a-1. Thus the negation of the existence of an entity does not entail the acceptance of nonentities. A nonentity is the absence of an entity; but if there are no entities, i. e., nothing possessing intrinsic nature, then, for the Mādhyamikas, it is meaningless to speak of the absence of such an entity.

[92]According to Avalokitavrata, a sūtra quotation is introduced at this point in reply to those who might charge, "[The absence of intrinsic nature in action and result] has been established by a mere limited (prādeśika) treatise of dessicated logic (śuṣka-tarka)." Instead, a major purpose of the MMK is to establish such scriptural passages (by reasoning). See Ava P56b-7 to 57a-1, D47a-6,7 and P57a-5,6,7; D47b-3,4,5.

[93]On this term, see D. S. Ruegg, "The Meanings of the Term gotra and the Textual History of the Ratnagotra-vibhāga," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 39 (1976), pp. 341-363.

[94]Avalokitavrata explains the gotra of the āryas as follows: "As to the lineage of the Noble Ones: The Noble Ones are born from the comprehension (thugs su chud pa,

probably adhigama) of ultimate reality." See Ava P57a-4, D47b-2,3.

95Avalokitavrata identifies this passage as being from the Kāśyapaparivarta of the Mahāratnakūṭa. See Ava P57a-1, D47a-7 to 47b-1. The portion of the passage following "Likewise" is found in The Kāśyapaparivarta, ed. A. von Staël-Holstein, Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1926, p. 151, with karma-abhisaṃskāra for karma-vipāka. For a discussion of the ārya-gotra according to the Kāśyapaparivarta, see D. S. Ruegg, La Théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra, Publications de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient, vol. 70, Paris: École Française d'Extrême-Orient, 1969, p. 110. I have not been able to locate the first part of the passage.

96On the various names of "Bhāvaviveka," see note 161 to my translation of chapter three.

Translation of Prajñāpradīpa, Chapter Twenty-three:
Examination of Error (viparyāsa)

Now [Nāgārjuna] begins the twenty-third chapter with the aim of showing that error has no intrinsic nature (svabhāva) by means of refuting a particular counter-position (vipakṣa)[1] to emptiness (śūnyatā) as [in the previous chapters].

Objection:

> It has been said that desire (rāga), hatred (dveṣa), and confusion (moha) arise from conceptual construction (saṃkalpa). [MMK 23-1ab]

[It has been said, that is,] in the treatise (śāstra).[2]

[As for] those [afflictions], moreover, desire, hatred, and confusion, respectively,

> They indeed occur in dependence on the errors of [apprehending things as] pleasant (śubha) or unpleasant (aśubha).[3] [MMK 23-1cd]

The word "indeed" (hi) has the sense of specification (avadhāraṇa or nirdhāraṇa). It specifies that they occur only in dependence on the errors of [apprehending

things as] pleasant or unpleasant, but that they do not occur independently. It does not specify that they occur in dependence only on the errors of [apprehending things as] pleasant or unpleasant, since [other] conditions for their arising, such as superficial attention (ayoniśo manasikāra), also exist.

Thus that is a statement of a similar example (sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta). Because an example is given on account of something to be proved (sādhya) and a property which proves [it] (sādhana-dharma), the remaining members [of the syllogism] are understood. Therefore the inference (anumāna) is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality (paramārthataḥ), the aggregates (skandha) and so on do indeed exist by intrinsic nature,

[Reason:] because they occur in dependence on a cause (hetu),

[Similar Example:] as do desire, etc.

[Dissimilar Example:] What does not exist by intrinsic nature does not occur in dependence on a cause, as for instance a sky-flower [does not].

[Application:] The aggregates and so on occur in dependence each on its own cause.

[Conclusion:] Therefore by virtue of the stated reason, in ultimate reality the aggregates and so on do indeed exist by intrinsic nature.

Answer:

> Those which occur in dependence on the errors
> of [apprehending things as] pleasant or
> unpleasant, ... [MMK 23-2ab]

That is, those afflictions (kleśa), desire and so on, which you have given as an example,

> Do not exist because of intrinsic nature.
> [MMK 23-2c]

[This is so] by the method previously explained.[4]

> Therefore the afflictions do not exist in reality
> (tattvataḥ). [MMK 23-2d]

"In reality" means "in ultimate reality."

Therefore [the opponent's] proof (sādhana) has the fault of having a defective example. If one supposes that it is a conventional (vyāvahārika) example, it will be hard to answer [the charge] that [the example] lacks the property to be proved, because in ultimate reality, the afflictions have no intrinsic nature.[5] If [the opponent] is proving the existence of conventional intrinsic nature, he is proving what is [already]

established [for us] (siddha-sādhana).[6]

Moreover,

> The existence and nonexistence of the self (ātman), [MMK 23-3a]

With respect to the mode of [either] ultimate or superficial reality (saṃvṛti),

> Are not established in any way. [MMK 23-3b]

The word "any" (cit or cic ca) has the sense of specification [when combined with a negation]; that is, it is simply not established.[7]

Thus [without] the self,

> Without that [self], how can the existence and nonexistence of the afflictions be established? [MMK 23-3cd]

The meaning of the sentence is that it is simply not established. The idea (abhiprāya) is that [this is so] because the dependent (brten pa, probably āśrita) would exist if that on which it depends (rten, probably āśraya) existed.

In order to clarify that same point, the following is said:

> Those afflictions arise from some [self],[8]
> [MMK 23-4a]

because they are qualities (guṇa) of that [self] and are objects of enjoyment for that [self].

> But that [self] is not established. [MMK 23-4b]

Why? It has been found [to be] so in the [eighteenth] chapter [of the MMK,] "Examination of the Self." Thus this [pāda] has shown that the property (dharma) of the afflictions [which proves their ultimate nonexistence] is that they have no basis (rten, probably āśraya).[9] Therefore the inference is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, desire and so on do not exist,

[Reason:] because their basis [the self] does not exist,

[Similar Example:] as with the dark complexion of a childless woman's son.

Objection: Our fellow Buddhists (svayuthyāḥ) say, "Though the self does not exist, the relation ('brel pa, probably sambandha or pratibandha) is established that the afflictions belong to the mind (citta). Because the

afflictions are a property (dharma) of the mind, the meaning of the reason (hetu) [of your syllogism] is not established for those who propound the nonexistence of the self."

Answer: It is not the case that the meaning of [our] reason is unestablished, because the mind is not established since [1] the origination of the mind has been negated and [2] the intrinsic nature of cognition (vijñāna) has been rejected and [3] its existence as a real substance (dravya) has been negated.

Objection: Some who propound existence say, "Since we hold that the characteristic (lakṣaṇa) of an entity (bhāva) does not exist, due to the nonexistence of one thing in another (itaretarābhāva), that [statement] that the afflictions do not exist is established [for us]. Therefore a relation of the mental factors (caitta) with the nonexistence of intrinsic nature of entities will also be established."[10]

Answer: To them, [we] say the following: You maintain that a jar or a piece of cloth lack the characteristic of an entity different from that [jar or cloth]. Because that [absence of a different entity's characteristic][11] is a cause for the origination of a cognition which appears as presence (bhāva) and absence (abhāva),[12] [that absence of one thing in another] must be [either] a presence (bhāva) or an absence (abhāva). As to that, if

it is a presence [your] thesis (pratijñā) [of the absence of one thing in another] is lost. If it is an absence, well then, because the relationship [expressed in such statements as] "this is the blueness or redness of this jar" would not exist, conventional usage (vyavahāra) would not exist.[13]

Therefore [Nāgārjuna] says,

> Without some [basis], does anything exist?
> [MMK 23-4c]

Without some basis [such as] a jar or a piece of cloth, is any dependent [quality such as] blueness or redness maintained to exist?

> No afflictions exist.[14] [MMK 23-4d]

The idea is that [afflictions do not exist] for a nonentity [having] the characteristic of such [things] as a childless woman's son. Because it is not so maintained [i. e., that attributes exist without a basis], therefore nonexistent [afflictions] cannot serve as an example [in the opponent's original syllogism]. Thus the meaning maintained [by the opponent] is not proved.[15]

To our fellow Buddhists, moreover, the following should be said:

Like the view of one's own "body,"[16] the
afflictions ... [MMK 23-5a]

"One's own" (sva) [refers] to the self and what belongs to it (ātma-ātmīya). "Body" (kāya) is a synonym of name and form collectively. "The view of one's own body" is the afflicted (kliṣṭa) view apprehending one's own body. "Like the view of one's own body" [means] "similar to the view of one's own body." [The analysis of] the afflictions [and the one who is afflicted] is similar to that [expressed in the following verse:]

[The Tathāgata] is not [his] body nor is he
different from [his] body. [His] body does not
exist in him, nor he in it.
The Tathāgata does not possess [his] body. What is
the Tathāgata?[17] [MMK 22-21]

The afflictions are "afflicting" in the sense of "injuring."

... in five ways[18] do not exist in the afflicted.
[MMK 23-5b]

That is, [they do not exist] in the afflicted mind. The afflictions are not the afflicted because [their] being nondifferent from that [afflicted mind] has been

negated and because it would follow that the consuming [fire] and the consumed [fuel] would be the same.[19] Neither are the afflictions different from the afflicted because, as before, their being different from that has been negated and because it would follow that [there could be] afflictedness even without afflictions. The afflictions do not exist in the afflicted, nor does the afflicted exist in the afflictions, nor do the afflictions possess the afflicted - [all] because difference simply does not exist. Thus in five ways the afflictions do not exist in the afflicted.

> Like the view of one's own "body," in five ways the afflicted does not exist in the afflictions. [MMK 23-5cd]

The nonexistence of the afflicted in the afflictions in five ways should also be construed in that way. As to that, because the afflictions do not exist, the example [of the opponent's original syllogism, i. e., desire, etc.] has the fault that it lacks the property to be proved [i. e., existence by intrinsic nature].[20]

Moreover, for our own position,

> The errors of [apprehending things as] pleasant and unpleasant do not exist by intrinsic nature

(svabhāvatah). [MMK 23-6ab]

Then

> What are the afflictions [which occur] in dependence on the errors of [apprehending things as] pleasant and unpleasant?[21] [MMK 23-6cd]

"Which occur" is the rest of the sentence. Therefore in ultimate reality, it is not the case that a property (dharma) of the afflictions is [their] originating dependently. Thus the example [i. e., desire, etc.] has the fault that it lacks the property which proves [the thesis, i. e., the property of occurring in dependence on a cause].

Objection: Our fellow Buddhists[22] retort:

> Forms, sounds, tastes, and tangibles, smells and dharmas, sixfold, ... [MMK 23-7ab]

They are six kinds. What are they?

> ... are the object (vastu). [MMK 23-7c1]

Because [something] dwells in this, it is an object (asmin vasatīti vastu); the sense is that [the

afflictions] arise from those [six kinds of objects]. Form is what can be formed. Sound is what can be sounded. Smell is what can be smelled. Taste is what can be tasted. The tangible is what can be touched. Dharmas [are so called] because they bear their own characteristics (svalakṣaṇa-dhāraṇa).[23]

Of what are those six the object?

> They are conceptually constructed (vikalpyate) [as the object] of desire, hatred and confusion. [MMK 23-7c2,d]

Desire causes one to be attached; it is clinging (adhyavasāna). Hatred causes one to hate; it produces malice (āghāta) toward beings. Confusion makes one confused; it is not knowing.[24] This [verse] has shown that a property (dharma) of error is that [its] object exists.

Therefore the inference is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, desire and so on, which occur in dependence on whatever errors of [apprehending things as] pleasant and unpleasant, do indeed exist,

[Reason:] because their object exists.

[Dissimilar Example:] Here what does not exist in ultimate reality has no object, like the visual

cognition of a blind person.

[Application:] Desire and so on have [the six] objects, which are conceptually constructed as the errors [i. e., they are apprehended as pleasant or unpleasant].

[Conclusion:] Therefore by virtue of the stated reason, since the errors exist, the afflictions, which occur in dependence on them, are established. Therefore there is no fault in the example [of the opponent's original syllogism, i. e., "desire, and so on"].

Answer:

> Forms, sounds, tastes, and tangibles, smells and dharmas are isolated (kevala).[25] [MMK 23-8ab]

"Isolated" [means] "without intrinsic nature." They do not bear even a slight scent of intrinsic nature.

Nor do [we] nihilistically negate (apavāda) the conventional truth (vyavahāra-satya). For [as to] those [sense objects],

> They are like an [illusory] city of the gandharvas; they are similar to a mirage or a dream. [MMK 23-8cd]

They are "like a city of the gandharvas" since they

have a common property (sādharmya) in that they are objects of apprehension which are restricted as to place and time and unrestricted as to [individual] series.[26] They are "similar to a mirage" since they have a common property in that, despite being empty of intrinsic nature, they attain the state of being a causal condition such that one who is attached to them seeks [them]. They are "similar to a dream" since they have a common property in that, despite having no intrinsic nature, they attain a state [in which] one who desires for a little while brings about cause and effect.

Since form and so on, which are of such a kind, [are like a person created by magical illusion] because of having the common property of appearing falsely [and are similar to a reflection] because of having the common property of arising independently of the action of an agent, therefore [Nāgārjuna] asks,[27]

> In regard to those [objects], which are like a person [created by] magical illusion and similar to a reflection,
> How will [the notions of] either pleasant or unpleasant occur? [MMK 23-9]

The idea is that they will simply not occur because [those objects] are empty of ultimately real

(pāramārthika) intrinsic nature. Therefore because in ultimate reality the object is not established, the meaning of the reason [of the opponent's last syllogism, i. e., the existence of the object of the afflictions] is not established; and it has a contradictory meaning.[28]

Moreover,

> The pleasant, in dependence on which we could
> designate the unpleasant as unpleasant,
> Does not exist without relation (anapeksya) [to the
> unpleasant].[29] [MMK 23-10abc]

["The unpleasant" is] that which would be called "unpleasant." ["We could designate the unpleasant as unpleasant;" i. e.,] we could designate something unpleasant as [having] the intrinsic nature of the unpleasant [by saying,] "This is unpleasant."[30] The meaning [of "does not exist without relation"] is that that pleasant does not exist as having the nature of the pleasant unless it is related to the unpleasant.

> Therefore the pleasant is not possible.
> [MMK 23-10cd]

The idea is that [this is so] because the unpleasant does not exist and therefore the pleasant also, being unre-

lated to that, would simply not be the pleasant.

Likewise,

> The unpleasant, in dependence on which we could
> designate the pleasant as pleasant,
> Does not exist without relation [to the pleasant].[31]
> [MMK 23-11abc]

["The pleasant" is] that which would be established as "pleasant." ["We could designate the pleasant as pleasant;" i. e.,] we could designate something pleasant as [having] the intrinsic nature of the pleasant [by saying,] "This is pleasant."[32] [The meaning of "does not exist without relation" is that] that unpleasant is not established as having the nature of the unpleasant unless it is related to the pleasant.

> Therefore the unpleasant is not possible.
> [MMK 23-11d]

The idea is that [this is so] because the pleasant thus does not exist and therefore the unpleasant also, being without relation to that pleasant, would simply not be the unpleasant.

Therefore in that way,

If the pleasant does not exist, how will desire
arise?
If the unpleasant does not exist, how will hatred
arise? [MMK 23-12]

Because those two [i. e., the pleasant and the unpleasant][33] do not exist, confusion also does not exist. It is established that simply because those two do not exist, that also does not exist. It is not the case that there is no fault if one speaks of them; therefore the [previously] stated fault of the reason is not avoided.

Objection:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the errors of [apprehending things as] pleasant and unpleasant do indeed exist,

[Reason:] because the Blessed One has spoken [of them] in the sūtras.

[Similar Example:] That which the Blessed One has spoken of in the sūtras exists, for instance, the absence of a self.

[Application:] Those statements in the sūtras exist, [namely,] "to hold that the impermanent (anitya) is permanent (nitya), that what is not the self (anātman) is the self (ātman), that the painful (duḥkha) is pleasurable (sukha), and that the impure (aśuci) is pure (śuci) is error."[34]

[Conclusion:] Therefore in ultimate reality, the errors of [apprehending things as] pleasant and unpleasant do indeed exist.

Answer: If someone were mistaken (vipratipanna) [about conventional errors], this proof [of yours] would be possible for establishing the conventional errors of [apprehending things as] pleasant and unpleasant. In ultimate reality, it is not possible:[35]

The Buddhas have also said that there is not any self or nonself. [MMK 18-6cd]

In that [verse], the answer has been given [to the opponent's argument]. Therefore because the absence of a self is not established, [your] example does not exist.

Nor does [your] reason exist, since [we] do not accept that the errors are said in the sūtras to exist in ultimate reality. Here error is twofold: [error] according to saṃsāra and [error] according to nirvāṇa. As to that, [error] according to saṃsāra is as follows: "The impermanent is permanent," etc. [Error] according to nirvāṇa is as follows: "The impermanent is impermanent," etc. Both of those are errors. They are to be abandoned by one who has attained nonconceptual wisdom (nirvikalpaka-jñāna), because they are contrary (vipakṣa) to that [wisdom].

Objection: The view that the impermanent is impermanent, etc., is not an error. Therefore it is not

possible that [that view] is an error.

<u>Answer</u>: What is the meaning of that [word] "error"? If [you] say that it means the false view that the impermanent is permanent, therefore [Nāgārjuna] says,

"The impermanent is permanent": [MMK 23-13a]

[That is,] "the impermanent which is empty of permanence is permanent."

If to hold thus is an error, [MMK 23-13b]

[That is,] if such a cognition is an error because it apprehends a false meaning, in that case,

> [Then] because permanence does not exist in what is empty, why is it not an error to hold [thus]?[36] [MMK 23-13cd]

Because in what is empty, permanence is also empty of intrinsic nature, why is not an error to hold that the empty is permanent? The meaning of the sentence is that that is indeed an error. It is [a rhetorical question] like, for example, "if one is free from desire for the three realms [of saṃsāra] (<u>traidhātuka</u>-<u>vīta</u>-<u>rāga</u>), why is one not liberated?" [That is,] one is indeed liberated.

Objection: Why do [you] maintain that in what is empty, permanence is also empty of intrinsic nature in ultimate reality?

Answer: Because, by the method previously explained, it is unoriginated, like nirvāṇa.

Or,

"The impermanent is impermanent": [MMK 23-14a]

[That is,] "the impermanent which is empty of permanence is impermanent."

If to hold thus is not an error, [MMK 23-14b]

[That is,] if such a cognition is not an error because it does not apprehend a false meaning, in that case,

> [Then] because impermanence does not exist in what is empty, why is it not an error to hold [thus]?[37] [MMK 23-14cd]

In what is empty, impermanence is also empty of intrinsic nature. Therefore, why is it not also an error to hold that the empty is impermanent? The meaning of the sentence is that that, also, is indeed an error. The sense is that [this is so] because the property of that

[view] is that it is a conceptual construction (vikalpa), as in the case of holding [the empty] to be permanent.

Thus because here [the opponent's] statement is open to objection (glags yod pa'i tshig),[38] the meaning of a statement opposite to the meaning of the opponent's thesis becomes manifest. For instance, if a jar, which is made, is impermanent, why would sound, which is made, not be impermanent also? Here the syllogism (prayoga-vākya) is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, that cognition that form is impermanent is an error,

[Reason:] because it is a conceptual construction,

[Example:] like the cognition that form is permanent.[39]

Objection: [Your reason, "because it is a conceptual construction,"] is inconclusive (anaikāntika) due to [the fact that] conceptual (savikalpaka) cognitions that the saṃskāras[40] are empty [are not errors].

Answer: Since even that cognition [that the saṃskāras are empty] is an error, there is no fault [in our reason].[41]

Objection: In that case,

[Thesis:] Even the wisdom of emptiness does not cause one to attain liberation,

[Reason:] because it is an error,

[Example:] like the cognition that the objects of the internal āyatanas[42] are pleasurable, etc.

Answer: What is the meaning of that thesis here? If it is that the cognition[43] that the visual organ is empty does not cause one to attain liberation, it [merely] proves what is [already] proved [for us] (siddha-sādhana), because liberation is attained through nonconceptual wisdom. But if [the meaning is] that the nonconceptual[44] [wisdom does not cause one to attain liberation], it is not established that that [nonconceptual wisdom] is an erroneous cognition. Therefore the meaning of [your] reason, ["because it is an error,"] is not established.

Objection:

[Thesis:] Even the nonconceptual wisdom of emptiness does not cause one to attain liberation,

[Reason:] because it is nonconceptual,

[Example:] like a spiritually immature person's[45] visual cognition (cakṣur-vijñāna).

Answer: [Even] for yourself, the meaning of [your] reason is inconclusive. It is inconclusive since [you accept that nonconceptual] cognitions of cessation (nirodha) which arise from meditation (bhāvanā-maya) [do cause one to be liberated].[46]

Also, [even] for yourself, the meaning of [your] reason is inconclusive because even the wisdom of emptiness conceptually constructs, due to a conceptual construction of intrinsic nature.[47]

Also, [your] inference does not damage [our position] (anumāna-bādha), because [your] example does not exist [even] for yourself.[48]

Moreover, what is the meaning of that [predicate of your thesis,] "does not cause one to attain liberation"? If [it means] that [the wisdom of emptiness] does not make liberation, that [merely] proves what is [already] proved [for us], since liberation is not made. If [it means] that [the wisdom of emptiness] is not correct (yathārtha) cognition,[49] [your reason, "because it is nonconceptual,"] is inconclusive because there are perceptual cognitions (pratyakṣa-buddhi) [which are both nonconceptual and correct].[50]

One should understand that those who say,

[Thesis:] "Even nonconceptual wisdom is an erroneous cognition,

[Reason:] because it is nonconceptual,

[Example:] like visual cognition,"

have also been answered by this [argument].[51]

Objection: Those who hold that perceptual cognition (pratyakṣa-jñāna) is conceptual (savikalpaka) say [the following]:

[Thesis:] Perceptual cognition is conceptual,

[Reasons:] because it is cognition and because it is a means of correct knowledge (pramāṇa),

[Example:] like inferential cognition (anumāna-jñāna).

Answer: To them, also, the following should be said:

[Thesis:] Devadatta's perceptual cognition (*pratyakṣa-buddhi*) is nonconceptual,

[Reasons:] because it has immediately evident visible form (*pratyakṣa-rūpa*) as its object (*viṣaya*) and because it is based on the visual organ,

[Example:] like the visual cognition of a spiritually immature person (*bāla*).[52]

Therefore conventionally [your reasons] are inconclusive due to those cognitions [i. e., ordinary visual cognitions]. In ultimate reality, [your] example [inferential cognition] does not exist since even inferential, etc., cognitions have a single characteristic, because they are isolated (*pravivikta*) [i. e., empty] and have a single taste (*ekarasa*) [of emptiness].

Enough incidental discussion! We will deal with [our] subject matter.

Just as it is erroneous to hold that the impermanent is permanent or impermanent, so it should be said that it is erroneous to hold that self and happiness and purity[53] are self and happiness and purity, [on the one hand,] or nonself and suffering and impurity, [on the other].[54]

Others,[55] having superimposed [their own views on] the meaning of [our] thesis, say [the following]:

Objection:

[Thesis:] Holding (grāha) does indeed exist,

[Reason:] because the means of holding that (tad-grahaṇa) and the holder (grahītṛ) and what is held (gzung ba, probably grāhya) exist.

[Dissimilar Example:] Here what does not exist does not have those three, as, for instance, a hare's horn [does not].

[Application:] In the case of holding erroneously, there are the cognition by means of which one holds; the holder, [who has] the nature of the aggregates; and what is held, such as visible form.[56]

[Conclusion:] Therefore by virtue of the stated reason, holding erroneously does indeed exist.

Answer:

That by which one holds, the holding, the holder, and what is being held,
Are all extinguished [or "pacified": upaśānta].
Therefore holding does not exist.[57] [MMK 23-15]

"That by which one holds" is the cognition which apprehends the specific and general characteristics (sva-sāmānya-lakṣaṇa) of an entity. "The holding" has the nature of imputation (samāropa) and nihilistic negation (apavāda). "The holder" [either] has the nature of name and form [nāma-rūpa, i. e., the aggregates] or is

different from them. "What is being held" is form and so on. It has been shown according to the context [i. e., as they came up in different contexts] that those are empty of intrinsic nature. Therefore the means of holding and the rest are all extinguished.

Therefore holding does not exist. [MMK 23-15d]

The idea is that [this is so] because there is no establishment of [the opponent's] reason and example, [which purport] to show that like holding, those [i. e., the means of holding, the holder, and the held] exist.

Therefore in that way,

> If holding either falsely or correctly does not exist, [MMK 23-16ab]

[that is, if holding that form, etc., are] permanent or impermanent and so on [does not exist,] then, in ultimate reality,

> For whom would there be error?
> For whom would there be nonerror? [MMK 23-16cd]

The idea is that [this is so] because the cognitions of permanence, impermanence, and so on do not arise for one who remains in the practice of nonconceptual wisdom (<u>prajñā</u>).

Alternatively, [one may explain the last verse using the following pūrvapakṣa:]

Objection:

[Thesis:] Errors do indeed exist,

[Reason:] because the one who possesses that error exists.

[Similar Example:] For instance, when one possessing a parasol exists, the parasol exists.

[Application:] Likewise, these spiritually immature persons who possess error exist.

[Conclusion:] Therefore errors do indeed exist.

Answer: To those [who argue in that way], we answer:

> If holding either falsely or correctly does not exist, [MMK 23-16ab]

because by the proof previously shown, the arising and so on of either [sort of holding] is not established, likewise,

> For whom would there be error?
> For whom would there be nonerror? [MMK 23-16cd]

In relation to some error, [one could say,] "This one possesses error; this one possesses nonerror." Those also, like error, do not exist. The meaning of the sentences [i. e., MMK 23-16cd] is that one who possesses error and one who possesses nonerror simply do not exist. Therefore in ultimate reality, the meaning of the reason

[in the opponent's last syllogism] is not established; and [his] example also does not exist. According to superficial reality (saṃvṛtyā), the meaning is contradictory.[58]

Moreover, if you maintain here that this one who possesses error (phyin ci log dang ldan pa) is one who is endowed with error (phyin ci log dang bcas pa), that one must either be in error (phyin ci log tu gyur pa, viparīta), or not in error (aviparīta), or [in the process of] coming to be in error (viparyasyamāna). As to that,

> For one who is [already] in error, errors are not possible. [MMK 23-17ab]

[This is so] because coming to possess those [errors] would be pointless for one who [already] possesses them.

> For one who is not [yet] in error, errors are not possible. [MMK 23-17cd]

[This is so] because he is free from them, like a Noble One (ārya).

> For one who is [in the process of] coming to be in error, errors are not possible. [MMK 23-18ab]

[This is so] because both faults would [follow].

Apart from one who is in error and one who is not in error and one who is [in the process of] coming to be in error, there cannot be [any] one who possesses error. Therefore [we] say, Be impartial and

> Consider for yourself: For whom are errors possible? [MMK 23-18cd]

The meaning of the sentence is that one who possesses error simply does not exist. Therefore the fault of the [opponent's] reason and example are as before.

Moreover, when it has been shown by means of the stated method that in ultimate reality, all entities are unoriginated, then

> If errors are unoriginated, how will they exist? [MMK 23-19ab]

The meaning of the sentence is that because they are unoriginated, it is simply not established that they exist.

> If errors are unoriginated, how will one who has fallen into error (viparyaya-gata) exist?

[MMK 23-19cd]

"One who has fallen into error" means "one who possesses error." Therefore there are the same faults in the [opponent's] reason, etc.

Moreover, in ultimate reality,[59]

> If self and purity and permanence and happiness exist,
> The cognition of self, the cognition of purity, the cognition of permanence, and the cognition of happiness will not be errors.[60] [MMK 23-20 (CPP: 23-21)]

The idea is that [this is so] because [their] object of cognition [would] not be false. Here the phrases, "cognition of self" and so on, indicate the cognition of the self, etc., because [those cognitions] remain on those [objects], the self, etc.[61].

Likewise, in ultimate reality,

> If self and purity and permanence and happiness do not exist,
> Nonself, impurity, impermanence, and suffering do not exist.[62] [MMK 23-21 (CPP: 23-22)]

The idea is that [this is so] because the intrinsic nature of nonself, for example, is established as being nonself [either] by the exclusion (bsal ba) of self or in relation to it. Since nonself and so on are not established, in relation to what would the view of self and so on be an error? For if there were no people, there would also be no error of seeing a tree stump as a person. Since error itself is not established, it will be difficult to avoid that same fault that the [opponent's] reason and so on do not exist.

Question: Well, when [the yogin] has ceased to conceptually construct those [errors and nonerrors] because the errors and nonerrors of permanence and impermanence [respectively] and the rest are thus not established, what excellence (guṇa) will accrue to that yogin?

Answer: Wishing to explain the result [which comes about] through the method which has been explained, [Nāgārjuna says,]

> Thus because of the cessation of error, ignorance (avidyā) ceases. [MMK 23-22ab (CPP: 23-23ab)]

Since the cause of errors is ignorance, because of the cessation of error, ignorance, the cause of the view of self and so on, ceases.[63]

When ignorance has ceased the karmic conditionings (saṃskārāḥ) and so on cease.[64] [MMK 23-22cd (CPP: 23-23cd)]

The expression "karmic conditionings and so on" should be construed as [meaning karmic conditionings and the remaining members of the twelvefold dependent origination]: [2] karmic conditionings; [3] consciousness (vijñāna); [4] name and form (nāma-rūpa); [5] the six [internal] āyatanas [i. e., the six sense organs]; [6] contact (sparśa); [7] feeling (vedanā); [8] craving (tṛṣṇā); [9] appropriation (upādāna); [10] saṃsāric existence (bhava); [11] birth (jāti); and [12] old age (jārā), death (maraṇa), and the rest.[65] Therefore in that way it is established that affliction (kleśa) is extinguished because of the realization (rtogs pa) of the absence of intrinsic nature.

For this position which says that intrinsic nature exists, those afflictions must either be existent or nonexistent. What [follows] from that?

If any afflictions of anyone existed by intrinsic nature, [MMK 23-23ab (CPP: 23-24ab)]

Though [Nāgārjuna] did not say, "of [any] existent [person],"[66] it should be understood from the context.

How could they be abandoned? [MMK 23-23c (CPP: 23-24c)]

Why are they not abandoned?

Who will abandon the existent?[67] [MMK 23-23d (CPP: 23-24d)]

The idea is that [this is so] because the existent [has] unchanging intrinsic nature.

But if [the afflictions] are nonexistent like a hare's horn or like the characteristic of the nonexistence of one thing in another (<u>itaretara</u>-<u>abhāva</u>), even so,

If any afflictions of anyone were, by intrinsic nature, nonexistent,[68] [MMK 23-24ab (CPP: 23-25ab)]

Here also, though [Nāgārjuna] did not say, "[of any] nonexistent [person],"[69] it should be understood from the context.

How could they be abandoned? [MMK 23-24c (CPP: 23-25c)]

Why are they not abandoned?

> Who will abandon the nonexistent? [MMK 23-24d (CPP: 23-25d)]

[This is so] because the nonexistence of the nonexistent cannot be abandoned. For a nonexistent sky-flower does not abandon [its] nonexistent intrinsic nature; and what lacks the intrinsic nature of a horse does not abandon [its] "horseless" intrinsic nature (rta med pa'i ngo bo nyid).

Objection: It is established that one does indeed abandon existent afflictions by means of a counteragent which has arisen. Therefore there is no fault [in our position].

Answer: It is difficult to show that point, [namely,] how one abandons [them] by means of a counteragent which has arisen for something existent.[70]

As to that, here the abandonment of those [afflictions] is not possible for one who supposes that the afflictions are existent or nonexistent [by intrinsic nature]. Therefore, since [the position of the opponent who maintains existence by intrinsic nature] is [thus] open to objection (sāvakāśa),[71] it has been shown that the property of the afflictions [which proves that they lack intrinsic nature] is [their being] abandoned.[72]

Therefore the inference is:

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the afflictions do not exist by intrinsic nature,

[Reason:] because they are abandoned,

[Example:] like a woman, man, and girl with a doll[73] emanated by a magician.

[Application:] One who realizes [their] faults abandons them [in both cases].[74]

In that connection, here the meaning of the chapter is [as follows:] By describing the faults in the proofs stated by the opponent and setting forth unobjectionable proofs of [our] own, [we] have shown that error does not exist by intrinsic nature.

Therefore such [scriptural] statements as the following are established:[75] [From the Ārya-ananta-mukha-sādhaka-dhāraṇī,][76]

> As this speech is formless, completely
> unapprehendable,
> So the afflictions are formless, thoroughly
> unapprehendable.
> As this speech does not exist, abiding neither
> internally nor externally,
> So the afflictions do not exist, abiding neither
> internally nor externally.

Likewise, [from the Suvikrāntavikrāmi-paripṛcchā,][77] "Śāradvatīputra, the thorough comprehension of defile-

ment[78] is in accordance with reality (yathābhūta). That [thorough comprehension] has no defilement, but beings who are in error become defiled. Error does not exist, and there is no perfection (pariniṣpatti) or characteristic of what exists in that which does not exist. Śāradvatīputra, to comprehend thoroughly in that way is called 'purification' (vyavadāna)." Likewise, [from another sūtra,][79] "The Tathāgata has fully and completely awakened to and taught [the fact that] the afflictions do not exist. Though [they] do not appear as visible form, he has completely known [them]. Though he does not make [them] into a duality, he has directly realized (sākṣāt-kṛ) [them]; but there is also no attainment."

The twenty-third chapter, "Examination of Error," of the Prajñāpradīpa, a commentary on [Nāgārjuna's] Mūlamadhyamaka composed by ācārya Bhavyakara/Bhavyakāra (legs ldan byed)[80] [is concluded].

Notes to Translation of Chapter 23

[1]According to Avalokitavrata, emptiness is [Nāgārjuna's] own position (svapakṣa); the opponent's position is that entities (bhāva) exist by intrinsic nature. In particular, the opponent holds that the errors and afflictions (kleśa) exist by intrinsic nature. See Ava P259a-2 to 5, D216a-1 to 4.

[2]Avalokitavrata glosses "treatise" as "scripture" (āgama); see Ava P259b-3, D216b-1. Compare the scriptural passages quoted in CPP 451.12,13,15.

[3]Candrakīrti understands śubhāśubhaviparyāsān as a triple dvandva rather than a tatpuruṣa, that is, "the pleasant, the unpleasant, and error," rather than "the errors of the pleasant and the unpleasant." Thus, in his interpretation, rāga arises in dependence on śubha; dveṣa in dependence on aśubha; and moha in dependence on viparyāsa (CPP 452.4,5).

[4]Namely, that things which are designated in dependence on other things, i. e., causes and conditions, do not exist because of their own intrinsic nature; see Ava P260b-4, D 217a-7.

[5]In other words, since the opponent's thesis refers to ultimate reality it cannot be supported by an example which exists only on the conventional level. See Ava P260b-8, D217b-3.

[6]Avalokitavrata explains that the Mādhyamika accepts that the aggregates and so on have conventional intrinsic nature. See Ava P261a-1,2; D217b-4.

[7]According to Avalokitavrata, the existence of the self is not established with regard to paramārtha and its nonexistence is not established with regard to saṃvṛti. See Ava P261a-6, D217b-7 to 218a-1.

[8]The Tibetan of MMK 23-4a in BPP and Ava P261b-5, D218a-5,6 differs from CPP (May 399.8), Bp (Saito 326.4), and Akutobhayā P99a-5, D85b-6, which all have gang gi yin for 'ga' las 'byung. Bhāvaviveka may have read kasmāccid dhi bhavanti for kasyacid ... (CPP 453.13).

[9]See Ava P261b-8, 262a-1; D218b-1,2.

[10]Avalokitavrata explains that the opponents maintain that the intrinsic nature of entities exists. Nevertheless, they are "without intrinsic nature" in the sense that one thing does not exist in another as, for example, a jar does not exist in a piece of cloth and vice versa. Of course, the intrinsic nature of the jar and the cloth does exist in each one separately. See Ava P262b-2 to 5, D219a-2 to 4.

The opponents' position is reminiscent of that of the Cūlasuññatā-sutta of the Pāli Canon. See Gadjin M. Nagao, "'What Remains' in Śūnyatā: A Yogācāra Interpretation of Emptiness," in Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice, ed. Minoru Kiyota,

Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1978, pp. 66-82, and references therein.

[11]See Ava P262b-7 to 263a-1, D219a-5,6,7.

[12]Probably in the sense that an entity's characteristic is present in that entity and absent in other entities.

[13]Presumably because, if every entity (bhāva) is totally absent (abhāva) in every entity different from it, blueness could not exist in a jar. This is a variant of the argument that if things exist by virtue of their own intrinsic nature, they would be self-sufficient and independent; and there could be no relation between them.

[14]The Tibetan of 23-4cd in CPP (May 399.10,11) differs from that in the other commentaries. The Sanskrit (CPP 453.14) does not quite seem to correspond to any of the Tibetan translations.

[15]See Ava P263a-5,6,7; D219b-2,3,4 for some of the phrases in brackets.

[16]The term svakāyadṛṣṭi is equivalent to the more usual term satkāyadṛṣṭi; see May 183 n. 595 and references therein. The literal meaning is "view in regard to one's own body;" but what is being referred to is the view that the self exists in one of four possible relations to the five skandhas. See May 213 n. 720, Mahāvyutpatti ##4684-4704, and CPP 355 n. 4. These four relations are the same as the five relations mentioned in

note 18, with the omission of difference.

[17]In CPP, "aggregates" (skandha, phung po) is substituted for "body" (sku, kāya?) in MMK 22-1. See CPP 432.12,13 and n. 7. In Bhāvaviveka's commentary on this verse in chapter 22, he remarks, de la sku'i don ni phung po'i don to|| (BPP P262a-8, D209b-4,5).

[18]The "five ways" are five possible relations: A is the same as B; A is different from B; A possesses B; B exists in A; A exists in B. See MMK 10-14, 10-15, 22-1 and May 183 n. 597.

[19]Probably referring to chapter six of the MMK, rāga-rakta-parīkṣā, and chapter ten, agni-indhana-parīkṣā, respectively.

[20]See Ava P264a-3,4; D220a-7 too 220b-1.

[21]The Tibetan translation of 23-6cd, in both BPP and CPP (May 401.15), seems to read katamāḥ for katamān (CPP 455.17).

[22]Candrakīrti (CPP 456.3) regards 23-7 as expressing Nāgārjuna's own view.

[23]For the Sanskrit of similar, but not identical, etymologies of the six kinds of sense objects, see CPP 456.9-457.1.

[24]Again, for the Sanskrit of similar etymologies of the three afflictions, see CPP 457.3-6.

[25]In 23-8ab, Nāgārjuna almost quotes a passage from the Pāli Canon: evam rūpā rasā saddā gandhā phassā ca

kevalā itthā dhammā anitthā ca na ppavedhenti tādino (Aṅguttaranikāya III 379; see also Vinaya I 185, Theragāthā 643, and Kathāvatthu 90). Also, note that 23-8cd (CPP 457.14) is identical to 17-33cd (CPP 334.6), as pointed out by Christian Lindtner, Nāgārjuniana, Indiske Studier IV, Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1982 (abbreviation: Lindtner), pp. 25-26 n. 79.

[26] A "city of the gandharvas" is a type of mirage called "Fata Morgana." For a discussion of the physics of the Fata Morgana, see Alistair B. Fraser and William A. Mach, "Mirages," Scientific American 234, no. 1 (January, 1976), pp. 102-111, and Walter Tape, "The Topology of Mirages," Scientific American 252, no. 6 (June, 1985), pp. 120-129, esp. pp. 127-129. Bhāva-viveka's point is that this mirage occurs only at times when and places where the conditions are right but that when and where it does occur, it can be seen by anyone, unlike dreams, which occur only in one person's "series" (saṃtāna).

[27] Part of this commentary actually occurs between 23-9a and 23-9b and immediately following 23-9b. The sequence of text and commentary has been changed in order to produce tolerable English syntax.

[28] According to Avalokitavrata, it is not established in ultimate reality and is contradictory according to superficial reality (saṃvṛtyā). Perhaps he means that

the opponent's reason contradicts the conventional truth that the nature of the sense objects is illusion-like. See Ava P266a-1, D222a-2.

[29]Bhāvaviveka appears to read yat pratītyāśubhaṃ in 23-10, instead of yat pratītya śubhaṃ (CPP 458.12). See Lindtner, ibid., and Saito, "Introduction," p. xvi.

[30]These two sentences follow 23-10a and 23-10b, respectively, in the Tibetan text. They have been rearranged for the sake of clarity.

[31]Bhāvaviveka appears to read yat pratītya śubhaṃ in 23-11, instead of yat pratītyāśubhaṃ (CPP 459.8). See Lindtner, ibid., and Saito, ibid.

[32]These two sentences follow 23-11a and 23-11b, respectively, in the Tibetan text. They have been rearranged for the sake of clarity.

[33]See Ava P259b-4,5; D216b-2,3.

[34]On the four viparyāsas, see Aṅguttaranikāya II 52 and references in LVP AK V 21 n. 2 and May 190 n. 620.

[35]Bhāvaviveka is speaking about ultimate reality when he negates the errors. See Ava P267a-2,3,4; D223a-1,2,3.

[36]Bhāvaviveka seems to read na nityaṃ vidyate śūnye kuto grāho 'viparyayaḥ in 13cd, instead of nānityaṃ ... viparyayaḥ (CPP 460.6). See Lindtner, loc. cit., and Saito, loc. cit. On the variants in the Tibetan translation of 23-13cd in CPP and the Akutobhayā, see May 190 n.

619, 405 nn. 1 and 2. On _grāha_, see May 190 n. 618.

[37]Bhāvaviveka seems to read _anitye 'nityam ity evam yadi grāho 'viparyayaḥ| nānityam vidyate śūnye_ (= Candrakīrti's 23-13c) _kuto grāho 'viparyayaḥ||_ in 23-14, instead of _anitye nityam ity evam yadi grāho viparyayaḥ| anityam ity api grāhaḥ śūnye kiṃ na viparyayaḥ||_ (CPP 462.8,9). See Saito, _loc. cit._; the reconstruction in Lindtner, _loc. cit._, is somewhat different. On the variants in the Tibetan translation of 23-14 in CPP and the _Akutobhayā_, see May 407 nn. 1, 2, 3, 4.

[38]_glags yod pa'i tshig_ corresponds literally to _sāvakāśa-vacana_, though in some cases it may translate _prasaṅga-vākya_. See Y. Kajiyama, "Bhāvaviveka's _Prajñāpradīpaḥ_ (1. Kapitel)," _Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens_ _7_, 50, nn. * and 13.

Bhāvaviveka also criticized Buddhapālita's _prasaṅga_ arguments as being _sāvakāśa_. See, e.g., Kajiyama, _op. cit._; D. S. Ruegg, _The Literature of the Madhyamaka School in India_, Vol. VII, Fasc. 1 of _A History of Indian Literature_, ed. Jan Gonda, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981, pp. 64-5; and Christian Lindtner, "Bhavya the Logician," typescript, p. 4 and p. 19 n. 25. (This paper will appear in the _Vidhusekhar Bhattacharya Commemoration Volume_, eds. Sunil Sen-Gupta and Suniti Kumar Pathak.)

[39]The point of this paragraph seems to be that the opponent's thesis that it is not an error to say that the

impermanent is impermanent (MMK 23-14a) is true on the conventional level, but open to objection from the point of view of nonconceptual wisdom.

[40]Here the term saṃskārāḥ is synonymous with saṃskṛtā dharmāḥ, "conditioned dharmas."

[41]See Ava P268b-8 to 269a-5, D224b-3 to 7.

[42]The twelve āyatanas are the six sense organs (the five physical sense organs plus the mind) and the corresponding six sense objects. The sense organs are said to be "internal," and the sense objects are said to be "external."

[43]Avalokitavrata glosses this as "the conceptual cognition arisen from hearing and reflection (śruta-cintā-maya)." See Ava P269b-3,4; D225a-5.

[44]Avalokitavrata glosses this as "the nonconceptual cognition arisen from meditation (bhāvanā-maya)." See Ava P269b-6, D225a-7.

[45]Avalokitavrata glosses bāla as pṛthag-jana, that is, one who is not yet an ārya; see Ava P270a-1,2; D225b-2.

[46]See Ava P270a-5, D225b-5.

[47]Avalokitavrata says that the wisdom of emptiness has the intrinsic nature of cognition. Thus it is not nonconceptual in the same way that unconsciousness (sems pa med pa) is nonconceptual. See Ava P270b-2, D226a-2.

[48]A spiritually immature person's visual cognition,

which was the example in the opponent's syllogism, is also conceptual in the sense of having the intrinsic nature of cognition. See the previous note and Ava P270b-3,4,5; D226a-2,3,4.

[49]Not correct because, being nonconceptual, it does not cognize impermanent things as impermanent, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P271a-4, D226b-2.

[50]See Ava P271a-3, D226b-1.

[51]Again the point is that direct perception (pratyakṣa) is both nonconceptual and correct. See Ava P271a-8 to 271b-4, D226b-5 to 227a-1.

[52]Here the argument is that visual cognition is nonconceptual because, unlike cognition in general, it has an aspect of the physical world as its object (viṣaya) and a physical sense organ as its support (āśraya). The same applies to the other four physical senses.

[53]One would expect "nonself and suffering and impurity," corresponding to "impermanence."

[54]Avalokitavrata remarks that MMK 23-13,14 should be rephrased in terms of each of the other three viparyāsas. See Ava P272a-8 to 272b-2, D227b-3,4,5.

[55]Other Buddhists, according to Avalokitavrata; see Ava P272b-5, D227b-7.

[56]In other words, an agent, who has the nature of the aggregates, erroneously holds an object such as form

to be permanent. He does so by means of a cognition apprehending form. See the commentary following MMK 23-15.

[57]Nāgārjuna deals with the grāha, grāhya, and grahītṛ in Vigrahavyāvartanī 13, 14, 15 and 66, 67. Here the analysis is in terms of yena gṛhṇāti, grāha, grahītṛ, and yad gṛhyate.

[58]Perhaps in the sense that the opponent's reason and example assume that conventional errors and parasols exist ultimately, contradicting the conventional truth that their nature is illusion-like. See note 28.

[59]CPP's verse 23-20 is omitted in BPP. "If an entity does not originate from itself and does not originate from another and does not originate from both itself and another, how will one who possesses error exist?" na svato jāyate bhāvaḥ parato naiva jāyate| na svataḥ parataś ceti viparyayagataḥ kutaḥ|| (CPP 468.3,4). This verse is also omitted in the Akutobhayā (P42-4-4, D44-2-3; see May 199 n. 656) and in PN of Bp, though it is found in DC of Bp (see Saito 332 n. 1). The last pāda is omitted in the Peking version of CPP (P72-3-4,5) but is given in Derge (D77-4-5). It is interesting to note that the first two pādas of CPP's 23-20 and the first six syllables of the third are identical to MMK 21-13abc, while the fourth pāda is identical to 23-19d. See also Lindtner, loc. cit.

[60]One should bear in mind that Bhāvaviveka's 23-20 is Candrakīrti's 23-21 and so on for the rest of the chapter. Note that *śuci* is translated as *gtsang ba* in CPP (May 413) but as *sdug pa* here and in the *Akutobhayā* (P42-4-4, D44-2-3) and Bp (Saito 332.4).

Also, the four occurrences of *shes* in the last two *pādas* have no counterpart in the Sanskrit or Tibetan of CPP. It seems to be an interpretive translation, based on Bhāvaviveka's commentary following the verse.

[61]See Ava P274b-5,6; D229b-4,5.

[62]Once again, CPP translates *śuci* as *gtsang ba* while the other three commentaries have *sdug pa*. (See the references note 60.)

[63]This argument is valid only if ignorance is a sufficient cause of error.

[64]Here Nāgārjuna alludes to the twelvefold dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*), the first two members of which are ignorance and karmic conditionings. Chapter twenty-six of the MMK is devoted to the twelvefold dependent origination; see also the following commentary. Note that in this context, the term *saṃskārāḥ* has a different meaning from the one it had earlier in the chapter; see note 40.

[65]"And the rest" refers here to sorrow (*śoka*), lamentation (*parideva*), suffering (*duḥkha*), unhappiness (*daurmanasya*), and trouble (*upāyāsa*).

[66]See Ava P275b-3, D230b-1.

[67]Although the Sanskrit of CPP has svabhāvam (CPP 471.4) in the last pāda, the Tibetan translation has yod pa (May 415.21) = sadbhāvam (CPP 471 n. 1). The following verse has ´sadbhāvam = med pa (May 415.35).

[68]abhūtāḥ svabhāvena (CPP 471.12), parallel to bhūtāḥ svabhāvena in 23-24a (CPP 471.3). This translation is an attempt to show that the position here is not a negation of "existence by intrinsic nature" (which would be the same as the Mādhyamika´s position), but rather a view that nonexistence is established by intrinsic nature.

[69]See Ava P275b-6, D230b-3.

[70]Avalokitavrata explains, "Because the existent [has] an unchanging intrinsic nature" (Ava P276a-3, D230b-7). In other words, how could there be a counteragent for something which exists by intrinsic nature?

[71]See note 38.

[72]See Ava P276a-4,5,6; D231a-1,2.

[73]gzugs su byas pa´i na chung, probably puttali-yuvati. This translation is conjectural.

[74]See Ava P276a-8, 276b-1; D231a-3,4.

[75]Avalokitavrata states the reason for giving sūtra quotations in the same words as in chapter seventeen. See Ava P276b-3,4,5; D231a-6,7 and note 92 to

chapter seventeen.

[76]Identified by Avalokitavrata (Ava P276b-5, D231a-7). I have not been able to locate these verses in the text of the sūtra.

[77]Sanskrit text in Ryusho Hikata, _Suvikrāntavikrāmi-paripṛcchā Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra_, Fukuoka, Japan: Kyushu University, 1958, p. 62.

[78]_kun nas nyon mongs pa'i yongs su shes pa_, _saṃkleśasya parijñā_.

[79]See Ava P277a-2, D231b-4.

[80]See note 161 to my translation of chapter three.

Translation of Prajñāpradīpa, Chapter Twenty-six:
Examination of the Twelve Factors of Saṃsāric Existence
(bhavāṅga)[1]

Now [Nāgārjuna] begins the twenty-sixth chapter with the aim of expounding conventional (vyāvahārika) dependent origination (pratītya-samutpāda) by means of refuting a particular counterposition (vipakṣa)[2] to emptiness as [in the preceding chapters].

Objection: In the immediately preceding chapter, you said,

> No dharma has been taught by the Buddha to anyone anywhere. [MMK 25-24cd]

The Blessed One did [in fact] teach dependent origination, which puts to flight all the founders of non-Buddhist sects (tīrthakara) [like] herds of wild game[3] [and] which extinguishes the faults of bad views. Because he comprehended that [dependent origination], the Blessed One is renowned in the world as the "Awakened One" (buddha). Therefore you, who wish to disprove that [fact that the Buddha taught dependent origination], have said,

> No dharma has been taught by the Buddha to anyone anywhere; [MMK 25-24cd]

[but] that will conflict with what [you yourself] maintain (abhyupagata-bādha) [namely, that the Blessed

one is, in fact, "awakened."]

Answer: Therefore [Nāgārjuna] says,[4]

> One who is enveloped by ignorance (avidyā)
> forms/performs (abhisaṃskurute) the threefold
> karmic conditionings (saṃskārān)[5] leading to
> rebirth.
> By means of those actions (karman), he goes to a
> state of existence (gati). [MMK 26-1]

As to that, ignorance is so called because it is a dharma which is contrary (vipakṣa) to knowledge (vidyā) or because it does not know the twelve factors of dependent origination, which are without self (anātman), motionless, and momentary. "Enveloped" by that [means] "covered" [by it]. Here one should specify (nges par gzung bar bya, probably avadhārayet or nirdhārayet) that only (eva) one who is enveloped by ignorance forms karmic conditionings, while one who is not enveloped does not. One should not, however, specify that one who is enveloped by ignorance [forms] only the karmic conditionings, because the remaining factors, consciousness and so on, also have that [ignorance as their] cause.

Nor should one specify that one who is enveloped only by ignorance [forms karmic conditionings], because afflictions (kleśa) other than that [ignorance] exist.

The afflictions such as desire are also causes of karmic conditionings; but ignorance is mentioned (grahaṇa) because it is the chief. For example, one speaks [rhetorically] of the king's being victorious[6] and of the mother "conch's" going.[7]

Objection: It is correct [to say] that unwholesome karmic conditionings arise from ignorance as [their] cause, since confusion (moha) is unwholesome. But how [will] wholesome karmic formations [arise from ignorance]?

Answer: Ignorance is also indirectly (pāramparyeṇa) a cause [of wholesome karmic conditionings], as [when] one who is ignorant wishes to experience the pleasure of frolicking with goddesses in a divine palace [and therefore] practices virtue [in order to be reborn as a god]. [Moreover,] because saṃsāra is, in the ultimate sense, unwholesome (pāramārtha-akuśala), even the wholesome belonging to that [saṃsāra] is unwholesome.[8] Therefore there is no fault [in saying that ignorance is also a cause of wholesome karmic conditionings].

"Rebirth" (punarbhava) is [the fact] that the existent will occur again due to the connected series of cause and effect. The meaning is "being born again." "Leading to rebirth" (punarbhavāya) means "for the sake of rebirth" (punarbhavārtham). "Karmic conditionings" (saṃskārāḥ) are the making up (abhisaṃskaraṇa) of karmic conditionings.[9] [The karmic conditionings are] "three-

fold" by the distinction of meritorious (puṇya), nonmeritorious (apuṇya), and "immovable" (āniñjya)[10] or by the distinction of bodily, vocal, and mental karmic conditionings. "[One enveloped by ignorance] forms [karmic conditionings];" that is, [he forms] the weak, middling, and strong (mṛdu-madhya-adhimātra) degrees of meritorious, etc., [karmic conditionings].

> By means of those actions, he goes to a state of existence. [MMK 26-1d]

[That is, he goes] to a state of existence corresponding to merit, corresponding to nonmerit, or corresponding to immovability (puṇya-, apuṇya-, āniñjya-upaga).[11]

> Consciousness (vijñāna), with karmic conditioning as its causal condition (pratyaya), enters states of existence.[12] [MMK 26-2ab]

"With karmic conditioning as its causal condition" [means] "having karmic conditioning as its causal condition" (yasya saṃskārapratyayas tat saṃskārapratyayam); [the phrase modifies] "consciousness." Consciousness is an awareness of objects individually (vastu-prativijñapti). [Consciousness enters] "states of existence," that is, the states of existence belonging to the category of gods and so on.[13] "Enters" [means] "is [re]born."

Here one should not specify that only consciousness, with karmic conditioning as its causal condition, enters, because the mental factors (caitta) also enter. Nor should one specify that consciousness, with karmic conditioning as its only causal condition, enters, because an Arhat has karmic conditioning but is not reborn in saṃsāric existence again.[14] One should not specify that consciousness, with a causal condition which is only karmic conditioning, enters, because [its] causal condition[s] of saṃsāric existence (bhava), etc.,[15] also exist.[16]

Here the opinions of the ācaryas differ. Some[17] say that the series of the name and form (nāma-rūpa) of the intermediate existence (antarābhava) reaches the location of the [next] state of existence. Others[18] say that consciousness, having karmic conditioning as its causal condition, reaches the [next] state of existence simply by means of birth in [that] state of existence.

As to that, the former, [i. e., those who hold that there is an intermediate existence,] say:

[Thesis:] The birth [of] the series of material form

(rūpa) of material (rūpin) beings who have ceased somewhere, is held [to take place by means of] reaching another place by arising continuously in different places,

[Reason:] because if [a body] is material, the stream of

motion is continuous,

[Example:] like [the flame of] a lamp,[19]

[Alternative Reason:] or because it is born at another location [in some] state of existence [after having come] from the place of death by means of a [continuous] series of name and form based on material form,

[Alternative Example:] as in the living state.

The latter, [i. e., those who deny that there is an intermediate existence,] say,

[Thesis:] In a material realm (<u>rūpi</u>-<u>dhātu</u>), the death-existence (<u>maraṇa</u>-<u>bhava</u>) and the birth-existence (<u>upapatti</u>-<u>bhava</u>)[20] are not separated by another saṃsāric existence,

[Reason:] because those existences are defiled (<u>sāsrava</u>),

[Example:] like the death-existence and birth-existence in the formless (<u>ārūpya</u>) [realm].

Alternatively,

[Thesis:] The body which arises at the end of the death-existence of embodied beings (<u>dehin</u>) is not a body of an intermediate existence,

[Reasons:] because it is a [karmic] maturation (<u>vipāka</u>) and because it is included in the Truth of Suffering,

[Example:] like the body of [present] enjoyment.[21]

Moreover, [continue those who deny that there is an intermediate existence,] because a mind-made body (manomaya-kāya)[22] reaches another place, [its] stream of motion is continuous. Because of that [fact], the [first] reason [alleged by the proponent of intermediate existence] is inconclusive. Even without an intermediate existence,

> By [the examples of] reading aloud, a lamp, a seal, a mirror, a sound, a fire-crystal, a seed, and a sour fruit,[23]
>
> The wise should understand the rebirth (pratisaṃdhi) of the aggregates and the non-passing-over (asaṃkrama) [of any entity in the process].[24]
> [Pratītyasamutpāda-hṛdaya, kārikā 5][25]

One who is no other [than the author of this commentary, i. e., Bhāvaviveka himself,][26] says that since the reason, "because if it is material, the stream of motion is continuous," is particular (khyad par can), the former [i. e., the proponents of intermediate existence,] do not have that fault.[27]

> When consciousness has entered, name and form (nāma-rūpa) are infused (niṣicyate). [MMK 26-2cd]

"Name" (nāman) [is so called because] it turns toward (namati) the states of existence (gati), or

[because] it can be turned (nāmya) by the afflictions; it is the four nonmaterial aggregates. Form (rūpa) is what can be formed (rūpyate). It is the four great elements and derivative matter (upādāya-rūpa).[28]

Here again, one should not specify that name and form have only consciousness as their causal condition, because ignorance and so on are also their causal conditions. Nor should one specify that only name and form have consciousness as their causal condition because consciousness is also a causal condition of the six āyatanas of spontaneously born (upapāduka)[29] beings, and because consciousness is also a causal condition of the "name" of the formless [realm].[30] Nor should one specify that name and form have consciousness as their only causal condition, because an Arhat's last [moment of] mind is not a causal condition [for the further origination of name and form].

> When name and form have been infused, the six
> āyatanas arise. [MMK 26-3ab]

An āyatana [is so called because] it opens the door of the arising of consciousness (vijñāna-āyadvāraṃ tanoti). "Six" [is specified] because the internal āyatanas are referred to. They are held to be the visual organ, the auditory organ, the olfactory organ, the

gustatory organ, the tactile organ, and the mental organ (manas).[31] The āyatana which is the visual organ has color as its object, is transparent matter (rūpa-prasāda),[32] and possesses the locus[33] of visual consciousness. [Likewise, the other] āyatanas also, from the auditory organ up to the tactile organ have sound and so on as their [respective] objects, are transparent matter, and possess the locus of auditory, etc., consciousness [respectively]. The āyatana which is the mental organ is the immediately past [moment of the] six groups of consciousness (vijñāna-kāya).[34]

Here also, one should not specify that the six āyatanas have only name and form as their causal condition, because the karmic conditionings and so on are also causal conditions for them and also because name alone is a causal condition for the six āyatanas of spontaneously born beings. Nor should one specify that only the six āyatanas have name and form as their causal condition, because name and form are also causal conditions for contact (sparśa) and so on. Nor should one specify that the six āyatanas have name and form as their only causal condition, because the Arhat's last [moment of] name and form is not a causal condition [for the further origination of the six āyatanas].

In dependence on the six āyatanas, contact arises

from them.[35] [MMK 26-3cd]

"In dependence on" (*āgamya*, literally, "having arrived at") [means] "having found support [in]" (*gnas thob nas*, perhaps *āśrayaṃ gatvā*). "From them" [means] "from the six *āyatanas*." "Contact" is "meeting" (*phrad pa*, perhaps *saṃgati*); it is what is experienced as pleasure, as pain, or as neither pleasure nor pain.[36] [Its] defining characteristic will be indicated below [in MMK 26-5ab,c1].

> In dependence on the visual organ and [visible] form and mental focusing (*samanvāhāra*),[37] [visual consciousness] indeed originates.[38] [MMK 26-4ab]

"Mental focusing" is "attending to" (*manasikāra*).

> Thus in dependence on name and form, consciousness arises.[39] [MMK 26-4cd]

[This refers to] the time at which [contact] begins.[40] As the consciousness which apprehends [visible] forms arises in dependence on the visual organ and [visible] form, so it should be stated that [auditory consciousness arises] in dependence on the auditory organ and sound, up to [the statement that] mental

consciousness arises in dependence on the mental organ and dharmas. [Consciousness has been discussed in this context] because [Nāgārjuna] wished to speak of the origination of the result of the six *āyatanas*.[41]

Well, what is contact?

> The coming together (*saṃnipāta*) of the three, visual
> organ, [visible] form, and [visual] consciousness,
> Is contact. [MMK 26-5ab,c1]

"The three" are the sense organ, the sense object, and [the corresponding] consciousness. "Coming together" [means] "assembling in one [place];" [and] that is "contact." The visual organ and so on are mentioned in order to show a particular [case], because contact is easy to investigate by means of them.

> From that contact, feeling (*vedanā*) arises.
> [MMK 26-5c2,d]

[This is] "feeling" in the sense of "sensation" (*pratisaṃvedana*); it is the threefold experience (*anubhava*) [of pain, pleasure, and neither]. "Arises" (*saṃpravartate*) means "comes about" (*abhinirvartate*). The meaning is that feeling arises, having contact as its causal condition.

> With feeling as its causal condition, craving (tṛṣṇā) [arises], for one craves the object of feeling. [MMK 26-6ab]

"Craving" has "desire" as its defining characteristic.

For one craves the object of feeling. [MMK 26-6b]

The untaught, spiritually immature, who do not understand that the suffering of change (vipariṇāma-duḥkhatā),[42] slight in enjoyment (āsvāda) and great in misery (ādīnava), is like the brief sweet taste [of] drops of honey smeared on a razor's edge, crave that.[43]

Objection: Since a feeling of pleasure is beneficial, when one experiences [it], one desires that [feeling] again and again; therefore it is correct that one would crave that. But when one experiences a painful feeling, it is harmful; therefore one would not desire that [feeling]. How [then] could there be craving with that [painful feeling] as its causal condition?

Answer: When one experiences a painful feeling, craving which desires to be free from that arises. Therefore there is no fault [in saying that both pleasant and painful feelings are causal conditions for craving].

> One who craves appropriates the fourfold

appropriation (upādāna).[44] [MMK 26-6cd]

[As for the term] "appropriation", it is an appropriation (upādāna) because it is appropriated (upādīyate). Some say that the augmentation (´phel ba, perhaps upacaya) of saṃsāric existence (bhava) is appropriation.[45] Others say that it is effort for the sake of obtaining enjoyments.[46] "Fourfold" [means having] the defining characteristics of the appropriation of [1] sensual pleasure (kāma), [2] views (dṛṣṭi), [3] the overestimation of moral conduct and ascetic practices (śīla-vrata-parāmarśa), and [4] the doctrine of the self (ātma-vāda).[47]

When appropriation exists, saṃsāric existence (bhava) arises for the appropriator. [MMK 26-7ab]

"Saṃsāric existence" [here means] "saṃsāric existence [in the sense of] action" (karma-bhava).[48] Because [action] causes [one] to exist (bhāvayati), it is "existence" (bhava).

Alternatively, "saṃsāric existence" is "arising" (´byung ba); "arising" and "origination" (skye ba) are synonyms. Action, the cause of saṃsāric existence, is [called] "saṃsāric existence" by a metonymy (upacāra) of cause for effect, as [when one says,] "The arising of

Buddhas is happiness."

Here also, one should not specify contact and so on in either way, [i. e., as being conditions only or conditioned only,] since by the fact of being causal conditions, they have causal conditions, and since they are also causal conditions of other [factors].[49] The consciousness and so on which belong to the present [life] have arisen from the cause [called] "ignorance and karmic conditionings" [of the past life].[50]

As to that, if by means of relying on a spiritual friend (kalyāṇa-mitra), hearing the good Dharma, and thorough attention (yoniśo manasikāraḥ), one [either] sees conditioned things (saṃskārāḥ) as the suffering of conditioned things (saṃskāra-duḥkhatā) by means of the aspects (ākāra) [which are] suffering and so on,[51] or [one sees that conditioned things] are unoriginated because they are empty of intrinsic nature,[52] then because the knowledge of reality (tattva) has arisen, one does not crave; and if craving does not exist, one does not appropriate. Therefore,

> For if he had no appropriation, he would be liberated; there would be no saṃsāric existence [for him]. [MMK 26-7cd]

[This is so] because, among the three groups (kāṇḍa)

of [factors of] dependent origination, it is taught that the [future] result [occurs] when the presently existing [group] ceases; but the juncture (*sbyor ba*, perhaps *yoga* or *prayoga*) at which the [presently] existent ceases is also precisely (*eva*) a juncture of the present time.[53]

Question: What is the defining characteristic of that "saṃsāric existence" which is said [to arise] when appropriation exists?

[*Answer*:]

> Moreover, that saṃsāric existence is the five aggregates (*skandha*). [MMK 26-8a]

Here also the cause of the five aggregates, [i.e., action,] is conventionally designated as the five aggregates. One should specify that the five aggregates are only saṃsāric existence; but one should not specify that saṃsāric existence is only the five aggregates, since the saṃsāric existence of the formless realm is four aggregates, [form being absent].[54]

> From saṃsāric existence, birth (*jāti*) arises. [MMK 26-8b]

"Birth" (*jāti*) is so called because it arises (*jāyate*?). It is the aggregates' coming to exist after

not having existed (abhūtvā bhāvaḥ).[55]

Old age (jarā) and death (maraṇa), sorrows
[MMK 26-8c]

Old age and death are the causes of transformation (pariṇāma) and cessation [respectively]. Sorrow (śoka) is produced by separation from what is dear (priya). It has inner torment (yongs su gdung ba, perhaps paritāpa) as its defining characteristic.

Together with lamentations, sufferings,[56]
[MMK 26-8d]

"Lamentation" (paridevana, smre sngags 'don) is an utterance of words, based on expressing the good qualities of [something] lost which was cherished [by] a person. It is lamenting and lamentation (yongs su smre zhing smre sngags 'don pa'o). "Suffering" (duḥkha) is the feeling of bodily discomfort.

Unhappiness and troubles: [MMK 26-9a]

"Unhappiness" (daurmanasya) is the feeling of mental discomfort. "Troubles" (upāyāsāḥ) are troubles due to a troubled mind and body.

> They [all] arise from birth. [MMK 26-9b]

Thus those, old age and death and so on as described, arise from birth.

> Thus this unadulterated (kevala) heap of suffering arises. [MMK 26-9cd]

"Heap of suffering" (duḥkha-skandha) means "collection of suffering." "Unadulterated" means "unmixed with happiness." "This arises" (etasya saṃbhavaḥ) [means that it] "originates." That arising of that heap [of suffering] belonging to the conventional truth is conventional dependent origination. In ultimate reality, by the method explained in the chapter on nonorigination, [the first chapter of the MMK,][57] it does not exist. Therefore there is no conflict with what [we Mādhyamikas] maintain (abhyupagata-bādha).[58]

Question: How will that series of births, which proceeds in that way, cease?

Answer: Because the unwise have formed/performed [karmic conditionings],

> Therefore the wise do not form/perform (saṃskaroti)[59] karmic conditionings, [which are]

the root of saṃsāra. [MMK 26-10ab]

[This is so] because those who see the faults of karmic conditionings[60] do not form/perform (abhisaṃskurvanti) them, because they see things as they really are (yathābhūtam). In regard to karmic conditionings [or "conditioned things"], which arise from a beginningless series of causal conditions as do magical illusions or mirages, the unwise do not see their faults. Therefore they wish to experience happiness again and again, so that they form/perform [karmic conditionings].

> Therefore the unwise are doers (kāraka), not the wise, because [the wise] see reality. [MMK 26-10cd]

[The wise see reality] because the counteragent (pratipakṣa) [to ignorance and the afflictions][61] has arisen and because ignorance, which has the nature of the obscuration of the afflictions and [the obscuration] of objects of knowledge (kleśa- and jñeya-āvaraṇa),[62] has been abandoned.

> When ignorance has ceased, the karmic conditionings also[63] do not arise. [MMK 26-11ab]

[This is so] because [their] causal condition does not exist, as the sprout [does not arise] when the the seed does not exist.

Moreover, [as for] that cessation of ignorance:

> The cessation of ignorance is due to the meditative cultivation (bhāvana, usually bhāvanā) of that very knowledge. [MMK 26-11cd]

[That is, the cessation of ignorance] is due to that very knowledge of emptiness (śūnyatā), which has as its object the absence of a self in dharmas (dharma-nairātmya-viṣayin), which apprehends dependent origination, [and] which is to be meditated on and repeatedly cultivated (abhy-as) by means of negating (pratiṣedha) completely the intrinsic nature of entities (bhāva-svabhāva) by the method which has been explained.[64]

> By the cessation of each [successive factor], each [subsequent factor] does not arise. [MMK 26-12ab]

Each preceding factor of saṃsāric existence, such as karmic conditioning, ceases due to the arising of [its] counteragent. Therefore each subsequent factor of saṃsāric existence, such as consciousness, does not arise. [That is to say,] they do not arise [as

expressed in scriptural statements] from "by the cessation of karmic conditionings, consciousness ceases" up to "by the cessation of birth, old age and death cease."[65]

> Thus that unadulterated heap of suffering completely (samyak) ceases. [MMK 26-12cd]

[This is said] with regard to (yongs su gzung ba, probably parigrahāt or parigrahataḥ) conventional truth. In ultimate reality, the factors of dependent origination, ignorance and the rest, [being] unoriginated, have no origination; [and] therefore they also have no cessation. Because [we Mādhyamikas] do not maintain that the Blessed One taught the dependent origination of purification (vyavadāna)[66] as ultimate reality, there is no occasion for conflict with what [we ourselves] maintain.[67]

As to that, here the meaning of the chapter [is the following:] Conventional dependent origination has been expounded by means of answering the fault in [our] thesis (pratijñā-doṣa)[68] alleged by the opponent at the beginning of the chapter.

Therefore[69] those scriptural statements by the Blessed One such as the following are established: "Dependent origination is without origination; therefore it is called 'dependent origination.' How could that which has no origination have cessation? One who

comprehends noncessation comprehends dependent origination."[70]

The twenty-sixth chapter, "Examination of the Twelve Factors of Saṃsāric Existence," of the Prajñāpradīpa, a commentary on [Nāgārjuna's] Mūlamadhyamaka composed by ācarya Bhavyakāra (legs ldan byed)[71] [is concluded].

Notes to Translation of Chapter Twenty-six

[1] The formulation of dependent origination in terms of a number of factors of saṃsāric existence is a fundamental doctrine of early Buddhism. It occurs at many places in the Pāli Canon; we may note in particular the accounts in the Mahāpadānasutta and the Mahānidānasutta of the Dīgha-nikāya (II 30-35 and 55-71, respectively) and the ninety-three suttas of the Nidānasaṃyutta of the Saṃyutta-nikāya (II 1-132). The number of factors (usually called nidānas in Pāli) varies from one text to another, but the twelve enumerated here became standard. For more detail, see Louis de La Vallée Poussin, Bouddhisme. Études et Matériaux. Théorie des Douze Causes, Recueil de travaux publiés par la Faculté de philosophie et lettres, Université de Gand, 40é fasc., Gand, 1913 and the references in May 251 n. 897. For a collection of passages on the twelve factors translated from the Pāli Canon, see Henry Clarke Warren, Buddhism in Translations, New York: Atheneum, 1973 (reprint of Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1896), pp. 165-208.

[2] Again, Avalokitavrata explains that emptiness is [Nāgārjuna's] own position (svapakṣa), while the counter-position is the opponent's position that entities exist by intrinsic nature. See Ava P362a-5,6; D305a-7 to

305b-1.

[3]Probably an allusion to the well-known image of the Buddha's teaching as the "lion's roar" (_siṃha-nāda_).

[4]According to Avalokitavrata, the statement in MMK 25-24cd was made in regard to ultimate reality (_paramārthataḥ_). With respect to superficial reality (_saṃvṛtyā_), the Mādhyamikas do accept that the Buddha taught the twelvefold dependent origination, which Nāgārjuna now begins to expound. See Ava P363a-6 to 363b-2, D306a-6 to 306b-2.

[5]_saṃskārāḥ_ in the sense of "karmic conditionings" is equivalent to "actions," _karmāṇi_. See May 252 n. 902.

[6]Although his army was also victorious. See Ava P264a-2,3; D306b-7 to 307a-1.

[7]According to Avalokitavrata, the the mother "conch" (_dung_, probably _śaṅkha_ or _kambu_), a kind of _prāṇin_, swims in the water with her offspring in a line behind her. Although they all swim, only the mother is mentioned since she is the chief one. See Ava P264a-3,4; D307a-1,2. Could _dung_ be a mistake for _ngur pa_, _cakravāka_, "duck"?

[8]See AK 4-9c.

[9]This definition is obviously circular. Candrakīrti has _punarbhava-abhisaṃskāra_. See CPP 543.1 and n. 1. On the other hand, perhaps the _saṃskāras_ which are "made up" by the karmic conditionings should be understood in the

sense of saṃskṛtā dharmāḥ, "conditioned dharmas." See LVP AK I, pp. 28-9, esp. p. 29 n. 3a.

[10]On the variant spellings of āniñjya, see Franklin Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953, p.24 under aniñjya. Meritorious actions are wholesome (kuśala or śubha) actions belonging to the realm of desire (kāma-dhātu); see AK 4-46a. Nonmeritorious actions are unwholesome (akuśala or aśubha) actions; all of them belong to the realm of desire; see LVP AK IV p. 109. "Immovable" actions" are wholesome actions belonging to the realm of form or the realm of formlessness (rūpa- or ārūpya-dhātu); see AK 4-46b.

[11]See LVP AK III, p. 76 and n. 2. Presumably, states of existence corresponding to merit are the higher gatis (usually considered to be those of gods and men) within the realm of desire, while states of existence corresponding to demerit are the remaining gatis of the desire realm, and states of existence corresponding to immovability are the realms of form and formlessness.

[12]'gro ba rnams su. The Sanskrit of CPP has the singular (gatau). The Tibetan of CPP agrees with BPP. See CPP 543.5 and n. 4.

[13]On the five or six gatis, see LVP AK III, pp.11-12 and p. 11 n.2.

[14]Compare AK 4-52cd.

[15]See AK 3-21c,24c.

[16]In Tibetan, the three statements of what one should not specify occur first; then the reason for each statement is given in order. The paragraph concludes with the remark, "Thus the necessity of not specifying should be stated in order."

[17]Avalokitavrata (Ava P365b-7 to 366a-2, D308a-6 to 308b-2) specifies that these are "the Ārya-Sarvāstivādins, etc." They hold that the name and form, i. e., the five aggregates, of an intermediate existence occur between one existence and the next. This accounts for the fact that one may die in one place and be born in another, very distant place.

According to the Abhidharmakośa, the intermediate state occurs only before rebirth in a material (rūpin) realm (that is, the realm of desire or the realm of form). Presumably this is so because the formless realm has no location; see AK 3-3a and LVP AK III, p. 5. On the intermediate existence, see LVP AK III, pp. 31-50, esp. p. 32 n. 1.

According to Avalokitavrata (loc. cit. and following), the intermediate state occurs only after one has died in a material realm. In other words, for Avalokitavrata, if one dies in a material realm and is reborn in the formless realm, an intermediate existence intervenes; if one dies in the formless realm and is

reborn in a material realm, there is no intermediate existence. For the Abhidharmakośa, the reverse is true.

[18]Avalokitavrata identifies them as "the Mahāsāṅghikas, etc." They hold that consciousness simply "jumps" from death to birth. See Ava P366a-2 to 6, D308b-2 to 4.

[19]The ideà here is that since dharmas are instantaneous, they do not exist long enough to move; they simply arise and cease. What appears to be motion is a phenomenon in which a collection of dharmas ceases at one place and a collection of similar dharmas arises in another place. If the dharmas are material, however, they cannot skip intervening spaces; they must arise and cease at a continuous series of points. Thus material beings cannot simply die in one spot and be born in another with no intermediate state to connect the two.

[20]The maraṇa-bhava is the five aggregates at the moment of death; the upapatti-bhava is the five aggregates at the moment of birth. See AK 3-13cd.

Avalokitavrata (Ava P367a-4 to 7, D309b-4,5,6) seems to take rūpi-dhātau and ārūpye as modifying only maraṇa in maraṇa-upapatti-bhavau. This agrees with his previous explanation (see note 17), but it seems unlikely from the syntax.

[21]nye bar spyod pa'i lus, glossed by Avalokitavrata as da ltar nye bar spyod pa'i lus (Ava P367b-3, D309b-4).

This translation is rather conjectural, but the ordinary body which exists from birth to death seems to be what is meant.

[22]On the mind-made body, see LVP AK II, p. 209 and nn. 2 and 3, and AK 3-40c.

[23]A fire-crystal (me shel) or sun-stone (arka-kānta) is a crystal used to focus the sun's rays to make fire. The point of the example of a sour fruit is that merely seeing a lemon, for instance, can make one react as if one had tasted something sour, even though there is no saṃkrama of anything from the lemon to one's mouth. On the other examples, see May 253 n. 909, 259 n. 933.

[24]This is not punctuated as a verse in the Tibetan; but it is, in fact, a Tibetan translation of a verse which is quoted twice in the Sanskrit of the Prasannapadā (CPP 428.11,12; 551.14,15; see also 544.5) but is omitted both times in the Tibetan (see CPP 428 n. 3).

[25]Identified in CPP 608 and May 259 n. 933 from its occurrence in the Prasannapadā. On the Pratītyasamutpāda-hṛdaya and its authorship, see Carmen Dragonetti, "The Pratītyasamutpādahṛdayakārikā and the Pratītyasamutpāda-hṛdayavyākhyāna of Śuddhamati," Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 22 (1978), 87-93; Christian Lindtner, Nāgājuniana, Indiske Studier IV, Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1982, pp. 170-1; Christian Lindtner, "Adversaria Buddhica," Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 26

(1982), 167-172; and references therein. The occurrence of this quotation in the Prajñāpradīpa was pointed out by Lindtner, "Adversaria Buddhica," p. 168.

It is interesting to note that neither Bhāvaviveka nor Avalokitavrata indicates that this verse is a quotation or mentions its author. It is presented simply as a part of the argument of those who reject the antarābhava, identified by Avalokitavrata as "Mahāsāṅghikas, etc.," (Ava P367b-5 to 368a-5, D309b-6 to 310a-5).

[26]gzhan ma yin pa, ananya. Identified by Avalokitavrata (Ava P368a-5,6; D310a-5).

[27]That is, the first reason adduced by the proponents of an intermediate existence is not inconclusive, as those who deny intermediate existence have alleged, because it refers to a special case, namely, "if it is material." Avalokitavrata concludes from this statement that Bhāvaviveka himself holds that there is an intermediate existence. See Ava P368a-8, D310a-7.

[28]On bhautika, equivalent to upādāya-rūpa, see May 91 n. 198.

[29]On upapāduka, see AK 3-8cd,9.

[30]rūpa being absent in the formless realm, there are only the four nonmaterial aggregates, i. e., nāman. See AK 8-3cd. Thus there is no "name and form" in the formless realm.

[31]The twelve āyatanas are the six sense organs listed here plus the six corresponding sense objects. The sense organs are the internal (ādhyātmika) āyatanas; the sense objects are the external (bāhya) āyatanas.

[32]The sense organs are not the visible eye, ear, etc.; they are composed of subtle, transparent matter supported by the eye, ear, etc. See AK 1-9 and LVP AK I, p. 15 n. 1. Thus I have translated their names as "visual organ" and so on rather than "eye" and so on.

[33]gnas dang ldan pa. The sense organ is usually said to be the "support" (āśraya) of the corresponding sense consciousnesses; see AK 1-44cd,45. gnas may translate āśraya, although the more usual equivalent is rten.

[34]See AK 1-17 and LVP AK I, p. 31 n. 3.

[35]de las reg pa ´byung bar ´gyur. CPP has reg pa yang dag ´byung bar ´gyur = saṃsparśaḥ sampravartate (May 459.5, CPP 553.4). Perhaps Bhāvaviveka read tataḥ sparśaḥ pravartate.

[36]sukha-, duḥkha- and aduḥkhāsukha-vedya (or -vedanīya). See AK 3-31d and 4-47. Avalokitavrata glosses this as "[contact is] the cause of feeling;" see Ava P370a-1,2; D311b-5,6.

[37]On samanvāhāra, see May 261 n. 942 and Majjhima-nikāya I 190-1.

[38] "Originates," skye ba ... yin, is absent from the

Sanskrit of CPP 553.6, but is supplied in its Tibetan translation (May 459.9).

39 Candrakīrti explains that caksuḥ and rūpa belong to the form aggregate, while samanvāhāra belongs to the other four aggregates (= "name"). Thus consciousness can also be said to arise in dependence on name and form. (See CPP 554.2-4.) Since it was said earlier that name and form arise in dependence on consciousness (26-2cd), we see that name and form, on the one hand, and consciousness, on the other, are mutually dependent. See Dīgha-nikāya II 32, 56 and Saṃyutta-nikāya II 104.

40 See Ava P370a-6 to 8, D312a-3,4. In other words, the consciousness being referred to here occurs when contact arises in dependence on the six āyatanas. Depending on a sense organ (one of the six āyatanas) and a sense object and mental focusing, a sense consciousness arises. Once consciousness has arisen, the coming together, the functional interrelation of organ, object, and consciousness is contact. (See also Ava P371a-3,4; D312b-5,6).

41 According to Avalokitavrata, one might wonder why after saying in MMK 26-3cd that contact occurs in dependence on the six āyatanas, Nāgārjuna inserts a verse (MMK 26-4) on the origination of consciousness before proceeding to define contact. The answer is that, as explained in the previous note, the origination of

consciousness is an essential step in the process by which contact occurs. See Ava P370b-2 to 5, D312a-6 to 312b-1.

[42]On the three kinds of suffering, see AK 6-3 and following commentary. Note that the suffering of change pertains to pleasant conditioned things; see LVP AK VI, p. 125.

[43]In other words, pleasures are impermanent; and their pursuit has serious negative consequences. For the simile used here, compare Pāli appassāda (= alpa-āsvāda), glossed in the Therīgāthā commentary as sattha-dhārāyāṃ madhubindu viya or sattha-dhārā-gata-madhubindu viya. See Dines Anderson and Helmer Smith, editors, A Critical Pāli Dictionary, Vol. I, Part 7 (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Academy, 1935), p. 315 under app'-assāda.

[44]On upādāna, see May 154 n. 467, 263 n. 947.

[45]Compare LVP AK III, p. 87.

[46]Compare AK 3-23cd.

[47]On the four upādānas, see LVP AK III, pp. 86-7.

[48] On the two senses of bhava, see CPP 556 n. 6 and AK 3-24ab, 1-8cd and LVP AK V, p. 1 n. 3. bhava literally means "existence." I have translated it as "saṃsāric existence" in order to distinguish it from soteriologically neutral terms, such as astitva, which also mean "existence."

[49]That is, these factors are not only conditions nor

only conditioned; they are both. See Ava P372a-8, D313b-6,7.

[50]The twelve factors of dependent origination are divided into three groups (<u>kāṇḍa</u>); see AK 3-20. The first two, ignorance and karmic conditionings, belong to the past life; the next eight belong to the present life; and the last two, birth and old-age-and-death, belong to the next life. See LVP AK III, pp. 60-65 and Ava P372b-3 to 6, D314a-2,3,4.

[51]On the four aspects of the Noble Truth of Suffering, see LVP AK VII, pp. 30-39. Note that here <u>saṃskārāḥ</u> is equivalent to <u>saṃskṛtā</u> <u>dharmāḥ</u>.

[52]According to Avalokitavrata, the first is the way of the <u>śrāvaka-yogin</u>; the second is the way of the <u>mahāyāna-yogin</u>. See Ava P373a-5,6; D314b-3.

[53]Avalokitavrata glosses "juncture at which the [presently] existent ceases" (<u>yod</u> <u>pa</u> <u>´jig</u> <u>pa´i</u> <u>sbyor</u> <u>ba</u>) as "saṃsāric existence" (Ava P373a-4, D314b-2). He explains that when the eight factors from consciousness up to saṃsāric existence, which belong to the present life, cease, their result, birth in a future life occurs. Nevertheless, the cycle can be broken by the process described in the commentary immediately preceding MMK 26-7cd. When one changes fundamentally the way in which one perceives conditioned things, craving ceases; and hence the remaining factors do not occur. See Ava P373a-2 to

7, D314a-7 to 314b-4.

The question seems to be how, given the cycle of dependent origination, is liberation possible? The answer given is that future rebirth is not inevitable; one can take steps in the present life to break the cycle. The means for doing so is the practice of the Buddhist path, whether of the Śrāvakayāna or Mahāyāna variety. This removes one's ignorance about the nature of conditioned things, and therefore one ceases to crave them.

[54]See AK 8-3cd.

[55]See LVP AK II, p. 229.

[56] As pointed out by de La Vallée Poussin (CPP 557 n. 3), the word order of the Tibetan of 8cd, here and in CPP (May 461.16, 17), is different from that of the Sanskrit (CPP 557.6).

[57]The title of the first chapter is rkyen brtag pa (pratyaya-parīkṣā); but toward the end of it, Bhāvaviveka says, 'dir rab tu byed pa'i don ni skye ba med pa bstan pa yin pas (P74b-7,8; D62b-2).

[58]This answers the opponent's objection at the beginning of the chapter. See Ava P374a-5,6,7; D315b-1,2.

[59]Although the Sanskrit of CPP has the singular (CPP 558.5), the Tibetan (May 462.10) has the plural, as does BPP. Also, note that the Tibetan corresponds to na

vidvān (or its plural) rather than to avidvān, as pointed out by de La Vallée Poussin (CPP 558 n. 4). Otherwise, the Tibetan of BPP seems closer to the Sanskrit of CPP (as emended by de Jong) in 26-10 than does the Tibetan of CPP.

[60]Or perhaps saṃskārāḥ in the sense of "conditioned things." See commentary preceding 26-7cd and note 53.

[61]The counteragent is the Buddhist path. Compare AK 5-60d,61abc.

[62]The kleśa-āvaraṇa is the obscuration constituted by the afflictions. The jñeya-āvaraṇa is the obscuration of the objects of knowledge by ignorance. On the two obscurations, see, e. g., references in Étienne Lamotte, Le Traité de la grande vertu de sagesse de Nāgārjuna (Mahāprajñāpāramitāśātra), Vol. I, Bibliothèque du Muséon, Vol. 18, Louvain: Bureaux du Muséon, 1944, p. 27 n. 1.

[63] kyang, "also," does not occur in the Sanskrit or Tibetan of CPP 558.14, May 462.32.

[64]On the connections among emptiness, dependent origination, and entities' lack of intrinsic nature, see especially chapter 24 of the MMK.

[65]See references to the Pāli Canon in note 1.

[66]Apparently referring to the process by which the cessation of ignorance leads to the cessation of birth, old age, and death.

67 See note 58.

68 Specifically, that it contradicts what the Mādhyamikas themselves accept. On this fault of the thesis, see, e. g., Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu 3-40 to 3-56, translated in F. Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Vol. II, New York: Dover Publications, 1962 (reprint of Bibliotheca Buddhica, Vol. XXVI, Part II, Leningrad: Academy of Sciences of the U. S. S. R., c. 1930), pp. 153-171.

69 Once again, Avalokitavrata cites the same reasons for giving scriptural quotations. See note 92 to the translation of chapter seventeen, note 75 to the translation of chapter twenty-three, and Ava P375b-6,7; D316b-5,6.

70 There is a very similar passage in the Suvikrāntavikrāmi-paripṛcchā: ... anutpādo hi pratītyasamutpādaḥ samo 'nutpādas, tenocyate pratītya-samutpāda iti. yatra nāsty utpādas, tatra kuto nirodhaḥ? anirodho nirodhaḥ pratītyasamutpādasyāvabodhaḥ ... See Ryusho Hikata, Suvikrāntavikrāmi-paripṛcchā Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra, Fukuoka, Japan: Kyushu University, 1958, pp. 11-12.

71 See note 161 to my translation of chapter three.

Part III: Edited Tibetan Text of Six Chapters from the Prajñāpradīpa

Tibetan Text of Prajñāpradīpa, Chapter Three

{P90b-6, N79a-7, DC75b-1} da[1] ni skye ba mi mthun pa'i {N79b} phyogs kyi khyad par dgag pas skye mched rnams ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du bstan pa'i don gyi dbang gis rab tu byed pa gsum pa brtsam mo|| yang na 'gro ba mi mthun pa'i phyogs dgag pas skye mched rnams stong pa nyid du bstan pa'i phyir rab tu byed pa gsum pa brtsam mo||

gang gi tshe dang po ltar[2] brtag pa de'i tshe[3] mi mthun pa'i phyogs nye bar bzhag pa ni| don dam par nang gi skye mched rnams skye ba kho[4] nar gzung bar bya ste| yul so sor nges pa'i phyir ro|| 'di na gang skye ba med pa de la ni yul so sor nges pa med de| dper {P91a} na mo gsham gyi bu'i skye mched rnams la yul so sor nges pa med pa bzhin no|| nang gi skye[5] mched rnams la ni yul so sor nges pa 'di lta bu yod de| 'di lta ste| lta ba dang| nyan pa dang| snom pa dang| myong[6] bar byed pa dang| reg par byed pa dang| yid rnams kyi yul gzugs dang| sgra dang| dri dang| ro dang| reg bya dang| chos rnams yin par go rims[7] bzhin no|| de'i phyir gtan tshigs ji skad smos pas nang gi skye mched rnams skye ba kho[8] nar gzung bar bya'o||

gang gi tshe gnyis pa ltar brtag pa de'i tshe ni|
de[9] phyir 'gro dang 'gro po dang||
bgrod par bya ba'ang yod ma yin|| [MMK 2-25cd]

zhes bshad pa'i phyir|[10] pha rol po dag na re| 'gro ba yod pa nyid du shes par bya ste| bya ba'i 'bras bu yin pa'i phyir|[11] gzugs la lta ba la sogs pa bzhin no[12] zhes zer ro||

phyogs gnyi ga'i lan du bshad pa|

lta dang nyan dang snom pa dang||
myong[13] bar byed dang reg byed yid[14]||
dbang po drug po de dag gi|
spyod yul lta bar bya la sogs[15]|| [MMK 3-1]

lta zhes bya ba ni lta bar byed pa'i phyir ro|| lhag ma rnams la yang de bzhin no|| dbang po zhes bya ba ni gzugs la sogs pa gzung ba'i phyir tshogs de la dbang po dang| bdag po nyid byed pa'i phyir ro|| drug po zhes bya ba ni so so'i ming smos pa nyid kyis grangs kyang rab tu grub mod kyi| de nges par gzung ba ni tha snyad du yang de[16] dag las gzhan pa'i gzugs la sogs pa la dmigs par byed pa'i byed pa po med par shes par bya ba'i phyir ro|| de dag gi {N80a} zhes bya ba ni dbang po {D76a} drug po de dag gi'o||[17] spyod {C76a} yul zhes bya ba ni yul te de dag la mthu yod pa nyid ces bya ba'i tha tshig go|[18] blta bar bya ba la sogs pa zhes bya ba ni blta bar

bya ba dang| mnyan par bya ba dang| bsnam par bya ba dang| myang bar bya ba dang| reg par bya ba dang| bsam par bya ba dag go|[19]

yul can dang| yul so sor nges pa de {P91b} yang tha snyad pa yin gyi don dam pa ni ma yin pas| gtan tshigs mi mthun pa'i phyogs 'ba' zhig la yod pa'i phyir[20] don 'gal ba nyid do|| don dam par ji ltar mig la sogs pa yul can dang| yul gyi dngos por mi mthad pa de ltar 'di bshad par bya ste| re zhig mig gi dbang po gcig pu'i dbang du mdzad nas|

lta ba rang gi bdag nyid na||[21]
de ni de la mi lta nyid|| [MMK 3-2ab]

lta ba zhes bya ba ni lta bar byed pa'i phyir te| mig gi dbang po zhes bya'o|| rang gi bdag nyid na zhes bya ba ni| rang gi ngo bo nyid yin na'o||

de ni de la mi lta[22] nyid||[23] [MMK 3-2b]
ces bya ba la|[24] ci'i phyir lta bar mi byed pa nyid yin zhe na| phyogs de ni tshig gi don[25] 'og nas 'byung bas gsal bar byed do|| ci'i phyir zhe na| de ni de la mi lta ba'i phyir te| de ni grags pa yin no zhes bya bar dgongs so|| nyid ces bya ba'i sgra ni nges par gzung ba'i don te| 'dir lta bar mi byed pa nyid ces bya bar blta bar bya'i|[26] gzhan du na gzhan la lta bar byed pa zhes bya bar shes par 'gyur ro||

ci ste de lta na khyod kyis ci zhig bsgrub[27] par 'gyur te| gang gi tshe mig rang gi bdag nyid la lta bar mi byed do[28] zhes smras pa'i tshe| gzhan du gyur pa gzugs la lta bar byed do[29] zhes khas len to zhe na| khyod 'dod pa gang yin pa de yang|

gang tshe bdag la mi lta ba||[30]
de gzhan dag la ji ltar lta||[31] [MMK 3-2cd]

mig gzugs la lta[32] bar byed pa'i mthu nyid med do[33] zhes bya ba'i tshig gi don to||[34] de la 'dir tshig leur byas pa'i phyed gong mas ni mig rang gi bdag nyid la lta bar mi byed pa'i[35] chos bstan la| phyed 'og mas ni bsgrub par bya ba chos gzugs la lta[36] bar mi byed pa[37] bstan to|| de'i phyir bsgrub par bya ba dang| sgrub pa'i chos nye bar gzhag pas sbyor ba'i tshig tu 'dod {N80b} pa ni don dam par mig gi dbang po ni gzugs la lta bar mi byed pa nyid de| rang gi bdag nyid la lta bar mi {P92a} byed pa'i phyir| dper na rna ba la sogs pa bzhin no||

yang na phyed gong mas ni mig gi dbang po gzung ba nyid {D76b} ma yin par {C76b} bstan nas| mig gi dbang po rang gi bdag nyid chos mthun pa'i dpe nyid du nye bar bzhag la| phyed 'og mas ni mig gi dbang po gzugs la lta bar mi byed par bstan pas bsgrub par bya ba chos gzugs mig gi dbang po'i yul ma yin pa nyid bstan to|| 'dir de'i dbang gis[38] sbyor ba'i tshig ni don dam par gzugs

mig gi dbang po'i yul ma yin te| bsags pa'i phyir dper na mig gi dbang po'i bdag nyid bzhin no||

rang gi bdag nyid la lta[39] bar mi byed[40] pa dang| bsags pa ni mtshan nyid kyi sgra'i tshul nye bar gzung[41] ba'i phyir te| gtan tshigs thogs pa dang bcas pa nyid dang| 'byung ba las gyur pa nyid dang| rgyur byas pa'i gzugs nyid dang| gzugs kyi phung por gtogs pa nyid la sogs pa dag gi phyir ro[42] zhes kyang phyogs gnyi ga la rjes su dpag pa dag brjod par bya'o||

'dir kha cig na re| mig rang gi bdag nyid la lta[43] bar mi byed pa ni bstan du med pa yin pa'i phyir rung mod kyi| gzugs ni bstan du yod pa yin pas de'i phyir de la lta[44] bar byed do zhes zer ro||

de la rgyu gzhan des kho bo cag gis smras pa'i gtan tshigs dang dpe bsgrubs[45] pa'i phyir gnod pa med do||

chos mngon pa pa dag na re| gal te khyad par med pa'i mig gzugs la lta bar mi byed pa nyid[46] ces zer na| de ni grub pa la sgrub pa yin te| phyogs ni de dang mtshungs pa'i mig lta bar mi byed pa yin pa'i phyir ro|| 'on te mig gzugs rnams la lta bar mi byed pa rten[47] pa mtshungs pa la bya'o[48] zhes zer na ni de lta na khas blangs pa la gnod par 'gyur te| chos mngon pa las|

rten mtshungs mig ni gzugs rnams lta||
der brten[49] rnam par shes pa {P92b} min||[50]
[AK 1-42ab]

zhes gsungs pa'i phyir ro[51] zhes zer ro||

de la 'dir brten pa mtshungs pa'i mig nyid phyogs su byas pa'i phyir|[52] grub pa la sgrub pa {N81a} yang ma yin la| khas blangs pa la gnod par yang mi 'gyur te|

mig ni gzugs la mi lta zhing||
yid ni chos rnams mi shes te||
gang la 'jig rten mi 'jug pa||
de ni dam pa'i bden pa'o||[53]

zhes gsungs pa'i phyir ro|| don dam par mig gzugs la lta bar byed par khas ma blangs pa'i phyir dang| rjes su dpag pa rgyas pa ji skad bstan pa'i phyir de grub pas don dam par brten pa mtshungs pa'i mig ni gzugs la lta bar mi byed de| mig {D77a} gi dbang po yin pa'i phyir dper na de dang mtshungs pa bzhin {C77a} no||

yang na dbang po gzugs can yin pa'i phyir rna ba bzhin no[54] zhes bkag pa'i phyir ro|| grags pa'i gnod par yang mi 'gyur te| dam bcas pa khyad par can nye bar bzung[55] ba nyid kyis de ma spangs pa'i phyir dang| lan btab zin pa'i phyir ro||

kha che ba dag na re| mig ni lta bar byed pa nyid de| lta ba'i byed pa po yin pa'i phyir ro zhe'o||

kha cig na re[56]| de ni rigs pa ma yin te| dam bcas pa'i don gyi phyogs gcig yin pa'i phyir dang| rjes su 'gro ba med pa'i phyir dang| dgag pa smras zin pa'i phyir ro||[57,58]

gzhan dag na re kha che ba dag gis smras pa ni rigs pa ma yin te| skad cig mar smra ba rnams la ni skad cig

yin pas bya ba mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro|| skad cig ma ma yin par smra ba rnams la yang de nyid de las gzhan pa nyid du mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro[59] zhe'o||

mdo sde pa dag na re| 'du byed rnams la bya ba med pa'i phyir mig kyang lta[60] bar mi byed la| gzhan yang ma yin te| 'o na ci zhe na| mdo sde las mig dang gzugs rnams la brten nas mig gi rnam par shes pa skye'o zhes gsungs pas khyed mig lta bar mi byed do[61] zhes zer ba ni grub pa kho na la sgrub pa yin no[62] {P93a} zhe'o||

skye ba bkag pa kho nas mig gi rnam par shes pa mi 'thad pa'i phyir grub pa la sgrub ma yin no|| khas blangs pa la gnod[63] par mi 'gyur te| tha snyad kyi bden pa dang rjes su mthun pa'i mdo sde'i don khas blangs pa'i phyir dang| don dam par mdo {N81b} sde'i don la rigs pa med pa'i phyir ro||

mig dang gzugs kyi skye mched kyi skye ba bkag pa'i phyir dang| mig dang gzugs dag gi lta ba po dang| lta ba nyid bkag pa'i phyir de'i[64] khyad par mi srid pas chog mod kyi| 'on kyang nyan pa'i skye bo'i blo gros dbye bar 'dod pas phyogs tsam zhig bshad par bya'o||

lta ba rang gi bdag nyid na||[65]

de ni de la mi lta nyid||[66] [MMK 3-2ab]

ces bya bas snga ma bzhin du rang gi bdag nyid la lta bar mi byed pa nyid phyogs kyi chos su bstan nas|

gang tshe bdag la mi lta ba||

de gzhan dag la ji ltar lta|| [MMK 3-2cd]

zhes bya ba 'dis bsgrub par bya ba chos nye bar gzhag[67] pa'i phyir gzhan gyis yongs su brtags[68] pa'i rnam par rtog pa gzhan bsal bar 'dod pas sbyor ba'i tshig dag bya'o||

de la gang dag mig ni ma phrad {D77b} pa 'dzin pa'o[69] zhes zer ba de {C77b} dag gi phyir lta bar byed pa ni shes pa'i don yin pa'i phyir[70] dper na rgyal po dag gis rtog chen dag las shes pa bzhin te| rang gi bdag nyid la lta bar mi byed pa'i phyir ro|| gtan tshigs kyi don ni rang gi bdag nyid mi shes pa yin no|| don dam par mig ni yul ma phrad pa 'dzin pa ma yin te| rang gi bdag nyid la lta[71] bar mi byed pa'i phyir dper na sna la sogs pa bzhin no|| de bzhin du don dam par gzugs[72] ni mig gi dbang po yul ma phrad par 'dzin pa'i gzung ba ma yin te| 'byung ba las gyur pa yin pa'i phyir dper na dri la sogs pa bzhin no|| rang gi bdag nyid la lta bar mi byed pa dang| 'byung ba las gyur pa ni mtshan nyid kyi sgra'i tshul nye bar bzung ba'i phyir te| gtan tshigs thogs pa dang bcas pa nyid la sogs pa dag {P93b} gi phyir ro[73] zhes kyang phyogs gnyi ga la rjes su dpag pa dag brjod par bya zhing sbyor ba'i tshig ci rigs pa rgyas par bya'o||

yang na don dam par mig ni yul ma phrad pa 'dzin pa yin par mi 'dod de| da ltar gyi yul mngon sum pa yin pa'i phyir dper na[74] sna la sogs[75] pa bzhin no||

ci ste mig ni yul ma phrad pa 'dzin pa yin te| gzugs

bar du chod pa 'dzin pa'i phyir dang| rtsol ba[76] tha dad pa med pa dang| {N82a} dus tha dad pa med par 'dzin pa'i phyir dang| rang las lhag pa'i yul 'dzin pa'i phyir[77] dper[78] na yid bzhin no[79] zhe na| de yang bzang po ma yin te| 'di la ma phrad pa 'dzin pa ni gzugs bar du chod pa 'dzin pa'i don yin la| gzugs bar du chod pa 'dzin pa'i phyir zhes bya ba'i don kyang de nyid yin pas dam bcas pa'i[80] don gyi phyogs gcig yin pa'i phyir dang| rtsol ba tha dad pa med pa dang| dus tha dad pa med par 'dzin pa'i phyir zhes bya ba yang ma grub pa'i phyir ro|| gtan tshigs grub tu zin na yang rjes su 'gro ba mi 'grub ste| don dam par yid kyang ma phrad pa 'dzin pa nyid du ma grub pa'i phyir ro|| yang na don 'gal ba nyid kyang yin no||

grangs can dag mig ni yul[81] dang ma phrad pa 'dzin pa ma yin te[82] zhes bya ba ni grub pa la srub pa yin no zhes zer na| mig yul ma phrad pa 'dzin pa nyid kyi chos kyis[83] stong pa nyid du bstan pas yul phrad pa 'dzin pa yin no[84] zhes bsgrub pa'i tshul gyis ma bstan pa'i phyir gnas ma yin pa la dbugs 'byin to[85] zhes brjod par {D78a} bya'o||

gzhan yang mig ni yul phrad pa 'dzin pa yin par mi 'dod de| dbang po yin pa'i phyir {C78a} dper na yid bzhin no|| sna la sogs pa dag gis ma nges pa nyid kyang ma yin te| de dag kyang 'og nas de dang 'dra ba kho nar ston pa'i phyir ro||

phrad pa 'dzin pa zhes bya ba'i don kyang gang yin| gal te gnas nas yul gyi phyogs {P94a} su song ste 'dzin par byed pa'o zhe na| don dam par mig gi 'jug pa ni| mig gi rnam par shes pa'i rnam grangs kyi gnas nas phyi rol du mi 'gro ste| 'jug pa yin pa'i phyir[86] dper na sna la sogs pa'i dbang po'i 'jug pa bzhin no|| de bzhin du don dam par gzugs ni mig gi dbang po yul phrad pa 'dzin pa'i[87] gzung ba ma yin te| rgyu can yin pa'i phyir dper[88] na sgra la sogs pa bzhin no||

ji[89] ste phyogs gnyi gar bstan pa'i rjes su dpag pa rgyas pa dag gis[90] phyogs gcig gis gcig bsal[91] ba'i phyir gang yang rung ba la ma grub pa yin no zhe na| gnyi ga med pa'i phyir {N82b} mi sgrub par[92] 'dod pa grub po[93]||

gang dag la mig gi 'od zer yul gyi phyogs su song ste| yul 'dzin par byed do snyam pa'i blo gros yod pa de dag la yang 'di skad ces brjod par bya ste| tha snyad du yang mig gi dbang po ni 'od zer dang bcas pa ma yin par shes par bya ste| gzugs dmigs pa'i rgyu yin pa'i phyir dper na gzugs bzhin no||

gal te mig gi dbang po ni 'od zer dang bcas pa kho na yin te| mig gi dbang po yin pa'i phyir dper na[94] byi ba la sogs pa mtshan mo rgyu ba'i mig bzhin no zhe na| de ni rigs pa ma yin te| mig gi dbang po ni bstan du med pa'i phyir dang| de'i gnas 'od zer dang bcas pa nyid yin du zin na yang dpe ma grub pa'i phyir dang| 'gal ba 'khrul pa[95] med pa'i gnod pa yod pa'i phyir ro||

dpyad pa rnam par 'phros pas chog gi skabs nyid kyi dbang du bya'o||

lta ba rang gi bdag nyid na||

de ni de la mi lta nyid||

gang tshe bdag la mi lta ba[96]||

de gzhan dag[97] la ji ltar lta|| [MMK 3-2]

zhes bya ba 'di la kha cig na re| 'di la dngos po rnams kyi ngo bo nyid ni rang gi bdag nyid la mthong na| de dang ldan pas gzhan gyi bdag nyid la yang dmigs par 'gyur te| dper na chu la rlan mthong na de dang ldan pas sa la yang dmigs pa dang| me la tsha ba mthong na de dang ldan {D78b} pas {P94b} chu la yang dmigs pa dang| sna ma'i me tog la dri zhim pa nyid mthong na de dang ldan pas| gos la yang dmigs pa lta bu yin na| dngos po gang rang gi bdag nyid la mi snang ba de {C78b} gzhan gyi bdag nyid la ji ltar dmigs par 'gyur te| 'di ltar sna ma'i me tog la dri nga ba nyid ma mthong na gos la yang dmigs par mi 'gyur ba lta bu'o|| de'i phyir gal te lta ba rang gi bdag nyid la lta bar byed na ni| des na gzugs la lta bar byed pas lta ba'o[98] zhes bya ba de 'thad par 'gyur ba zhig na| lta ba[99] rang gi bdag nyid la lta bar mi byed pa do|| da[100] gang rang gi bdag nyid la lta bar mi byed pa de gzhan dag la ji ltar[101] lta bar byed de| de bas na gzugs la lta bar byed[102] pas lta ba'o[103] zhes bya ba de mi 'thad do||

{N83a} slob dpon 'phags pa lhas kyang|

dngos po kun gyi rang bzhin ni||
thog mar bdag la snang gyur na||
mig nyid la yang mig gis ni||
ci yi[104] phyir na 'dzin mi 'gyur||
[Catuḥśataka 13-16]

zhes gsungs so zhes zer ro[105]||

de la 'dir rang gi sde pa dag na re| lta ba gzugs dmigs[106] pa de gal te ji ltar mig la[107] med pa de bzhin du gzugs la yang[108] med do zhe na ni grub pa la sgrub pa yin te| de ltar yang|

de ni mig dang gzugs la med||
de gnyis bar na'ang[109] yod ma yin||
gang du de ni gnas 'gyur ba||
de yod ma yin de med min||

zhes gsungs pa'i phyir ro[110] zhe'o||[111]

kha cig na re| ji ste rang gi bdag nyid la lta bar byed pa'i nus pa med do zhe na ni| sna ma'i me tog dag de'i dper mi rung ste| sna ma'i me tog dag la tshogs pa'i dbang gis dri zhim pa nyid dag 'byung ba'i phyir me tog dang phrad pas 'bru mar dri zhim pa nyid du 'gyur ba bzhin no|| gzugs la lta bar byed pa'i bya ba yang sus kyang khas ma blangs pas de 'gog pa yang mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro|| ci ste bdag nyid la 'dzin par mi byed pa bzhin du gzhan dag la yang 'dzin par mi byed par sgrub na ni de lta na yang dpes {P95a} mi nus te| me dang sna ma'i me tog dag rang dang gzhan gyi bdag nyid la 'dzin par mi

byed pa'i phyir ro|| de lta bas na de ni rigs pa ma yin[112] no zhe'o||

de'i phyir de ltar mig lta bar ma grub pas skye ba yang ma grub| 'gro ba yang ma grub ste| dpe med pa'i phyir ro|| yang na gtan tshigs 'gal ba {D79a} nyid kyang yin no||

'dir smras pa| khyod bsgrub pa'i don sgro btags nas mig gzugs la lta bar mi byed de| rang gi bdag nyid lta bar mi byed pa'i phyir ro[113] zhes zer bas[114] ni 'di skad ces gal te de la rang gi bdag nyid la nus pa med na| de la gzhan gyi bdag nyid la yang de med par bstan pa yin no|| {C79a} de lta na yang ma nges pa nyid yin te| me la rang gi bdag nyid la sreg par byed pa'i nus pa nyid med du zin kyang gzhan gyi bdag nyid la sreg par byed pa'i[115] nus pa nyid yod pa'i phyir ro||

'dir bshad pa|

lta ba rab tu bsgrub pa'i phyir||
me yi dpes ni nus ma yin|| [MMK 3-3ab]

mig ni lta ba'i ngo bo nyid yin no[116] zhes {N83b} bya ba'i don de rab tu bsgrub pa'i phyir gtan tshigs ma nges pa nyid kyi skyon brjod pas te[117]| don dam par me ni sreg[118] par byed pa nyid du ma grub pa'i phyir dang| tha snyad du yang lta ba'i ngo bo nyid du ma grub pa'i phyir ro[119] zhes bya bar dgongs so||

yang na|[120]

lta ba rab tu bsgrub pa'i phyir||[121]

me yi dpes[122] ni nus ma yin|| [MMK 3-3ab]

gtan tshigs kyi skyon brjod pa'i phyir te| me'i ngo bo nyid rang dang gzhan gyi bdag nyid snang bar byed pa de ni gzhan gyi phyogs la yang med pa'i phyir dang| tha snyad du yang sreg[123] par byed pa'i ngo bo nyid du ma grub pa'i phyir ro[124] zhes bya bar dgongs so|| sreg[125] pa zhes bya ba yang mes[126] byas pa'i bud shing 'gyur ba yin pas| de'i[127] phyir me'i ngo bo nyid ma yin no||

gzhan yang|[128]

lta ba rab tu bsgrub pa'i phyir||[129]

me yi dpes ni nus ma yin||

song dang ma song {P95b} bgom[130] pa yis||

de ni lta[131] bcas lan btab po[132]|| [MMK 3-3]

lta[133] bcas zhes bya ba ni lta ba dang bcas pa'o|| gang zhe na| me'i dpe de'o|| ci zhig byas she na| lan btab po||[134] gang gis she na| song ba dang| ma song ba dang| bgom[135] pa dag gis te| ji ltar[136] sngar don dam par song ba dang| ma song ba dang| bgom[137] pa dag la 'gro ba med de| song zin pa'i phyir dang| ma song ba'i phyir dang| song ba dang| ma song ba ma gtogs par bgom[138] pa shes par mi 'gyur ba'i phyir ro[139] zhes bshad pa de bzhin du don dam par mes kyang bud shing bsregs[140] pa dang| ma

bsregs[141] pa dang| bsreg bzhin[142] pa dag sreg par mi byed de| bsregs pa'i phyir dang|[143] ma bsregs pa'i phyir dang| bsregs pa dang| ma bsregs pa ma gtogs {D79b} par[144] bsreg[145] pa shes par mi 'gyur ba'i phyir ro[146] zhes bya ba dang| de bzhin du don dam par mig kyang gzugs bltas pa dang| ma bltas pa dang| blta ba dag la lta[147] bar mi byed de| bltas pa'i phyir dang| ma bltas pa'i phyir dang| bltas pa dang| ma bltas pa ma gtogs par blta ba shes par mi 'gyur ba'i phyir ro[148] zhes go rims[149] bzhin du sbyor ba'i tshig dag brjod par bya'o||

'di la gzhan dag ni pha rol pos me bzhin {N84a} du lta ba la sogs pa 'grub ste[150]| dper na me ni sreg[151] par byed pa yin yang| gzhan dag sreg[152] par byed pa nyid yin gyi {C79b} rang gi bdag nyid sreg par byed[153] pa ni ma yin no|| de bzhin du lta ba yang lta bar byed pa yin yang| gzhan dag la lta bar byed pa nyid yin gyi[154]| rang gi bdag nyid la lta bar byed pa ni ma yin no[155] zhes smras pa'i lan du|[156]

> lta ba rab tu bsgrub pa'i phyir||[157]
> me yi dpes ni nus ma yin||
> song dang ma song bgom[158] pa yis||
> de ni lta[159] bcas lan btab po[160]|| [MMK 3-3]

de yang gzhan sreg par mi byed pa'i phyir ro[161] zhes zer ro||

gzhan dag na re de ni rigs pa ma yin te| dpe tsam gyis[162] {P96a} phyogs snga ma shin tu snying po ma yin

pas de 'gog pa'i rigs pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro zhe'o||[163]

gzhan dag gis smras pa|[164] mig la lta ba'i bya ba yod pa kho na yin te| sgra'i bstan bcos las de ltar bstan pa'i phyir ro|| 'di na sgra'i[165] bstan bcos las byed pa po la bya ba'i rkyen brjod nas lta bar[166] byed pas lta[167] ba zhes bya ste| der gang ci bstan pa de ni de bzhin te| dper na byed pa po la bya ba'i rkyen brjod nas thugs su chud par mdzad pa'am[168]| thugs su chud par gyur pas sangs rgyas zhes bya ba bzhin no||

'dir bshad pa| sgrub pa de tha snyad kyi bden pa'i khongs su ni yod mod kyi| don dam par ni med do|| ji ltar zhe na| 'di nyid du mig lta ba bkag pa'i phyir dang| de'i skye ba bkag pa'i phyir lta ba dang bral ba yin pas|

gang tshe cung zad mi lta ba||
lta bar byed pa ma yin no|| [MMK 3-4ab]

gang gi tshe gtan pa'am[169]| khri'u'am[170] cung zad la yang lta bar mi byed pa de'i tshe lta bar byed pa ma yin no|| de'i phyir|

lta bas lta bar byed ces byar||
de ni ji ltar rigs par 'gyur|| [MMK 3-4cd]

lta bas lta bar byed ces bya ba de ji ltar rigs par 'gyur te| de ni mi rigs pa kho na'o zhes bya {D80a} ba'i

tshig gi don to|| de'i phyir|

lta ba lta nyid ma yin te||
lta ba min pa mi lta nyid|| [MMK 3-5ab]

lta ba'i nus pas stong pa'i phyir||
bong ba la {N84b} sogs pa bzhin no||

zhes bya bar dgongs so|| des na don dam par sgra'i[171] bstan bcos las lta ba'i sgra dang| sangs rgyas kyi sgra bstan pa mi rung ba kho na ste| dpe med pa'i phyir ro|| mdzad pa'i mtha' dang yang[172] mi 'gal te| don dam par bcom ldan 'das kyang ngo bo nyid med pa'i phyir dang| 'og nas kyang|

de bzhin gshegs pa'i dngos nyid gang||
de ni 'gro 'di'i ngo bo nyid[173]||
de bzhin gshegs pa dngos nyid med||[174]
'gro 'di ngo bo nyid med do|| [MMK 22-16]

zhes 'byung ba'i phyir ro||

yang na gzhan du brtag ste[175]| 'di {C80a} la de lta ba yin pa la[176] byed pa po la[177] bya ba'i rkyen brjod nas lta bar byed {P96b} pas lta ba zhes bya ba'am[178]| lta ba ma yin pa la byed pa po la bya ba'i rkyen brjod nas lta bar byed pas lta ba zhes bya| des cir 'gyur| gal te de lta ba[179] yin pa la bya na ni|

gang tshe cung zad mi lta ba||[180]
lta bar byed pa ma yin no|| [MMK 3-4ab]

´o na ci zhe na| lta ba[181] nyid ni lta bar byed pa yin no|| des na mig lta ba´i bya ba skyes pas lta bar byed de| de lta na gtan tshigs dang dpe´i skyon de nyid yod do||

gal te de lta ba´i bya ba´i[182] byed pa po yin pa´i phyir lta bar byed pa nyid yin no zhe na| de´i tshe de lta ba yin na lta ba´i bya ba[183] don med pa nyid de| de´i phyir|[184]

lta bas lta bar byed ces byar||[185]

de ni ji ltar rigs par ´gyur|| [MMK 3-4cd]

mi rigs pa kho na yin te| lta ba´i bya ba dang ldan pa´i phyir ro[186] zhes bya ba´i tshig gi don to||

ji ste de lta ba ma yin pa la bya na yang|

gang tshe cung zad mi[187] lta ba||

lta bar byed pa ma yin no|| [MMK 3-4ab]

de´i tshe de lta ba´i ngo bo nyid ma yin na| bong ba la sogs pa bzhin du lta ba´i bya ba dang bral ba yin pas lta ba ma yin pa yang lta bar mi byed pa nyid do||

de´i phyir de ltar gnyi ga yang lta ba´i bya ba dang mi ldan pa´i phyir|

lta ba lta nyid ma yin te||[188]

lta ba min pa mi lta nyid|| [MMK 3-5ab]

ci ste dgag pa gnyis yod na| skabs kyi don go bas de´i phyir mig lta ba´i bya ba skyes pas lta bar byed do zhe na| de[189] ni bzang po ma yin te[190]| yod pa dang med pa´i rkyen dgag pa bzhin du yod pa dang| med pa´i rgyu

nyid bkag[191] {N85a} pa'i phyir ro|| phyis 'byung ba'i tshul gyis lta ba nyid du nye {D80b} bar brtags nas| de lta ba yin par rtog[192] na ni tha snyad kyi bden pa rab tu bsgrub pa'i phyir 'dod pa nyams so||

yang na pha rol po na re mig lta ba'i bya ba skyes pas lta bar byed par smra ste| bya ba'i tha snyad yod pa'i phyir ro|| gang la lta[193] ba'i bya ba ma skyes pa de ni lta bar byed do[194] zhes mi brjod de| {P97a} dper na[195] rna ba bzhin no|| mig la ni lta ba'i bya ba yod pas mig lta bar byed do zhes tha snyad 'dogs so zhes zer ba la[196]| slob dpon gyis bshad pa| de ltar na|

lta ba lta nyid ma yin te||[197] [MMK 3-5a]

pha rol pos don dam par lta ba po 'ga' zhig la lta ba'i bya ba skyes par ma bstan pa'i phyir dang| lta ba la lta ba'i bya ba skyes pa'i sngon rol na| lta ba nyid du ma grub pa'i phyir ro {C80b} zhes bya bar dgongs so||

sngon lta ba ma yin pa[198] las phyis lta ba'i bya ba dang ldan par 'gyur ba ni bstan dka' ba'i phyir|

lta ba min pa mi lta nyid|| [MMK 3-5b]

de ltar[199] na gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid dam| don 'gal ba nyid yin pas| dam bcas pa nyams so||

'dir grangs can dang| bye brag pa dag gis smras pa| 'dis lta bar byed pas lta ba ste| byed pa la bya ba'i rkyen brjod pa'i phyir ro|| byed pa de gang gi yin pa de ni lta ba po ste| de yang des lta bar byed do|| dper na gcod pa po sta res[200] gcad par bya ba shing gcod par byed

kyi[201] sta re nyid bcod par mi byed pa bzhin te| des na mig gis lta bar mi byed do[202] zhes bya ba de ni grub pa la sgrub[203] pa yin no|| byed pa dag la byed pa po yod de| byed pa yin pa'i phyir dper na sta re la sogs pa dag la gcod pa po yod pa bzhin no||

'dir bshad pa|

lta ba nyid kyis lta ba po||
rnam par bshad par shes par bya|| [MMK 3-5cd]

rnam par bshad par shes par bya ba[204] zhes bya ba[205] lan btab par shes par bya'o[206]|| gang gis she[207] na| lta ba nyid kyis so|| gang gi zhe na| lta ba po'i ste| lta ba po nyid du rnam par rtog pa dgag pa yang 'dra ba'i phyir ro[208] zhes bya bar dgongs so||

ji ltar der mig gi chos rang gi {N85b} bdag nyid la lta bar mi byed pa yin pa de bzhin du 'dir bdag gi chos kyang rang gi bdag nyid la lta bar mi byed pa yin te| gang {P97b} gi phyir bdag ni rang gi bdag nyid la lta[209] bar byed pa mi 'thad de| rang gi bdag nyid la 'jug pa 'gal ba'i phyir ro|| 'di ltar ral {D81a} gri'i so de nyid kyis ral gri'i so de[210] nyid gcod par mi byed pa bzhin no|| de[211] ltar rjes[212] su dpag pa ni don dam par bdag kyang lta ba po ma yin te| rang gi bdag nyid la lta bar mi byed pa'i phyir dper na rna ba bzhin no||

pha rol pos gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid du

dogs pa'i dug gis bslad du yang mi rung ngo|| gang la lar bdag gis bdag la lta bar byed do[213] zhes bshad pa der ni| yid phan 'dogs pa yin pa'i phyir| bdag gis zhes[214] bya ba'i sgrar sgro[215] btags nas tha snyad du de skad bshad pa yin no||

'dir rang gi bdag nyid la lta bar mi[216] byed pa ni mtshan nyid kyi sgra'i[217] tshul nye bar gzung[218] ba'i phyir te| gtan tshigs dngos po nyid dang| {C81a} shes bya nyid dang| brjod par bya ba nyid la sogs pa dag gi phyir[219] rna ba la sogs pa bzhin no[220] zhe'am[221]| sgra la sogs pa bzhin no zhe'am[222]| bdag gi bdag nyid bzhin no zhes gtan tshigs dang| dpe'i rjes su dpag pa dag kyang rgyas par brjod par bya'o||

de ltar na don dam par bdag ni gzugs la lta bar mi byed de| dngos po yin pa'i phyir dper na rna ba la sogs pa bzhin no||[223] de bzhin du don dam par bdag ni gzugs la lta bar mi byed de| shes bya yin pa'i phyir dper na sgra la sogs pa bzhin no|| de bzhin du don dam par bdag ni gzugs la lta bar mi byed de| brjod par bya ba yin pa'i phyir dper na bdag gi bdag nyid bzhin no|| gzugs la yang de bzhin du ci rigs par brjod par bya'o|| dam bcas pa la sogs pa'i skyon yang med de| tha snyad kyi bden pa'i dbang du byas pa'i phyir dang| spyir khas blangs pa'i bdag phyogs su byas pa'i phyir dang| de'i chos bstan {P98a} pa'i phyir dang| dpe nyid du yang de nye bar bzhag[224] pa'i phyir ro||

de ltar don dam par sta re la sogs pa ma grub pas dpe yang {N86a} med pa'i phyir grub pa la sgrub[225] pa ma yin no||

'dir kha cig na re| lta ba po lta bar mi byed do zhes bya ba ni de nyid kyis don de la skur pa btab pa'i phyir| dam bcas pa'i skyon du 'gyur ro zhes zer ro||

'dir rten cing 'brel bar[226] 'byung ba skye ba med do[227] zhes bya bas lan btab zin pa'i phyir yang phyir bzlas mi dgos so||

gzhan yang 'di la lta ba po de[228] lta ba po'i ngo bo nyid yin nam|[229] {D81b} 'on te lta ba po'i ngo bo nyid ma yin| de la gal te lta ba po'i ngo bo nyid yin te| ji ltar grangs can dag na re skyes bu'i ngo bo nyid ni shes pa yod pa nyid do[230] zhes zer ba lta bu'o zhe na| de la gal te de'i lta ba po de[231] lta ba po'i ngo bo nyid yin na ngo bo nyid ni ma byas pa'i phyir| lta ba med par yang lta ba por 'gyur ro||

ci ste gcod pa po de la sta re med na gcod pa po nyid du mi 'thad pa de bzhin du de yang lta ba ma spangs na[232]| lta ba po nyid du blta bar bya'o zhe na| de lta na bdag lta ba[233] po nyid ni tha snyad pa yin te| gcod pa po tha snyad pa yin pa'i phyir ro|| de ltar rtog na|[234]

ma spangs lta po yod min te||[235] [MMK 3-6a]

lta ba ma spangs na de lta ba po nyid[236] du {C81b}

khas blangs pa'i phyir ro[237] zhes bya ba'i tshig gi lhag ma'o|| 'di na lta ba dang ldan pa'i sngon rol dang lta ba dang bral ba'i 'og na lta ba med pas lta ba med na blta[238] bar bya ba la lta ba yang med pa'i phyir| lta ba po nyid du mi 'thad pas lta ba po med de|[239] lta ba po'i ngo bo nyid ma yin no[240] zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go|[241]

me bzhin du yang de mi 'grub ste[242]| bud shing med par me mi 'grub pa'i phyir ro||

yang na gal te lta ba[243] yod na lta ba po yin no zhe na[244] yang grangs can dag gis yongs su brtags[245] pa'i lta ba po med[246] do zhes bya ba'i tshig gi {P98b} lhag ma ste| 'di la gzugs dmigs shing[247] lta bar byed pas lta ba po'o zhes rjes su dpag pa yin na| gzugs dmigs pa de yang| mig dang| gzugs dang| snang ba dang| nam mkha' dang| yid la byed pa dag yod na yod pa yin pas de'i phyir| lhas byin zhes bya ba'i tshogs de dag dang ldan pa la[248] lta ba po zhes gdags kyi de las gzhan ni med do|| {N86b} de las gzhan pa yongs su brtags pa'i yod pa nyid cig yod du zin na yang| long ba'i rgyud la gzugs dmigs pa med pa'i phyir ro||

byed pa'i rgyu dag la byed pa por tha snyad gdags te| mar me bzhin du rigs pa nyid yin no|| dper na mar me la sems pa med[249] kyang snang ba'i rgyu yin pa'i phyir snang bar byed pa yin no[250] zhes zer ba bzhin te| de'i phyir tha snyad du yang de[251] med do||

ci ste lta ba po'i ngo bo nyid ma yin te| ji ltar

bye brag pa dag na re bzhi'i sbyor ba las gzugs shes pa skyes pa na lta bar byed do zhes zer[252] ba lta bu'o zhe na| de[253] lta na yang skyon de nyid yod de| ma grags pa'i yod pa nyid la der[254] brtag pa {D82a} mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro||

thun mong du khas blangs nas de yod do zhe na| yang bshad pa|

lta ba spangs par gyur kyang ngo|| [MMK 3-6b]

ci zhig[255] ce na| lta ba po yod min te|[256] zhes bya ba'i skabs yin te| lta ba'i nus pa spangs par gyur na| de'i[257] ngo bo nyid ma yin pa'i phyir ro|| don dam par de gzugs la lta bar byed par mi 'thad de| mig las gzhan yin pa'i phyir dper na bum pa bzhin no|| de ltar phyogs gnyis ka[258] la yang| lta ba po nyid ma grub po||

yang na lta ba po'i ngo bo nyid du yongs su brtags na yang|

ma spangs lta po yod min te||[259]

lta ba spangs par gyur kyang ngo|| [MMK 3-6ab]

lta[260] ba dang {C82a} bcas sam| lta ba med kyang rung ste| lta ba po'i ngo bo nyid med do[261] {P99a} zhes bya bar dgongs so||

gal te re zhig lta ba po de mig yod na lta bar byed do zhes bya ba de ltar 'dod na| de lta na gzugs dmigs pa 'grub pa ni mig yod na yod pa'i phyir me yod na bsreg pa

nyid bzhin pas lta ba po nyid tha snyad pa ste| mig nyid yin par 'dod par bya'o|| ci ste lta ba med kyang lta ba po yin no zhes byar ni long ba'i rgyud la gzugs dmigs pa med pa'i phyir de lta ba po nyid yin par mi rigs so||

'dir smras pa| lta ba'i bya ba yod pa nyid ni lta ba po yin par shes par bya ste| de la byed pa dang| las yod pa'i phyir ro|| 'di na gang la bya ba med pa de la ni byed pa dang las med de| dper na nam mkha'i me tog bzhin no|| lta ba po de la ni byed pa lta ba dang[262] {N87a} las blta[263] bar bya ba yod pas de'i phyir lta ba'i bya ba yod pa nyid ni lta ba po yin par shes par bya'o||

'dir bshad pa| don dam par lta ba rnam pa thams cad du bkag pa'i phyir dang| lta ba med na lta ba po yang mi 'thad de|

lta po med na khyod kyi ni||
blta bya lta ba ga la yod|| [MMK 3-6cd]

gang gis kyang lta bar mi byed[264] pa la blta bar bya ba[265] mi rigs pa'i phyir dang| 'dis lta bar byed pa'i lta ba po med pa kho na'i phyir byed pa yang mi rigs pa'i phyir ro zhes bya bar dgongs so|| des na khyod kyi byed pa dang las yod pa'i phyir ro[266] zhes bya ba'i gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid dam| don 'gal ba nyid yin no||

rang gi sde pa dag las| kha cig na re| rgyu dang

rkyen gzhan gyi dbang dang gYo ba med pa'i 'du byed dag la mig lta bar mi byed do[267] zhes bya ba dang| {D82b} de las gzhan pa'i bdag lta ba po med do[268] zhes bya ba gang yin pa de[269] ni rigs kyi| blta[270] bar bya ba dang| lta ba dag med do zhes bya ba ni mi 'dod de| de dag gi 'bras bu {P99b} rnam par shes pa la sogs pa bzhi yod pa'i phyir ro|| gang med pa de la ni| 'bras bu rnam par shes pa dang| reg pa dang| tshor ba dang| sred pa zhes bya ba dag med de| dper na dmus long gi mig bzhin no|| blta bar bya ba dang lta ba dag la ni 'bras bu rnam par shes pa la sogs pa bzhi yod pas| de'i phyir blta bar bya ba[271] dang| lta ba dag yod do zhes zer ro||

'dir bshad pa| {C82b} gal te ji skad bstan pa'i tshul gyis[272] blta bar bya ba dang| lta ba rab tu ma grub par bstan pa de'i tshe|

> blta bya lta ba med pa'i phyir||
> rnam par shes la sogs pa bzhi||
> yod min| [MMK 3-7ab,c1]

rkyen med pa'i phyir ro zhes bya bar dgongs so|| de'i phyir de dag ma grub pas ma grub na blta bar bya ba dang| lta ba yang 'grub par mi rigs te| dpe[273] yang med pa'i phyir ro||

gang dag 'di skad ces don dam par rnam par shes pa la sogs pa dag yod pa nyid de|[274] de dag gi 'bras bu nye

bar len pa la sogs pa dag yod pa'i phyir ro zhes zer ba de dag la {N87b} bshad par bya ste|

nye bar len pa la sogs pa||[275]
ji lta bur na yod par 'gyur||[276] [MMK 3-7c2,d]

de dag kyang rnam par shes pa la sogs pa bzhin du ma grub pa'i phyir ro[277] zhes bya bar[278] dgongs so|| nye bar len pa zhes bya ba ni| nye bar blang bar bya ba dag ste| 'dod pa dang| tshul khrims dang| brtul zhugs mchog tu 'dzin pa dang| bdag tu smra ba dang| lta ba zhes bya ba dag go|[279] sogs pa zhes bya ba ni gang dag gi dang por de dag bstan pa ste| de dag kyang srid pa dang[280] skye ba dang[281] rga shi dag go|[282] de'i phyir khyod la skyon de nyid yod do||

da ni pha rol pos rab tu byed pa'i dang por[283] nyan pa la sogs pa dang| sgra la sogs pa dpe nyid du nye bar bzhag pa dag ji skad bstan pa'i tshul gyis 'dra bar bstan par bzhed nas|

lta bas[284] nyan dang {P100a} snom pa dang||
myong[285] bar byed dang reg byed yid[286]||
nyan pa po dang mnyan la sogs||
rnam par bshad par shes par bya||[287] [MMK 3-8]

zhes bya ba gsungs so|| nyan pa dang| snom pa dang|

myong[288] bar byed pa dang| reg par byed pa dang| yid dang| nyan pa po dang| mnyan par bya {D83a} ba la sogs pa dag gi lan kyang[289] btab par shes par bya'o|| gang gis she na| lta ba nyid kyis te| lta ba dgag pa bzhin du nyan pa la sogs pa[290] dag dgag pa yang ci rigs par rjes su dpag pa rgyas pas[291] spros pa dang bcas te[292] bstan par bya'o||

des na rab tu byed pa rtsom pa nas[293] rnam par rtog par byed pa'i {C83a} skye ba yang ma grub la 'gro ba yang ma grub po|| de la 'dir rab tu byed pa'i don ni pha rol pos smras pa'i sgrub pa'i skyon brjod pas skye mched rnams stong pa nyid du bstan pa yin no||

de'i phyir nang gi sa'i khams gang yin pa dang| phyi rol gyi sa'i khams gang yin pa de[294] ni gnyis su med pa'i don te|[295] de yang de bzhin gshegs pas shes rab dang ye shes kyis gnyis su med pa dang| gnyis su dbyer med pa dang| mtshan nyid gcig pa 'di lta ste| mtshan nyid med par mngon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas so[296] zhes bya ba dang| de bzhin du bu mo khams dag ji ltar blta bar bya| bu mos smras pa| 'jam dpal {N88a} 'di lta ste| dper na 'jig rten gsum bskal pa'i mes bsregs pa na[297] thal ba yang med pa ltar ro[298] zhes bya ba dang| de bzhin du|[299]

mig ni gzugs la mi lta zhing||[300]
yid ni chos rnams mi shes te||
gang la 'jig rten mi 'jug pa||
de ni[301] dam pa'i bden pa'o||

zhes bya ba dang| de bzhin du chos thams cad ni shes par mi byed| lta bar mi byed de| de ni chos smra ba la yang dmigs par mi byed| sems par mi byed| rlom par {P100b} mi byed do[302] zhes bya ba dang| de bzhin du sring mo mig ni gzugs la lta[303] bar mi byed| rnam par shes par mi byed de| byang chub kyang mig dang[304] gzugs dang[305] bral[306] ba nyid do|| rna ba dang| sna dang| lce dang| lus dang|[307] yid kyang[308] chos rnams 'dzin par mi byed|[309] rnam par shes par mi byed de| byang chub kyang yid dang chos dang[310] bral ba[311] nyid do[312] zhes bya ba la sogs pa dang| de bzhin du rab kyi rtsal gyis rnam par gnon pa gzugs ni gzugs kyi spyod yul ma yin no|| tshor ba dang| 'du shes dang| 'du byed rnams dang| rnam par shes pa yang rnam par shes pa'i spyod yul ma yin no|| rab kyi rtsal gyis rnam par gnon pa spyod yul zhes bya ba ni gzugs kyis gzugs mi shes mi mthong ba {D83b} dang| tshor ba dang| 'du shes dang| 'du byed {C83b} rnams dang| rnam par shes pas rnam par shes pa mi shes mi mthong ba'o|| gzugs mi shes mi mthong ba dang[313]| tshor ba dang| 'du shes dang| 'du byed rnams dang| rnam par shes pa mi shes mi[314] mthong ba gang yin pa de ni shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'o[315] zhes bya ba la sogs pa gsungs pa de dag grub pa yin no||

slob dpon legs ldan byed kyis nye bar sbyar ba|[316] dbu ma'i rtsa ba'i 'grel pa[317] shes rab sgron ma las| skye mched brtag pa zhes bya ba ste| rab tu byed pa gsum

paʹo|| .

Notes to Tibetan Text of Prajñāpradīpa, Chapter Three

1PNDC: de la da; Ava P1b-1, D1b-1 omm. de la.

2DC add na.

3PN add |.

4N: kha.

5N: skya.

6PN: myang.

7PN: rim.

8N: kha.

9P: da.

10PN: phyir ro|| for phyir|.

11D: ||.

12PN add ||.

13PN: myang.

14PN: yin.

15P ad. so.

16N: da.

17PN: go|.

18D: ||.

19D: ||.

20DC: pas for pa'i phyir.

21P: |.

22PN add ba.

23PN omm. ||.

24N: 'o||.

[25]PN add |.

[26]DC omm. |.

[27]PN: bsgrubs.

[28]PN add ||.

[29]PN add ||.

[30]P: |.

[31]P: |.

[32]PN: blta.

[33]PN add ||.

[34]DC: te|.

[35]C om. pa'i.

[36]PN: blta.

[37]C om. pa.

[38]PN: gi.

[39]PN: blta.

[40]D: byad.

[41]C: gzungs.

[42]PN add ||.

[43]PN: blta.

[44]PN: blta.

[45]DC: bsgrub.

[46]PN add |.

[47]DC: bstan.

[48]PN add ||.

[49]PNDC: rten; Ava P8a-8: rten, D7b-5: brten.

[50]PN omm. ||.

[51] PN *add* ||.

[52] DC: phyir ro|| *for* phyir.

[53] C: |.

[54] PN *add* ||.

[55] PN: gzung.

[56] N: ra.

[57] DC *omm*. ||.

[58] PNDC *add* zhe na|; Ava P10a-4,5, D9a-6 *omm*. zhe na|.

[59] PN *add* ||.

[60] PN: blta.

[61] PN *add* ||.

[62] PN *add* ||.

[63] N: gnad.

[64] C: do´i.

[65] P: |.

[66] PN *omm*. ||.

[67] PN: bzhag.

[68] DC: brtag.

[69] PN *add* ||.

[70] PN *add* |.

[71] PN: blta.

[72] C: gtshugs.

[73] PN *add* ||.

[74] PN *add* |.

[75] PNDC: tshogs *for* la sogs; Ava P14a-4, D12b-5: la

sogs.

[76]D: pa.

[77]DC *add* dang|.

[78]N: dpar.

[79]PN *add* ||.

[80]DC *add* phyir.

[81]C: mul.

[82]PN *add* |.

[83]DC *omm.* kyis.

[84]PN *add* ||.

[85]PN *add* ||.

[86]PN *add* |.

[87]N: pa'a.

[88]N: dpar.

[89]N: ja.

[90]PNDC: gi; Ava P18a-3: gi, D16a-2: gis.

[91]DC: gi gcig brtsal *for* gis gcig bsal.

[92]D: bar.

[93]D: bo.

[94]DC *add* |.

[95]DC: ba.

[96]C: pa.

[97]DC: bdag.

[98]PN *add* ||.

[99]DC *add* na.

[100]DC: *omm.* da.

101_{PN} omm. ltar.

102_{N}: pyad.

103_{PN} add ||.

104_{PN}: ci'i for ci yi.

105_{PN} omm. zhes zer ro.

106_{PN}: med.

107_{C}: pa.

108_{PN} omm. yang.

109_{C}: na 'ang for na'ang.

110_{PN} add ||.

111_{PN} omm. ||.

112_{D}: min for ma yin.

113_{PN} add ||.

114_{DC}: ba.

115_{PNDC} omm. pa'i; Ava P21b-8, D19a-5: pa'i.

116_{PN} add ||.

117_{PN}: par bya ste, DC: pa ste for pas te; Ava P22a-4, D19b-1: pas te.

118_{C}: sred.

119_{PN} add ||.

120_{PN} omm. |.

121_{PN}: |.

122_{N}: dpas.

123_{N}: srag.

124_{PN} add ||.

125_{N}: srag.

[126] N: mas.

[127] N: da'i.

[128] PN *omm.* |.

[129] P: |.

[130] DC: bsgom.

[131] PN: ltar.

[132] D: bo.

[133] PN: ltar.

[134] PN: po|; DC: bo||.

[135] DC: bsgom.

[136] PN *add* sngon.

[137] DC: bsgom.

[138] PNDC: bsgom.

[139] PN *add* ||.

[140] PN: bsreg.

[141] PN: bsreg.

[142] PNDC: sreg *for* bsreg bzhin; Ava P23a-8 to 23b-1: bsregs bzhin, D20b-2: bsreg bzhin.

[143] PN *omm.* |.

[144] D: bar.

[145] PN: bsregs.

[146] PN *add* ||.

[147] PN: blta.

[148] PN *add* ||.

[149] PN: rim.

[150] N: sta.

151 PN: bsreg.

152 N: srag.

153 N: byad.

154 PN: gyis.

155 PN *add* ||.

156 PN *omm.* |.

157 PN: |.

158 DC: bsgom.

159 PN: ltar.

160 D: bo.

161 PN *add* ||.

162 P: gyi; N: gya.

163 PN: zhe na| *for* zhe´o||.

164 C: ||.

165 C: skra´i.

166 DC: ba bya ba *for* bar.

167 PN: blta.

168 D: ba´am.

169 PC: pa ´am *for* pa´am.

170 N: khri´u ´am; D: khre´u´am; C: khre´u ´am.

171 PN: sgra yi *for* sgra´i.

172 DC *omm.* yang.

173 P *ad.* med.

174 P *om.* MMK 22-16c.

175 DC: brtags te *for* brtag ste.

176 PN *omm.* lta ba yin pa la.

177 DC omm. la.

178 NC: ba ʼam.

179 PNDC add ma; Ava P26b-1, D23a-2 omm. ma.

180 PN: |.

181 PNDC: bar byed pa for ba; Ava P26b-2, D23a-3: ba.

182 DC: ba.

183 PN: baʼi.

184 PN omm. |.

185 P: |.

186 PN add ||.

187 N: ma.

188 P: |.

189 N: da.

190 D: ta.

191 C: bgag.

192 DC: rtogs.

193 PN: blta.

194 PN add ||.

195 PN add |.

196 PN add ni.

197 PN: ||.

198 N: pas.

199 DC: lta.

200 DC add shing.

201 PN add |.

202 PN add ||.

[203] PN: bsgrub.

[204] PN *omm*. rnam par bshad par shes par bya ba.

[205] PN *add* ni.

[206] PN: bya ba'o *for* bya'o.

[207] P: shes.

[208] PN *add* ||.

[209] PN: blta.

[210] N: nga.

[211] N: da.

[212] N: rjas.

[213] PN *add* ||.

[214] PN: shes.

[215] C *ad*. ba.

[216] N: ma.

[217] NC: skra'i.

[218] PN: bzung.

[219] PN *add* |.

[220] PN *add* ||.

[221] PN: zhe 'am.

[222] PN: zhe 'am.

[223] DC: no zhe na| *for* no.

[224] DC: gzhag.

[225] PN: bsgrub.

[226] PN: par.

[227] PN *add* ||.

[228] N: lta po da *for* lta ba po de.

229 DC omm. |.

230 PN add ||.

231 DC omm. lta ba po de.

232 DC: pa'i phyir for na.

233 DC omm. lta ba.

234 PN omm. |.

235 PN: |.

236 N: snyad.

237 PN add ||.

238 PN: lta.

239 PN omm. |.

240 PN add ||.

241 DC: ||.

242 N: sta.

243 DC add po.

244 PN add |.

245 PN: brtag.

246 N: mad.

247 PN add |.

248 N: lha for pa la.

249 N: sams pa me for sems pa med.

250 PN add ||.

251 N: da; DC omm. de.

252 N: zar.

253 N: da.

254 PN: der, DC: la de for la der; Ava P34b-3,

D29b-6: la der.

255$_{P}$ *ad*. gi.

256$_{DC}$: ||.

257$_{N}$: da´i.

258$_{P}$: ga.

259$_{PN}$: |.

260$_{PN}$: blta.

261$_{P}$ *ad*. ||.

262$_{PN}$ *add* |.

263$_{PN}$: lta.

264$_{N}$: bed.

265$_{PN}$ *omm*. ba.

266$_{PN}$ *add* ||.

267$_{PN}$ *add* ||.

268$_{PN}$ *add* ||.

269$_{PN}$ *omm*. de.

270$_{PN}$: lta.

271$_{N}$: pa.

272$_{PN}$: gyi.

273$_{N}$: dab.

274$_{DC}$ *omm*. |.

275$_{PN}$: |.

276$_{PN}$: |.

277$_{PN}$ *add* ||.

278$_{PN}$ *omm*. bya bar.

279$_{PN}$ *omm*. |; DC: ||.

[280]PN add |.

[281]PN add |.

[282]DC: ||.

[283]N: par.

[284]DC: dang.

[285]PN: myang.

[286]PN: yin.

[287]N: |.

[288]PN: myang.

[289]C om. kyang.

[290]PN omm. pa.

[291]PNDC: par; Ava P38b-6: pas, D33a-6: par.

[292]PN: bcas te, DC: dang bcas pa for dang bcas te; Ava P38b-6, D33a-6: dang bcas te.

[293]PN omm. nas.

[294]PN omm. de.

[295]PN omm. te|.

[296]PN add ||.

[297]C: ni.

[298]PN add ||.

[299]PN omm. |.

[300]P: |.

[301]N: da na for de ni.

[302]PN add ||.

[303]PN: blta.

[304]PN add |.

[305]PN *add* |.

[306]N: pral.

[307]PN *omm*. lus dang|.

[308]DC: gang.

[309]DC *omm*. |.

[310]PN *add* |.

[311]N: pa.

[312]P *ad*. ||; N: da||.

[313]PNDC *omm*. ba dang; Ava P41a-8, D35b-2: ba dang.

[314]N: ma.

[315]PN *add* ||.

[316]N: sbyar|| *for* sbyar ba|.

[317]C: ba.

Tibetan Text of <u>Prajñāpradīpa</u>, Chapter Four

{P100b-7, N88a-7, DC83b-2} da ni skye mched yod pa nyid mi mthun pa'i phyogs kyi khyad[1] par dgag[2] pas phung po rnams ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du bstan pa'i don gyi dbang {N88b} gis rab tu byed pa bzhi pa brtsam mo||

rab tu byed pa bstan ma thag pa'i mjug tu|
lta bas nyan dang snom pa dang||[3]
myong[4] bar byed dang reg byed yid||
nyan pa po dang mnyan la sogs||
rnam par bshad {P101a} par shes par bya||
[MMK 3-8 (CPP: 3-9)]

zhes bshad pa'i phyir rang gi sde pa dag na re| don dam par skye mched rnams yod[5] pa kho na yin te| phung pos bsdus pa'i phyir ro|| 'di na gang yod pa ma yin pa de ni gzugs la sogs pa'i phung pos ma bsdus te| dper na nam mkha'i me tog bzhin no|| nang gi skye mched rnams la ni phung pos bsdus pa yod de| 'di lta ste|[6] gzugs can bcu ni gzugs kyi phung pos bsdus la| chos kyi skye mched ni phung po gsum dang| gzugs kyi phung po'i phyogs gcig gis bsdus| yid kyi skye mched ni rnam par shes pa'i phung pos bsdus so|| de'i phyir gtan tshigs ji skad smos pas don dam par nang gi skye mched rnams yod pa kho na yin no[7] zhes zer ro||

'dir bshad pa| 'di la gzugs ni mdor bsdu na rnam pa gnyis te| 'byung ba'i gzugs dang| 'byung ba las gyur pa'i

gzugs so|| dus la sogs pa'i dbye bas tha dad pa de dag thams cad gcig tu bsdus nas gzugs kyi phung po zhes bya'o|| de la re zhig pha rol po'i gtan tshigs nyid du mig la sogs pa bsdus par[8] 'dod pa'i phyir dang| bstan sla ba'i phyir gzugs las brtsams te bsam par bya'o||

gzugs kyi rgyu ni ma gtogs par||
gzugs ni dmigs par mi 'gyur ro|| [MMK 4-1ab]

gzugs zhes bya ba ni {DC84a} gzugs su rung ba'o|| de'i rgyu ni gzugs kyi rgyu ste| de gang zhe na| sa la sogs pa 'byung ba chen po bzhi po dag go|[9] de dag ma gtogs par zhes bya ba ni| de dag bstsal na'o||

gzugs ni dmigs par mi 'gyur ro|| [MMK 4-1b]
zhes bya ba ni don dam par ro|| 'o na ci zhe na| tha snyad gdags pa'i phyir| gzugs kyi rgyu 'byung ba chen po bzhi po {P101b} dag la brten nas gzugs zhes 'dogs par byed do||

de ltar na 'dis gzugs kyi[10] bsgrub par {N89a} bya ba'i[11] chos sa[12] la sogs par 'dus pa tsam nyid dang| gzugs kyi sgrub[13] pa'i chos rang gi rgyu ma bzung[14] na de'i blo med pa bstan to|| dpe ni de'i dbang gis te| dmag dang nags tshal la sogs pa dag yin no||

'dir rjes su dpag pa ni don dam par gzugs rdzas[15] su yod pa ma yin te| rang gi rgyu ma bzung na de'i blo med pa'i phyir ro|| 'di na gang rang gi rgyu ma bzung na[16]

de'i blo med pa[17] de[18] ni rdzas su yod pa ma yin te| dper na dmag la sogs pa bzhin no|| de bzhin du gzugs kyang rang gi rgyu sa[19] la sogs pa dag ma bzung[20] na| gzugs kyi blo med pas rdzas su yod pa ma yin no||

yang na sbyor ba'i lam gzhan yang yod de| don dam par gzugs kyi blo ni dngos po rdzas su yod pa'i yul can ma yin te| blo yin pa'i phyir dper na nags tshal la sogs pa'i blo bzhin no||

yang na sbyor ba'i lam gzhan yang yod de| don dam par gzugs[21] zhes bya ba'i sgra 'di ni tshig gi don rdzas su yod pa'i yul can ma yin te| sgra yin pa'i phyir dper na dmag la sogs pa'i sgra bzhin no||

rnam par shes pa dang|[22] sems las byung ba dag kyang bsgrub par bya ba dang| rigs mthun pa nyid kyis de bzhin du dgag par bya ba yin pa'i phyir| gtan tshigs ma nges pa nyid ma yin no||

gal te gzugs ni don dam par yod pa[23] yin te| de zhig kyang de'i blo mi 'jig[24] pa'i phyir ro|| 'di na gang zhig na de'i blo 'jig pa de ni kun rdzob tu yod pa yin te[25]| dper na bum pa bzhin no|| gzugs sngon po la sogs pa dag ni zhig kyang de'i blo de ltar mi 'jig[26] pas de'i phyir gzugs ni rdzas su yod pa yin no zhe na| de ni bzang po ma yin te| rjes su 'gro ba med {P102a} pa'i phyir ro||

de ltar re zhig rgyur byas pa'i gzugs brtags zin to|| da ni 'byung ba'i gzugs {C84b} kyi {D84b} dbang du byas te bshad par bya'o||

rgyur byas pa'i gzugs ni yod pa kho na yin te[27]| de'i rgyu {N89b} yod pa'i phyir ro|| 'di na gang med pa de la ni rgyu gzung du med de| dper na nam mkha'i me tog bzhin no|| rgyur byas pa'i gzugs la ni rgyu sa[28] la sogs pa de dag yod pas de'i phyir rgyur byas pa'i gzugs ni yod pa kho na yin no zhe na| de'i phyir bshad pa|

gzugs zhes bya ba ma gtogs par||
gzugs kyi rgyu yang mi snang ngo|| [MMK 4-1cd]

'di la rgyur byas pa'i gzugs kyi mtshan nyid gzugs dang| sgra dang| dri dang| ro dang| reg bya ma gtogs par gzugs kyi rgyu sa la sogs pa dag kyang mi snang zhing gzung du med do|| 'dir yang 'byung ba'i gzugs kyi bsgrub par bya ba chos gzugs la sogs pa 'dus pa tsam nyid dang| sgrub pa'i chos gzugs la sogs pa mi snang na sa[29] la sogs pa de dag kyang mi snang bar bstan to|| de'i phyir de'i dbang gis[30] dpe yang mngon no||

de la 'dir re zhig sa'i dbang du byas te sbyor ba'i tshig bya'o|| 'dus pa tsam nyid kyang[31] don dam par mi ston pa'i phyir ro|| 'dir bstan bcos mdzad pas 'dus pa tsam nyid bstan pas| rdzas su yod pa nyid dgag pa kho na bstan te| de dgag pa ni don che ba'i phyir ro|| ji ltar de don che ba nyid yin zhe na| 'di ltar tha snyad du brten nas 'dogs par byed pa gang yin pa de ni| don dam par rdzas su yod pa ma yin pa'i phyir skye ba med pas ngo

bo nyid med pa nyid grub pa'i phyir ro||[32]

'phags pa lang kar gshegs pa'i mdo las|
gang phyir 'dus pa ma gtogs par||
blo yis dngos po gzung du med||
de phyir stong dang ma skyes dang||
rang bzhin med par nga[33] smra'o||
[Laṅkāvatāra 3-88]

'di la rkyen {P102b} gyis cung zad kyang||
skye ba dang ni 'gag pa med||
skye ba dang ni 'gag[34] pa yang||
rkyen rnams kho na 'ba' zhig go||[35]
[Laṅkāvatāra 2-138 = 10-85]

zhes bya ba la sogs pa ji skad gsung ba lta bu'o||

'dir sbyor ba'i tshig ni don dam par sa ni rdzas su yod pa ma yin par shes par bya ste| de'i rgyu mi snang na de mi snang ba'i phyir ro|| gang rgyu mi snang na de mi snang ba de ni don dam par rdzas su yod pa ma yin te| dper na dmag la sogs {N90a} pa bzhin no|| de bzhin du[36] blo dang sgra'i phyogs la yang ci rigs par brjod par bya'o||

yang na gzugs kyi rgyu sa la sogs pa de dag ma gtogs {D85a} par de dag las {C85a} gzhan pa'i gzugs dmigs su med de| rang gi rgyu ma bzung na de gzung[37] du med pa ni gzugs kyi chos yin no|| 'dir sbyor ba'i tshig ni[38] don dam par gzugs ni rang gi tshogs pa'i yan lag dag las gzhan ma yin te| de ma bzung na de'i blo med pa'i phyir|

dper na sa la sogs pa'i rang gi bdag nyid bzhin no||
'dir bya ba las[39] la gnas pa yin par bsams[40] pas ma bzung ba blo'i chos yin pa'i phyir| gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid ma yin no||

grangs can dag na re[41]| gzugs la sogs pa dag las sa la sogs pa dag gzhan ma yin pas| de ni grub pa la sgrub pa yin no[42] zhes zer ro||

de[43] ni bzang po ma yin te| gzhan nyid dgag pas gzhan ma yin pa nyid du ston par mi byed pa'i phyir dang| pha rol po 'dod pa'i gzhan ma yin pa nyid kyang khas ma blangs pa'i phyir ro||

bye[44] brag pa dag gtan tshigs ma nges pa nyid du rgol bar byed de| mar me ma bzung yang de las gzhan pa yod na bum[45] pa la de'i blo yod pa'i phyir ro[46] zhe na| de yang bzang po ma yin te| de'i blo med pa kho na'i phyir ro zhes nges par bzung ba'i phyir dang| mar me med kyang nor bu dang| 'od zer dang| {P103a} sman dang|[47] zla ba dang| nyi[48] ma'i snang ba yod na de'i blo yod pas| mi[49] mthun pa'i phyogs la sgrub[50] pa'i chos med pa'i phyir ma nges pa nyid ma yin no|| rang gi tshogs pa'i yan lag dag las gzhan ma yin te zhes[51] dam bcas pa khyad par can nye bar bzung ba'i phyir mar me ni bum pa'i rang gi tshogs pa'i[52] yan lag ma yin no||

'og nas|[53]

gang yang gang dang lhan cig tu||[54]

gzhan nyid du mi 'thad do||[55] [MMK 14-4cd]

zhes ston pas mi mthun pa'i[56] phyogs med pa'i phyir| don dam par mar me las bum pa gzhan nyid du ma grub pa'i phyir yang ma nges pa nyid ma yin no||

{N90b} gal te dmag la sogs pa yan lag can gyi rdzas dag la| rtsom pa yod pa'i phyir sa la sogs pa dag rdzas su yod pa nyid ma yin par rab tu sgrub pa'i rjes su dpag pa dag gi[57] dpe ma grub po zhe na| dmag gi yan lag dag ni dmag ces bya ba yan lag can gyi[58] rdzas rtsom par byed pa ma yin te| yan lag yin pa'i phyir| dper na| shing gi yan lag rtsa ba dang| sdong po dang| yal ga dang| yal ga phra mo la {D85b} sogs pa dag bzhin {C85b} no|| yang na glang po che dag la yongs su rdzogs pa de'i yan lag gang yin pa de ni shing rta dang rta la sogs pa dag rtsom par byed[59] pa ma yin te| de la med pa'i phyir dper na rgyu spun la sogs pa bzhin pas dpe med pa ma yin no||

de bzhin du|

gzugs zhes bya ba ma gtogs par||[60]

gzugs kyi rgyu yang mi snang ngo||[61] [MMK 4-1cd]

zhes bya ba 'di la yang snga ma bzhin du bsgrub par bya ba dang| sgrub pa'i chos dag nye bar sbyar nas| rjes su dpag pa rgyas par brjod par bya'o||

ji ltar gzugs la sogs pa dag las gzhan ma yin pa de bzhin du| sa la sogs pa dag gzugs las gzhan ma yin pa yang ma yin te| 'og nas {P103b} gzhan ma yin pa nyid kyang 'gog pa'i phyir dang| gzhan ma yin pa nyid kyis[62] 'o ma yang zho nyid du 'gyur ba'am[63]| zho yang 'o ma nyid

du 'gyur na mi rung ba'i phyir ro|| de'i phyir|

gcig pa nyid dang gzhan nyid du||[64]
ji ltar byis pas rnam brtags ltar||
dngos po gzhan pa ma yin dang||
tshogs las gzhan pa'ang gang na'ang med||[65]
[Laṅkāvatāra 3-102 = 10-598]

ces gsungs pa de grub pa yin no[66]||

de'i phyir de ltar skye mched rnams rab tu bsgrub pa'i phyir gtan tshigs phung pos bsdus pa'i phyir ro[67] zhes smras pa'i don[68] ma grub pa nyid dam| don 'gal ba nyid yin no||

gzugs kyi rgyu ma gtogs par yang gzugs yod do zhes[69] shes par byar mi nus te| 'on kyang rnam par rtog na|

gzugs kyi rgyu ni ma gtogs par||
gzugs na gzugs ni rgyu med par||
thal bar 'gyur te|[70] [MMK 4-2ab,cl]

gzugs kyi rgyu zhes bya ba ni gzugs kyi yod pa nyid kyi rgyu ste| bar gyi tshig mi mngon pa'i phyir me'i[71] rgyu bzhin no|| {N91a} de ma gtogs par zhes bya ba ni gzugs kyi rgyu ma gtogs par te[72]| gzugs yod pa nyid du ston pa'i rgyu med par zhes bya bar dgongs so|| gzugs na zhes bya ba ni dam bcas pa tsam las rnam pa de lta bu de 'dod na'o|| gzugs ni rgyu med par thal bar 'gyur te zhes bya ba ni 'thad pa med par zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go|[73]

de yang mi 'dod pas ji skad smras pa'i skyon ldog pa med do||

rgyu med par smra-ba[74] gang dag dngos po thams cad rgyu med pa kho na las skye bar khas blangs pa'i phyir| gzugs 'grub pa yang de dag dang 'dra'o[75] zhes zer na| de la bshad pa| {DC86a} gal te 'ga' zhig ji skad smras pa'i rnam pa lta bur gyur na ni de yang rung ba zhig na|

don gang yang|[76]
rgyu med[77] pa ni gang na'ang med||[78] [MMK 4-2c2,d]

des na[79] dpe med pa'i phyir smra ba de la yang grub pa med do|| kho bos dang po nyid du yang rgyu {P104a} med par smra ba dag bsal zin pas de ni don med pa[80] yin no||

gang dag grangs can dag gi tshul la mkhas su re bas| 'di skad ces khyod kyis sa la sogs pa dag gzugs la sogs pa dag las gzhan ma yin no zhes smras pas| de dag gzhan ma yin pa nyid du khas blangs pa yin pas des na don dam par sa la sogs pa dag rdzas su yod par shes par byar nus te| gzugs la sogs pa dag las gzhan nyid ma yin pa'i phyir| dper na gzugs la sogs pa'i rang gi bdag nyid bzhin no[81] zhes zer na|[82] ji skad bstan pa'i tshul gyis gzhan ma yin pa nyid ma grub pa'i phyir gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid yin no|| dpe yang med de| gzugs la sogs pa'i rang gi bdag nyid bsal ba'i phyir ro||

gzhan dag na re| don dam par sa la sogs pa dag yod pa kho na yin te| de dag gi 'bras bu yod pa'i phyir ro|| 'di na gang med pa de la ni 'bras bu gzung du med de| dper na nam mkha'i me tog bzhin no|| sa la sogs pa dag la ni 'bras bu gzugs la sogs pa dag yod pas de'i phyir sa la sogs pa dag yod {N91b} pa kho na yin no[83] zhes zer ro||

'dir bshad pa|

gal te gzugs ni ma gtogs par||
gzugs kyi rgyu zhig yod na ni||
'bras bu med pa'i rgyur 'gyur te||
'bras bu med pa'i rgyu med do|| [MMK 4-3]

kho bo'i phyogs la gal te gzugs ma[84] gtogs par gzugs kyi rgyu sa la sogs pa[85] zhig yod na ni des na 'bras bu med pa'i[86] rgyur 'gyur te| 'bras bu gzugs la sogs pa'i mtshan nyid kyis[87] 'bras bu med pa'i rgyur 'gyur ba'i phyir ro|| gzhan yin pa'i phyir[88] rtsi rkyang[89] la sogs pa bzhin no|| 'bras bu med pa'i rgyu med do zhes bya ba ni| de yang gzugs la sogs pa 'dus pa'i {P104b} bdag nyid yin pa'i phyir ro[90] zhes bya bar dgongs so|| de'i phyir rgyu bzhin du 'bras bu yang ma grub pa'i phyir de dag gi 'bras bu yod pa'i phyir ro[91] zhes sngar smras pa'i[92] gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid kyi skyon yod do|| spyir grags pa'i gtan tshigs nyid du {C86b} brjod na ni don

{D86b} ´gal ba nyid yin no||

sun dbyung ba´i lan[93] gzhan yang yod de| ´di la gzugs kyi rgyu zhig brtags na gzugs yod pa´am[94]| med pa la brtag[95] grang na| gnyi ga la yang mi ´thad par bshad pa|

gzugs yod na yang gzugs kyi ni||
rgyu yang ´thad par mi ´gyur nyid|| [MMK 4-4ab]

yod pa´i phyir dper na bum pa dang snam bu yod pa bzhin no|| ci ste med na yang|

gzugs med na yang gzugs kyi ni||
rgyu yang ´thad par mi ´gyur nyid|| [MMK 4-4cd]

sa la sogs pa ´dod pa ste|[96] skye ba´i sngon rol na med pa´i phyir de las gzhan pa bzhin no zhes bya bar dgongs so|| ´dir skye ba med pa´i rab tu byed par bstan pa´i sun dbyung ba rjes[97] su bzlas pas| sun dbyung ba brjod par rig par bya´o||

rgyu med par smra ba dag rgyu med pa kho na´o zhes zer bas[98] de dag gi phyir bshad pa|

rgyu med pa yi[99] gzugs dag ni||[100]
´thad par mi rung rung ma yin|| [MMK 4-5ab]

kun rdzob tu yang de khas ma blangs pa´i phyir ro[101] zhes

bya bar dgongs so||

yang na bye brag tu smra ba dag ma 'ongs pa'i gzugs kyang yod do zhes zer bas de dag gi phyir bshad pa|

rgyu med pa yi gzugs {N92a} dag ni||
'thad par mi rung rung ma yin|| [MMK 4-5ab]

ma 'ongs pa skye ba'i rgyu ma blangs[102] pa bdag[103] nyid kyi dngos po ma thob pa ni tha snyad du yang yod par mi 'grub pa'i phyir ro zhes bya bar dgongs so||

gang gi phyir de ltar 'byung ba dang| 'byung ba las gyur pa'i bdag nyid kyi gzugs {P105a} rnam pa thams cad du mi 'thad pa|

de[104] phyir gzugs kyi rnam par rtog|
'ga' yang rnam par brtag mi bya|| [MMK 4-5cd]

mkhas pa chos kyi de kho na rnam par rtog pa dang| legs par bral bar[105] rtogs[106] par 'dod pa yang dag pa'i shes pa'i mig yang dag par bye[107] bas gzugs rdzas su yod pa dang| rgyu las gzhan pa dang| rgyu las gzhan pa ma yin pa dang| de dag la sogs pa kha dog dang| dbyibs kyi dbye ba la sogs pa yul gyi rnam par rtog pa mang po bu ma btsas[108] pa'i rmi lam na bu'i gzugs dang spyod pa la sogs pa'i yul dag mthong nas sad pa lta bu dag la rnam par brtag par mi bya'o||

de'i phyir de ltar gzugs kyi rgyu mi 'thad pa'i phyir ji skad smras pa'i skyon dang ma bral lo||

dbu[109] ma'i rtsa ba'i 'grel pa shes rab sgron ma||
||bam po[110] lnga pa||[111]

yang gzhan yang 'di na rgyu'i yon tan snga na yod pa'i {D87a} rim gyis 'bras bu la yang yon tan mthong ba'i mtshan nyid kyis|[112] gang dag {C87a} 'bras bu rgyu dang 'dra'o zhes zer ba de dag gi phyir bshad pa|

'bras bu rgyu dang 'dra ba zhes||
bya ba 'thad pa ma yin te|| [MMK 4-6ab]

'bras bu rgyu dang 'dra bar bstan pa 'thad pa ma yin te| rgyu de[113] 'bras bu ma yin pa nyid do[114] zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go|[115] 'dir ni bsgrub par bya ba chos smra bar 'dod pa'i rgyu| rgyu ma yin pa nyid dang| sgrub pa'i chos 'dra bar bstan pa nye bar bzhag go|[116] dpe ni de'i dbang gis te| rgyud tha dad pa'i rdzas yin pa bzhin no|| 'dir sbyor ba'i tshig ni don dam par smra bar 'dod pa'i rgyu[117] rgyu spun sngon po[118] ni la ba sngon po'i rgyu ma yin te| 'dra[119] ba'i phyir dper na de[120] las gzhan pa'i la ba sngon po bzhin no||

'dir grangs can pa dag na re de las gzhan pa'i la ba {N92b} sngon po la yang smra bar 'dod pa'i la ba sngon po'i rgyu med[121] par {P105b} ma grub pa'i phyir dpe med do zhes zer ro||

de ni bzang po ma yin te| da ltar de 'byung ba'i rgyu'i[122] dngos po ma yin par[123] grub pa nyid dpe nyid du

'dod pa'i phyir dang| dgag pa 'di ni sgra gang dang lhan cig sbyor bar byed pa de'i brjod par bya ba don dgag pa kho nas mthu nye[124] bar zad pa yin te[125]| de ni[126] de'i khyad par mi ston pa'i phyir| bram ze[127] ma yin no[128] zhes bya ba bzhin pas skyon med do||

rang gi sde pa dag ni 'bras bu rgyu dang 'dra ba dang mi 'dra bar yang smra bas skad cig ma snga ma mtshan nyid 'dra ba las skad cig ma phyi ma skye ba la ltos nas[129]| dper na mar me dang chu'i rgyun la sogs pa dag la ni[130] rgyu'i skad cig ma dang 'dra ba'i phyir| 'dra ba yin no|| skad cig ma snga ma mtshan nyid mi 'dra ba las skad cig ma phyi ma skye ba[131] la ltos nas| dper na shing dang 'o ma[132] la sogs pa'i thal ba dang| zho la sogs pa dang[133] ni rgyu'i skad cig ma dang mi 'dra ba'i phyir mi 'dra ba yin no[134] zhe na| de la 'bras bu rgyu dang 'dra ba gang yin pa de ni rjes su dpag pa ji skad bstan pa nyid kyis bkag zin to|| 'bras bu rgyu dang mi 'dra ba gang yin pa de'i dbang du byas te bshad pa|[135]

> 'bras bu rgyu dang mi 'dra zhes||[136]
> bya ba'ang[137] 'thad pa ma yin no|| [MMK 4-6cd]

'dir yang bsgrub par bya ba'i chos myu gu smra bar 'dod pa'i rgyu'i 'bras bu ma yin pa nyid dang| sgrub pa'i chos mi 'dra bar bstan pa nye bar bzhag go|[138] des na yan lag lhag {D87b} ma yang snga ma bzhin du mngon no||

'dir {C87b} rjes su dpag pa ni don dam par myu gu ni smra bar 'dod pa'i rgyu'i 'bras bu ma yin te| mi 'dra ba'i phyir dper na gyo mo la sogs pa bzhin no||

ci ste yang 'bru ni myu gu'i rgyu kho na yin te| de yod na 'byung ba'i phyir ram| des tha snyad 'dogs pa'i phyir dper na rnga bo che'i sgra 'am nas kyi myu gu bzhin no[139] zhe na| de ni bzang po ma yin te| skye ba {P106a} can rnams kyi skye ba rnam pa[140] thams cad du bkag pas dpe ma grub pa'i phyir sgrub pa ma tshang ba'i skyon yod do||

gang dag 'di skad ces {N93a} mig la sogs pa'i 'bras bu ni mig gi rnam par shes pa la sogs pa mi 'dra ba yin pa'i phyir[141] mi 'dra ba zhes bya ba'i gtan tshigs ma nges pa nyid do[142] zhes zer na| de yang bzang po ma yin te| mig gi rnam par shes pa la sogs pa yang bsgrub par bya ba dang| rigs mthun pa nyid kyis de bzhin du dgag par bya ba yin pa'i phyir mi mthun pa'i phyogs med pas ma nges pa nyid kyi skabs med do|

yang na smra bar 'dod pa sa la sogs pa dag rgyu ma yin pas gzugs ma grub pa'i phyir de dag gi 'bras bu yod pa'i phyir ro[143] zhes bya ba'i gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid dam| don 'gal ba nyid yin no zhes ji skad bstan pa'i tshul dang 'dra'o||

bye brag tu smra ba dag na re| 'bras bu ni rgyu dang 'dra ba yang yin la| mi 'dra ba yang yin te| byed pa'i rgyus 'dus byas kyi byed pa'i rgyu ni thams cad yin par

khas blangs pa'i phyir dpe med do[144] zhes zer ro||

de ni bzang po ma yin te| rigs mthun pa bskyed pa'i rgyu thun mong ma yin pa la sogs pa'i khyad par can gyi sgrub par byed pa nyid 'gog par 'dod pa'i phyir ro||

de ltar na gzhung gi tshogs des 'byung ba'i gzugs dang| rgyur byas pa'i gzugs bkag pas gzugs kyi phung po mi srid par bstan to|| da ni gzugs bkag pa bzhin du[145] tshor ba la sogs pa dag dgag pa yang rim pa mtshungs par bstan par bya ste|

tshor dang 'du shes[146] 'du byed dang||[147]
sems dang dngos po thams cad kyang||
rnam pa dag ni thams cad du||
gzugs nyid kyis ni rim pa mtshungs|| [MMK 4-7]

gzugs dgag pa bzhin du tshor ba la sogs pa dag dgag pa yang rim pa mtshungs pa'i {P106b} phyir ro[148] zhes bya bar dgongs so|| ji ltar don dam par gzugs rdzas su yod pa ma yin te| rang gi rgyu ma {D88a} bzung {C88a} na de'i blo med pa'i phyir| dper na[149] dmag la sogs pa bzhin no[150] zhes bstan pa de bzhin du don dam par[151] tshor ba dang| 'du shes dang| 'du byed rnams dang| rnam par shes pa dag kyang {N93b} rdzas su yod pa ma yin te| rang gi rgyu ma bzung na de'i blo med pa'i phyir| dper na[152] dmag la sogs pa bzhin no[153] zhes rgyas par khong du chud par bya'o||

tshor ba la sogs pa dag gi rgyu ni[154] reg pa dang| mig dang| gzugs dang| snang ba dang| nam mkha' dang| yid la byed pa la sogs pa dag[155] yin par ci rigs par brjod par bya'o||

ji ltar don dam par gzugs ni rang gi tshogs pa'i yan lag dag las gzhan ma yin te| de ma bzung na de'i blo med pa'i phyir| dper na sa la sogs pa'i rang gi[156] bdag nyid bzhin no[157] zhes bya bas don dam par gzugs rang gi rgyu dag las gzhan ma yin par bstan pa de bzhin du 'dir yang don dam par tshor ba la sogs pa dag rang gi rgyu dag las gzhan ma yin par brjod par bya'o|| 'dir sun 'byin pa dang| sun 'byin pa'i lan dag kyang snga ma bzhin no||

dngos po thams cad kyang zhes bya ba ni phung po las gzhan pa 'dus byas kyi chos med mod kyi| de dag gi bye brag dag dgag pa brjod par bzhed pas nye bar bzhag ste| yongs su brtags pa'i bum pa dang| snam bu la sogs pa dag rdzas su yod pa nyid dang| gzhan pa nyid dgag pa'i phyir ro|| 'dir yang snga ma bzhin du sbyor ba'i tshig dag ci rigs par brjod par bya'o||

de ltar phung po rnams ma grub pa'i phyir phung pos bsdus pa zhes bya ba'i gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid dang|[158] dpe med do|| {P107a} ji ltar zhe na| 'di lta ste| gzugs la sogs pa'i phung pos bsdus pa dag don dam par yod do[159] zhes bya bar med pa'i phyir ro||

yang na gtan tshigs kyi don 'gal ba nyid kyang yin te| phung pos bsdus pa ni tha snyad kho nar yod pa yin

pa'i phyir ro||

de ltar rigs pa des na|

stong pa nyid kyis brtsad byas tshe||
gang zhig lan 'debs smra byed pa||
de yi thams cad lan btab min||
bsgrub par bya dang mtshungs par 'gyur|| [MMK 4-8]

de kho na brtag pa'i mtshan nyid la dngos po 'ga' zhig gi don dam pa'i[160] ngo bo nyid brtag pa brtsam pa na stong pa pa nyid kyis don dam par skye mched {D88b} rnams skye ba med pa dang| {N94a} rdzas su yod pa ma yin par tshad ma yongs su bzung ste| brtsad {C88b} cing 'gyed pa byas pa'i tshe[161]| gang zhig rtog ge phyi ma nye bar bzhag pas lan 'debs shing smra bar byed pa de'i de dag thams cad ni lan btab pa ma yin te| bsgrub par bya ba dang mtshungs par 'gyur ba'i phyir ro|| de ston pa'i gtan tshigs dang| dpe de dag bsgrub par bya ba dang mtshungs par ma grub pa'i phyir| rtog ge phyi ma mi 'grub po zhes bya bar dgongs so||

de bzhin du|

stong pa nyid kyis bshad byas tshe||
gang zhig skyon 'dogs[162] smra byed pa||
de yi thams cad skyon btags[163] min||
bsgrub par bya dang mtshungs par 'gyur|| [MMK 4-9]

phung po dang| khams dang| skye mched dag ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du bstan pa na stong pa nyid kyis[164] sbyor ba rnam par dbye ba byas te| rnam par bshad pa'i tshe gang zhig tshad ma log pas blo gros bslad pa nyid kyis phung po la sogs pa dag yod pa kho na yin te[165]| bden pa la sogs pas bsdus pa'i phyir ro[166] zhes bya ba la sogs pas skyon 'dogs shing smra bar byed pa de'i {P107b} de dag thams cad kyang skyon btags[167] shing sun 'byin pa ma yin te| bsgrub par bya ba dang mtshungs par 'gyur ba'i phyir ro[168] zhes bya ba'i tshig gi lhag ma'o|| ji ltar[169] zhes na| sun dbyung ba dang 'dra ba'i phyir| bsgrub par bya ba ma grub pa nyid dang spyir mtshungs te|

dngos po gcig la gang lta ba||[170]
de ni kun la'ang lta bar 'dod||
gcig gi stong nyid gang yin pa||
de nyid[171] kun gyi stong pa nyid||

[<u>Catuḥśataka</u> 8-16]

ces gsungs so||[172]

de la 'dir rab tu byed pa'i don ni skyed mched rnams yod par ston pa nye bar bzhag pa'i sgrub pa'i skyon brjod pas| phung po rnams ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du bstan pa yin no||

de'i phyir rab kyi rtsal gyis rnam par gnon pa phung po lnga po dag gi mngon par 'grub par gtogs pa ston pa gang yin pa de ni| shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa ma

yin no|| rab kyi rtsal gyis rnam par gnon pa gzugs ngo bo nyid dang bral ba ni gzugs so|| de bzhin du tshor ba dang| 'du shes dang| {N94b} 'du byed rnams dang| rnam par shes pa ngo bo nyid dang bral ba ni rnam par shes pa'o|| gzugs dang| tshor ba dang| 'du shes dang| 'du byed rnams dang| rnam par shes pa dag gi ngo bo nyid dang bral ba gang yin pa de ni {D89a} shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'o|| rab kyi rtsal gyis rnam par gnon pa gzugs ngo bo nyid med pa {C89a} ni gzugs so|| de bzhin du tshor ba dang| 'du shes dang| 'du byed rnams dang| rnam par shes pa ngo bo nyid med pa ni rnam par shes pa'o|| gzugs dang| tshor ba dang| 'du shes dang| 'du byed rnams dang| rnam par shes pa dag gi ngo bo nyid med pa gang yin pa de ni shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'o[173] zhes bya ba dang| de bzhin du|

> ngas ni 'jig rten phung po bstan||
> de la 'jig rten gnas par gyur||
> mkhas pa de[174] la mi gnas pa||
> 'jig {P108a} rten chos kyis mi gos so||
> 'jig rten nam mkha'i mtshan nyid de||
> nam mkha' la yang mtshan nyid med||
> de phyir de yis de rtogs pas[175]||
> 'jig rten chos kyis mi gos so||

zhes bya ba dang| de bzhin du byang chub sems dpas| gzugs dang| sgra dang| dri dang| ro dang| reg bya dang| chos la gnas te sbyin pa sbyin[176] par mi bya'o[177] zhes bya ba

dang| de bzhin du|

srid pa gsum ni btags[178] pa tsam||

ngo bo nyid kyis dngos po med||

btags[179] pa dngos po'i rang bzhin du||

ngan rtog rnams ni rtog par byed||

[Laṅkāvatāra 3-52 = 10-83]

blo yis[180] rnam par brtag byas na||

ngo bo nyid ni gzung[181] du med||

de phyir de dag brjod med dang||

ngo bo nyid ni med par bstan||

[Laṅkāvatāra 2-173 = 10-167]

zhes bya ba la sogs pa gsungs pa de dag grub pa yin no||

slob dpon legs ldan byed kyis nye bar sbyar ba| dbu ma'i rtsa ba'i 'grel pa shes rab sgron ma las phung po brtag pa zhes bya ba ste| rab tu byed pa bzhi pa'o||

Notes to Tibetan Text of <u>Prajñāpradīpa</u>, Chapter Four

[1]C: khyod.

[2]N:dgags.

[3]P: |.

[4]PN: myang.

[5]C: mod.

[6]PN <u>omm</u>. |.

[7]PN <u>add</u> ||.

[8]PN: pa.

[9]DC: ||.

[10]DC: kyis; N: da ltar na ´das gzugs kya <u>for</u> de ltar na ´dis gzugs kyi.

[11]DC: ba.

[12]PN <u>omm</u>. sa.

[13]DC: bsgrub.

[14]PN: gzung.

[15]C: rjes.

[16]PN <u>add</u> |.

[17]PN: par.

[18]PNDC <u>omm</u>. de; Ava P44a-5, D38a-3: de.

[19]N: rgyus <u>for</u> rgyu sa.

[20]P: gzung.

[21]DC <u>add</u> kyi.

[22]C <u>om</u>. |.

[23]PN <u>add</u> ma.

[24]P: ´jigs.

[25]P: ta.

[26]P: ´jigs.

[27]PD: ta.

[28]PN omm. sa.

[29]PNC: nas for na sa.

[30]PN: gi.

[31]DC add |.

[32]PN: te|.

[33]D: ngas?

[34]P: dgag.

[35]PN omm. ||.

[36]DC add |.

[37]P: bzung.

[38]P om. ni.

[39]PNDC omm. las; Ava P47b-7, D41b-1: las.

[40]PN: bsam.

[41]N: ra.

[42]N ad. ||.

[43]N: da.

[44]N: pe.

[45]D: bam.

[46]PN add ||.

[47]DC omm. |.

[48]N: nya.

[49]DC: de´i mi for mi.

[50]PNDC: bsgrub; Ava P49a-1, D42b-2: sgrub.

[51]PN: te| des for te zhes.

[52]N: chags pa'a for tshogs pa'i.

[53]PNDC omm. |; Ava P49b-6, D43a-5: |.

[54]PNDC omm. ||; Ava P49b-6, D43a-6: ||.

[55]DC omm ||.

[56]PN omm. pa'i.

[57]DC: gis.

[58]P: gyis.

[59]N: byad.

[60]PN: |.

[61]PN omm. ||.

[62]PN: kyi.

[63]PN: ba 'am.

[64]P: |.

[65]PN omm. ||.

[66]N: na.

[67]PN add ||.

[68]PN omm. don.

[69]P: ces.

[70]PN omm. |.

[71]C: ma'i.

[72]P: ste.

[73]DC: ||.

[74]DC omm. smra ba.

[75]PN add ||.

[76]PN omm. |.

[77]N: mad.

[78]PN: |.

[79]DC: de yang for des na.

[80]DC: bden pa ma for don med pa.

[81]PN add ||.

[82]DC omm. |.

[83]PN add ||.

[84]N: mi.

[85]P: ma.

[86]N: pa'a.

[87]PN: kyi.

[88]PN add |.

[89]PNDC: skyang; Ava P55a-3, D48a-4: rkyang.

[90]PN add ||.

[91]PN add ||.

[92]P: ma smra ba'i, N: smra ba'i for smras pa'i.

[93]PN: lam; DC: len; Ava P55b-6, D48b-5: lan.

[94]PN(C?): pa 'am for pa'am.

[95]PN: brtags.

[96]PNDC: ||.

[97]P: rjas.

[98]DC: ba.

[99]C: yid.

[100]P: |.

[101]PN add ||; C ad. |.

102 P: blang sa *for* blangs.

103 PN *omm*. bdag; DC: dag; Ava P56b-2, D49b-2: bdag.

104 PN: de'i.

105 NC: par.

106 P: rtog; N: rtag.

107 N: bya.

108 PD: ptsas.

109 DC: ||dbu.

110 N: pa.

111 DC: ma| bam po lnga pa| *for* ma|| ||bam po lnga pa||.

112 DC *omm*. |.

113 N: da.

114 PN *add* ||.

115 DC: ||.

116 DC: ||.

117 D *ad*. |; C *ad*. ||.

118 PN *omm*. sngon po.

119 P: 'ang.

120 N: da.

121 P: mad.

122 PNDC: rgyu ni *for* rgyu'i; Ava P58b-4, D51b-1: rgyu'i.

123 N: par.

124 N: nya.

125 N: ta.

126 DC: na.

127 N: za.

128 PN add ||.

129 PN: las.

130 PN add |.

131 PNDC: skyed pa for skye ba; Ava P59a-6, D52a-2: skye ba.

132 DC add dang de.

133 DC add la.

134 PN add ||.

135 PN omm. |.

136 PN omm. ||.

137 NDC: ba 'ang for ba'ang.

138 DC: ||.

139 PN add ||.

140 PN omm. rnam pa.

141 PN omm. mi 'dra ba yin pa'i phyir.

142 PN: yin no|| for nyid do.

143 PN add ||.

144 PN add ||.

145 PN: tu.

146 C ad. dang.

147 P: |.

148 PN add ||.

149 P ad. |.

150 PN add ||.

[151] DC *add* |.

[152] PN *add* |.

[153] PN *add* ||.

[154] DC *add* |.

[155] PN *omm*. dag.

[156] PN *omm*. rang gi.

[157] P N *add* ||.

[158] PN: do||.

[159] PN *add* ||.

[160] PN: par.

[161] N: che.

[162] PN: 'dog.

[163] DC: brtags.

[164] PN: kyi.

[165] N: ta.

[166] PN *add* ||.

[167] DC: brtags.

[168] PN *add* ||.

[169] DC: lta.

[170] P: |.

[171] C: ni.

[172] PN *omm*. ces gsungs so||.

[173] PN *add* ||.

[174] N: da.

[175] PN: de'i phyir de'i de rtogs pas, DC: de phyir de yi de brtags pas *for* de phyir de yis de rtogs pas; Ava

P69a-3, D61a-1: de phyir de yis de rtogs pas.

[176]PN: byin.

[177]PN add ||.

[178]DC: brtags.

[179]DC: brtags.

[180]PN: yi.

[181]P: bzung.

Tibetan Text of <u>Prajñāpradīpa</u>, Chapter Five

{P108a-5, N94b-7, DC89a-5} da[1] ni stong pa nyid kyi mi mthun pa'i phyogs kyi khyad par dgag pas khams rnams ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du bstan pa'i don gyi dbang gis rab tu byed pa lnga pa brtsam mo||

rab tu byed pa bstan ma thag tu|[2]

gzugs zhes bya ba ma {N95a} gtogs par||

gzugs kyi rgyu yang mi snang ngo|| [MMK 4-1cd]

zhes bshad pa'i phyir re zhig rang gi sde pa dag na re| 'di la[3] bcom ldan 'das kyis[4] rgyal po chen po khams drug po 'di dag ni skyes bu'o zhes gsungs pas khams drug po|[5] sa dang| chu dang| me dang| rlung dang| nam mkha' dang| rnam par shes pa zhes bya ba dag gi mtshan nyid sra ba dang| gsher pa dang| tsha ba dang|[6] gyo ba dang| skabs 'byed pa dang| rnam par shes par byed pa {D89b} dag bstan to|| nam mkha'i me tog la sogs pa lta bu med pa dag ni skyes {C89b} bu'i rgyu nyid {P108b} du ma bstan pas de'i phyir| slob dpon gyis sa la sogs pa dag la yang gzugs kyi rgyu med do zhes dam bca' ba[7] byas pa de ni khas blangs pa la gnod par 'gyur ro||

gal te de bzhin gshegs pas tha snyad du khams drug po dag skyes bu'o zhes bstan par khas blangs pas nyes pa med do[8] zhe na| don dam par bstan par khas blangs pa'i phyir nyes pa med pa ma yin no|| gal te de ma grub pa'i phyir rigs pa ma yin no zhe na| ma grub pa ma yin te| don

dam par sa la sogs pa khams rnams yod pa kho na yin te| de dag gi mtshan nyid yod pa'i phyir ro|| 'di la bcom ldan 'das kyis[9] gang don dam par med do zhes gsungs pa de la ni mtshan nyid med de| dper na nam mkha'i me tog bzhin no|| sa la sogs pa dag la[10] ni sra ba nyid la sogs pa'i mtshan nyid dag yod pas de ltar de dag gi mtshan nyid yod pa'i phyir sa la sogs pa khams rnams yod pa kho na yin no[11] zhes zer ro||

de la 'dir nam mkha'i ngo bo nyid stong pa nyid kyis bstan sla ba'i phyir dang| de yod pa ma yin par bstan pas khams lhag ma rnams dgag pa yang sla ba'i phyir| slob dpon gyis nam mkha'i khams kho na'i dbang du mdzad de bshad pa|

> nam mkha'i mtshan nyid snga rol na||[12]
> nam mkha' cung zad yod ma yin||[13] [MMK 5-1ab]

{N95b} dbyer med pa'i phyir ro zhes bya bar dgongs so||

'di la bye[14] brag[15] tu smra ba dag nam mkha' ni mi sgrib pa kho nar[16] ston pas mi sgrib pa nyid nam mkha' yin la| de yang yod pa nyid du sgrub[17] pas mi sgrib pa yod pa nyid kyis bsgrub par bya ba dang[18] sgrub pa mi 'grub ste[19]| dper na sgra mi rtag ste| mi rtag pa'i phyir ro[20] zhes bya ba de bzhin du 'dir yang nam mkha' yod de| nam mkha' yin pa'i phyir ro zhes bya bar[21] smras par 'gyur ro||

yang na gang dag dbu ma'i {P109a} bstan bcos kyi tshul la sdang ba dag 'di skad ces gang[22] gi phyir| rim[23] mam cig[24] car de mi 'thad par 'gyur ba'i mtshan nyid kyi gzhi dang| mtshan nyid dag gzhan nyid yin par khas mi len te| skyes bu chen po'i mtshan rnams las skyes bu chen po gzhan yin par mi rigs pa bzhin no|| 'di la de mtshon[25] par bya ba yin pas mtshan nyid de| las la bya ba'i rkyen brjod pa'i phyir ro[26] {D90a} zhes smra'o {C90a} zhes zer ro||

de dag gi de ltar khas blangs pa nyid la yang|
nam mkha'i mtshan nyid snga rol na||
nam mkha' cung zad yod ma yin|| [MMK 5-1ab]

nam mkha' nyid mtshan nyid yin na de nyid kyis de bsgrub pa'i phyir nye bar sbyor bar byed pa ni gtan tshigs su mi rung ste| don ma grub pa'i phyir des na gang gis[27] ci zhig sgrub par 'gyur| ci ste yang tha snyad du yod pa'i nam mkha' ni mi sgrib pa nyid yin par grags so[28] zhe na| de bstan pa'i phyir gtan tshigs mi 'dod do|| don dam par ni ma grags pas de ltar bstan pa la rab tu 'bad[29] par bya'o[30] zhe na| de la yang gtan tshigs kyi skyon dang dpe'i skyon yod de| dam bcas pa tsam la gnas par zad do||

yang na bye brag tu smra ba dang| bye brag pa dag nam mkha' ni rdzas su yod pa dang| 'dus ma byas so zhes zer bas de dag gi phyir bshad pa|
nam mkha'i mtshan nyid snga rol na||
nam mkha' cung zad yod ma yin|| [MMK 5-1ab]

rdzas su gyur pa'o zhes dam bca' ba nye bar bzhag pa yin no|| de skye ba med par phyogs gnyi ga la grags pa ni chos yin no|| dpe ni de'i dbang gis te| ri bong gi rwa {N96a} la sogs pa dag yin no|| 'dir rjes su dpag pa ni| don dam par nam mkha' rdzas su yod pa ma yin te| skye ba med pa'i phyir dper na ri bong gi rwa bzhin no|| de bzhin du rgyu med pa'i phyir dang| 'bras bu med pa'i phyir dang| yod {P109b} pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro[31] zhes bya ba la sogs pa'i gtan tshigs dag kyang brjod par bya'o||

gang dag nam mkha' ni sgra'i mtshan nyid do[32] zhes zer ba de dag la yang| sgra nyid nam mkha' yin pas gtan tshigs kyi skyon snga ma bzhin no||

'dir kha cig na re gal te don 'di bstan bcos byed pa'i bsam pa yin par gyur na de lta na bstan bcos byed pas|[33]

nam mkha'i mtshan[34] las gzhan[35] gyur pa'i||[36]
nam mkha' cung zad yod[37] ma yin||[38]

zhes smras pa kho nar 'gyur ro zhes zer ro|| snga phyi mi srid par bstan pa kho nas gzhan nyid dgag pa 'grub pa'i phyir de ni mi gnod do||

bye brag pa dag ni[39] mtshan nyid kyi gzhi dang| mtshan nyid dag gzhan nyid du dam bca' bas[40] de dag gi gzhan nyid yin na lan 'ga' snga phyir yang 'gyur te| gzhan nyid yin pa'i phyir dper na {D90b} bum pa {C90b} dang| snam bu dag bzhin pas de'i phyir bshad pa|

gal te mtshan las snga gyur na||
mtshan nyid med par thal bar 'gyur|| [MMK 5-1cd]

mtshan nyid med pa ni mtshan nyid yod pa ma yin pa ste| de smra bar 'dod pa'i mtshan nyid kyi gzhi nyid du ma gyur par zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go|[41]

gal te mtshan las snga gyur na||[42] [MMK 5-1c] zhes bya ba 'dis[43] de'i chos dus tha dad pa nyid bstan to|| 'dir rjes su dpag pa ni nam mkha' ni smra bar 'dod pa'i mtshan nyid kyi[44] mtshan nyid kyi gzhi ma yin te| de bas dus snga na yod pa'i phyir dper na de las gzhan pa bzhin no||

yang na|[45]

mtshan nyid med par thal bar 'gyur||[46] [MMK 5-1d] zhes bya ba ni mtshan nyid la med pa ni mtshan nyid med pa ste| de la mtshan nyid kyi gzhi nyid med par zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go|[47]

gal te mtshan las snga gyur[48] na||[49] [MMK 5-1c] zhes bya ba ni nam mkha' zhes bya ba'i {N96b} skabs yin te| 'dis[50] ni de'i chos mtshan nyid kyi gzhi las mtshan nyid gzhan pa nyid bstan to|| 'dir rjes su dpag pa ni smra {P110a} bar 'dod[51] pa'i mtshan nyid kyis mtshan nyid kyi gzhi nam mkha' mtshon par[52] mi nus te| gzhan yin pa'i phyir dper na de las gzhan pa[53] bzhin no||

pha rol po'i ni rang gi rjes su dpag pa la gnod

de|[54] mtshan nyid kyi gzhi dang|[55] mtshan nyid dag la mtshan nyid med pa nyid du mi 'dod pas| gzhan nyid du rnam par rtog pa yang spang bar bya ba yin no||

ci ste yang dbyug pas ma bzlog pa'i phyir| kun rdzob pa'i gtan tshigs brjod na| gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid ma yin yang don 'gal ba nyid bzlog dka' bas| de'i phyir mtshan nyid don gzhan dang| don gzhan ma yin par gyur pa ma grub pa'i phyir| nam mkha' mtshan nyid med pa zhes bya bar gyur to[56] zhe na| de mtshan nyid med pa'i dngos po nyid yin par yang shes par byar[57] mi nus te| 'di ltar|[58]

mtshan nyid med pa'i dngos po ni||[59]
'ga' yang gang na'ang[60] yod ma yin||[61] [MMK 5-2ab]

don dam pa pa'i dngos po gzhan gyi phyogs dang| bdag cag gi phyogs gang na yang 'grub pa med do||

gang dag mtshan nyid kyi gzhi nam mkha' ni yod pa kho na yin te| de la[62] mtshan nyid 'jug pa'i phyir ro[63] zhes zer na| de yang rigs pa ma yin par nges par bzung ste|

mtshan nyid med pa'i dngos med na||
mtshan nyid gang du 'jug par 'gyur|| [MMK 5-2cd]

gzhi {D91a} med[64] pa'i {C91a} phyir[65] gzhi[66] bzhin du

gtan tshigs mi 'grub ste yul med pa la gtan tshigs 'jug pa mi 'grub pa'i phyir gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid kyi skyon du 'gyur ro||

yang na gzhan ma yin pa nyid kyi phyogs la ni|[67] mtshan nyid kyi gzhi dang|[68] mtshan nyid dag gzhan ma yin pa nyid yin na de nyid kyis de mtshon par byar mi rung ste| de las gzhan pa'i mtshan nyid med pa'i phyir| nam mkha' la mtshan nyid[69] med do|| gzhan[70] nyid {P110b} kyi phyogs la yang smra bar 'dod pa'i mtshan nyid ni mtshan nyid kyi gzhi'i mtshan nyid ma yin te| {N97a} gzhan yin pa'i phyir de las gzhan bzhin no|| mtshan nyid med pa'i phyir| des kyang nam mkha' la mtshan nyid med de| mtshan nyid med pa'i dngos po nam mkha' zhes bya ba med na mtshan nyid gang du 'jug par 'gyur te| de 'jug pa mi 'grub pa nyid do[71] zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go|[72]

gzhan yang mtshan nyid kyi gzhi la 'jug pa zhes bya ba'i gtan tshigs de'i don ni 'di la mtshan nyid 'di mtshan nyid kyi gzhi'i chos yod pa nyid la sogs pa med na mi 'byung ba des mtshan nyid kyi gzhi shes par 'gyur ba yin na| gang gi[73] tshe kho bo cag gi phyogs la|[74]

> mtshan nyid med la mtshan nyid ni||
> mi 'jug mtshan nyid bcas la min|| [MMK 5-3ab]

de'i tshe med pa la ni mtshan nyid mi 'grub pa'i phyir dang[75] mtshan nyid dang bcas pa'i dngos po yang mi 'grub

pa'i phyir ro[76] zhes bya bar dgongs so||

ji skad bstan pa'i rnam pa dang| mtshan nyid mi 'dra ba'i mtshan nyid kyi gzhi yang mi 'grub pa'i phyir|

mtshan bcas mtshan nyid med pa las||
gzhan la'ang 'jug par mi 'gyur ro|| [MMK 5-3cd]

de'i phyir de ltar don dam par dngos po 'gal ba la mtshan nyid 'jug par[77] ma grub pa'i phyir dang| dpe med pa'i phyir khyod kyi 'dod pa'i don ma grub po||[78]

yang na mtshan nyid med pa nam mkha'i me tog la sogs pa dag la mtshan nyid de med pa'i phyir mi 'jug pa de ni grags pa yin no||

da ni mtshan nyid bcas la min[79] [MMK 5-3b2] zhes bya ba mtshan nyid dang bcas pa la[80] mtshan nyid mi 'jug go[81] zhes bya ba'i skabs de ni dam bca' ba nye bar bzhag pa yin no|| de'i chos ni mtshan nyid gang gis mtshon[82] na mtshan nyid dang bcas pa zhes bya ba'i mtshan nyid[83] yin no|| dpe ni de'i dbang gis te| de {D91b} las gzhan {C91b} pa'i {P111a} mtshan nyid dag yin no|| 'dir rjes su dpag pa ni don dam par mi sgrib pa ni nam mkha'i mtshan nyid ma yin te[84]| mtshan nyid yin pa'i phyir dper na sra ba la sogs pa dag bzhin no||

rnam pa[85] gnyis su smra ba dag rnam {N97b} grangs las mtshan nyid dang bcas pa dang| mtshan nyid med pa la mtshan nyid 'jug pas nyes pa med do[86] zhe na| de dgag

pa'i phyir yang bshad pa|

mtshan bcas mtshan nyid med pa las||[87]

gzhan la'ang 'jug par mi 'gyur ro|| [MMK 5-3cd]

gnyi ga'i bdag nyid kyi dngos po mi srid pa'i phyir dang| ltos[88] pa'i nges pa yang me dang bud shing brtag pa'i rab tu byed pa las 'og nas 'gog par 'gyur ba'i phyir dang| phyogs gnyi gar bstan pa'i skyon gnyis[89] 'gyur du 'byung ba'i phyir| de yang rigs pa ma yin no||

gzhan dag ni|

mtshan nyid med la mtshan nyid ni||[90]

mi 'jug [MMK 5-3a,b1]

ces bya ba 'di la| de ltar gang gi phyir mtshan nyid med pa'i dngos po 'ga' yang yod pa ma yin pa de'i phyir mtshan nyid med pa'i dngos po med na gzhi med pa la mtshan nyid 'jug par mi 'thad do|| mtshan nyid bcas la min[91] [MMK 5-3b2] zhes[92] bya ba 'di la yang mtshan nyid dang bcas pa'i dngos po la yang mtshan nyid 'jug pa mi 'thad de| dgos pa med pa'i phyir ro[93] zhes zer ro||

de ni rigs pa ma yin te| mtshan nyid yod na de dang ldan pa la med pa nyid mi 'thad pa'i phyir dang| de bzhin[94] du mtshan nyid kyi gzhi yod pa'i phyir ro|| mtshan nyid dang bcas pa'i dngos po grub pa la yang pha rol po dran par bya ba'i phyir mtshan nyid kyi gzhi la mtshan nyid[95] 'jug pa 'gal ba med pa'i phyir des[96] mi nus so||

de'i phyir de ltar mtshan nyid kyi gzhi la mtshan

nyid[97] 'jug par[98] mi 'thad pas|

mtshan nyid 'jug pa ma yin na||[99]
mtshan gzhi 'thad par mi 'gyur ro|| [MMK 5-4ab]

zhes bstan pa'i don gyi {P111b} dbang gis mjug bsdus so||

'dir mkhas su re ba'i mngon pa'i nga rgyal can kha cig rang gi phyogs kyi skyon brjod pa brnag[100] par mi bzod pa na 'di skad ces nam mkha' yod pa yin te| mtshan nyid yod pa'i phyir ro zhes smra ba na| khyed kyis[101] mtshan nyid kyi gzhi dang mtshan nyid dag snga phyir sgro btags nas gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid du brjod pa ni dper na sgra mi rtag ste| byas pa'i phyir ro zhes smras {N98a} pa la| gal te sgra skyes {D92a} pa'i snga rol na|[102] {C92a} byas pa nyid yod na ni sgra la 'khrul[103] pa yod pa'i phyir gtan tshigs su mi[104] rung ngo|| 'on te sgra skyes pa'i sngon rol na byas pa nyid med de| phyis yod na ni gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid do[105] zhes zer ba de'i tshig de rigs[106] pa dang ldan pa ma yin te| ma grub pa ltar snang ba nyid du brjod pa'i phyir ro[107] zhes bya ba de bzhin du khyed kyis|[108]

nam mkha'i mtshan nyid snga rol na||[109]
nam mkha' cung zad yod ma yin||[110] [MMK 5-1ab]

zhes bya ba la sogs pas gtan tshigs ji skad smras pa sun 'byin par 'dod pas mtshan nyid yod pa 'gog par byed pa'i tshig de yang legs[111] par smras pa ma yin no[112] zhes zer

ro||

'dir bshad pa| mtshan nyid kyang de nyid dang| gzhan la sogs pa'i khyad par gyis[113] mtshan nyid kyi gzhi'i khongs su gtogs pa yin la| mtshan nyid kyi gzhi'i skye mched de dag gi don dam pa pa'i[114] yod pa nyid ni don dam par bstsal bas[115] de'i phyir mtshan nyid kyi gzhi mi 'thad na mtshan nyid kyang mi srid pas de dgag pa'i phyir ni 'bad pa mi rtsom mo|| 'di skad ces mtshan nyid kyi gzhi dang| mtshan nyid dag snga phyir sgro btags nas[116] zhes bya ba la sogs pa gang smras pa de la yang nyon cig dang| snga phyi[117] mi srid par bstan pa kho nas gzhan nyid dgag pa bstan pa'i phyir ma grub pa ltar snang ba nyid ma yin no||

ci ste gang la gzhan nyid yin yang med na mi 'byung ba'i[118] mtshan nyid kyis {P112a} 'brel pa de ni gtan tshigs yin pas des na gzhan yin pa'i phyir gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid du brjod pa yang ma grub pa ltar snang ba nyid yin no[119] zhe na| de ni bzang po ma yin te| don dam par gzhan nyid dang| med[120] na mi 'byung ba'i mtshan nyid kyis[121] 'brel pa ma grub pas de la mngon par zhen pa yang spang bar 'dod pa'i phyir ro|| sgrub pa de tha snyad kyi bden par gtogs pa'i dngos po bstan pa'i phyir| tha snyad dang rjes su mthun pa ni yin no|| {N98b} zhar la bshad pas chog go|[122]

'dir smras pa| don dam par nam mkha' yod pa kho na yin te| mtshan nyid yin pa'i phyir ro|| 'di na[123] gang

yang med pa de ni mtshan nyid yin par mi 'dod de| dper na nam mkha'i me tog bzhin no|| nam mkha' ni mtshan nyid yin te| rgyal po chen po khams drug po 'di dag ni skyes bu'o[124] zhes gsungs pas de'i phyir de ni yod pa kho na yin no||

{D92b} bshad pa| {C92b} mtshan nyid kyi gzhi mi 'thad do[125] zhes bstan zin pas de'i phyir|

mtshan gzhi 'thad pa ma yin na||[126]
mtshan nyid kyang ni yod ma yin||[127] [MMK 5-4cd]

mtshan nyid kyang mtshan nyid kyi gzhi'i khongs su gtogs pa'i phyir de bzhin du mi 'grub pa'i phyir dang| dpe yang med pa'i phyir ro[128] zhes bya bar dgongs so||

gang gi phyir de ltar shes rab kyis nye bar brtags na mtshan nyid kyi gzhi dang| mtshan nyid dag mi 'thad pa de'i[129] phyir bstan bcos mdzad pas|

de[130] phyir mtshan gzhi yod min te||[131]
mtshan nyid yod pa nyid ma yin||[132] [MMK 5-5ab]

zhes mjug bsdu ba mdzad de| de ston pa'i rjes su dpag pa med pa'i phyir dang| de med par ston pa'i rjes su dpag pa yod pa'i phyir ro[133] zhes bya bar dgongs so||

bye brag tu smra ba dag gis smras pa| nam mkha' ni dngos po yin te|[134] yul de la 'dun pa'i 'dod chags spong

ba'i phyir| dper na gzugs bzhin no|| {P112b} yang na snyoms par 'jug pa'i dmigs pa yin pa'i phyir dper na| rnam par shes pa la sogs pa bzhin no|| yang na 'dus ma byas yin pa'i phyir dper na mya ngan las 'das pa bzhin no||

'dir bshad pa| 'di la don dam par nam mkha' de dngos po nyid du 'dod na| mtshan nyid kyi gzhi'am[135]| mtshan nyid yin grang na| mtshan nyid kyi gzhi dang| mtshan nyid de dag ji ltar mi srid pa de ltar ni sngar bstan zin pas| des na gang gi phyir kho bo cag gi phyogs la|

mtshan gzhi mtshan nyid ma gtogs pa'i||
dngos po yang ni yod ma yin||[136] [MMK 5-5cd]

de'i phyir dpe ma {N99a} bstan par bsgrub[137] par bya ba 'grub pa med do|| mya ngan las 'das pa dang| gzhan gang yang rung ba dag kyang dngos po nyid du grub pa med pa'i phyir ro||

'dis ni sde pa gzhan dag gi sgrub[138] pa nam mkha' yod pa kho na yin te| gzugs yongs su chad pa'i phyir dang| 'dus ma byas yin pa'i phyir ro[139] zhes bya ba dag la yang skyon gyis lan btab pa yin te| gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid kyang brjod par bya'o||

mdo sde pa dag gis smras pa| nam mkha' dngos po nyid ni ma yin te| 'o na ci zhe na| kho bo cag la de ni thogs pa dang bcas pa'i rdzas kyi dngos po med pa tsam yin no||

snyoms par 'jug pa'i dmigs pa yin pa'i phyir zhes bya ba dang| yul de la 'dun pa'i 'dod {D93a} chags spong ba'i phyir zhes {C93a} bya ba des dngos po med[140] pa'i ngo bo nyid sel bar byed pa yin mod kyi| 'on kyang de dag nam mkha' la rtog par byed pa de dag dgag pa'i phyir| dgag pa ches gsal ba brjod par bzhed pa de nyid bshad pa|

gzugs kyi rgyu ni ma gtogs par||
gzugs ni dmigs par mi 'gyur ro|| [MMK 4-1ab]

zhes bya bas de bstan zin pas de'i phyir|[141]

dngos po yod pa ma yin na||
dngos med gang gi[142] yin par 'gyur|| [MMK 5-6ab]

thogs pa dang bcas pa'i {P113a} gzugs zhes bya ba'i dngos po yod pa ma yin na khyed kyis nam mkha' zhes bya bar btags[143] pa gang yin pa'i dngos po med pa de gang gi yin par 'gyur te| de ston pa'i rjes su dpag pa yod pa ma yin pas don de rab tu mi 'grub po[144]||

yang na gzhan du brtag ste| pha rol pos smras pa| nam mkha' dngos po yin te[145] zhes bya ba'i don de bstan par mi nus te| khyod kyis|[146]

mtshan gzhi mtshan nyid ma gtogs pa'i||[147]
dngos po yang ni yod ma yin|| [MMK 5-5cd]

zhes bya bas dpe[148] med pa dang dpe bsgrubs su zin kyang bsgrub par bya ba dang| sgrub pa mi 'grub pa kho nar {N99b} 'gyur ro[149] zhes[150] smras pas|[151] de'i phyir| kho

bos de nyid bsgrub pa bya ste| gzugs la sogs pa la[152] dngos po yod pa kho na yin te| ltos[153] pas de dag med pa yod pa'i phyir ro|| 'di na gang yod pa de la ni ltos[154] pas dngos po med pa yod de[155]| dper na gzugs la ro nyid med pa bzhin no|| gang med pa de la ni ltos[156] pas dngos po med pa med de| dper na rta'i rwa bzhin no||

gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid kyang ma yin te[157]| 'di ltar khyod kyis lan cig ma yin par phung po dang| khams dang| skye[158] mched dag phung po la sogs pa nyid kyis med pa nyid du brjod pas| de'i phyir ltos[159] pas de dag med pa yod pa'i phyir dngos po yod pa kho na yin no||

'dir bshad pa| kho bos gzugs la sogs pa'i dngos po yod pa nyid dgag pa byas par zad kyi| de dag med par ma bstan pas| de'i phyir gzugs zhes bya ba'i dngos po yod pa ma yin na gang ro nyid med par 'gyur te| de med pa'i phyir dpe ma grub pas 'dod pa'i don grub pa med do||

gzhan dag gis smras pa|[160] dngos po dang dngos po med pa dag ni yod pa kho na yin[161] te| de dag shes pa yod pa'i phyir ro|| 'di na gang la shes {DC93b} pa yod pa de ni yod de| dper na chos nyid {P113b} bzhin no||

'dir bshad pa| pha rol po'i yid la bsam pas brtags pa'i dngos po dang| dngos po med pa[162] shes pa de yang dngos po'am|[163] dngos po med pa zhig yin grang na| de gnyi ga dgag pa yang bstan zin pas de dag shes pa yod par mi 'grub po[164]||

dngos po dang dngos po med pa dang mi mthun pa'i shes pa gzhan zhig yod par rtog na| de yang mi rung ste| de'i phyir bshad pa|

dngos dang dngos med mi mthun chos||
gang gis dngos dang dngos med shes|| [MMK 5-6cd]

de ni yod pa ma yin pa nyid do zhes bya ba'i tshig gi don to||

gal te rnam grangs kyi tshul smra ba dag gis brtags pa'i dngos po dang dngos po med pa dang| mi mthun pa[165] de dag shes pa yod {N100a} pa'i phyir nyes pa med do[166] zhe na| de ni rigs pa ma yin te[167]| gcig la bdag nyid mi mthun pa gnyis mi srid pa'i phyir dang| ltos[168] pa mi 'thad pa'i phyir dang| de ston pa'i rjes su dpag pa med pa'i phyir ro[169] zhes bya bar dgongs so||

gang gi phyir de ltar dpyad na| nam mkha' 'thad pa mi bzod pa|[170]

de phyir nam mkha' dngos po min||
dngos med ma yin mtshan[171] gzhi min||
mtshan nyid ma yin [MMK 5-7ab,c1]

zhes pha rol pos smras pa'i dngos po nyid la sogs pa ston[172] pa'i sgrub pa sun 'byin pa bsal[173] ba'i dbang gis mjug bsdus so||

khams lnga po||[174]
gzhan gang dag kyang nam mkha' mtshungs||
[MMK 5-7c2,d]

khams zhes bya ba'i don ni 'byung khungs kyi[175] don te| gser gyi 'byung khungs[176] bzhin du nam mkha' la sogs[177] pa dag kyang sdug bsngal dang yid mi bde ba la sogs pa dag gi 'byung khungs su[178] gyur pa[179] yin no||

yang na khams zhes bya ba'i don ni byed pa med par rang gi mtshan nyid 'dzin pa'i don to|| lnga po zhes bya ba ni sa dang| chu dang| me[180] dang| rlung dang| rnam par shes pa zhes bya ba dag go|[181] gzhan zhes bya ba ni nam mkha'i 'og tu dgag par bya ba yin pa'i phyir ro|| gang dag kyang nam mkha' {P114a} mtshungs[182] zhes bya ba ni khams lnga po gzhan gang dag yin pa de dag kyang nam mkha' dang mtshungs par dgag par bya ba ste| ji ltar sngar|

nam mkha'i mtshan nyid sna rol na||[183]
nam mkha' cung[184] zad yod ma yin||[185] [MMK 5-1ab]

zhes bya ba nas brtsams te|

de phyir nam mkha' dngos po min||
{D94a} dngos med ma yin mtshan gzhi min||
mtshan nyid ma yin|[186] [MMK 5-7ab,c1]

zhes bya {C94a} ba'i bar gyis[187] nam mkha' dgag pa bstan pa de bzhin du 'dir yang|

sa sogs mtshan nyid snga rol na||

sa sogs cung zad yod[188] ma yin||

zhes bya ba nas brtsams te|

de phyir sa sogs dngos po min||

dngos med ma yin mtshan gzhi min||

mtshan nyid ma yin

zhes bya ba'i bar du rgya cher brjod par bya zhing sa la sogs pa'i khams {N100b} lnga po gzhan gang[189] dag yin pa de dag kyang nam mkha' dang dgag pa mtshungs pa'i phyir 'dra bar bstan par bya'o||

bcom ldan 'das kyi[190] gsung rab la khams de[191] dag de ltar yod par bstan pa[192] ni de dag bstan pas| gdul bya'i[193] skye bo'i rjes su thugs brtse bas tha snyad du grags pa[194] tha snyad kyi bden par gtogs pa yin gyi| don dam par ni khams rnams yod pa ma yin no||[195] khams rnams yod pa'i phyir khas blangs pa la gnod pa yang med la| skye mched rnams 'grub par yang mi 'gyur ro||

yang[196] kha cig na re| khyod kyis don dam par dngos po thams cad la skur pa btab pa'i phyir log pa'i lta ba dngos po thams cad la skur pa 'debs pa'i tshul can rjes su brjod pas| bcom ldan 'das kyi gsung rab ltar bcos pas 'jig rten rgyang phan[197] pa'i 'dod pa bsgrub pa[198] byas pa'i phyir 'di ni[199] bcom ldan 'das kyi bka' ma yin pas spang bar bya ba yin no[200] zhes zer ro||

de la[201] 'dir pha rol po dag ni skyon cha ma mnyam[202] pas rab rib skyes pa dag| skra shad[203] dang|

sbrang bu {P114b} dang| sbrang bu mchu rings la sogs pa yang dag ma yin pa dag sel bar byed pa dang 'dra ste| 'di ltar kho bos ni skye mched rnams kyi yod pa nyid dgag pa smras pa na ngo bo nyid yod pa dgag pa byas par zad kyi|[204] dngos po med pa nyid du ni ma smras te| mdo sde las|

ji srid sems kyi spyod yul ba||
yod med gnyis kyi mthar yang 'gyur||
spyod yul 'gags[205] par gyur na ni||
sems kyang yang dag 'gag par 'gyur||
[Laṅkāvatāra 3-9]

zhes bya ba dang| de bzhin du dngos por ma lhung ba ni dngos po med pas| chos 'ga' yang dngos po med par mi byed do zhes bya ba la sogs pa ji skad gsungs pa lta bu'o|| de bzhin du slob dpon nyid kyis kyang gzhan dag tu|

'di ni yod nyid 'gog pa ste||
med nyid yong su {DC94b} 'dzin pa min||
nag po min zhes[206] smras pa na||
dkar po yin zhes ma brjod bzhin||

zhes gsungs so||

de'i phyir rnam pa de gnyi ga {N101a} yang lta ba ngan pa kho na[207] yin te| mkhas pa spros pa ma lus pa nye bar zhi ba'i bde ba 'dod pa'i gegs[208] yin pa'i phyir ro|| ji ltar zhe na| 'di la don[209] dam par 'dod pa dang| gzugs dang| gzugs med pa na spyod pa dang| 'jig rten las 'das pa dang| dge ba dang| mi dge ba dang| lung du ma bstan pa

dag gal te tshul gang gis tha snyad gdags su rung ba des bdag nyid thob pa'i ngo bo nyid yin par gyur na de'i phyir dge ba dang| mi dge ba'i chos rnams skyed pa dang mi skyed pa'i phyir 'bad pa don med pa nyid du 'gyur te| yod pa'i phyir dper na bum pa dang| snam bu yod pa bzhin pas bde ba dang ldan pa rnams kyang bde ba'i khyad par nyams pa med pa dang| sdug bsngal dang ldan pa rnams kyang sdug bsngal gyi khyad par nyams pa med[210] par 'gyur te| rtsig pa la bris pa'i ri mo bzhin du srog chags rnams kyi na tshod dang|[211] {P115a} bong[212] tshod dang| spyod lam gyi khyad par dag la skyed dbri[213] med par 'gyur ro||

ci ste khams gsum pa dang| 'jig rten las 'das pa dang| dge ba dang| mi dge ba dang| lung du ma bstan pa dag ngo bo nyid med pa yin par gyur na| de lta na yang dge ba dang mi dge ba'i chos rnams skyed[214] pa dang| mi skyed[215] pa'i phyir 'bad pa don med pa nyid du 'gyur te| med pa'i phyir dper na ri bong gi rwa rnon por bya ba'i phyir 'bad pa bzhin pas| tha snyad chad par 'gyur ro||

de'i phyir 'di bshad de| lta ba ngan pa'i rab rib kyis blo gros kyi mig nyams pa|

> blo chung gang dag dngos rnams[216] la||
> yod pa nyid dang med nyid du||
> lta ba des[217] ni blta[218] bya ba||
> nye bar zhi ba zhi mi mthong|| [MMK 5-8]

blo chung ngu[219] gang dag rab rib can dbang po nyams pas zla ba gnyis la sogs pa yang dag pa ma yin pa mthong ba bzhin du dngos po rnams la yod pa nyid dang| med pa nyid du lta ba de dag gis ni don dam pa'i bden pa shin tu {N101b} cha phra ba[220] 'phags pa'i shes rab kyi spyan gyi spyod yul blta bar bya ba nye bar[221] zhi zhing zhi ba mi[222] mthong ngo zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go|[223]

blta bar bya ba nye bar zhi ba zhes bya ba ni 'di la blta bar bya ba mtshan ma thams cad mi snang bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro|| zhi zhes bya ba ni gnod pa thams cad dang bral ba'i phyir te| mdo {D95a} sde las|

gang gis gang la rkyen rnams kyis[224]||
{C95a} yod par sgrub pa med nyid 'gyur||
lta ngan skye bar smra ba yis||
yod pa dang ni med par bstan||

zhes ji skad gsungs pa lta bu'o||

mkhas pa gang stong pa nyid la lta ba dang| sgom pa'i mig sman dang ldan pas| blo gros kyi mig gi skyon dang bral bar gyur pa blo gros kyi mig yang dag par bye ba[225] des ni dngos po rnams kyi ji lta ba nyid mthong ste| bcom ldan 'das kyis|[226]

gang tshe 'jig rten yod min zhing||
med min yod med min[227] mthong ba||
de tshe {P115b} sems ni rnam ldog cing||
bdag med nyid kyang rtogs[228] par 'gyur||

[Laṅkāvatāra 3-22 = 10-476]

zhes ji skad gsungs pa dang| de bzhin du[229] 'od srungs yod ces bya ba 'di ni mtha' gcig go|[230] med ces bya ba 'di yang mtha' gcig go[231] zhes bya ba la sogs pa ji skad gsungs pa lta bu'o||

de[232] la 'dir rab tu byed pa'i don ni sa la sogs pa khams rnams yod par ston pa'i gtan tshigs mtshan[233] nyid yod pa'i phyir ro[234] zhes bya ba nye[235] bar bzhag pa de'i skyon brjod pas khams rnams ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du bstan pa yin no||

de'i phyir nang gi[236] sa'i khams gang yin pa dang| phyi rol gyi sa'i khams gang yin pa de ni gnyis su med pa'i don to|| de yang de bzhin gshegs pas shes rab dang ye shes kyis gnyis su med pa dang| gnyis su dbyer med pa dang| mtshan nyid gcig pa 'di lta ste| mtshan nyid med[237] par mngon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas so zhes bya ba dang| de bzhin du bu mo khams dag ji ltar blta ba bya| bu mos[238] smras pa| 'jam dpal 'di lta ste| dper na[239] 'jig rten gsum bskal pas[240] bsregs pa na thal ba yang med pa ltar ro[241] zhes {N102a} bya ba dang| de bzhin du gzugs med pa dang| bstan du med pa dang| gnas med pa dang| snang ba med pa dang| rnam par rig pa med pa gang yin pa de la mngon par zhen par mi bya'o[242] zhes bya ba dang| de bzhin du[243] shā[244] ra dwa ti'i bu chos thams cad ni chags pa med pa'i mtshan nyid de| gang chos[245] gang gi mtshan nyid yin pa de ni de'i[246] mtshan nyid med pa yin pas| chos 'ga' yang mtshan nyid mngon[247] par sgrub pa'i phyir|

nye bar mi gnas so zhes bya ba dang| de bzhin du|[248]

ngas[249] ni 'jig rten phung po bstan||

de la 'jig rten gnas par gyur||

mkhas pa de la mi gnas pa||

'jig rten chos {D95b} kyis[250] mi gos so||

'jig rten nam {C95b} mkha'i mtshan nyid de||

{P116a} nam mkha' la yang mtshan nyid med||

de phyir de yis[251] de rtogs pas||

'jig rten chos kyis mi gos so||

zhes bya ba dang| de bzhin du shā[252] ra dwa ti'i bu chos thams cad kyi mtshan nyid med pa nyid dang| yongs su grub pa med pa nyid gang yin pa de ni chags pa med pa nyid ces bya'o[253] zhes ba ba la sogs pa gsungs pa de dag grub pa yin no||

slob dpon legs ldan byed[254] kyis nye bar sbyar ba| dbu ma'i rtsa ba'i 'grel pa shes[255] rab sgron ma las| khams brtag pa zhes bya ba ste| rab tu byed pa lnga pa'o||

Notes to Tibetan Text of Prajñāpradīpa, Chapter Five

[1]N: de.

[2]DC: ||.

[3]PN omm. la.

[4]P: 'dra gyis for 'das kyis.

[5]PDC: ||.

[6]DC omm. |.

[7]PN: bcas pa for bca' ba.

[8]PN add ||.

[9]PN: kyi.

[10]P om. la.

[11]PN add ||.

[12]P: |.

[13]PN omm. ||.

[14]C: byed.

[15]N: bag.

[16]PN: na.

[17]PN: bsgrub.

[18]PN add |.

[19]N: sta.

[20]PN add ||.

[21]PN omm. bya bar.

[22]DC add dag.

[23]C: mim.

[24]PN: gcig.

[25] C: mtshan.

[26] PN *add* ||.

[27] PN: gi.

[28] PN *add* ||.

[29] C: 'bod.

[30] PN *add* ||.

[31] PN *add* ||.

[32] PN *add* ||.

[33] DC *omm*. |.

[34] DC *add* nyid.

[35] DC *add* du.

[36] DC *omm*. ||.

[37] DC *add* pa.

[38] DC *omm*. ||.

[39] DC: gi.

[40] PN: bcas pas *for* bca' bas.

[41] D: ||.

[42] PN *omm*. ||.

[43] PN *add* ni.

[44] DC *omm*. mtshan nyid kyi.

[45] PN *omm*. |.

[46] PN *omm*. ||.

[47] D: ||.

[48] PN: 'gyur.

[49] PN *omm*. ||.

[50] PN: 'dir.

[51]DC: byed.

[52]DC omm. par.

[53]PN omm. pa.

[54]DC: do ||.

[55]PN omm. |.

[56]P ad. ||; N ad. |.

[57]DC omm. byar.

[58]PN omm. |.

[59]PN: |.

[60]N: na 'ang for na'ang.

[61]PN: |.

[62]N: pa.

[63]P ad. ||.

[64]N: mad.

[65]PN add |.

[66]DC add ji.

[67]P: ||.

[68]PN omm. |.

[69]DC add kyi gzhi.

[70]DC: gzhi gzhan for gzhan.

[71]PN add ||.

[72]D: ||.

[73]PN omm. gi.

[74]PN omm. |.

[75]PN add |.

[76]PN add ||.

[77]C: pa´i.

[78]PN: po; D: bo||.

[79]DC add ||.

[80]C: li.

[81]PN add |.

[82]C: mtshan.

[83]PN add nyid.

[84]N: ta.

[85]PN omm. pa.

[86]PN add ||.

[87]P: |.

[88]PN: bltos.

[89]PNDC: nyis.

[90]PN: |.

[91]PN add |.

[92]N: zhas.

[93]PN add ||.

[94]N: bzhan.

[95]PNDC add du; Ava P80a-5, D71a-3 omm. du.

[96]C: de la for des.

[97]DC add kyis.

[98]DC: pa.

[99]P: yin| for yin na||.

[100]DC: brnags.

[101]DC: kyi.

[102]C om. |.

103 PN: byas.

104 DC omm. mi.

105 PN add ||.

106 PN: rig.

107 PN add ||.

108 PN omm. |.

109 PN: |.

110 P: |.

111 N: lags.

112 PN add ||.

113 DC: gyi.

114 PN: par for pa pa´i.

115 DC: brtsal pas for bstsal bas.

116 PN add |.

117 PN: phyir.

118 P om. ba´i.

119 PN add ||.

120 DC: me med for med.

121 DC: kyi.

122 DC: ||.

123 C: ni.

124 PN add ||.

125 PN add ||.

126 PN: |.

127 N: |.

128 PN add ||.

129 N: da'i.

130 P: de'i.

131 PN: |.

132 PN: |.

133 PN *add* ||.

134 N *om.* |.

135 PC: gzhi 'am *for* gzhi'am.

136 P: |.

137 PN: sgrub.

138 DC: bsgrub.

139 PN *add* ||.

140 N: mad.

141 N: ||.

142 PN: po med gang *for* med gang gi.

143 DC: brtags.

144 D: bo.

145 PN *add* |.

146 PN: kyi.

147 P: |.

148 P: dpo.

149 PN *add* ||.

150 N: zhas.

151 DC: pa.

152 P *om.* la.

153 PN: bltos.

154 PN: bltos.

155 N: da.

156 PN: bltos.

157 N: ta.

158 N: dang bskye for dang| skye.

159 PN: bltos.

160 PN omm. |.

161 N ad. yin.

162 DC: par.

163 P: po 'am|; N: po 'am gangs for po'am|.

164 D: bo.

165 C om. pa.

166 PN add ||.

167 N: ta.

168 PN: bltos.

169 PN add ||.

170 N: ||.

171 PN: mchan.

172 N: sngon.

173 PN: gsal.

174 PN: |.

175 PN: khung gi for khungs kyi.

176 PN: khung.

177 N: sags.

178 PN: khung du for khungs su.

179 DC add dag.

180 N: ma.

[181]DC: ||.

[182]PN add ||.

[183]N: |.

[184]N: chung.

[185]P: |.

[186]DC omm. |.

[187]C: gyes.

[188]N: yad.

[189]PN omm. gang.

[190]PN: kyis.

[191]P: di.

[192]PN add de.

[193]PN: ´dul ba´i for gdul bya´i.

[194]DC: pa´i.

[195]PN: te|.

[196]DC add na.

[197]PNDC: pan.

[198]DC: par.

[199]PN add |.

[200]PN add ||.

[201]P om. la.

[202]N: myan.

[203]PN: sha.

[204]DC omm. |.

[205]PN: ´gag.

[206]N: zhas.

[207]PN *omm*. na.

[208]DC: bgegs.

[209]N: den.

[210]C *om*. pa med.

[211]DC *omm*. |.

[212]PN: bongs; C: pong.

[213]P: bri.

[214]PN: bskyed.

[215]PN: bskyed.

[216]C: brnams.

[217]PN: de.

[218]PN: lta.

[219]P: du.

[220]PN *add* pa.

[221]DC *omm*. nye bar.

[222]P: ma.

[223]DC: ||.

[224]DC: skye rnams kyi *for* rkyen rnams kyis.

[225]C: byed pa *for* bye ba.

[226]PN *omm*. |.

[227]PNDC: min mi *for* med min; Ava P98b-5, D88a-7: med min.

[228]P: rtog.

[229]DC *add* |.

[230]DC: ||.

[231]PN *add* |.

[232]N: da.

[233]DC *omm*. mtshan.

[234]PN *add* ||.

[235]N: nya.

[236]N: ga.

[237]N: nyad mad *for* nyid med.

[238]N: mas.

[239]PN *add* |.

[240]PN: pa; C: bas.

[241]PN *add* ||.

[242]PN *add* ||.

[243]DC *add* |.

[244]DC: sha.

[245]N: chas.

[246]N: pa´a da na *for* pa de ni de´i.

[247]N: mngan.

[248]PN *omm*. |.

[249]P: das.

[250]PN: kyi.

[251]PN: yi.

[252]DC: sha.

[253]PN *add* ||.

[254]C: byod.

[255]N: shas.

Tibetan Text of *Prajñāpradīpa*, Chapter Seventeen

{P211b-6, N189a-6, DC170b-2} da[1] ni de bzhin du stong pa nyid kyi mi mthun pa'i phyogs kyi khyad par dgag pas[2] las dang 'bras bu[3] ngo bo nyid med pa nyid[4] du bstan pa'i don gyi dbang gis rab tu byed pa bcu bdun pa brtsam mo|| rab tu byed pa 'das ma thag par 'du byed rnams dang| sems can dang| gang zag 'khor bar mi 'thad do|| zhes bstan pa'i phyir 'dir pha rol po dag gis bstan bcos mdzad pas dam bcas pa'i don sgro btags nas smras pa| khyed[5] kyis 'du byed {N189b} rtag pa dang| mi rtag pa rnams {P212a} la 'khor ba mi 'thad de| rtag pa dang|[6] chad pa'i skyon du 'gyur ba'i phyir ro zhes smras pa[7] ni|

'du byed mya ngan 'da' bar[8] ni||

ji lta bur yang mi 'thad do|| [MMK 16-4ab]

zhes bstan pa yin pas| de'i phyir 'dir ji ltar rtag pa dang| chad pa'i skyon du yang[9] mi 'gyur la| 'du byed rnams la 'khor ba yang yod pa de ltar bsgrub par bya ste| don dam par nang gi 'du byed rnams la 'khor ba yod pa kho na yin te| las dang 'bras bu 'brel pa'i[10] phyir ro|| 'di na gang med pa de la ni las dang 'bras bur 'brel pa[11] ma mthong ste| dper na mo gsham gyi bu zhes bya ba'i 'du byed rnams bzhin no|| nang gi 'du byed rnams la ni las dang 'bras bur 'brel pa yod pas de'i phyir gtan tshigs ji skad smos pa'i mthus don dam par nang gi 'du byed rnams la 'khor ba yod pa kho na yin no||

de la re zhig las ni|

bdag nyid legs par sdom pa dang||[12]
gzhan la phan 'dogs byams sems gang||
de chos de ni 'di gzhan du||
'bras bu dag gi sa bon yin|| [MMK 17-1]

bdag nyid legs par sdom[13] pa zhes bya ni bdag nyid yang dag par sdom par byed cing mi dge ba las ldog par byed pa ste| mi dge ba[14] spong {D171a} ba'i sems pa {C171a} dang mtshungs par ldan pa'i sems zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go|[15] gzhan la[16] phan 'dogs par zhes[17] bya ba ni sbyin pa dang snyan par smra ba dang| 'jigs[18] pa las yongs su skyob pa la sogs pa gzhan dag la phan 'dogs par byed pa'o|| byams pa zhes bya ba ni mdza' bshes las[19] 'byung bas byams pa'o|| yang na byams pa nyid byams pa ste| bdag gi don la de[20] dang mthun pa'i rkyen brjod pa'i phyir ro|| de lta bu'i sems pa gang yin pa de chos yin no||

de ni sa bon yin te| rgyu dang rkyen ces bya ba'i tha tshig go|[21] gang dag gi zhe na| 'bras {P212b} bu dag gi'o|| gang du zhe na| 'di dang gzhan du ste| tshe 'di dang gzhan {N190a} dag tu myong bar 'gyur ba'i[22] dbang gis so|| sems pa ni sa bon nyid du gsungs te| lus dang ngag gi las dag[23] kun nas slong ba yin pa'i phyir ro||

chos las bzlog pas chos ma yin pa ste|[24] chos ma yin

pa dang| sdig pa dang| mi dge ba zhes bya ba dag ni rnam grangs so|| chos ma yin pa las bzlog pas chos kyi rnam grangs dag go||[25] lung du ma bstan pa ni rnam par smin pa las skyes pa dang| spyod lam las byung ba dang| bzo'i gnas las byung ba dang| sprul pa byed pa las byung ba'i bye brag gis rnam pa bzhi ste| rnam par smin pa 'dod pa dang| mi 'dod pa mi skye ba'i phyir dang| dge ba dang| mi dge ba nyid du brda mi sprod pa'i phyir lung du ma bstan to||

de ltar chos la sogs pa'i dbye bas tha dad pa de dag kyang rnam pa gnyis te|

drang srong mchog gis las rnams ni||
sems pa[26] dang ni bsam par gsungs|| [MMK 17-2ab]

drang[27] srong mchog ni bcom ldan 'das te| de ni drang srong yang yin la mchog kyang yin te| bgrod par bya ba ma lus par bgrod zin pa'i phyir dang| nyan thos dang| rang sangs rgyas dang| byang chub sems dpa' zhes bya ba'i drang srong rnams las mchog tu 'gyur ba'i phyir ro|| de las chos dang|[28] chos ma yin pa dang| lung du ma bstan pa'i[29] dbye bas tha dad pa rnams ni rnam pa gnyis te| sems pa dang| bsam pa'o zhes gsungs so||

las de dag gi bye brag ni||[30]
rnam pa du mar yongs su bsgrags||[31] [MMK 17-2cd]

zhes bya ba ni mdor bstan pa'o|| de rgyas par bshad pa ni|

de la las gang sems pa[32] zhes||
gsungs pa de {C171b} ni yid kyir[33] 'dod||
[MMK 17-3ab]

de la zhes bya ba'i sgra {D171b} ni dmigs kyis bsal ba'i don to|| las gang sems pa zhes gsungs pa de ni {P213a} yid kyir[34] 'dod de| yid kyi zhes bya ba ni yid las byung ba ste| yid kyi sgo kho na nas de mthar thug par 'gyur ba'i[35] phyir ro|| lus kyi dang ngag {N 190b} gi dag ni sems pa zhes mi brjod de| de[36] dag sems pas kun nas bslang ba yin yang lus dang| ngag gi sgo nas yongs su rdzogs pa'i phyir ro||

bsam pa zhes ni gang gsungs pa||
de ni lus dang ngag gi yin|| [MMK 17-3cd]

bsam pa zhes bya ba ni blos bsams[37] nas byed pa gang yin pa ste| de ltar las gang bsam pa zhes bya ba[38] gsungs pa de[39] ni lus dang ngag gi yin te| lus dang ngag[40] las byung ba'i phyir dang| de dag gi sgo nyid nas mthar thug par 'gyur ba'i phyir ro|| de ltar re zhig las rnam pa gnyis bstan to||

ji ltar rnam pa du ma zhe na|

ngag dang bskyod dang mi spong ba'i||
rnam rig byed min zhes bya gang||
spong ba'i rnam rig byed min pa||
gzhan dag kyang ni de bzhin 'dod|| [MMK 17-4]
longs spyod[41] las byung bsod nams dang||
bsod nams ma yin tshul de bzhin||
sems pa dang ni chos de bdun||
las su mngon par 'dod pa yin|| [MMK 17-5]

de la ngag ni yi ge gsal bar brjod pa'o|| bskyod pa ni lus gYo ba'o|| mi spong ba'i rnam par byed ma yin pa zhes bya ba ni| bdag gi lus sam ngag gam yid kyis mi dge ba 'di lta bu zhig bya'o snyam du yi[42] dam bcas pa'i skad cig ma tshun chad nas byed pa pos las de mi byed du zin kyang| mi dge ba yang[43] dag par blangs pa'i[44] rgyu las byung ba mi spong ba'i mtshan nyid kyi rnam par rig byed ma yin pa gang dag yin pa'o||

spong ba'i rnam par rig byed ma yin pa gzhan dag kyang de bzhin du 'dod de| bdag gis lus sam ngag gam yid kyi dge ba'i las 'di lta bu zhig bya'o snyam du yi[45] dam du bcas pa'i sems pa tshun chad nas byed pa pos[46] las de mi byed du zin kyang[47] dge ba'i[48] bya ba {P213b} yang dag par blangs pa'i sems pas bskyed pa spong[49] ba'i mtshan nyid kyi rnam par rig byed[50] ma yin pa gang dag yin

pa'o|| rnam par rig byed ma yin pa zhes bya ba ni| gzugs dang bya ba'i ngo bo nyid yin[51] du zin kyang rnam par rig byed bzhin du gzhan la rnam par rig par mi byed pa'i phyir ro||

longs {N191a} spyod[52] pa las byung ba'i {C172a} bsod nams zhes bya ba ni yongs su longs spyod[53] pa'i rgyu las bsod {D172a} nams de byung ngo zhes bya bar tshig rnam par sbyar te| yongs su longs spyod[54] pa zhes bya ba ni[55] dkon mchog gsum gyi yul la dngos[56] po yongs su btang ba nye bar spyod[57] pa'o|| de'i rgyu las byung ba zhes bya ba ni de'i rjes las byung ba ste| 'brel pa dang 'phel ba zhes pa dag gi rnam grangs so|| bsod nams zhes bya ba ni dag par byed pas bsod nams te| dge ba zhes bya ba dag gi rnam grangs so|| longs spyod[58] pa las byung ba'i bsod nams ma yin pa yang tshul de bzhin te| yongs su longs spyod[59] pa'i rgyu las byung zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go|[60] bsod nams ma yin pa ni bsod nams las bzlog[61] pa las khong du[62] chud par bya'o||

sems pa zhes bya bas[63] ni yid kyi las bstan te| 'o na sems pa zhes bya ba de gang yin zhe na| yon tan dang skyon las sems mngon par 'du byed pa ste yid kyi las so||

de ltar ngag la sogs pa bdun po de dag ni chos te| rang gi mtshan nyid 'dzin pa'i don gyis chos yin no|| las su mngon par 'dod pa yin zhes bya ba ni las kyi mtshan nyid dag tu 'dod pa yin no|| bsam gtan dang| klog pa la sogs pa'i las dag kyang yod mod kyi 'di dag nyid

kyi khongs su 'dus pa'i phyir|[64] bdun kho nar nges par bzung ngo|| las de dang[65] 'bras bur 'brel pa mthong ba ni| 'gro ba lngar {P214a} phung po lnga skye ba'i mtshan nyid yin no|| de ltar las dang 'bras bur[66] 'brel pa'i mtshan nyid kyi[67] gtan tshigs kyis don dam par nang gi 'du byed rnams la 'khor ba yod pa kho na yin te| des na bcings pa dang thar pa yod pa'i phyir don dam par nang gi dngos po rnams la ngo bo nyid yod pa kho na yin no||

'dir bshad pa| 'di[68] la las de skyes {N191b} nas smin[69] pa'i dus kyi bar du gnas pa'am| skyes nas 'jig par 'gyur ba zhig[70] grang na| de la re zhig|

gal te smin pa'i dus bar du||
gnas na las de[71] rtag par 'gyur|| [MMK 17-6ab]

skyes ma thag tu mi 'jig pa de'i bdag nyid ma yin pa ni phyis kyang 'jig par mi rigs pa'i phyir rtag pa nyid du thal bar 'gyur ro[72] zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go|[73] gal te chu shing dang 'dam bu dang| smyig[74] ma bzhin du 'bras bu smin pa'i 'og tu de 'jig pas skyon med do[75] zhe na| skyon med pa ma yin te|[76] chu shing la sogs pa dag skad cig {C172b} ma re re la 'jig pa nyid dang| {D172b} de dang rigs mthun pa'i rgyun chad pas 'jig pa nyid tha dad par khas blangs pa'i phyir dang| don dam par ni las bzhin du smyig[77] ma la sogs pa dag kyang 'bras bu dang 'brel par[78] mi 'thad pa'i[79] phyir dang| sngar ma zhig pa phyis

de'i bdag nyid du 'gyur ba yang bstan dka' ba'i phyir ro||[80]

gal te 'jig pa'i rgyu'i snga rol na[81] 'jig pa med du zin kyang phyis yod par 'gyur bas[82] sngon ma zhig pa yang phyis 'jig pa nyid du 'gyur ro zhe na| de yang rigs pa ma yin te| 'di ltar gang zhig gang gi 'jig pa'i rgyur brjod pa de ni de'i 'jig pa'i rgyu ma yin te| de las gzhan pa'i phyir ram|[83] rgyu can yin pa'i phyir dper na de las gzhan pa bzhin pas rjes su dpag pas[84] gnod pa'i phyir dang| lung las|

lus dang dbang po blo rnams ni||
skad cig las ni ring mi gnas||[85]

zhes {P214b} gsungs pas| khas blangs pa la gnod par 'gyur ba'i phyir ro||

ci ste skyon der gyur na mi rung ngo[86] snyam nas skyes ma thag tu 'jig par dam bca' na| de lta na[87] yang|

gal te 'gags na 'gags gyur pa||
ji ltar 'bras bu bskyed par 'gyur|| [MMK 17-6cd]

'gags[88] pa ni rang gi bdag nyid med pa kho na'i phyir ro zhes bya bar dgongs so|| 'gag bzhin pa yang 'bras bu bskyed pa nyid du rtog na yang 'gag bzhin pa 'gags pa'am| ma 'gags[89] pa nyid la de mi 'thad pa'i phyir

dang| brgal zhing brtag[90] pa dang| lan mtshungs pa'i {N192a} phyir ro|| 'gag bzhin pa ni 'gag pa la mngon par phyogs pa'o zhes[91] rtog na yang skyon ji skad bstan pa nyid du 'gyur ba'i phyir ro|| brjod par bya ba ma yin pa nyid du rtog na yang don dam par brjod par bya ba ma yin pa ni 'bras bu bskyed pa nyid du mi 'thad de| brjod par bya ma yin pa'i phyir dper na skye bzhin pa[92] bzhin pas rjes su dpag pas gnod pa'i phyir de yang snying po ma yin no|| de'i phyir gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid kyi skyon dang| don 'gal ba nyid kyi skyon de nyid yod do||

'dir smras pa| las dang 'bras bur 'brel pa ni 'thad pa kho na yin te| ci'i phyir zhe na| rgyud kyi rgyun las 'bras bu 'grub pa'i phyir te| 'di lta ste[93] dper na|

myu gu la sogs rgyun gang ni||
sa bon las ni mngon par 'byung||
de las 'bras bu sa bon ni||
med na de yang 'byung mi 'gyur|| [MMK 17-7]
gang phyir sa bon las rgyun {C173a} dang||
rgyun las 'bras bu 'byung {D173a} 'gyur zhing||
sa bon 'bras bu'i sngon 'gro ba||
de phyir chad min rtag ma yin|| [MMK 17-8]

myu gu dang| 'dab ma dang| sdong bu dang| sbu gu dang| snye ma dang| sbun pa[94] dang| gra ma dang| srus[95] dang| 'bras thug po che la sogs pa'i mtshan nyid kyi

rgyun gang yin pa de ni sa bon 'gags pa las mngon {P215a} par 'byung zhing rgyun de las 'bras bu mngon par 'byung ngo|| sa bon med na myu gu sngon du btang ba'i rgyun de las mngon par 'byung bar mi 'gyur ro|| gang gi phyir sa bon las rgyun mngon par 'byung la| rgyun las 'bras bu mngon par 'byung bar[96] 'gyur zhing| sa bon 'bras bu'i sngon[97] du 'gro ba de'i phyir chad pa ma yin te| sa bon gyi rgyun gyis nges par gnas pa'i phyir ro|| rtag pa yang ma yin te| myu gu byung ba na sa bon de 'gags pa'i phyir ro|| de ltar na de ni chos mthun pa'i[98] dpe'i {N192b} tshig yin no|| de bzhin du|

sems kyi rgyun ni gang yin pa||
sems pa las ni mngon par 'byung||
de las 'bras bu sems pa ni||
med na de yang 'byung mi 'gyur||[99] [MMK 17-9]
gang phyir sems pa las rgyun dang||
rgyun las 'bras bu 'byung 'gyur zhing||
las ni 'bras bu'i sngon 'gro ba||
de phyir chad min rtag ma yin|| [MMK 17-10]

sems kyi[100] rgyun 'brel par 'jug pa'i mtshan nyid gang yin pa de ni byams pa dang| byams pa ma yin pa'i sems[101] pa las su brjod pa gang yin pa'i sems pa 'gags[102] pa de las mngon par 'byung zhing rgyun de las 'bras bu

'dod pa dang mi 'dod pa[103] nyams su myong ba'i mtshan nyid mngon par 'byung ngo|| sems pa med na sems kyi rgyun de yang mngon par 'byung bar mi 'gyur te| de ltar des ni las kyi chos rgyun rjes su 'jug pa nyid bstan to||

gang gi phyir sems pa[104] las rgyun ces bya ba rgyu dang 'bras bu'i dngos por 'brel cing rgyas par[105] 'gyur ba'i rgyun 'brel pa zhes bya ba'i don mngon par 'byung la| rgyun las 'bras bu mngon par 'byung bar 'gyur[106] zhing| las 'bras bu'i sngon du 'gro ba de'i phyir chad pa yang ma yin la| rtag pa yang ma yin te| bsgrub pa ji skad bstan pas 'du byed rnams kyi rgyun gyis 'bras bu bskyed[107] pa'i phyir dang| skad cig ma gnyis par nges par[108] mi gnas pa'i phyir ro[109] {P215b} zhes bya bar {C173b} dgongs te| de ltar[110] de ni mjug bsdu ba'i tshig yin no||

de'i phyir 'dir rjes {D173b} su dpag pa ni don dam par sems can gyi sgrar brjod pa'i 'du byed rnams la las dang 'bras bur 'brel pa yod pa kho na yin te| bcom ldan 'das kyis[111] 'bras bu khyad par can thob[112] par 'dod pa rnams la de dang 'brel pa thob[113] par bya ba'i phyir thabs bstan pa yod pa'i phyir| dper na sa bon dang 'bras bur 'brel pa bzhin no|| 'di na gang yod pa ma yin pa de la ni bcom ldan 'das kyis de dang 'brel pa thob par bya ba'i phyir thabs ma {N193a} bstan te| dper na nam mkha'i me tog gi phreng ba bzhin no||

'di la ni|

chos sgrub pa yi thabs rnams ni||
dkar po'i las kyi[114] lam bcu ste||
chos kyi 'bras bu 'di gzhan du||
'dod pa'i yon tan rnam lnga'o|| [MMK 17-11]

rnam par smin pa dang| rgyu mthun pa'i 'bras bu'i bye brag las so zhes bcom ldan 'das kyis 'bras bu khyad par can 'dod pa rnams la de dang 'brel pa[115] thob par bya ba'i phyir thabs bstan pa yod pas| de'i phyir gtan tshigs ji skad smos pa'i mthus ji skad smras pa'i don grub po||

gzhan dag gis smras pa|

gal te brtag pa der gyur na||
nyes pa chen po mang por 'gyur||
de lta bas na brtag pa de||
'dir ni 'thad pa ma yin no|| [MMK 17-12]

gal te khyod kyi sa bon gyi rgyun dang| chos mthun pa'i mtshan nyid kyi brtag pa de ltar gyur na| nyes pa'i skyon chen po mang du 'byung bar 'gyur te|[116] mi'i rgyud las lha la sogs pa'i rgyud du skye bar mi 'gyur te| rigs tha dad pa'i phyir dper[117] na shing nim pa'i sa bon las a mra la sogs pa'i 'bras bu skye bar mi 'gyur ba bzhin pas[118] rjes su dpag pas gnod pa'i phyir ro|| de bzhin du

dge ba'i sems las mi dge ba dang| lung du ma bstan pa'i sems dang|[119] mi dge {P216a} ba'i sems las dge ba dang| lung du ma bstan pa'i sems dang| lung du ma bstan pa'i sems[120] las dge ba dang| mi dge ba'i sems dang| 'dod pa na spyod pa'i sems las gzugs dang| gzugs med pa na[121] spyod pa dang| 'jig rten las 'das pa'i sems dang| gzugs na spyod pa'i sems las 'dod pa dang| gzugs med pa na[122] spyod pa dang| 'jig rten las 'das pa'i sems dang| gzugs med pa na spyod pa'i sems las 'dod pa dang| gzugs na spyod pa dang| 'jig rten las 'das {C174a} pa'i sems skye bar mi {N193b} 'gyur te| rjes su dpag pa ji skad bstan pas gnod {D174a} par 'gyur ba'i phyir te| de ltar na dge ba dang| mi dge ba dag bya ba dang| spang par mi 'thad pas| de'i phyir brtag pa de ni 'dir 'thad pa ma yin no||

'o na ci[123] lta bu 'thad ce na| ji skad smos pa'i skyon gyi dri mas ma gos pa|

sangs rgyas rnams dang rang rgyal dang||
nyan thos rnams kyis gsungs pa yi||
brtag pa gang zhig 'dir 'thad pa||
de ni rab tu brjod par bya|| [MMK 17-13]

de yang gang zhe na|

ji ltar bu lon dpang rgya ltar||
de ltar las dang chud mi za|| [MMK 17-14ab]

bu lon gyi dpang rgya ji lta ba de ltar las kyi chud mi za ba'i mtshan nyid kyi chos nges par gnas te| dper na bu lon gyi nor de spyad[124] kyang dpang rgya yod pas nor bdag gi nor chud mi za zhing nor gyi phung po skyed dang bcas pa 'ong bar 'gyur ba de[125] bzhin du las skad cig ma 'gags su zin kyang| de'i rgyu las byung ba chud mi za ba zhes bya ba'i chos yod pas| byed pa po'i las kyi 'bras bu chud mi za zhing 'bras bu khyad par dang bcas pa 'ong bar 'gyur ro|| ji ltar nor bdag gis nor phyir khugs na bu lon gyi dpang rgya ror 'gyur[126] ba de ltar byed pa {P216b} pos 'bras bu myong na chud mi za ba yang de bzhin du 'gyur ro||

de ni khams las rnam pa bzhi||[127] [MMK 17-14c]

chud mi za ba de ni 'dod pa dang| gzugs dang| gzugs med par gtogs pa dang| zag pa med pa'i khams kyi bye brag las rnam pa bzhir 'gyur ro||

de yang rang bzhin lung ma bstan|| [MMK 17-14d]

dge ba dang mi dge ba nyid du brda mi sprod pa'i phyir ro||

spong bas spang[128] ba ma yin te| [MMK 17-15a]

sdug bsngal dang| kun 'byung dang| 'gog pa dang| lam mthong bas spang bar bya ba spong bas[129] spang ba ma yin pa'i phyir ro||

bsgom pas spang ba nyid kyang yin|| [MMK 17-15b]

'bras bu 'pho ba na bsgom pa'i lam gyis spang ba yin pa'i phyir ro|| kyang zhes bya ba'i sgra ni 'bras bu bskyed pas kyang spang ba nyid yin no[130] zhes rnam par brtag pa'i don to||

{N194a} de phyir chud mi za ba yis||[131]
las kyi 'bras bu bskyed par[132] 'gyur||
[MMK 17-15cd]

gang gi phyir de sdug bsngal la sogs pa mthong bas spang bar bya ba spong bas| spang ba ma yin pa de'i phyir sdug bsngal la sogs pa mthong bas spang bar bya ba'i las mi dge ba bzhin du las spangs su zin kyang chud mi za bas las {C174b} rnams kyi 'bras bu bskyed[133] par 'gyur ro||

de la chud mi za ba de|

gal te mthong bas spang ba dang||
{D174b} las 'pho ba dang mthun[134] gyur na||
de la las 'jig la sogs pa'i||

skyon rnams su ni thal bar 'gyur|| [MMK 17-16]

de la gal te chud mi za ba de sdug bsngal la sogs pa mthong bas spang bar bya ba nyon mongs pa'i phra rgyas sdug bsngal la sogs pa mthong bas spang bar bya ba dang| las 'pho ba dang| rigs[135] mthun pa yin par gyur na de la las kyi 'bras bu med pas| las 'jig pa la sogs pa'i skyon rnams su thal bar 'gyur ro||[136] las mi dge ba ni mthong ba'i lam gyis[137] spang ba yin par[138] blta bar bya ste| {P217a} 'phags pa yang so so'i skye bo'i las dang ldan par gyur na mi rung ba'i phyir ro|| de lta bas na mthong bas spang bar bya ba dang| las bzhin du spang bar bya ba ma yin te| 'bras bu 'phos[139] na ni spang[140] bar 'gyur ro|| 'dod par gtogs pa ni 'dod pa'i khams las yang dag par 'das pas spong[141] la| gzugs dang gzugs med par gtogs pa dag kyang| gzugs dang| gzugs med pa'i khams dag las yang dag par 'das pas spong ngo||

khams tshungs las ni cha mtshungs dang||
cha mi mtshungs pa thams cad kyi||
de ni nying mtshams sbyor ba'i tshe||[142]
gcig pu kho na[143] skye bar 'gyur|| [MMK 17-17]

khams mtshungs pa'i zhes bya ba ni khams 'dra ba'i 'o|| las cha mtshungs pa ni rigs mthun pa'o||[144] cha mi mtshungs pa ni rigs {N194b} mi mthun pa'o||[145] de dag

thams cad kyi chud mi za ba de[146] tshe 'di la re re las bskyed pa dag ni nying mtshams sbyor ba'i dus kyi tshe de[147] dag thams cad 'gag pa na yang gcig pu kho na[148] skye bar 'gyur ro||

tshe 'di la ni las dang las||
rnam pa gnyis po thams cad kyi||
de ni tha dad skye 'gyur zhing||
rnam par smin kyang gnas pa yin|| [MMK 17-18]

tshe 'di la ni las dang las so so ba sems pa dang| bsams pa'i bye brag gam| dge ba dang| mi dge ba'i bye brag gis rnam pa gnyis po thams cad kyi[149] chud mi za ba gang yin pa de ni tha dad par skye bar 'gyur ro|| rnam par smin na[150] yang gnas pa yin te| de ni las rnam par smin pa'i rgyus 'gag pa ltar nges pa nyid ma yin no|| de gnas su zin kyang yang[151] 'bras bu bskyed[152] par mi nus te| 'bras bu bskyed[153] zin pa'i phyir nges par spyad zin pa'i dpang[154] rgya bzhin no||

de ni 'bras bu 'phos pa dang||
shi bar gyur na 'gag par {C175a} 'gyur||
de {D175a} yi {P217b} rnam dbye zag med dang||
zag dang bcas par shes par bya||[155] [MMK 17-19]

las de'i chud mi za ba de'i 'gag pa ni rnam pa

gnyis su nges pa yin te|[156] 'bras bu 'phos par gyur pa dang| shi bar gyur pa'o|| de la 'bras bu 'phos par gyur pa ni bsgom[157] pas spang bar bya ba nyid kyang yin zhes bstan pa yin no|| shi bar gyur pa ni|

khams mtshungs las[158] ni cha mtshungs dang||
cha mi mtshungs pa thams cad kyi||
de ni nying mtshams sbyor ba'i tshe||
gcig pu kho na[159] skye bar 'gyur|| [MMK 17-17]

zhes bstan pa yin no|| de'i de yang rnam par dbye na rnam pa gnyis su shes par bya ste| zag pa med pa dang| zag pa dang bcas pa'i las kyi bye brag gis so||

de'i phyir de ltar chud mi za ba yod na| srog chags las sna tshogs pa las skyes pa 'gro ba dang| rigs dang| rus dang| yul dang| dus tha dad pa rnams kyi lus dang| dbang po dang| kha dog dang| dbyibs dang| stobs dang| {N195a} blo dang| mos pa dang| ngang tshul dang| longs spyod la sogs pa tha dad pa dag mngon par 'grub par 'gyur ro|| de'i phyir|

stong pa nyid dang chad min dang||
'khor ba dang ni rtag pa min||
las rnams chud mi za ba'i chos||
sangs rgyas kyis ni bstan pa yin|| [MMK 17-20]

de ltar gang gi phyir las dang 'bras bur 'brel pa de'i phyir stong pa nyid kyang 'thad pa yin te| 'du byed

rnams[160] mu stegs byed kyis yongs su brtags[161] pa'i bdag gis stong pa'i phyir ro|| chad pa yang ma yin te| chud mi za ba nges par gnas pa'i phyir ro|| 'khor ba yang 'thad de|[162] 'gro ba tha dad par 'du byed rnams mngon par grub pa'i mtshan nyid yod pa'i phyir ro|| rtag pa yang ma yin te| las rnam par 'jig pa'i phyir ro|| las rnams[163] kyang chud mi za ba ste|[164] chud mi za ba zhes bya ba'i {P218a} chos sangs rgyas kyis bstan pa de yang grub pa'i phyir ro||[165] de lta bas na brtag[166] pa de nyid 'dir 'thad pa yin no|| de'i phyir sngar smras pa'i gtan tshigs las dang 'bras bur 'brel pa'i phyir ro[167] zhes bya ba de'i don ma grub pa nyid kyang ma yin la| rtag pa dang| chad pa'i skyon du yang thal bar mi 'gyur ro||

'dir bshad pa| kho bo cag gi phyogs la|

gang phyir las ni {C175b} skye med pa||
[MMK 17-21a]

de'i phyir las kho na bzhin du don dam par sa bon gyi rgyun kyang skye ba med pas {D175b} dpe med pa'i phyir sgrub pa ma tshang ba'i skyon yod do||

gal te las de ci'i phyir skye ba med ce na|

gang phyir dngos nyid med de'i phyir|| [MMK 17-21b]

gang gi phyir las ngo bo nyid med pa de'i phyir skye ba med do|| de ltar re zhig phyogs dang po shos kyi phyir skyon bshad do|| phyogs gnyis pa shos kyis gang smras pa de la yang gal te sgrub pa'i sbyor ba 'di yin te| las dang 'bras bur 'brel pa yang yod la| rtag pa dang| chad pa'i skyon du {N195b} yang mi 'gyur te| chud mi za ba yod pa'i phyir ro[168] zhe na| de lta na yang kho bo cag gi phyogs la|

gang phyir las ni skye med pa||[169] [MMK 17-21a] de'i phyir don dam par chud mi za ba yang ma grub ste| 'di ltar skyes na ni de'i chud mi za ba yang chud mi za bar 'gyur ba zhig na| de yang ma skyes pas| de med pa'i phyir de yang med pas gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid do|| kun rdzob tu las dang| 'bras bur 'brel pa ston pa[170] na ni don 'gal ba nyid do||

phyogs dang po pa'i phyir phyogs gnyis pa pas[171] gal te| khyod kyi sa bon gyi rgyun dang chos mthun pa'i mtshan nyid kyi brtag pa de ltar gyur na nyes pa'i skyon chen po mang du 'byung bar 'gyur te[172] zhes gang smras pa| de yang rigs pa ma yin te| rgyu dang 'bras bu'i rgyun rjes su 'jug pa nyid kyis 'brel pa med na mi 'byung ba nyid dang| {P218b} rtag pa ma yin pa dang| chad pa ma yin pa nyid med na mi 'byung ba nyid kyis[173] sa bon gyi rgyun dpe nyid du 'dod pa'i phyir ro|| de'i khyad par dag bsgrub par bya ba la rnam par rtog par[174] byed pa yang[175] rnam par rtog pa 'dra[176] ba'i ltag chod du 'gyur te| sems

dang sems las byung ba'i rgyun las| de dag gi[177] rgyun 'byung bas[178] rigs tha dad pa'i phyir zhes bya ba'i gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid do|| gtan tshigs kyi[179] don ma nges pa nyid kyi skyon yang yod[180] de| de dag gi phyogs la ba lang gi spu dang| lug gi bal[181] dag las rtswa dū rba'i[182] rgyun 'byung ba'i phyir dang| rwa[183] las smyig[184] ma skye ba'i phyir ro||

'dir smras pa| lung las byung[185] ba yang rtags yin pas chud mi za ba yang bcom ldan 'das kyis gsungs la| de'i rtags rtag pa ma yin[186] pa dang|[187] chad pa ma yin pa nyid kyang grub pa'i phyir las bzhin du[188] don[189] dam par chud mi za ba yang ma[190] grub pas gtan tshigs kyi don {C176a} ma grub pa nyid do[191] zhes[192] gang smras pa de rigs pa ma yin no||

'dir bshad {D176a} pa| bcom ldan 'das kyis|[193]

gang phyir de ni ma {N196a} skyes pa||[194]
de phyir chud zar[195] mi 'gyur ro|| [MMK 17-21cd]

zhes gsungs pas| de'i phyir ma skyes pa la chud za bar mi 'gyur ro[196] zhes gang gsungs pa de 'dod la de yang pha rol po'i phyogs la ma grub pas rang la don ma grub pa nyid do||

ngo bo nyid yod par smra bas kyang las la[197] ngo bo nyid med do[198] zhes nges par[199] khong du chud par bya dgos so|| gzhan du dam bcas na|[200]

gal te las la dngos nyid yod||
rtag par 'gyur bar[201] the tshom med|| [MMK 17-22ab]

rang bzhin ni mi 'gyur ba'i phyir ro[202] zhes bya bar dgongs so||

de'i phyir|[203]

las ni byas pa ma yin 'gyur||
rtag la bya ba med phyir ro|| [MMK 17-22cd]

las ma byas pa la 'bras bu myong ba yod par rtog na|

ci ste las ni ma byas na||
ma byas pa dang phrad 'jigs[204] 'gyur||
[MMK 17-23ab]

gzhan {P219a} yang|[205]

tshangs[206] spyod gnas pa ma yin pa'ang||
de la skyon du thal bar 'gyur|| [MMK 17-23cd]

tshangs pa ni mya ngan las 'das pa'o|| tshangs par spyod pa ni de[207] la[208] spyod pa'o|| tshang par spyod pa la gnas pa ni de'i don du gnas pa'o||[209] tshangs par spyod pa la gnas pa ma yin pa ni[210] tshangs

par spyod pa la mi gnas pa'o|| de la tshangs par spyod pa la gnas pa ma yin pa yang tshangs[211] par spyod pa la gnas pa'i skyon du thal bar 'gyur te| mya ngan las 'das pa thob par byed pa'i las ma byas pa nyid la yang de yod[212] par 'gyur ba'i phyir ro[213] zhes bya bar dgongs so||

de bzhin du bum[214] pa dang| snam bu dag gyis shig[215] ces bya ba la sogs pa'i|[216]

tha snyad thams cad nyid dang yang||
'gal bar 'gyur ba the tshom med|| [MMK 17-24ab]

gzhan yang|

bsod nams dang ni sdig byed pa'i||
rnam par dbye ba'ang[217] 'thad mi 'gyur||
[MMK 17-24cd]

'di ni bsod nams byed pa'o|| 'di ni sdig pa byed pa'o[218] zhes bya ba'i rnam par dbye ba dag kyang 'thad pa nyid du mi 'gyur ro||

de yi rnam smin[219] smin gyur pa||
yang dang yang du rnam smin {N196b} 'gyur||
[MMK 17-25ab]

de yi rnam smin smin gyur pa||[220] zhes bya ba ni de'i rnam par smin pa smin zin par gyur pa ste| las kyi 'bras bu bskyed zin pa zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go|[221] gal te ci'i phyir las kyi rnam par smin pa smin zin kyang| yang dang yang du rnam par smin par 'gyur bar[222] bshad ce na|

gal te gang phyir las gnas pa||
{C176b} de phyir ngo bo nyid yod phyir||
[MMK 17-25cd]

gal te gang gi phyir {D176b} las ngo bo nyid kyis nges par gnas pa de'i phyir ngo bo nyid yod pa'i phyir ro|| gal te de gnas su zin kyang yang 'bras bu bskyed[223] par mi nus te 'bras bu bskyed[224] zin pa'i phyir| nges par spyad zin pa'i dpang[225] rgya bzhin no zhe na| nges par spyad pa'i dpang[226] rgya yang don dam par[227] ma grub pa'i phyir de[228] ni lan[229] ma yin no||

phyir rgol ba dag na re| {P219b} don dam par las ni yod pa kho na yin te| de'i rgyu yod pa'i phyir ro|| 'di na gang med pa de la ni rgyu mi 'thad de| dper na rus[230] sbal gyi spu'i gos bzhin no|| las la ni rgyu nyon mongs pa dag yod pas de'i phyir gtan tshigs ji skad smos pa'i mthus don dam par las ni yod pa kho na yin no zhe na|[231] de ni bzang po ma yin te|[232]

las 'di[233] nyon mongs bdag nyid na||
nyon mongs de dag yang dag min||
gal te nyon mongs yang dag min||[234]
las ni de yis ji ltar byas|| [MMK 17-26]

las 'di[235] nyon mongs bdag nyid na|| zhes bya ba ni las 'di nyon mongs pa'i[236] rgyu las byung ba yin na[237] zhes bya ba'i tha tshig ste|[238] dper na bum pa 'jim pa'i bdag nyid yin na[239] zhes bya ba lta bu'o|| nyon mongs de[240] dag yang dag min|| zhes bya ba ni nyon mongs pa'i ngo bo nyid med do[241] zhes bya ba'i tha tshig ste| skye ba bkag pa'i phyir dang| 'dod chags dang[242] chags pa brtag par de'i ngo bo nyid bkag pa'i phyir ram| yang na 'og nas|

gang dag sdug dang mi sdug pa'i||
phyin ci log la brten[243] 'byung ba||
de dag ngo bo nyid med pas||
de phyir nyon mongs yang dag min|| [MMK 23-2]

zhes 'gog par 'gyur ba'i {N197a} phyir ro|| de'i phyir de ltar gal te nyon mongs pa de dag yang dag par ngo bo nyid med pa yin na las de| de dag gis byas par ji ltar 'gyur te| las kyi rgyu nyon mongs pa ma yin no zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go|[244] de'i phyir gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid dam| don 'gal ba nyid do||

'dir smras pa| don dam par nyon mongs pa[245] rnams ni yod pa kho na yin te| de dag gi 'bras bu yod pa'i phyir

ro|| 'di na[246] gang med pa de la ni 'bras bu gzung du med de| dper na[247] 'on pa'i rna ba'i dbang po la 'bras bu rna ba'i rnam par shes pa bzhin no|| nyon mongs pa[248] rnams la ni 'bras bu las dang lus kyi mtshan nyid {P220a} yod pas de'i phyir don dam par[249] nyon mongs pa {C177a} rnams ni yod pa kho na yin pas gtan tshigs kyi don ma {D177a} grub pa nyid dang|[250] don 'gal ba nyid ma yin pa'i phyir 'dod pa'i don grub po||[251] yang na don dam par las ni yod pa kho na yin te| de'i 'bras bu yod pa'i phyir ro|| 'di na gang med pa de la ni 'bras bu med de| dper na nam mkha'i me tog gi 'bras bu bzhin no|| las la ni 'bras bu lus kyi mtshan nyid yod pas de'i phyir don dam par las ni yod pa kho na yin pas[252] las[253] yod pa ma yin par sgrub pa'i rjes su dpag pa dag la rtog ge[254] phyi mas gnod par 'gyur ro|||

'dir bshad pa|

las dang nyon mongs pa dag ni||
lus rnams kyi ni rkyen du bstan|| [MMK 17-27ab]

bstan bcos las de ltar bstan pa ni tha snyad pa dag yin gyi don dam pa ni ma yin no|| don dam par ni kho bo cag gi phyogs la sgrub pa sngar bstan pa dag gis|

gal te las dang nyon mongs pa||
de stong lus la ji ltar brjod|| [MMK 17-27cd]

las dang nyon mongs pa dag la ngo bo nyid med pa'i phyir las dang nyon mongs pa dag kho na bzhin du lus kyang ma grub pa'i phyir ro zhes bya bar dgongs so|| {N197b} de'i phyir de dag gi 'bras bu yod pa'i phyir ro[255] zhes bya ba'i gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pas[256] ji skad bstan pa'i skyon yang ma nyams la[257] dpe ma grub pas| rtog ge phyi mas gnod pa yang med do||

smras pa| don dam par las ni yod pa kho na yin te| de'i 'bras bu la longs spyod pa'i za ba po yod pa'i phyir ro|| 'di na gang med pa de la ni de'i 'bras bu la[258] longs spyod pa'i za ba po med de| dper na nam mkha'i me tog gi phreng ba bzhin no|| las la ni 'bras bu la longs spyod pa'i za ba po|[259]

ma rig bsgribs[260] pa'i skye bo gang||
sred[261] ldan de ni za ba po||
de yang byed las gzhan min zhing||
{P220a} de nyid de yang ma yin no|| [MMK 17-28]

zhes bya ba[262] yod[263] de| de la ma rig pa ni rig[264] pa'i mi mthun pa'i phyogs su gyur pa'i chos so|| des bsgribs[265] pa ni gYogs pa'o|| skye bo gang zhes bya ba ni skye ba po gang yin pa ste srogs chags so|| sred ldan zhes bya ba la sred pa ni[266] 'dod pa'o|| de la kun tu sbyor ba de nyid yod pas sred ldan te| sred pa'i kun tu

sbyor ba dang ldan pa zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go|[267] de ni las kyi 'bras bu za ba po ste| ji skad du[268] mdo sde las|[269]

ma rig[270] bsgribs[271] pa'i sems can dag|
sred pa'i kun tu sbyor dang ldan||[272]

zhes bya ba dang| de {C177b} bzhin du ji ste khyod {D177b} rang nyid kyis sdig pa'i las 'di byas na khyod rang nyid kyis de'i rnam par smin pa nyams su myong bar bya dgos so[273] zhes gsungs pa'i phyir ro|| de yang byed pa po las gzhan[274] ma yin zhing| de nyid de yang ma yin te| de nyid dang gzhan nyid du brjod par bya ba ma yin pa'i phyir ro|| de'i phyir[275] gtan tshigs ji skad smos pa'i mthus las kyi 'bras bu la longs spyod pa'i za ba po yod pas| don dam par las ni yod pa kho na yin no||

'dir bshad pa| de ni bstan bcos kyi dang po kho nar dngos po spyir|[276]

de phyir[277] rkyen las byung[278] ma yin||[279]
{N198a} rkyen min las byung 'bras bu ni||
yod min 'bras bu med pas na||
rkyen min rkyen du ga la 'gyur||[280] [MMK 1-14]

zhes bshad[281] zin pas|

gang gi phyir na las 'di ni||
rkyen las byung ba ma yin zhing||
rkyen min las byung yod min pa||
de phyir byed pa po yang med|| [MMK 17-29]

de yang de bzhin du ma skyes pa'i phyir dang| byed pa po bkag pa'i phyir dang| rdzas[282] su yod pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro zhes bya bar dgongs so|| de'i[283] phyir de ltar sgrub[284] pa ji skad bstan pas|

gal te las dang byed med na||
las skyes 'bras bu ga la yod|| [MMK 17-30ab]

des na|

ji ste 'bras {P221a} bu yod min na||
za ba po lta ga la yod|| [MMK 17-30cd]

za[285] ba po'i sgrar brjod pa nyid kyi rgyu med pa'i phyir ro zhes bya bar dgongs so|| de'i phyir de'i 'bras bu la longs spyod pa'i za ba po yod pa'i phyir ro[286] zhes bya ba'i gtan tshigs de'i don ma grub pa nyid do|| log par ston na[287] ni don 'gal ba nyid do||

'dir kha cig gis smras pa| las dang 'bras bu la skur pa 'debs pa'i lta ba ni log par lta ba yin pas| dbu ma smra ba lta ba'i skyon gyi ling tog[288] gis blo gros kyi mig bsgribs[289] pa rnams la de kho na mthong ba mi 'thad do||

'dir bshad pa|

ji ltar sprul pa ston byed pa||
rdzu 'phrul phun sum tshogs pa yis||[290]
sprul zhing sprul pas gzhan sprul byed||
sprul pa des kyang gzhan dag ltar|| [MMK 17-31]

sprul par byed pa zhes bya bar sbyar ro||

de bzhin byed pos las gang byas||
de yang sprul pa'i rnam pa bzhin|| [MMK 17-32ab]

de bzhin du byed pa pos las gang byas pa'i byed pa po de yang sprul pa'i rnam pa bzhin te| thog ma med pa nas rkyen brgyud pa las byung ba'i bdag nyid bzhin yin[291] pa'i phyir ro|| las de yang sprul pa'i rnam pa bzhin {D178a} te| ngo bo nyid med pa'i phyir ro||

dper na sprul pas sprul gzhan {N198b} zhig||[292]
sprul pa mdzad pa {C178a} de bzhin no||
[MMK 17-32cd]

dper na de bzhin gshegs pa'i sprul pas sprul pa gzhan zhig sprul pa mdzad pa de la yang ngo bo nyid med pa bzhin no||

nyon mongs las dang lus rnams dang||
byed pa po dang 'bras bu dag||

dri za'i grong khyer lta bu dang||
smig rgyu rmi lam 'dra ba yin|| [MMK 17-33]

rgyu dang rkyen tshogs pas bskyed pas tha snyad du grags pa mtho ris dang[293] byang grol 'thob[294] pa'i tshogs su gyur pa dag tha snyad du khas len pas| de'i phyir las dang 'bras bu la skur pa mi 'debs pas ji skad smras {P221b} pa'i skyon med do||

gal te don dam par de dag la skur pa btab pas[295] de ni lan ma yin no zhe na| de ni sngar|[296]

gal te dngos por ma grub na||
dngos med grub par mi 'gyur ro|| [MMK 15-5ab]
yod ces bya ba rtag par 'dzin||
med ces bya ba chad par lta||
de phyir yod dang med pa la||
mkhas pas gnas par mi bya'o|| [MMK 15-10]

zhes bya ba bstan[297] pa der sgrub[298] pa smras pas| las dang 'bras bu med par smra ba khas ma[299] blangs pa'i phyir lan ma yin pa ma yin[300] no||

yang na[301] rnam par rmongs pa'i sems dang ldan pa dag don dam par dngos po rnams ngo bo nyid med pa nyid yin na las dang 'bras bu dang de dag 'brel pa dang| byed pa po dang za ba po dag med pas tshangs par spyod pa la gnas pa don[302] med par 'gyur ro snyam du sems pa[303] rnams kyi rnam par rmongs pa'i yol ba bshu[304] ba'i phyir las la sogs pa kun rdzob tu sprul pa la sogs pa'i rnam pa bzhin

du yod par bstan pa'i phyir|[305]

ji ltar sprul pa ston byed pa||

rdzu 'phrul phun sum tshogs pa yis||[306]

sprul zhing sprul pas[307] gzhan sprul byed||[308]

sprul pa des kyang gzhan dag ltar|| [MMK 17-31]

zhes bya ba la sogs pa rgya cher gsungs so||

de la 'dir rab tu byed pa'i don[309] ni| pha rol pos[310] rab tu byed pa'i dang por smras pa'i gtan tshigs kyi skyon brjod pas| las {N199a} dang 'bras bu ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du bstan pa yin no|| de'i phyir gang la las kyang med[311] las kyi 'bras bu yang med pa de ni byang chub bo||[312] byang chub ji lta ba bzhin du 'thob pa yang de bzhin no|| 'thob pa ji lta bzhin du lung bstan pa yang de bzhin no|| de bzhin du 'phags pa rnams kyi rigs gang yin pa de la ni las kyang med las kyi rnam par smin pa yang med do|| rigs {C178b} de la ni lus {D178b} kyis[313] kyang las mi byed| ngag gis[314] kyang mi byed| yid kyis {P222a} kyang mi byed do[315] zhes bya ba la sogs pa gsungs pa de dag grub pa yin no||

slob dpon legs ldan byed kyis nye bar sbyar ba| dbu ma'i rtsa ba'i 'grel pa shes rab sgron ma las| las dang 'bras bu brtag pa zhes bya ba ste| rab tu byed pa bcu bdun pa'o||

Notes to Tibetan Text of *Prajñāpradīpa*, Chapter Seventeen

[1]N: de.

[2]D: ba, C: pa.

[3]C: bu'i.

[4]PN *omm.* med pa nyid.

[5]DC: khyod.

[6]DC *omm.* |.

[7]N: pas.

[8]C: ba.

[9]P: lang.

[10]P: ba'i.

[11]P: ba.

[12]P: |.

[13]N: sdam.

[14]PN *omm.* ba.

[15]D: ||.

[16]C: yang.

[17]N: zhas.

[18]C: 'jig.

[19]PN: la.

[20]P: di.

[21]D: ||.

[22]DC: *add* rkyen.

[23]C: deg.

[24]DC: te| *for* pa ste|.

[25]PC: |.

[26]P: dpa´.

[27]C: dong.

[28]PN omm. |.

[29]PN add phyir.

[30]P: |.

[31]P: ⌈.

[32]PN: dpa´.

[33]PN: kyi.

[34]PN: kyis.

[35]N: pa´i.

[36]N: do| da for de| de.

[37]PN: bsam.

[38]PN omm. bya ba.

[39]DC omm. de.

[40]PN omm. gi yin te| lus dang ngag.

[41]P: spyad.

[42]N: yid.

[43]C: lang.

[44]P: ba´i.

[45]PN: yid.

[46]PN: po.

[47]PN add |.

[48]PN: ba.

[49]P: sbong.

[50]N: byad.

51 C *omm.* yin.

52 PNDC: spyad.

53 PNDC: spyad.

54 PN: spyad.

55 DC: 'di.

56 P: lad ngos *for* la dngos.

57 PNDC: spyad.

58 DC: spyad.

59 PNDC: spyad.

60 D: ||.

61 P: ba zlog *for* bzlog.

62 PN: khongs su.

63 PN: ba.

64 DC *omm.* |.

65 C: dad.

66 PN: bu.

67 N: kya.

68 P: 'dir.

69 N: sman.

70 DC *add* yin.

71 DC: te.

72 P *ad.* ||.

73 D: ||.

74 PN: smig.

75 PN. *add* ||.

76 P: ||.

[77] PN: smig.

[78] PN: bar.

[79] P: ba´i.

[80] N: ra||.

[81] DC *add* |.

[82] C: pas.

[83] DC: dang|, N: ram.

[84] PN: pa´i.

[85] P *om.* ||, C: |.

[86] PN *add* ||.

[87] PN *omm.* na.

[88] DC: ´gag.

[89] PN: ´gag.

[90] P: rtag.

[91] PN *add* bya bar.

[92] DC *omm.* bzhin pa.

[93] P N *add* |.

[94] C: ba.

[95] DC: srugs.

[96] C: ba.

[97] PN: mngon.

[98] P: pa.

[99] DC: ´byung||.

[100] DC: ni.

[101] N: sams.

[102] PNDC: ´gag *for* pa ´gags; Ava P36a-6: pa ´gag,

D30b-4: pa ´gags.

103 P om. dang mi ´dod pa.

104 PN omm. pa.

105 PN omm. par.

106 C: ´kyur.

107 DC: skyed.

108 PN omm. nges par.

109 PN add ||.

110 DC add na.

111 PN: kyi.

112 PN: ´thob.

113 N: thab.

114 DC: po las ni for po´i las kyi.

115 C: ba.

116 N: ta|.

117 N: dpar.

118 DC add |.

119 N ad. dge ba dang.

120 PN add |.

121 P: ni.

122 P: ni.

123 DC: ji.

124 N: spyod.

125 DC omm. de.

126 P: ´byung.

127 DC omm. ||.

[128] C: spong.

[129] DC add |.

[130] P ad. ||.

[131] PND: yi||, C: yin||.

[132] DC: skye bar for bskyed par.

[133] PND: skyed.

[134] P: 'thun.

[135] PN: ris.

[136] N: |.

[137] PN: gyi.

[138] PN: pas.

[139] PN: 'pho, C: 'phas.

[140] PN: spong.

[141] P: spang.

[142] P: |.

[143] PNDC: nar; Ava P43a-7, D36b-3: na.

[144] N: |.

[145] N: om. ||.

[146] DC: de'i.

[147] PN omm. de.

[148] DC: nar.

[149] DC: kyis.

[150] PNDC: pa; Ava P43b-8, D37a-2: na.

[151] DC omm. yang.

[152] PN: skyed.

[153] PN: skyed.

[154] C: dbang.

[155] P: |.

[156] C: ||.

[157] DC: sgom.

[158] PN: la.

[159] DC: nar.

[160] P *ad*. su.

[161] PN: rtag.

[162] PN *omm*. |.

[163] P: rnam sa *for* rnams.

[164] PNDC *omm*. chud mi za ba ste|; Ava P45b-4, D38a-7: chud mi za ba ste|.

[165] N: ro|.

[166] PN: rtag.

[167] PN *add* ||.

[168] PN *add* ||.

[169] PN: |.

[170] PN *omm*. pa.

[171] DC: las.

[172] PN *add* |.

[173] PN: kyi.

[174] PN: pa.

[175] DC *add* |.

[176] DC: pa'i dra *for* pa 'dra.

[177] PN: de'i.

[178] N: ba'i.

179 PN omm. kyi.

180 C: mod.

181 N: pal.

182 DC: dūr ba'i.

183 P: ngwa.

184 PN: smin.

185 PN: 'byung.

186 C: min.

187 DC omm. |.

188 DC add |.

189 N: dan.

190 PN omm. yang ma.

191 PN add ||.

192 PN: ces.

193 PN omm. |.

194 PN: |.

195 PN: za bar for zar.

196 PN add ||.

197 C om. la.

198 PN add ||.

199 DC: de for nges par.

200 DC: ||.

201 PN: ba.

202 PN add ||.

203 PN omm. |.

204 DC: 'jig.

205 DC *omm.* |.

206 P: tshungs.

207 N: da.

208 PN: las.

209 PN *omm. preceding sentence*.

210 DC *add* |.

211 C: tshongs.

212 N: yid.

213 PN *add* ||.

214 N: pum.

215 PN *add* |.

216 PN *omm.* |.

217 DC: ba.

218 PN *add* ||.

219 PNDC: par; Ava P51a-1, D42b-4: smin.

220 P: |.

221 D: ||.

222 P: par.

223 PN: skyed.

224 PN: skyed.

225 C: dbang.

226 C: dbang.

227 P *om*. par.

228 N: da.

229 DC: lam.

230 P: rul; N: ru.

231 C: ||.

232 P: ||.

233 DC: ni.

234 PN *omm*. 17-26c.

235 DC: ni.

236 D: ba'i.

237 PN: te|.

238 PN: go|.

239 PN *add* |.

240 PNDC: sems; Ava P52a-2, D43b-3: de.

241 PN *add* ||.

242 DC *add* |.

243 PN: rten.

244 D: ||.

245 C: ba.

246 P: 'den, C: 'dir *for* 'di na.

247 PN *add* |.

248 C: ba.

249 DC *add* |.

250 DC: do||.

251 P: bo||.

252 PN *add* |.

253 DC: lus.

254 C: gi.

255 PN *add* ||.

256 PN *add* |.

[257]C: nyams| *for* nyams la.

[258]N: sa.

[259]PDC: ||.

[260]PN: sgribs.

[261]PN: sreg.

[262]PN *add* yang.

[263]N: mod.

[264]PN: rigs.

[265]PN: sgribs.

[266]D: na.

[267]DC: ||.

[268]DC *add* |.

[269]PN *omm*. |.

[270]DC *add* pa.

[271]PN: bsgrib, DC: sgribs.

[272]PN *omm*. ||.

[273]PN *add* ||.

[274]PN *add* yang.

[275]N *ad*. |.

[276]PN *omm*. spyir|.

[277]PN *omm*. de phyir.

[278]PN *add* ba.

[279]PN: |.

[280]PN: |.

[281]PN: dpyad.

[282]P: rjas.

283$_{C}$: da'i.

284$_{PN}$: bsgrub.

285$_{P}$: bra.

286$_{PN}$ add ||.

287$_{DC}$: pa.

288$_{P}$: rtog.

289$_{PN}$: bsgrib.

290$_{PN}$: yi||.

291$_{PN}$ omm. yin.

292$_{PD}$: |.

293$_{PN}$ add |.

294$_{PN}$: thob.

295$_{P}$: bas.

296$_{PN}$ omm. |.

297$_{P}$: ba stan for bstan.

298$_{DC}$: bsgrub.

299$_{PNDC}$ omm. ma; Ava P56a-8, D47a-1: ma.

300$_{C}$: min.

301$_{PN}$ add |.

302$_{C}$: non.

303$_{P}$: ba.

304$_{C}$: pa shu for ba bshu.

305$_{DC}$: phyir ro|| for phyir|.

306$_{PN}$: yi||.

307$_{PNDC}$: pa.

308$_{C}$ om. byed||.

[309] C: do na for don.

[310] P: po sa for pos.

[311] PN add |, C: mad.

[312] C: po||.

[313] PN: kyi.

[314] N ad. las.

[315] P: byed| for byed do, N ad. ||.

Tibetan Text of Prajñāpradīpa, Chapter Twenty-three

{P275b-6, N250b-1, D219b-6, C219b-7} da[1] ni de bzhin du stong pa nyid kyi mi mthun pa'i phyogs kyi khyad par dgag pas| phyin ci log ngo bo nyid med[2] pa nyid du bstan pa'i don gyi[3] dbang gis rab tu byed pa nyi shu gsum brtsam mo||

'dir smras pa|

> 'dod chags {C220a} zhe sdang gti mug rnams||
> kun tu rtog las byung bar gsungs|| [MMK 23-1ab]

bstan bcos las so|| 'dod chags dang| zhe sdang dang| gti mug de dag kyang| go rim bzhin du|

> sdug dang mi sdug phyin ci log|
> brten pa nyid las {P276a} kun tu 'byung||
> [MMK 23-1cd]

nyid las zhes bya {D220a} ba'i sgra ni nges par gzung ba'i don te| sdug pa dang[4] mi sdug pa'i phyin ci log la brten pa nyid las kun tu 'byung gi| ma brten par mi 'byung ngo[5] zhes nges par gzung gi| sdug pa dang| mi sdug pa'i phyin ci log nyid la brten nas zhes bya bar ni nges par mi gzung ste| de dag skye ba'i rkyen tshul bzhin ma

yin pa yid la byed pa la sogs pa dag kyang yod pa'i phyir ro||

de ltar na de ni[6] chos mthun pa'i dpe'i tshig yin te| bsgrub par bya ba dang| sgrub pa'i chos kyi dbang[7] gis dpe bstan pas yan lag lhag ma dag mngon no|| de'i phyir rjes su dpag pa ni don dam par phung po la sogs pa dag ngo bo nyid yod pa kho na yin te| rgyu la brten nas 'byung ba'i phyir dper na| 'dod chags la sogs pa bzhin no|| gang ngo bo nyid med pa de ni rgyu la[8] brten nas mi 'byung ste| dper na nam mkha'i me tog bzhin no|| phung po la sogs pa dag ni rang rang gi rgyu la brten nas 'byung bas| de'i phyir gtan tshigs ji skad smos pa'i mthus don dam par phung po la sogs pa dag ngo bo nyid yod pa kho na yin no||

'dir bshad pa|

> gang dag sdug dang mi sdug pa'i||
> phyin ci log la brten {N251a} 'byung ba||
> [MMK 23-2ab]

'dod chags la sogs pa nyon mongs pa khyod kyis[9] dpe nyid du bstan pa dag go|[10]

> de dag ngo bo nyid las med||[11] [MMK 23-2c]

gang gi phyir sngar bstan pa'i tshul gyis so||

de phyir nyon mongs yang dag med|| [MMK 23-2d]

yang dag par zhes bya ba ni don dam par zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go|[12]

de'i phyir sgrub[13] pa dpe ma tshang ba'i skyon yod do|| tha snyad pa'i dper[14] rtog na ni bsgrub par bya ba chos ma tshang ba nyid kyi lan gdab dka' ste| don dam par nyon mongs pa rnams ngo bo nyid med pa'i phyir ro|| tha snyad {P276b} pa'i ngo bo nyid yod pa nyid du sgrub {C220b} na ni grub pa la sgrub pa yin no||

yang gzhan yang|

bdag gi yod nyid med nyid ni|| [MMK 23-3a]

don dam pa dang kun rdzob kyi tshul la bltos nas|[15]

ji lta bur yang 'grub pa med|| [MMK 23-3b]

yang zhes bya ba'i sgra ni nges par gzung[16] ba'i don te| 'grub pa med pa nyid do zhes bya ba'o||

de ltar bdag|

de med nyon mongs rnams kyi[17] ni||
yod nyid med nyid ji ltar 'grub|| [MMK 23-3cd]

mi 'grub pa nyid do zhes bya ba'i tshig gi don to||[18] brten[19] pa ni rten yod na yod par 'gyur ba'i phyir ro[20] zhes bya bar dgongs so||

don de nyid gsal bar bya ba'i phyir 'di[21] {D220b} bshad de|

nyon mongs de dag 'ga' las 'byung|| [MMK 23-4a]

de'i yon tan yin pa'i phyir dang| de'i longs spyad par bya ba yin pa'i phyir ro||

de yang 'grub pa yod ma yin||[22] [MMK 23-4b]

ji ltar zhe na| de ltar bdag brtag pa'i rab tu byed pa nyid du brtags[23] zin to|| de ltar na 'dis ni nyon mongs pa rnams kyi chos ni rten med pa yin par bstan to|| de'i phyir rjes su dpag pa ni|[24] don dam par 'dod chags la sogs pa dag yod pa ma yin te| de dag gi rten med pa'i phyir dper na| mo gsham gyi bu'i sngo bsangs nyid bzhin no||

rang gi sde pa dag na re| bdag med du zin kyang sems kyi nyon mongs pa rnams so[25] zhes {N251b} 'brel pa[26] 'grub ste| nyon mongs pa[27] rnams ni sems de'i chos yin pa'i phyir| bdag med par smra ba rnams la gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid do[28] zhes zer ro||[29]

gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid ma yin te| sems

kyi skye ba bkag pa'i phyir dang|[30] rnam par shes pa'i ngo bo nyid bsal ba'i phyir dang| de rdzas su yod pa nyid bkag pas sems ma grub pa'i phyir ro||

gang dag yod par smra ba dag na re 'di ltar kho bo {P277a} cag ni gcig la gcig med pas| dngos po'i mtshan nyid med par smra ba yin pas| nyon mongs pa rnams yod pa ma yin no[31] zhes bya ba de grub pas| sems las byung ba rnams la[32] dngos po rnams kyi ngo bo nyid med pa dang|[33] 'brel par yang grub par 'gyur ro zhes zer ro||

de dag gi phyir 'di bshad de| khyed bum pa dang| snam bu dag la de las gzhan pa'i dngos {C221a} po'i mtshan nyid med par 'dod pa gang yin pa de ni dngos po dang| dngos po med par snang ba'i blo skye ba'i rgyu yin pa'i phyir dngos po'am[34]| dngos po med pa zhig yin grang na| de la gal te dngos po yin na ni[35] dam bcas pa nyams so|| ci ste dngos po med pa yin na ni 'o na| des na bum pa 'di'i sngo ba nyid dang| dmar ba nyid 'di'o zhes bya ba'i 'brel pa med pa'i phyir tha snyad med par[36] 'gyur bas de'i phyir bshad pa|

gal te gang med ci zhig yod||[37] [MMK 23-4c]

rten bum pa'am[38] rnam bu gang zhig med par brten[39] pa sngo ba nyid dam dmar ba nyid ji zhig[40] yin par 'dod|[41]

nyon mongs 'ga' yang yod ma yin|| [MMK 23-4d]

mo gshams kyi bu la sogs pa'i mtshan nyid dngos po med pa la[42] zhes bya bar dgongs so|| de ltar ni mi 'dod pas de'i phyir yod pa ma yin pa {D221a} dpe nyid du mi rung bas 'dod pa'i don grub pa med do||

rang gi sde pa rnams kyi phyir yang 'di bshad par bya ste|

rang lus lta bzhin nyon mongs rnams|| [MMK 23-5a]

rang zhes bya ba ni bdag dang bdag gi'o|| lus zhes bya ba ni ming[43] dang[44] gzugs nye bar {N252a} bsags pa'i rnam[45] grangs so|| rang gi lus la lta ba zhes bya ba ni| rang gi lus la dmigs pa'i nyon mongs pa can gyi lta ba'o|| rang gi lus la lta ba bzhin[46] zhes bya ba ni rang gi lus la lta ba dang 'dra ba[47] ste|[48] ji ltar|[49]

sku min sku las gzhan ma yin||
de la {P227b} sku med der de med||
de bzhin gshegs pa sku ldan min||
de bzhin gshegs pa gang zhig yin||[50] [MMK 22-1]

zhes bya ba bzhin du nyon mongs pa rnams kyang de dang 'dra'o|| nyon mongs pa rnams zhes bya ba ni gnod pa'i don gyis nyon mongs par byed pa dag go|[51]

nyon mongs can la rnam lngar med|| [MMK 23-5b]

nyon mongs can gyi sems la ste| nyon mongs pa rnams ni nyon mongs pa can ma yin te| de las gzhan ma yin pa nyid bkag pa'i phyir dang| sreg pa dang| bsregs[52] pa dag gcig pa nyid du thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro|| nyon mongs pa rnams ni nyon mongs pa can las gzhan pa yang ma yin ste| snga ma bzhin du de las gzhan nyid bkag pa'i phyir dang| nyon {C221b} mongs pa rnams med par yang[53] nyon mongs pa can nyid du thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir[54] ro|| nyon mongs pa rnams nyon mongs pa can la med cing| nyon mongs pa can yang nyon mongs pa rnams la med la| nyon mongs pa rnams nyon mongs pa can dang ldan pa yang ma yin te| gzhan nyid med pa kho na'i phyir ro|| de ltar nyon mongs pa rnams nyon mongs pa can la rnam pa lngar med do||

rang lus lta bzhin nyon mongs can||
nyon mongs pa la rnam lngar med|| [MMK 23-5cd]

nyon mongs pa can nyon mongs pa rnams la rnam pa lngar[55] med pa yang de bzhin du sbyar bar bya'o|| de la nyon mongs pa rnams med pa'i phyir| dpe la bsgrub[56] par bya ba chos ma tshang ba nyid kyi[57] skyon yod do||

yang gzhan yang| gang gi tshe kho bo cag gi phyogs la|

sdug dang mi sdug phyin ci log|

{N252b} ngo bo nyid las yod min pa|| [MMK 23-6ab]

de'i tshe|

sdug dang mi sdug phyin ci log|
brten nas nyon mongs gang dag yin|| [MMK 23-6cd]

'byung ba zhes bya ba'i tshig gi lhag ma'o|| de'i phyir don dam par nyon mongs pa {D221b} rnams kyi chos ni brten nas 'byung ba {P278a} ma yin pas| dpe la sgrub[58] pa'i chos ma tshang ba nyid kyi skyon yod do||

rang gi sde pa dag yang phyir zlog[59] par byed de|

gzugs sgra ro dang reg pa dang||
dri dang chos dag rnam drug ni|| [MMK 23-7ab]

rnam pa drug go|[60] de dag ci zhig[61] yin zhe na|

gzhi ste [MMK 26-7c1]

'di la gnas pas gzhi ste| de dag las 'byung ngo zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go|[62] gzugs zhes bya ba ni gzugs su rung ba'o|| sgra zhes bya ba ni bsgrag tu rung ba'o|| dri zhes bya ba ni bsnam tu rung ba'o|| ro zhes bya ba ni myang du rung ba'o|| reg pa zhes bya ba ni reg byar rung ba'o|| chos dag ces bya ba ni rang gi mtshan nyid 'dzin

pa'i phyir ro||

rnam pa drug po de dag gang gi gzhi yin zhe na|

'dod chags zhe sdang dang||[63]

gti mug gir ni rnam par brtag||[64] [MMK 23-7c2,d]

'dod chags ni chags par byed pa ste| lhag par chags pa'o|| zhe[65] sdang ni sdang bar byed pa ste| sems can rnams la kun nas mnar sems bskyed pa'o|| gti mug ni rmongs par byed pa ste| mi shes pa'o|| 'dis ni phyin ci log gi chos ni gzhi yod pa yin par bstan {C222a} to||

de'i phyir rjes su dpag pa ni don dam par sdug pa dang| mi sdug pa'i phyin ci log gang dag la brten nas 'byung ba'i 'dod chags la sogs pa dag ni yod pa kho na yin te| de dag gi gzhi yod pa'i phyir ro|| 'di na gang don dam par yod pa ma yin pa de la ni gzhi med de| dper na long ba'i mig gi rnam par shes pa bzhin no|| 'dod chags la sogs pa dag la ni gzhi phyin ci log dag tu rnam par brtag pa gang dag yin pa dag yod pas| de'i phyir gtan tshigs ji skad smos pa'i mthus phyin ci log dag yod pas de dag la {N253a} brten nas| nyon mongs pa rnams 'byung ba 'grub pas[66] {P278b} dpe'i skyon med do||[67]

'dir bshad pa|

gzugs sgra ro dang reg pa dang||[68]

dri dang chos dag 'ba' zhig pa||[69] [MMK 23-8ab]

'ba zhig ces bya ba ni ngo bo nyid med pa ste| ngo bo nyid kyi dri tsam gyis kyang ma bsgos pa dag yin no||

tha snyad kyi bden pa la skur pa 'debs pa yang ma yin te| 'di ltar[70] de dag ni|[71]

dri za'i grong khyer lta bu dang||[72]
smig rgyu rmi lam 'dra ba yin|| [MMK 23-8cd]

dri za'i grong khyer lta bu zhes bya ni yul dang dus nges pa dang|[73] rgyud nges pa med par dmigs par bya ba nyid dang chos mthun pa'i phyir ro|| smig rgyu 'dra ba zhes bya ba ni ngo bo nyid stong pa nyid yin yang de la {D222a} mngon par zhen pas yongs su tshol ba'i phyir rkyen gyi dngos por nye bar 'gro ba dang| chos mthun pa'i phyir ro|| rmi lam 'dra ba zhes bya ba ni ngo bo nyid med pa nyid yin yang re zhig par 'dod pas rgyu dang[74] 'bras bu sgrub pa'i dngos por nye bar 'gro ba dang|[75] chos mthun pa'i phyir ro||

gang gi phyir rnam pa de lta bu'i gzugs la sogs pa|[76]

sgyu[77] ma'i skye bu lta bu[78] dang||[79] [MMK 23-9a]

log par snang ba dang| chos mthun pa'i phyir ro||

gzugs brnyan 'dra ba de dag la|| [MMK 23-9b]

byed pa po'i bya ba la[80] mi ltos[81] par skye ba nyid dang| chos mthun pa'i phyir ro||

de'i phyir|[82]

sdug pa dang ni mi sdug pa||
'byung bar yang ni ga la 'gyur|| [MMK 23-9cd]

zhes bya ba smras te| 'byung bar mi 'gyur ba nyid de| don dam pa pa'i ngo bo nyid stong pa'i phyir ro[83] zhes bya bar dgongs so|| de'i phyir don dam par gzhi ma[84] grub {C222b} pa'i phyir[85] gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa[86] nyid dang| don 'gal ba nyid yod do||

gzhan yang|

gang la brten nas mi sdug pa||[87] [MMK 23-10a]

mi sdug pa zhes bya bar 'gyur ba'o||[88]

mi sdug par[89] ni gdags bya ba|| [MMK 23-10b]

mi sdug pa gang 'di ni mi sdug pa'o zhes mi sdug pa'i ngo bo nyid du 'o bu cag gis gdags par bya'o||

sdug pa ma bltos[90] {N253b} yod min pas||
[MMK 23-10c]

sdug pa {P279a} de mi[91] sdug pa la ma bltos[92] par sdug[93] pa'i bdag nyid du yod pa ma yin pas zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go|[94]

de'i phyir sdug pa 'thad ma yin|| [MMK 23-10d]

mi sdug pa med pa'i phyir sdug pa yang de la ma bltos[95] par sdug pa nyid du mi 'gyur ba nyid kyi phyir ro[96] zhes bya bar dgongs so||

de bzhin du|

gang la brten nas sdug pa ni||[97] [MMK23-11a]

sdug pa zhes bya bar rab tu 'grub pa'o||

sdug pa zhes ni gdags[98] bya ba|| [MMK 23-11b]

sdug pa gang 'di ni sdug pa'o[99] zhes sdug pa'i ngo bo nyid du 'o bu cag gis gdags par bya'o||

mi sdug ma bltos[100] yod min pas||[101] [MMK 23-11c]

mi sdug pa de sdug pa la ma bltos[102] par mi sdug pa'i

bdag nyid du grub pa med pas so||

de phyir mi sdug 'thad ma yin||[103] [MMK 23-11d]

gang gi phyir de ltar sdug pa yod pa ma yin pa de'i phyir mi sdug pa yang sdug pa de la ma bltos[104] par mi sdug pa nyid du mi 'gyur ba nyid kyi phyir ro[105] zhes bya bar dgongs so||

de'i phyir de ltar|[106]

sdug pa yod pa ma yin na||
'dod chags 'byung bar ga la 'gyur||
mi sdug yod pa ma yin na||
zhe sdang 'byung[107] bar ga la 'gyur|| [MMK 23-12]

de dag med pa'i phyir gti mug kyang med de| de {D222b} dag med pa kho nas de yang yod pa ma yin par grub po||[108] de dag brjod na[109] skyon med pa ma yin pas[110] de'i phyir gtan tshigs kyi skyon [111] ji skad bstan pa ldog pa med do||

||dbu ma'i rtsa ba'i 'grel pa shes rab sgron ma||[112] bam po bcu bdun pa||[113]

'dir smras pa| don dam par sdug pa dang| mi sdug pa'i phyin ci log dag ni yod pa kho na yin te| bcom ldan 'das kyis mdo sde las gsungs pa'i phyir ro|| bcom ldan 'das kyis gang mdo sde las gsungs pa de ni yod de|[114]

dper na[115] bdag med pa nyid bzhin no|| mdo sde[116] las| {P279b, C223a} mi rtag pa la rtag pa dang| bdag med pa la {N254a} bdag dang| sdug bsngal ba la bde ba dang| mi sdug pa la sdug par 'dzin pa ni phyin ci log go zhes gsungs pa de dag yod pas| de'i phyir don dam par sdug pa dang| mi sdug pa'i phyin ci log dag yod pa kho na yin no||

'dir bshad pa| gal te 'ga' zhig log par bsgrub[117] pa yod na tha snyad pa'i sdug pa dang| mi sdug pa'i phyin ci log dag bsgrub pa la ni sgrub[118] pa 'di rung ngo|| don dam par ni mi rung ngo||

sangs rgyas rnams kyis bdag dang ni||

bdag med gang yang med par gsungs||[119] [MMK 18-6cd] zhes bya ba der lan btab zin pas| bdag med[120] pa nyid ma grub pa'i phyir dpe med do||[121]

gtan tshigs kyang med de| don dam par mdo sde las| phyin ci log dag yod par gsungs par khas ma blangs pa'i phyir ro|| 'dir phyin ci log ni[122] rnam pa gnyis te| 'khor ba dang| mya ngan las 'das pa dang| rjes su mthun pa'o|| de la 'khor ba dang| rjes su mthun pa ni 'di lta ste| mi rtag pa la rtag pa zhes bya ba la sogs pa'o|| mya ngan las 'das pa dang| rjes su mthun pa ni 'di lta ste| mi rtag pa la mi rtag pa zhes bya ba la sogs pa'o|| de gnyi ga yang phyin ci log ste| rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes thob pas spang bar bya ba yin te| de'i mi mthun pa'i phyogs yin pa'i phyir ro||

gal te mi rtag pa la sogs pa la| mi rtag pa la sogs

par lta ba ni phyin ci ma log pa'i phyir phyin ci log nyid yin par mi rigs so[123] zhe na|[124] phyin ci log ces bya ba de'i don gang yin| gal te mi rtag pa la rtag go[125] zhes log par lta ba'i don to zhe na| de'i {D223a} phyir bshad pa|

gal te mi rtag rtag pa zhes||[126] [MMK 23-13a]

mi rtag pa rtag pa nyid kyis[127] stong pa la rtag pa zhes so||

de ltar 'dzin pa log yin na||[128] [MMK 23-13b]

de ltar {N254b} shes pa phyin ci log gi {P280a} don la dmigs pa'i phyir phyin ci log yin na'o|| de lta na|

stong la rtag pa yod min pas||[129]
'dzin pa ji ltar log {C223b} ma yin||[130]
[MMK 23-13cd]

stong pa la rtag pa nyid kyang ngo bo nyid kyis[131] stong pa'i phyir[132] stong pa la rtag par 'dzin pa ji ltar phyin ci log ma yin te| de ni phyin ci log nyid[133] yin no[134] zhes bya ba'i tshig gi don te| dper na gal te khams gsum pa las| 'dod chags dang bral na| ji ltar grol ba ma yin te[135] grol ba nyid yin no[136] zhes bya ba bzhin no||

ji ltar don dam par stong pa la rtag pa nyid kyang| ngo bo nyid kyis stong par 'dod ce na| sngar bstan pa'i tshul gyis ma skyes pa'i phyir dper na| mya ngan las 'das pa bzhin no||

yang na|

gal te mi rtag mi rtag ces|| [MMK 23-14a]

mi rtag pa mi rtag pa nyid kyis[137] stong pa la mi rtag pa zhes so||

de ltar 'dzin pa log min na|| [MMK 23-14b]

de ltar shes pa phyin ci log gi don la dmigs pa ma yin pa'i phyir phyin ci log ma yin na'o|| de lta na|

stong la[138] mi rtag yod min pas||[139]
'dzin pa ji ltar log ma yin|| [MMK 23-14cd]

stong pa la mi rtag pa nyid kyang ngo bo nyid kyis stong pa'i phyir stong pa la mi rtag par 'dzin pa yang ji ltar phyin ci log ma yin te| de yang phyin ci log nyid yin no[140] zhes bya ba'i tshig gi don te| de'i chos ni rnam par rtog pa nyid yin pa'i phyir dper na| rtag par 'dzin pa bzhin no[141] zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go|[142]

de ltar na 'dir glags yod pa'i[143] tshig yin pa'i

phyir pha rol po'i dam bcas pa'i don las bzlog pa'i tshig gi don mngon te| dper na[144] gal te bum pa byas pa mi rtag na| sgra byas pa yang ci'i phyir mi rtag par mi 'gyur zhes bya ba bzhin no|| 'dir sbyor ba'i tshig ni don dam par gzugs mi rtag go[145] zhes bya bar shes pa de ni phyin ci log yin te| rnam par rtog pa nyid yin pa'i phyir|[146] dper na| {P280b} gzugs rtag go zhes bya bar shes pa bzhin no||

gal te 'du byed rnams {N255a} stong ngo zhes bya bar shes pa rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa dag gis ma nges pa nyid do zhe na| de yang phyin ci log yin pa'i phyir skyon med do||

gal te de lta na stong pa nyid kyi[147] ye shes kyang {D223b} thar pa thob par byed pa ma yin te| phyin ci log yin pa'i phyir dper na| nang gi skye mched {C224a} rnams kyi yul la bde ba la sogs par shes pa bzhin no zhe[148] na| 'dir dam bcas pa de'i don gang yin| gal te mig[149] stong par shes pa thar pa thob par byed pa ma yin no[150] zhe[151] na ni grub pa la sgrub pa yin te| thar pa ni rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes kyis[152] thob[153] pa yin pa'i phyir ro|| ci ste rnam par mi rtog pa'o zhe na ni| de phyin ci log gi shes pa nyid yin par ma grub pa'i phyir gtan[154] tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid do||

gal te stong pa nyid kyi ye shes rnam par mi rtog pa yang thar pa thob par byed pa ma yin te| rnam par mi rtog pa'i phyir dper na byis pa'i mig gi rnam par shes pa

bzhin no[155] zhe na|[156] rang la gtan tshigs kyi don ma nges pa nyid de| 'gog pa shes pa bsgom pa las byung ba dag gis ma nges pa nyid yin pa'i phyir ro|| rang la gtan tshigs kyi[157] don ma grub pa nyid kyang yin te| stong pa nyid kyi ye shes kyang ngo bo nyid rnam par rtog pas rnam par rtog pa yin pa'i phyir ro|| rjes su dpag pas kyang mi gnod de| rang la dpe med pa nyid kyi phyir ro||

gzhan yang thar pa thob par byed pa ma yin te[158] zhe bya ba de'i don gang yin| gal te thar pa mi byed pa'o zhe na ni grub pa la sgrub pa yin te|[159] thar pa ni byas pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro|| gal te don ji lta ba bzhin du shes pa ma yin no zhe na ni| rang la ma nges pa nyid de|[160] mngon sum gyi blo dag gis ma nges pa'i phyir ro||

'dis ni rnam {N255b} par {P281a} mi rtog pa'i ye shes kyang phyin ci log gi shes pa yin te| rnam par mi rtog pa'i phyir mig gi rnam par shes pa bzhin no[161] zhes zer ba dag la yang lan btab par rig par bya'o||

ji ste mngon sum gyi shes pa rnam par rtog pa dang bcas par smra ba dag[162] 'di skad ces mngon sum gyi shes pa ni rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa yin te| shes pa yin pa'i phyir dang| tshad ma yin pa'i phyir dper na[163] rjes su dpag pa'i shes pa bzhin no[164] zhe na| de dag la yang[165] 'di skad ces lhas byin gyi mngon sum gyi blo ni rnam par rtog pa med pa yin te| mngon sum gyi gzugs kyi yul can yin pa'i phyir dang| {C224b} mig la brten pa'i phyir dper na byis pa'i mig gi rnam par shes pa bzhin

no[166] zhes brjod par bya'o||

de'i phyir tha snyad du ni shes pa de[167] dag gis ma nges pa {D224a} nyid yin la| don dam par ni dpe med de| rjes su dpag pa la sogs pa'i shes pa dag kyang rab tu dben pa dang| ro[168] gcig pas mtshan nyid gcig pa'i phyir ro||

zhar la bshad pas mchog gi[169] skabs nyid kyi dbang du bya'o||

ji ltar mi rtag pa la[170] rtag pa dang[171] mi rtag par 'dzin pa phyin ci log yin pa de bzhin du bdag dang| bde ba dang| sdug pa dag la|[172] bdag dang bde ba dang[173] sdug pa dang| bdag med pa dang| sdug bsngal ba dang| mi sdug par 'dzin pa dag kyang phyin ci log yin par brjod par bya'o||

gzhan dag gis dam bcas pa'i don sgro btags nas smras pa| 'dzin pa ni yod pa kho na yin te| de 'dzin par byed pa dang| 'dzin pa po dang gzung[174] ba dag yod pa'i phyir ro|| 'di na gang yod pa ma yin pa de la ni gsum po de dag med de| dper na ri bong gi rwa bzhin no|| phyin ci log tu 'dzin pa la ni shes pa gang gis 'dzin par byed pa dang|[175] {P281b} 'dzin pa po phung po'i bdag nyid dang| gzung ba gzugs[176] la sogs pa dag yod pas {N256a} de'i phyir gtan tshigs ji skad smos pa'i mthus| phyin ci log tu 'dzin pa ni yod pa kho na yin no||

'dir bshad pa|

gang gis[177] 'dzin dang 'dzin gang dang||[178]
'dzin pa po dang gang gzung ba||
thams cad nye bar zhi ba ste||
de[179] phyir 'dzin pa yod ma yin|| [MMK 23-15]

gang gis 'dzin par byed pa ni dngos po'i[180] rang dang spyi'i mtshan nyid la dmigs pa'i shes pas so|| 'dzin pa gang yin pa ni sgro 'dogs pa dang| skur pa 'debs pa'i bdag nyid do|| 'dzin pa po ni ming dang gzugs kyi bdag nyid dam| de las gzhan pa'o|| gang gzung ba ni gzugs la sogs pa'o|| de dag ni skabs ji lta ba bzhin du ngo bo nyid stong par bstan zin pas| des na 'dzin par byed pa la sogs pa thams cad nye bar zhi ba ste|

de phyir 'dzin pa yod ma yin||[181] [MMK 23-15d]

'dzin pa bzhin du de dag yod pa nyid du ston pa'i gtan tshigs dang| dpe ma grub pa'i phyir ro zhes bya bar dgongs so||

de'i phyir de ltar|

log pa'am yang dag nyid du ni||
'dzin pa yod pa ma yin na|| [MMK 23-16ab]

rtag pa dang mi rtag pa la {C225a} sogs par ro|| 'o na don dam par[182]|

gang la phyin ci log yod cing||

gang la phyin ci ma log yod|| [MMK 23-16cd]

rnam par mi rtog pa'i shes rab kyi spyod pa la gnas pa la| rtag pa dang| mi rtag pa la sogs par shes pa kun tu mi 'byung ba'i phyir ro zhes bya bar {D224b} dgongs so||

yang na gang dag 'di skad ces phyin ci log rnams ni yod pa kho na yin te| de dang ldan pa yod pa'i phyir ro|| dper na gdugs dang ldan pa yod na| gdugs yod pa de bzhin du phyin ci log dang ldan pa'i byis pa 'di dag yod pas| de'i phyir[183] phyin ci log rnams ni yod pa kho na yin no zhes zer na| de dag gi phyir 'di bshad de|

log pa'am yang dag nyid du ni||

'dzin pa yod pa ma yin na|| [MMK 23-16ab]

rnam pa gnyi ga yang sngar bstan pa'i {N256b} sgrub pas skye ba la sogs par {P282a} ma grub pa'i phyir ro|| de bzhin du|

gang la[184] phyin ci log dang ni||

gang la phyin ci ma log yod|| [MMK 23-16cd]

phyin ci log gang la ltos nas[185] 'di ni phyin ci log dang ldan pa'o|| 'di ni phyin ci ma log pa dang ldan pa'o zhes bya ba de dag kyang phyin ci log bzhin du yod pa ma yin te| gang la phyin ci log yod pa dang| gang la phyin ci ma log pa yod pa de dag[186] yod pa ma yin pa nyid do zhes bya ba'i tshig gi don to|| de'i phyir don dam par gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid dang| dpe yang med la| kun rdzob tu ni[187] don 'gal ba nyid kyang yin

no||

yang gzhan yang| ´di la phyin ci log dang ldan pa ´di ni phyin ci log dang bcas par ´dod na| de yang phyin ci log tu gyur pa ´am| phyin ci log tu ma gyur pa ´am| phyin ci log tu ´gyur bzhin[188] pa zhig yin[189] grang na| de la|

phyin ci log tu gyur pa la||
phyin ci log dag mi srid do|| [MMK 23-17ab]

de dag dang ldan pa la[190] de dag dang ldan par ´gyur ba don med pa nyid du ´gyur ba´i phyir ro||

phyin ci log tu ma gyur la||
phyin ci log dag mi srid do|| [MMK 23-17cd]

de dag dang bral ba´i phyir dper na ´phags pa bzhin no||

phyin ci log tu ´gyur bzhin la||
phyin ci log dag mi srid do|| [MMK 23-18ab]

skyon gnyi gar ´gyur ba´i phyir {C225b} ro||

phyin ci log tu gyur pa dang| phyin ci log tu ma gyur pa dang| phyin ci log tu ´gyur[191] bzhin pa ma gtogs pa´i phyin ci log dang ldan pa mi ´thad pas[192] de´i phyir bshad pa| khyod nyid phyogs su lhung ba´i blo med par

gyis la|

gang la phyin ci log srid pa||
bdag nyid kyis ni rnam par dpyod|| [MMK 23-18cd]

phyin ci log dang ldan pa yod pa ma yin pa nyid do zhes bya ba'i tshig gi don to|| de'i phyir gtan tshigs dang[193] dpe'i skyon snga ma bzhin no||

gzhan yang| gang gi tshe don dam par ji skad bstan {D225a} pa'i tshul gyi dbang gis dngos po thams cad skye ba med par bstan pa de'i[194] tshe|

phyin ci log rnams ma skyes na||
ji lta bur na yod par 'gyur|| [MMK 23-19ab]

yod {N257a} par mi 'grub pa nyid de| ma skyes pa'i phyir ro zhes bya ba'i tshig gi don to||

{P282b} phyin ci log rnams skye med na||
phyin ci log can ga la yod|| [MMK 23-19cd]

phyin ci log can zhes bya ba ni phyin ci log dang ldan pa zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go|[195] de'i phyir gtan tshigs la sogs pa'i skyon de nyid yod do||

yang gzhan yang| don dam par|

gal te[196] bdag dang sdug pa dang||[197]
rtag dang bde ba yod na ni||
bdag shes sdug shes rtag shes dang||
bde[198] shes phyin ci log ma yin|| [MMK 23-20]

shes bya phyin ci log ma yin pa'i phyir ro zhes bya bar dgongs so|| 'dir bdag shes zhes[199] bya ba la sogs pa'i sgra ni| bdag la sogs pa de dag la gnas pa nyid kyi phyir| bdag la sogs pa shes pa yin par bstan to||

de bzhin du don dam par|

gal te bdag dang sdug pa dang||[200]
rtag dang bde ba med na ni||
bdag med mi sdug mi rtag dang||
sdug bsngal yod pa ma yin no|| [MMK 23-21]

bdag med pa la sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid ni bdag la sogs pa bsal[201] bas sam| de dag la bltos[202] pas bdag med pa nyid la sogs par 'grub pa'i phyir ro[203] zhes bya bar dgongs so|| bdag med pa la sogs pa ma grub pa'i phyir| gang dag la bdag la sogs par lta ba phyin ci log tu 'gyur[204] te| 'di ltar mi med na sdong[205] dum la mir mthong ba'i phyin ci log kyang med do|| phyin ci log nyid ma grub pa'i phyir gtan tshigs la sogs pa med pa'i skyon de {C226a} nyid bzlog dka'o||

'o na rnal 'byor pa de la de ltar rtag pa dang| mi

rtag pa la sogs pa'i phyin ci log dang| phyin ci log ma yin pa dag ma[206] grub pa'i phyir de dag tu rnam par rtog pa log par gyur ba na| yon tan ci zhig 'byung bar 'gyur zhe na| ji skad bstan pa'i tshul gyis[207] 'bras bu bstan par bzhed pas|

> de ltar[208] phyin ci log 'gags[209] pas||
> {N257b} ma rig pa ni 'gag par 'gyur|| [MMK 23-22ab]

phyin ci log dag gi rgyu yang ma rig pa yin pa'i phyir phyin ci log 'gags[210] pas| bdag la sogs {P283a} par lta ba'i rgyu ma rig pa 'gag par 'gyur ro||

> ma rig[211] 'gags[212] par gyur na ni||
> 'du byed {D225b} la sogs 'gag par 'gyur||
> [MMK 23-22cd]

'du byed la sogs pa zhes bya bar tshig[213] sbyar te| 'du byed dang| rnam par shes pa dang| ming dang| gzugs dang| skye mched drug dang| reg pa dang| tshor ba dang| sred pa dang| len pa dang| srid pa dang| skye ba dang| rga shi la sogs pa dag go|[214] de'i phyir[215] de ltar[216] ngo bo nyid med pa nyid rtogs[217] pa las[218] nyon mongs pa nye bar zhi ba 'grub po[219]||

ngo bo nyid yod par smra ba'i phyogs 'di la nyon mongs pa de dag yod par gyur pa'am[220]| med par gyur pa

zhig yin grang na| des cir ´gyur zhe na|

gal te la la´i nyon mongs pa||
gang dag ngo bo nyid yod na|| [MMK 23-23ab]

yod par gyur pa´i zhes ma smos kyang| skabs las shes par bya´o||

ji lta bur na spong bar ´gyur|| [MMK 23-23c]

ji ltar spong bar mi ´gyur zhe na|

yod pa su zhig spong bar byed|| [MMK 23-23d]

yod par gyur pa ni[221] ngo[222] bo nyid mi ´gyur ba´i phyir ro zhes bya bar dgongs so||

ji ste med par gyur pa[223] ri bong gi rwa lta bu´am[224]| gcig la gcig[225] med pa´i mtshan nyid lta bu yin na|[226] de lta na yang|

gal te la la´i nyon mongs pa||
gang dag ngo bo nyid med na|| [MMK 23-24ab]

´dir yang med par gyur pa zhes ma smos kyang| skabs las shes par bya´o||

ji lta bur na spong bar ´gyur|| [MMK 23-24c]

ji ltar spong bar mi ´gyur zhe na|

med pa su zhig spong bar byed|| [MMK 23-24d]

med par gyur pa´i med pa nyid ni spang du med pa´i phyir te| ´di ltar nam mkha´i me tog med pas[227] med pa´i ngo bo nyid {C226b} spong bar mi byed la| rta ngo bo nyid med pas kyang| rta med pa´i ngo bo nyid spong bar mi byed do||

ji ste yang[228] ´di snyam du nyon mongs pa yod par gyur pa rnams nyid gnyen po skyes pas| spong bar ´grub pa´i {N258a} phyir skyon med do snyam na| yod par gyur pa[229] gang gi gnyen po skyes pas| {P283b} ji ltar spong ba´i don de bstan dka´o||

de la ´dir nyon mongs pa rnams yod par gyur pa dang| med par gyur par rtog pa la de dag spong ba mi ´thad pas| glags yod pas nyon mongs pa rnams kyi chos ni spang ba yin par bstan to|| de´i phyir rjes su dpag pa ni don dam par nyon mongs pa rnams ngo bo nyid med de| spang ba yin pa´i phyir dper na|[230] sgyu ma mkhan gyis[231] sprul pa´i bud med dang| skyes pa dang| gzugs su byas pa´i na chung bzhin te| skyon rtogs[232] pa la {D226a} de dag spong ba yod do||

de la ´dir rab tu byed pa´i don ni| pha rol pos

smras pa'i sgrub[233] pa'i skyon brjod pa dang| rang gi sgrub pa kha na ma tho ba med pa bstan pas| phyin ci log ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du bstan pa yin no||

de'i phyir|

ji ltar ngag 'di gzugs can min[234]||[235]
kun nas dmigs su med pa ltar||
de ltar nyon mongs gzugs can min||[236]
gtan du dmigs su yod ma yin||[237]
ji ltar ngag 'di[238] yod pa min||
nang dang phyi na mi gnas ltar||
de ltar nyon mongs yod min pa||
nang dang phyi na gnas pa min||

zhes bya ba la sogs pa dang| de bzhin du

shā ra dwā[239] ti'i bu kun nas nyon mongs pa'i yongs su shes pa gang yin pa de ni yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin no|| de la ni kun nas nyon mongs pa 'ga'[240] yang med de| sems can phyin ci log tu gyur pa rnams ni kun nas nyon mongs par 'gyur ro|| phyin ci log gang yin pa de ni yod pa ma yin te| gang yod pa ma yin pa de la yod pa'i yongs su 'grub pa'am| mtshan nyid med do||[241] shā ra dwā[242] ti'i bu de ltar yongs su shes pa gang yin pa de ni| rnam par byang ba zhes bya'o

zhes bya ba la sogs pa dang| de bzhin du

de bzhin gshegs pas nyon mongs pa rnams {N258b} yod pa ma yin par mngon par {C227a} rdzogs[243] par sangs rgyas shing bstan te| gzugs su mi snang yang kun tu {P284a}

mkhyen la| gnis su ma mdzad kyang| mnon sum du mdzad cing thob pa yang med do[244]
zhes bya ba la sogs pa gsungs pa de dag grub pa yin no||[245]

slob dpon legs ldan byed kyis nye bar sbyar ba| dbu ma'i rtsa ba'i 'grel pa shes rab sgron[246] ma las| phyin ci log brtag pa zhes bya ba ste| rab tu byed pa nyi shu gsum pa'o||

Notes to Tibetan Text of Prajñāpradīpa, Chapter Twenty-three

[1]N: de.

[2]C: mad.

[3]DC: kyi.

[4]D ad. |.

[5]PN add ||.

[6]PNDC: de'i for de ni; Ava P259b-8, D216b-5: de ni.

[7]PN: bdag.

[8]PN: las.

[9]PN: kyi|.

[10]DC: ||.

[11]PN: |.

[12]D: ||.

[13]DC: bsgrub.

[14]PNDC: dpes; Ava P260b-7, D217b-2: dper.

[15]PN: bltos pas|; DC: ltos nas|.

[16]C: gzungs.

[17]DC: kyis.

[18]DC: te|.

[19]N: rten; DC: brtan.

[20]PN add ||.

[21]PN omm. 'di.

[22]P: |.

[23]PN: brtag.

[24]P: ||.

[25]PN *add* ||.

[26]D: ba.

[27]PN *omm.* pa.

[28]P *ad.* ||; N *ad.* |.

[29]N:|.

[30]DC *omm.* |.

[31]PN *add* ||.

[32]DC *add* |.

[33]DC *omm.* |.

[34]PNC: po 'am *for* po'am.

[35]P *om.* ni.

[36]PN: pa.

[37]PN: |.

[38]DC *add* |; PNC: pa 'am *for* pa'am.

[39]P: rten; N: rtan.

[40]PN: cig, DC: gcig *for* ji zhig; Ava P263a-2,3, D219b-1: ji zhig.

[41]P:||.

[42]PN *add* |.

[43]P: mi.

[44]DC *add* |.

[45]DC: rnams.

[46]DC *add* ||.

[47]DC: 'dra *for* dang 'dra ba.

[48]N *om.* |.

[49]N: lta; DC *omm*. |.

[50]PN *omm*. ||.

[51]DC: ||.

[52]PN: bsreg.

[53]PN *add* nyon mongs pa.

[54]PN *omm*. ba'i phyir.

[55]DC: lnga'i.

[56]PN: sgrub.

[57]P *om*. kyi.

[58]PNDC: bsgrub; Ava P264a-7, D220b-3: sgrub.

[59]PN: bzlog.

[60]DC: ||.

[61]PN *omm*. zhig.

[62]DC: ||.

[63]PN *omm*. dang||; DC: |.

[64]PN: gti mug ni chags par brtag *for* gti mug gir ni rnam par brtag||.

[65]PN: zhes.

[66]P: bas.

[67]P: de|.

[68]C: |.

[69]C: |.

[70]PN *add* |.

[71]PNDC *omm*. |; Ava P265b-1: |; Ava D221b-3: ||.

[72]PNDC: |; Ava *loc*. *cit*.: ||.

[73]P:||.

[74]DC add |.

[75]DC omm. |.

[76]PNDC, Ava P265b-6 omm. |; Ava D221b-7: |.

[77]PN: rgyu.

[78]PN omm. lta bu.

[79]PNDC: |.

[80]C om. la.

[81]PN: bltcs.

[82]PN omm. |.

[83]P ad. ||; N ad. |.

[84]DC: mi.

[85]PN omm. phyir.

[86]DC add de.

[87]P: |.

[88]PN omm. mi sdug pa zhes bya bar ´gyur ba´o||; D: pa´o for ba´o.

[89]PNDC: pa; Ava P266a-4, D222a-4: par.

[90]DC: ltos.

[91]PN: ni.

[92]DC: ltos.

[93]C: sdus.

[94]D: ||.

[95]DC: ltos.

[96]PN add ||.

[97]P: |.

[98]P: dags.

[99] PN add ||.

[100] DC: ltos.

[101] N: |.

[102] DC: ltos.

[103] C: |.

[104] DC: ltos.

[105] PN add ||.

[106] PN omm. |.

[107] PN: 'gyur.

[108] DC add de dag brjod na skyon yod pa ma yin par grub na|.

[109] P: ni.

[110] PN: pa.

[111] DC omm. kyi skyon.

[112] DC omm. ||.

[113] NDC: |.

[114] DC omm.|.

[115] PN add |.

[116] D: sda.

[117] DC: sgrub.

[118] P: bsgrub; DC: grub.

[119] P: |.

[120] D om. med.

[121] N: |.

[122] P ad. ||; N ad. |.

[123] PN add ||.

124 PNDC omm. |.

125 PN add |.

126 PN: |.

127 PN: kyi.

128 PN: |.

129 P: |.

130 PN: |.

131 PN: kyi.

132 PNDC add ro||; Ava P268a-1, D223b-6 omm. ro||.

133 DC: ma.

134 PN add ||.

135 PN add |.

136 PN add ||.

137 PN: kyi.

138 DC: pa.

139 P: |.

140 PN omm. de yang phyin ci log nyid yin no.

141 PN add ||.

142 D: ||.

143 N ad. phyir.

144 DC add |.

145 PN add |.

146 PN omm. phyir|.

147 PN: kyi.

148 D: zha.

149 PN: mi.

[150]PN *add* ||.

[151]P: zhes.

[152]PN: kyi.

[153]DC: 'thob.

[154]N: gnyan.

[155]PN *add* ||.

[156]PN *omm*. |.

[157]P: gyi.

[158]PN *add* |.

[159]DC: no|| *for* te|.

[160]C: do|.

[161]PN *add* ||.

[162]PN: dang.

[163]PN *add* |.

[164]PN *add* ||.

[165]DC *add* |.

[166]N *ad*. ||.

[167]P: da.

[168]P: no.

[169]DC: pa dag gis *for* gi.

[170]DC *omm*. mi rtag pa la.

[171]DC *add* |.

[172]DC *omm*. bdag dang| bde ba dang| sdug pa dag la.

[173]DC *add* |.

[174]PN: bzung.

[175]P *om*. |.

176 PNDC omm. gzugs; Ava P272b-4, D227b-6: gzugs.

177 PN: gi.

178 P: |.

179 P: de'i.

180 N: po'a.

181 C: |.

182 PN omm. don dam par.

183 PN add |.

184 DC: na.

185 PN omm. phyin ci log gang la ltos nas.

186 PNDC omm. yod pa de dag; Ava P273b-6, D228b-6: yod pa de dag.

187 DC omm. ni.

188 PN: yin; D: ba bzhin, C: pa bzhin for bzhin.

189 PN omm. yin.

190 PN omm. de dag dang ldan pa la.

191 DC add ba.

192 DC add |.

193 DC add |.

194 PNDC: pa'i for pa de'i; Ava P274a-7, D229a-6: pa de'i.

195 D: ||.

196 N: ta.

197 P: |.

198 PNDC: de; Ava P274b-4, D229b-3: bde.

199 PNDC omm. zhes; Ava P274b-5, D229b-4: zhes.

[200]P: |.

[201]DC: brtsal.

[202]DC: ltos.

[203]PN add ||.

[204]PNDC: gyur; Ava P275a-1, D229b-7: ´gyur.

[205]N: sdom; DC: sdang.

[206]PNDC omm. ma; Ava P275a-5, D230a-3: ma.

[207]PN: gyi.

[208]DC add |.

[209]PN: ´gag.

[210]PN: ´gag.

[211]PN add pa.

[212]PN: ´gag.

[213]C: tsig.

[214]D: ||.

[215]PN add |.

[216]PN add |.

[217]PN: rtog.

[218]C: la sas for pa las.

[219]PN: bo.

[220]PN: ´gyur ba ´am, C: gyur pa ´am for gyur pa´am.

[221]DC omm. ni.

[222]N: do.

[223]DC add ni.

[224]PNC: bu ´am for bu´am.

[225]PN: cig la cig for gcig la gcig.

226D om. |.

227DC omm. med pas.

228PN add |.

229PNDC: pas; Ava P276a-2, D230b-6: pa.

230P: ||.

231PN: gyi.

232PNDC: rtog; Ava P276a-7, D231a-3: rtogs.

233DC: bsgrub.

234DC: yin.

235NC: |.

236C: |.

237C: |.

238PN: ni.

239DC: sha ra dwa for shā ra dwā.

240P: dga'.

241DC: de|.

242DC: sha ra dwa for shā ra dwā.

243N: rdzags.

244PN add ||.

245N om. no||.

246P: sgrol.

Tibetan Text of <u>Prajñāpradīpa</u>, Chapter Twenty-six

{P312b-2, N286a-3, D249a-2, C251a-2} da[1] ni de bzhin du stong pa nyid kyi mi mthun pa'i phyogs kyi khyad par dgag pas tha snyad pa'i rten cing 'brel par[2] 'byung ba[3] bstan pa'i don gyi dbang gis rab tu byed pa nyi shu drug pa brtsam mo||

'dir smras pa| khyod kyis rab tu byed pa 'das ma thag par|

sangs rgyas gyis ni gang du yang||

su la'ang[4] chos 'ga' ma bstan to|| [MMK 25-24cd]

zhes smras pa ni| bcom ldan 'das kyis rten cing 'brel[5] par 'byung ba mu stegs byed kyi ri dags kyi tshogs thams cad 'byer[6] par byed pa| lta ba ngan pa'i skyon nye bar zhi bar byed pa[7] bka' stsal pa|[8] de thugs su chud pas bcom ldan 'das 'jig rten na sangs rgyas zhes bya bar snyan par grags pa de'i phyir khyod kyis de sun dbyung bar 'dod pas|

sangs rgyas gyis ni gang du yang||

su la'ang[9] chos 'ga' ma bstan to|| [MMK 25-24cd]

zhes smras pa yin pas de la khas blangs pas gnod par 'gyur ro||

de'i phyir bshad[10] pa|

ma rig bsgribs[11] pas yang srid phyir||

'du byed rnam pa gsum po dag|

mngon par 'du byed gang yin pa'i||
las de dag gis 'gro bar {N286b} 'gro|| [MMK 26-1]

zhes bya ba la sogs pa ste| de la ma rig pa zhes bya ba ni| rig[12] pa'i mi mthun pa'i phyogs su gyur pa'i chos sam|[13] rten cing 'brel[14] par 'byung ba'i yan lag bcu gnyis po bdag med pa| gYo ba med pa skad cig ma dag mi shes pa'i phyir ma rig pa'o[15]|| des bsgribs pas zhes bya ba[16] ni khebs pas[17] so|| 'dir ma rig pas bsgribs[18] pa[19] kho nas 'du byed rnams mngon par 'du {P313a} byed kyi|[20] ma bsgribs[21] pas ni mi byed do zhes nges par gzung[22] bar bya'i| ma rig pas bsgribs pas 'du byed rnams kho na {C251b} zhes ni nges par gzung[23] bar mi bya ste| rnam par shes pa la sogs pa yan lag lhag ma rnams la yang rgyu de yod pa'i phyir ro||

ma rig pa kho nas {D249b} bsgribs pas zhes[24] kyang nges par gzung[25] bar mi bya ste| de las gzhan pa'i nyon mongs pa rnams kyang yod pa'i phyir ro|| 'du byed rnams kyi rgyu nyid ni 'dod chags la sogs pa nyon mongs pa rnams kyang[26] yin na ma rig pa gzung[27] ba ni gtso bo nyid yin pa'i phyir te| dper na rgyal po rgyal ba dang dung gi ma 'gro ba bzhin no||

ci ste yang la la 'di snyam du mi dge ba'i 'du byed rnams ma rig pa'i rgyu las byung ngo zhes bya ba de ni gti mug mi dge ba yin pa'i phyir rigs na dge ba'i 'du byed rnams ji ltar snyam na| ma rig pa dang bcas pa lha'i

pho brang na lha mo dang rtsen pa'i bde ba nyams su myong bar[28] 'dod pas dge ba spyod pa bzhin du ma rig pa yang brgyud pas[29] rgyu nyid yin pa'i phyir dang| 'khor ba ni don dam pa'i mi dge ba yin pas der gtogs[30] pa'i dge ba yang mi dge ba yin pa'i phyir ma rig pa ni de mngon par 'du byed pa'i rgyu yin pa'i phyir skyon med do||

yang srid ces bya ba ni yod pa rgyu dang 'bras bu'i rgyun 'brel pas yang srid par 'gyur ba ste| yang skye ba zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go|[31] yang srid pa'i phyir zhes bya ba ni yang srid pa'i don du'o|| {N287a} 'du byed ces bya ba ni 'du byed rnams mngon par 'du byed pa'o|| rnam pa gsum po dag ces bya ba ni bsod nams dang| bsod nams ma yin pa dang| mi gYo ba'i bye[32] brag gis sam| lus dang ngag dang yid kyi 'du byed kyi bye brag gis so|| mngon par 'du byed pa[33] gang yin pa zhes bya ba ni bsod nams {P313b} la sogs pa'i[34] chung ngu dang| 'bring dang chen po'i bye brag dag[35] go|[36]

las de dag gis 'gro bar 'gro||[37] [MMK 26-1d]

zhes bya ba ni bsod nams su nye bar 'gro ba dang| bsod nams ma yin par nye bar 'gro ba dang| mi gYo ba'i nye[38] bar 'gro ba'i 'gro bar ro||

'du byed rkyen can[39] rnam par shes||
'gro ba rnams su 'jug par 'gyur|| [MMK 26-2ab]

zhes bya ba la[40] 'du byed rkyen can zhes bya ba ni

{C252a} gang la 'du byed kyi rkyen yod pa de ni 'du byed kyi rkyen can te rnam par shes pa'o||[41] rnam par shes pa zhes bya ba ni dngos po so sor rnam par rig pa'o|| 'gro ba rnams su zhes bya ba ni lha la sogs pa'i rigs su 'gro ba'i[42] 'gro ba rnams su'o|| 'jug par 'gyur zhes bya ba ni skye bar 'gyur ba'o||

'dir ni 'du byed kyi rkyen can gyi rnam par shes pa kho na 'jug par 'gyur ro[43] zhes kyang nges par gzung[44] mi bya {D250a} la| 'du byed kyi rkyen can kho na'i rnam par shes pa 'jug par 'gyur ro[45] zhes kyang nges par gzung[46] bar mi bya| 'du byed kho na'i rkyen can gyi rnam par shes pa 'jug par 'gyur ro[47] zhes kyang nges par gzung[48] bar mi bya ste| sems las byung ba rnams kyang 'jug par 'gyur ba'i phyir dang|[49] dgra bcom pa 'du byed yod kyang yang[50] srid par nying mtshams mi sbyor ba'i phyir dang| srid pa la sogs pa dag gi[51] rkyen yang yod pa'i phyir ro[52] zhes nges par mi gzung[53] ba'i dgos pa go rims bzhin du brjod par bya'o||

'dir slob dpon rnams kyi blo gros {N287b} dag tha dad par gyur te| kha cig na re bar ma do'i srid pa zhes bya ba'i ming[54] dang| gzugs kyi rgyun gyis[55] 'gro ba'i yul 'thob po[56] zhes zer ro|| gzhan dag na re rnam par shes pa 'du byed kyi rkyen can[57] 'gro bar skye ba nyid kyis 'gro ba 'thob po[58] zhes zer ro|||

de la snga ma pa dag na re sems can gzugs can gang du 'gags[59] pa {P314a} rnams kyi[60] gzugs kyi rgyun skye ba

ni rgyun chags su yul gzhan du skye bas yul gzhan thob par 'dod de| gzugs can yin na 'gro ba'i rgyun rjes su 'jug pa'i phyir[61] dper na mar me bzhin no|| yang na gzugs la brten[62] pa'i ming dang gzugs kyi rgyun gyis 'chi ba'i yul nas 'gro ba'i yul gzhan du skye ba'i phyir dper na gson po'i[63] gnas skabs bzhin no zhes zer ro||

phyi ma pa dag na re gzugs can gyi khams su 'chi ba dang| skye ba'i srid pa dag ni srid pa {C252b} gzhan gyis bar bu ma chod de|[64] zag pa dang bcas pa'i phyir dper na gzugs med par 'chi ba dang| skye ba'i srid pa dag bzhin no||

yang na lus can rnams kyi 'chi ba'i srid pa'i mjug thogs su lus gang[65] skye ba de ni bar ma do'i[66] srid pa'i lus ma yin pa'i phyir te| rnam par smin pa yin pa'i phyir dang| sdug bsngal gyi bden[67] par gtogs pa'i phyir dper na nye bar spyod pa'i lus bzhin no||

gzhan yang yid las byung ba'i lus yul gzhan 'thob pas 'gro ba'i rgyun rjes su 'jug pa'i phyir des gtan tshigs ma nges pa'i phyir bar ma do'i srid pa mi 'grub ste| bar ma do'i srid pa med par yang kha ton[68] dang|[69] mar me dang|[70] rgya dang| me long dang| skad dang| me shel dang| sa bon dang| skyur[71] dag gis phung po'i nying mtshams sbyor ba mi 'pho bar mkhas pa rnams kyis rtogs par {D250b} bya'o zhes zer ro||

gzhan ma yin pa na re[72] gzugs can yin na 'gro ba'i rgyun rjes su 'jug pa'i phyir zhes gtan tshigs khyad

{N288a} par can yin pa'i phyir snga ma dag la skyon de med do zhes zer ro||

rnam par shes pa zhugs gyur na||
ming dang gzugs ni chags par 'gyur|| [MMK 26-2cd]

zhes bya ba la| ming zhes bya ba ni 'gro ba rnams su[73] gzhol ba'am[74]| nyon mongs pa rnams {P314b} kyis[75] gzhol bar bya ba ste| phung po gzugs can ma yin pa bzhi po dag go|[76] gzugs zhes bya ba ni gzugs su rung ba ste| 'byung ba chen po bzhi dang ni[77] rgyur byas pa'i gzugs rnams so||

yang 'dir rnam par shes pa kho na'i rkyen can gyi ming dang gzugs zhes kyang nges par gzung[78] bar mi bya ste| ma[79] rig pa la sogs pa dag kyang de'i rkyen yin pa'i phyir ro|| rnam par shes pa'i rkyen can gyi ming dang[80] gzugs kho na zhes kyang nges par gzung bar mi bya ste| rdzus te skye ba rnams kyi skye mched drug gi rkyen[81] kyang rnam par shes pa yin pa'i phyir dang| gzugs med pa'i ming gi rkyen kyang rnam par shes pa yin pa'i phyir ro|| rnam par shes pa'i rkyen can kho na'i ming dang gzugs zhes kyang nges par gzung[82] bar mi bya ste| dgra bcom pa'i tha ma'i sems rkyen ma yin pa'i phyir ro||

{C253a} ming dang gzugs ni chags gyur na||
skye mched drug ni 'byung bar 'gyur|| [MMK 26-3ab]

zhes bya ba la skye mched ces bya ba la ni rnam par shes pa skye ba'i sgo 'byed par byed pa'o|| drug ces bya ba nang gi skye mched kyi dbang du byas pa'i phyir te[83]| de dag ni mig dang|[84] rna ba dang| sna dang| lce dang| lus dang| yid ces bya ba dag yin par 'dod do|| mig gi skye mched ni yul kha dog dang| gzugs dang ba dang| mig gi rnam par shes pa'i gnas dang ldan pa'o|| rna ba la sogs pa lus kyi bar gyi skye mched dag kyang yul sgra la sogs pa dang| gzugs dang ba dang|[85] rna ba la sogs pa'i {N288b} rnam par shes pa dag gi gnas dang ldan pa'o|| yid kyi skye mched ni rnam par shes pa'i tshogs drug po dag 'gags ma thag pa'o||

'dir yang ming dang gzugs kho na'i rkyen can gyi skye mched drug ces kyang nges par gzung bar mi bya ste| 'du[86] byed[87] la {P315a} sogs pa dag kyang de'i rkyen yin pa'i phyir dang| rdzus te skye ba rnams kyi skye mched drug gi rkyen ming 'ba' zhig kyang yin pa'i phyir ro|| {D251a} ming dang gzugs kyi rkyen can gyi skye mched drug kho na zhes kyang nges par gzung bar mi bya ste| reg[88] pa la sogs pa dag gi rkyen kyang ming dang gzugs yin pa'i phyir ro|| ming dang gzugs kyi rkyen can kho na'i skye mched drug ces kyang nges par gzung bar mi bya ste| dgra bcom pa'i tha ma'i ming dang gzugs rkyen ma yin pa'i phyir ro||

skye mched drug la brten nas ni||
de las reg pa 'byung bar 'gyur|| [MMK 26-3cd]

zhes bya ba la brten nas zhes bya ba ni gnas thob nas so||[89] de las zhes bya ba ni skye mched drug las so|| reg pa zhes bya ba ni phrad pa ste bde ba dang| sdug bsngal dang| sdug bsngal ba yang ma yin bde ba yang ma yin pa myong bar 'gyur ba ste| mtshan nyid 'og nas ston to||

mig[90] dang gzugs dang dran byed la||
brten nas skye ba kho na yin|| [MMK 26-4ab]

zhes bya ba la[91] dran byed ces bya ba ni yid la byed pa'o||

de ltar ming dang gzugs[92] brten nas||[93]
rnam {C253b} par shes pa skye bar 'gyur||[94]
[MMK 26-4cd]

'jug pa'i dus na ste| ji ltar mig dang gzugs la brten nas gzugs la dmigs pa'i rnam par shes pa skye ba de bzhin du rna ba dang| sgra la brten pa dang| yid dang chos rnams kyi bar la brten nas yid kyi rnam par shes pa skye bar[95] brjod par bya ste| skye mched drug gi 'bras bu skye ba brjod par 'dod pa'i phyir ro||

´o na reg pa de gang zhe na|

mig dang gzugs dang rnam par shes||[96]
{N289a} gsum po ´dus pa gang yin pa||
de ni reg pa [MMK 26-5ab,cl]

zhes bya ba yin te| gsum po zhes bya ba ni dbang po dang[97] yul dang|[98] rnam par shes pa rnams so|| ´dus pa zhes bya ba ni gcig tu tshogs pa {P315b} ste| de ni reg pa yin no|| mig la sogs pa smos pa ni khyad par bstan pa´i phyir te| de dag gi dbang gis reg pa brtag sla ba´i phyir ro||

reg pa de[99] las|[100]
tshor ba kun tu ´byung bar ´gyur||[101] [MMK 26-5c2,d]

zhes bya ba la[102] tshor ba zhes bya ba ni so sor rig pa´i don gyis te| rnam pa gsum myong ba´o|| kun tu ´byung bar ´gyur zhes bya ba ni mngon par ´byung bar ´gyur ba ste| reg pa´i rkyen can gyi[103] tshor ba[104] ´byung ngo zhes bya ba´i tha tshig go|[105]

tshor ba´i rkyen gyis sred pa ste||
tshor ba´i don la sred par ´gyur|| [MMK 26-6ab]

zhes bya ba la[106] sred pa zhes bya ba ni ´dod pa´i mtshan

nyid do||

tshor ba'i don la sred par 'gyur||[107] [MMK 26-6b]

zhes bya ba ni| byis pa thos pa dang mi ldan pa ral gri'i so la {D251b} sbrang rtsi'i[108] thigs pas skus pa[109] mngar ba'i ro yun thung ba lta bu'i 'gyur ba'i[110] sdug bsngal mnog chung la nyes dmigs che ba ma rtogs pa rnams de la sred par 'gyur ro||

ci ste 'di snyam du bde ba'i tshor ba ni phan 'dogs pa yin pas nyams su myong ba na yang dang yang du de 'dod pas[111] de la sred par 'gyur bar rigs na sdug bsngal gyi tshor ba ni snyams su myong ba na[112] gnod par 'gyur ba yin pas de[113] 'dod par mi 'gyur ba yin na ji ltar de'i rkyen gyis sred par 'gyur zhe na| sdug bsngal gyi tshor ba nyams su myong ba[114] na de dang 'bral bar 'dod pa'i sred pa skye bas skyon med do||

sred[115] par gyur pa nye bar len||
rnam pa bzhi po nyer[116] {C254a} len 'gyur||
[MMK 26-6cd]

zhes bya ba la[117] nye bar len pa zhes bya ba ni nye bar blang ba yin pas nye bar len pa'o|| kha cig na re| srid pa {N289b} 'phel ba nyid nye bar len pa'o zhes[118] zer ro|| gzhan dag na re| longs spyod rnams thob par bya ba'i phyir 'bad pa'o zhe'o|| rnam pa bzhi po zhes bya ba ni 'dod pa dang| lta ba dang| tshul khrims dang[119] brtul

zhugs mchog {P316a} tu 'dzin pa dang| bdag tu smra ba nye bar len pa'i msthan nyid dag go|[120]

nyer len yod na[121] len pa po'i[122]||
srid pa rab tu 'byung bar 'gyur|| [MMK 26-7ab]

zhes bya ba la| srid pa zhes bya ba ni las kyi srid pa zhes bya ba ste| srid par byed pas srid pa'o|| yang na srid pa ni 'byung ba ste| 'byung ba dang[123] skye ba zhes bya ba dag ni rnam grangs so|| srid pa'i rgyu'i las gang yin pa de srid pa ste| 'bras bu la rgyu nye bar btags pa'i phyir dper na sangs rgyas rnams 'byung ba bde'o[124] zhes bya ba bzhin no||

'dir yang reg[125] pa la sogs pa dag ni gnyi ga ltar yang nges[126] par gzung bar mi bya ste| rkyen nyid kyis de dag rkyen can yin pa'i phyir dang| de dag gzhan dag gi rkyen kyang yin pa'i phyir ro|| rnam par shes pa la sogs pa da ltar gyi dus su gtogs pa dag ni ma rig pa dang 'du byed ces bya ba dag gi rgyu las byung ba yin[127] no||

de la gal te dge ba'i bshes gnyen la brten pa dang| dam pa'i chos nyan pa dang| tshul bzhin yid la byed pas 'du byed rnams sdug bsngal ba la sogs pa'i rnam pa dag gis 'du byed kyi sdug bsngal nyid dam| ngo bo nyid stong pas ma skyes par mthong ba de'i tshe na de kho na shes pa skyes pas sred[128] par mi 'gyur zhing| sred[129] pa med na nye bar {D252a} len par mi byed pas|

gal te nye bar len med na||[130]
grol bar 'gyur te srid mi 'gyur|| [MMK 26-7cd]

rten cing 'brel par[131] 'byung ba phung po gsum pa la yang da ltar yod pa 'jig na 'bras bu nye bar ston pa yin la yod pa 'jig pa'i sbyor ba yang da ltar gyi dus kho na'i sbyor ba yin pa'i phyir ro||

nye bar len {C254b} pa yod {N290a} na srid pa zhes gsungs pa de'i mtshan nyid kyang gang zhe na|

srid pa de yang phung po lnga||[132] [MMK 26-8a]

'dir {P316b} yang phung po lnga'i rgyu[133] la phung po lnga zhes tha snyad btags te| phung po lnga ni srid pa kho na'o zhes nges par gzung bar[134] bya'i| phung po lnga kho na srid pa'o zhes ni nges par gzung bar mi bya ste| gzugs med pa'i khams kyi srid pa ni phung po bzhi po[135] yin pa'i phyir ro||

srid pa las ni skye ba 'byung||[136] [MMK 26-8b]

zhes bya ba la[137] skye ba zhes bya ba ni skye bas na skye ba ste| phung po rnams ma byung ba las 'byung ba'o||

rga shi dang ni mya ngan dang|| [MMK 26-8c]

zhes bya ba la[138] rga shi zhes bya ba[139] ni yongs 'gyur ba dang| 'jig pa'i rgyu dag go|[140] mya ngan zhes bya ba ni sdug pa dang bral bas bskyed[141] pa ste| nang gi yong su gdung ba'i mtshan nyid do||

smre sngags 'don bcas sdug bsngal dang||[142]
[MMK 26-8d]

zhes bya ba la| smre sngags 'don pa zhes bya ba ni skye bo snying du sdug pa chud zos pa'i yon tan kun tu[143] brjod pa la brten pa'i tshig brjod pa ste| yongs su smre[144] zhing smre sngags 'don pa'o|| sdug bsngal zhes bya ba ni lus kyi mi bde ba tshor ba'o||

yid mi bde[145] dang 'khrug pa rnams||[146] [MMK 26-9a]

zhes bya ba la| yid mi bde dang zhes bya ba ni sems kyi mi bde ba tshor ba'o|| 'khrug pa rnams zhes bya ba ni lus dang sems 'khrug pas 'khrug pa rnams so||

de dag skye[147] las rab tu byung||[148] [MMK 26-9b]

zhes bya ba ni de ltar rga shi la sogs pa ji skad bstan pa de dag skye ba las rab tu 'byung bar 'gyur ba'o||

de ltar sdug bsngal phung po ni||
'ba' zhig pa 'di[149] 'byung bar[150] 'gyur||
[MMK 26-9cd]

zhes bya ba la| sdug bsngal phung po zhes bya ba ni sdug bsngal gyi tshogs zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go|[151] 'ba' zhig pa zhes bya ba ni bde ba dang ma 'dres pa zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go|[152] 'di 'byung bar 'gyur zhes bya ba ni skye bar {N290b} 'gyur ba'o|| tha snyad kyi bden par gtogs pa'i phung po de 'byung ba de ni|[153] tha snyad pa'i rten cing {P317a} 'brel par 'byung ba yin no|| don dam par ni skye ba med pa'i rab tu byed par ji skad bstan {C255a} pa'i tshul {D252b} gyis yod pa ma yin pas khas blangs pa la gnod pa med do||

de ltar skye ba'i rgyun 'jug pa de ji ltar ldog par 'gyur zhe na| de'i phyir bshad pa| gang gi phyir mi mkhas pa rnams kyis mngon par 'du byas pa|

de phyir mkhas rnams 'khor ba ni||
rtsa ba'i 'du byed 'du mi byed|| [MMK 26-10ab]

'du byed kyi skyon mthong ba rnams yang dag pa[154] ji lta ba bzhin du mthong ba nyid kyis[155] de mngon par 'du mi byed pa'i phyir ro|| mi mkhas pa rnams ni 'du byed sgyu ma dang| smig rgyu lta bu thog ma med pa'i rkyen brgyud pa[156] las[157] byung[158] ba dag la de dag gi skyon ma

mthong ba'i phyir yang dang yang du bde ba nyams su myong bar 'dod pas mngon par 'du byed pas|

de[159] phyir mi mkhas byed pa yin||
mkhas min de nyid mthong phyir ro|| [MMK 26-10cd]

gnyen po skyes pa'i phyir dang| nyon mongs pa dang| shes bya'i sgrib pa'i ngo bo nyid kyi ma rig pa spangs pa'i phyir ro||

ma rig 'gags par gyur na ni||
'du byed rnams kyang 'byung mi 'gyur||
[MMK 26-11ab]

rkyen med pa'i phyir sa bon med pas[160] myu gu bzhin no||
ma rig pa 'gag[161] pa de yang|

ma rig 'gag[162] par 'gyur ba[163] ni||
shes pa de nyid bsgoms pas so|| [MMK 26-11cd]

chos bdag med pa nyid kyi yul can stong pa nyid shes pa rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba la dmigs pa de nyid ji skad bstan pa'i tshul gyis dngos po'i ngo bo nyid ma lus par dgag[164] pas bsgom zhing goms par bya bas so||

de dang de ni 'gags gyur pas[165]||

de dang de ni mngon mi 'byung|| [MMK 26-12ab]

'du byed la sogs pa srid pa'i yan lag snga ma de dang de gnyen po skyes pas 'gags par gyur pas rnam par shes {N291a} pa la sogs pa srid pa'i yan lag phyi ma de {P317b} dang de mngon par 'byung bar mi 'gyur te| 'du byed 'gags pas rnam par shes pa 'gag ces bya ba nas| skye ba 'gags pas rga shi 'gag ces bya ba'i bar du mngon par 'byung bar mi 'gyur ro||

sdug bsngal phung po 'ba' zhig pa||
de ni de ltar yang dag 'gag| [MMK 26-12cd]

tha snyad kyi bden pa yongs su gzung[166] ba las so|| don dam par ni ma rig pa la sogs {C255b} pa rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba'i yan lag ma skyes pa rnams la skye ba med pa'i phyir 'gag pa yang med do|| bcom ldan 'das kyis don[167] dam par rnam par byang ba'i rten cing 'brel[168] par 'byung ba bka' stsal par khas ma blangs pa'i phyir khas blangs pa la gnod[169] pa'i skabs med de| de la {D253a} 'dir rab tu byed pa'i don ni pha rol pos rab tu byed pa'i dang por dam bcas pa'i skyon bstan pa'i lan btab pas tha snyad pa'i rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba bstan pa yin no||

de'i phyir bcom ldan 'das kyis rten cing 'brel[170] par 'byung ba ni skye ba med pa[171] de'i phyir rten cing

'brel par 'byung ba zhes bya ste| gang la skye ba med pa de la 'gag pa ga la yod[172] de| 'gag pa med par rtogs pas[173] rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba rtogs so[174] zhes bya ba la sogs[175] pa ji skad gsungs pa de dag grub pa yin no||

slob dpon legs ldan byed kyis nye bar sbyar ba| dbu ma'i rtsa ba'i 'grel pa shes rab sgron ma las| srid pa'i yan lag bcu gnyis brtag pa zhes bya ba ste| rab tu byed pa nyi shu drug pa'o||

Notes to Tibetan Text of Prajñāpradīpa, Chapter Twenty-six

[1]DC: de.

[2]PN: pa.

[3]C: nga.

[4]C: la 'ang.

[5]C: 'dres.

[6]C: 'byed.

[7]DC add |.

[8]DC omm. |.

[9]C: la 'ang.

[10]C: ba shad for bshad.

[11]PN: sgribs; C: bsgri bas.

[12]C: rigs.

[13]DC omm. |.

[14]N: bral.

[15]N: pa'a.

[16]PN: bas.

[17]C: pa sa for pas.

[18]PN: sgribs.

[19]PNDC add mi byed do (N: da) zhes (DC: ces for do zhes) nges par gzung (PN: bzung) ba; Ava P363b-5, D306b-4 omm. mi byed do zhes nges par gzung ba.

[20]DC omm. |.

[21] PN: sgribs.

[22]PN: bzung.

[23]PN: bzung.

[24]DC: shes.

[25]PN: bzung.

[26]PN omm. kyang.

[27]PN: bzung.

[28]PN: bas.

[29]DC: rgyud las for brgyud pas.

[30]PN: btags; DC: brtags; Ava P364a-8, D307a-4: gtogs.

[31]DC: ||.

[32]C: bya.

[33]PN omm. pa.

[34]DC: pa.

[35]PN omm. dag.

[36]D: ||.

[37]PN omm. ||.

[38]C: nya.

[39]N: dang.

[40]DC add |.

[41]C: |.

[42]DC: pa'i.

[43]PN add ||.

[44]PN: bzung.

[45]PN add ||.

[46]PN: bzung.

[47]PN: add ||.

[48]PN: bzung.

[49]DC omm. |.

[50]PN omm. yang.

[51]PN: gis.

[52]PN add ||.

[53]PN: bzung.

[54]D: zhes ba'i ming, C: zhes bya'i mi for zhes bya ba'i ming.

[55]PN omm. rgyun gyis.

[56]PN: bo.

[57]PNDC add nye bar; Ava P365b-6, D308a-6 omm. nye bar.

[58]PN: bo.

[59]PN: 'gag.

[60]PNDC: kyis; Ava P366a-6, D308b-4: kyi.

[61]PN add |.

[62]N: rten.

[63]D: pa'i.

[64]PN: do||.

[65]PNDC: dag; Ava P367a-8, D309b-3: gang.

[66]C: mdo'i for ma do'i.

[67]P: bdan.

[68]PN: dog; DC: don; Ava P368a-3, D310a-4: ton.

[69]DC omm. |.

[70]PN omm. |.

[71]P: sgyar.

[72]PN add |.

[73]P: kyi.

[74]PN: ba 'am.

[75]P: su; N: kyi.

[76]DC: ||.

[77]DC omm. ni.

[78]C: da zug for gzung.

[79]P: mi.

[80]DC add |.

[81]DC add rnams.

[82]P: bzung.

[83]N: ta.

[84]DC omm. |.

[85]PN: dang ldan pa'o|| for dang|.

[86]P: 'di.

[87]N: byad.

[88]N: rag.

[89]P: nas| for gnas so||.

[90]PNDC: ming; Ava P370a-3: ming, D311b-7: mig.

[91]DC add |.

[92]PNDC add la.

[93]PNDC: |.

[94]PNC: |.

[95]PN: ba.

[96]PN: |.

[97] PN *add* |.

[98] PN *omm*. |.

[99] P: da.

[100] PN *omm*. |.

[101] PN *omm*. ||.

[102] DC *add* |.

[103] PN: gyis.

[104] DC *add* kun.

[105] DC: ||.

[106] DC *add* |.

[107] PN *omm*. ||.

[108] PN: rtsi.

[109] PNDC *add* dang; Ava P371b-2, D313a-4 *omm*. dang.

[110] PNDC: bur gyur pa (P: ba) ni *for* bu'i 'gyur ba'i; Ava P371b-2, D313a-4: bu'i 'gyur ba'i.

[111] DC *add* |.

[112] P: ni.

[113] DC: des.

[114] DC: bas.

[115] PN: srid.

[116] P: nye.

[117] DC *add* |.

[118] C: zhas.

[119] PN *add* |.

[120] DC: ||.

[121] DC: pa.

[122] C: pa´i.

[123] DC add |.

[124] PN add ||.

[125] C: rog.

[126] N: ngas.

[127] PNDC: bzhin; Ava P372b-1, D313b-7: yin.

[128] PN: srid.

[129] PN: srid.

[130] P: |.

[131] P: bar.

[132] P: |.

[133] PNDC: rgyun; Ava P373a-8: rgyu, D314b-5: rgyun. Following commentary in Ava supports rgyu.

[134] PN add mi.

[135] PN: pa.

[136] PN omm. ||.

[137] DC add |.

[138] DC add |.

[139] DC: pa for bya ba.

[140] DC: ||.

[141] DC: skyed.

[142] PN omm. ||.

[143] C: du.

[144] DC: smra.

[145] PN add ba.

[146] PN omm. ||.

[147]PN add ba.

[148]PN omm. ||.

[149]DC: ni.

[150]N: par.

[151]DC: ||.

[152]D: ||.

[153]N om. |.

[154]PN: par.

[155]PN: kyi.

[156]P: ba.

[157]C: la.

[158]N: byung.

[159]PN: de´i.

[160]DC: pa´i.

[161]DC: ´gags.

[162]DC: ´gags.

[163]PNDC: gyur na for ´gyur ba; Ava P374b-8, D316a-2: ´gyur ba.

[164]PN: ´gag.

[165]PND: ´gyur bas, C: ´gyur pas for gyur pas; Ava P375a-2, D316a-3: gyur pas.

[166]PN: bzung.

[167]N: dan.

[168]N: ´bral.

[169]N: gnad.

[170]N: ´bral.

[171]DC: pas.

[172]N: yad.

[173]DC <u>add</u> |.

[174]PN <u>add</u> ||.

[175]N: sags.

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Appendix A: Sanskrit Text of MMK for Chapters of BPP Translated Here, according to CPP as emended by J. W. de Jong, "Textcritical Notes on the Prasannapadā," Indo-Iranian Journal 20 (1978), 25-59, 217-252.

Chapter Three

darśanaṃ śravaṇaṃ ghrāṇaṃ rasanaṃ sparśanaṃ manaḥ|
indriyāṇi ṣaḍ eteṣāṃ draṣṭavyādīni gocaraḥ|| 1

svam ātmānaṃ darśanaṃ hi tat tam eva na paśyati|
na paśyati yad ātmānaṃ kathaṃ drakṣyati tat parān|| 2

na paryāpto 'gnidṛṣṭānto darśanasya prasiddhaye|
sadarśanaḥ sa pratyukto gamyamānagatāgataiḥ|| 3

nāpaśyamānaṃ bhavaci yadā kiṃ cana darśanaṃ|
darśanaṃ paśyatīty evaṃ katham etat tu yujyate|| 4

paśyati darśanaṃ naiva naiva paśyaty adarśanaṃ|
vyākhyāto darśanenaiva draṣṭā cāpy avagamyatāṃ|| 5

draṣṭā nāsty atiraskṛtya tiraskṛtya ca darśanaṃ|
draṣṭavyaṃ darśanaṃ caiva draṣṭary asati te kutaḥ|| 6

pratītya mātāpitarau yathoktaḥ putrasaṃbhavaḥ|

cakṣūrūpe pratītyaivam ukto vijñānasaṃbhavaḥ|| 7

draṣṭavyadarśanābhāvād vijñānādicatuṣṭayaṃ|
nāstīty upādānādīni bhaviṣyanti punaḥ kathaṃ|| 8

vyākhyātaṃ śravaṇaṃ ghrāṇaṃ rasanaṃ sparśanaṃ manaḥ|
darśanenaiva jānīyāc chrotṛśrotavyakādi ca|| 9

Chapter Four

rūpakāraṇanirmuktaṃ na rūpam upalabhyate|
rūpeṇāpi na nirmuktaṃ dṛśyate rūpakāraṇaṃ|| 1

rūpakāraṇanirmukte rūpe rūpaṃ prasajyate|
āhetukaṃ na cāsty arthaḥ kaścid āhetukaḥ kvacit|| 2

rūpeṇa tu vinirmuktaṃ yadi syād rūpakāraṇaṃ|
akāryakaṃ kāraṇaṃ syān nāsty akāryaṃ ca kāraṇaṃ|| 3

rūpe saty eva rūpasya kāraṇaṃ nopapadyate|
rūpe 'saty eva rūpasya kāraṇaṃ nopapadyate|| 4

niṣkāraṇaṃ punā rūpaṃ naiva naivopapadyate|
tasmād rūpagatān kāṃścin na vikalpān vikalpayet|| 5

na kāraṇasya sadṛśaṃ kāryam ity upapadyate|
na kāraṇasyāsadṛśaṃ kāryam ity upapadyate|| 6

vedanācittasaṃjñānāṃ saṃskārāṇāṃ ca sarvaśaḥ|
sarveṣām eva bhāvānāṃ rūpeṇaiva samaḥ kramaḥ|| 7

vigrahe yaḥ parīhāraṃ kṛte śūnyatayā vadet|
sarvaṃ tasyāparihṛtaṃ samaṃ sādhyena jāyate|| 8

vyākhyāne ya upālambhaṃ kṛte śūnyatayā vadet|
sarvaṃ tasyānupālabdhaṃ samaṃ sādhyena jāyate|| 9

Chapter Five

nākāśaṃ vidyate kiṃcit pūrvam ākāśalakṣaṇāt|
alakṣaṇaṃ prasajyeta syāt pūrvaṃ yadi lakṣaṇāt|| 1

alakṣaṇo na kaścic ca bhāvaḥ saṃvidyate kvacit|
asaty alakṣaṇe bhāve kramatāṃ kuha lakṣaṇam|| 2

nālakṣaṇe lakṣaṇasya pravṛttir na salakṣaṇe|
salakṣaṇālakṣaṇābhyāṃ nāpy anyatra pravartate|| 3

lakṣaṇāsaṃpravṛttau ca na lakṣyam upapadyate|
lakṣasyānupapattau ca lakṣaṇasyāpy asaṃbhavaḥ|| 4

tasmān na vidyate lakṣyaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ naiva vidyate|
lakṣyalakṣaṇanirmukto naiva bhāvo 'pi vidyate|| 5

avidyamāne bhāve ca kasyābhāvo bhaviṣyati|
bhāvābhāvavidharmā ca bhāvābhāvāv avaiti kaḥ|| 6

tasmān na bhāvo nābhāvo na lakṣyaṃ nāpi lakṣaṇaṃ|
ākāśam ākāśasamā dhātavaḥ pañca ye 'pare|| 7

astitvaṃ ye tu paśyanti nāstitvaṃ cālpabuddhayaḥ|
bhāvānāṃ te na paśyanti draṣṭavyopaśamaṃ śivaṃ|| 8

Chapter Seventeen

ātmasaṃyamakaṃ cetaḥ parānugrāhakaṃ ca yat|
maitraṃ sa dharmas tad bījaṃ phalasya pretya ceha ca|| 1

cetanā cetayitvā ca karmoktaṃ paramarṣiṇā|
tasyānekavidho bhedaḥ karmaṇaḥ parikīrtitaḥ|| 2

tatra yac cetanety uktaṃ karma tan mānasaṃ smṛtaṃ|
cetayitvā ca yat tūktaṃ tat tu kāyikavācikaṃ|| 3

vāg vispando 'viratayo yāś cāvijñaptisaṃjñitāḥ|

avijñaptaya evānyāḥ smṛtā viratayas tathā|| 4

paribhogānvayaṃ puṇyam apuṇyaṃ ca tathāvidhaṃ|
cetanā ceti saptaite dharmāḥ karmāñjanāḥ smṛtāḥ|| 5

tiṣṭhaty āpākakālāc cet karma tan nityatām iyāt|
niruddhaṃ cen niruddhaṃ sat kiṃ phalaṃ janayiṣyati|| 6

yo 'ṅkuraprabhṛtir bījāt saṃtāno 'bhipravartate|
tataḥ phalam ṛte bījāt sa ca nābhipravartate|| 7

bījāc ca yasmāt saṃtānaḥ saṃtānāc ca phalodbhavaḥ|
bījapūrvaṃ phalaṃ tasmān nocchinnaṃ nāpi śāśvataṃ|| 8

yas tasmāc cittasaṃtānaś cetaso 'bhipravartate|
tataḥ phalam ṛte cittāt sa ca nābhipravartate|| 9

cittāc ca yasmāt saṃtānaḥ saṃtānāc ca phalodbhavaḥ|
karmapūrvaṃ phalaṃ tasmān nocchinnaṃ nāpi śāśvataṃ|| 10

dharmasya sādhanopāyāḥ śuklāḥ karmapathā daśa|
phalaṃ kāmaguṇāḥ paṃca dharmasya pretya ceha ca|| 11

bahavaś ca mahāntaś ca doṣāḥ syur yadi kalpanā|
syād eṣā tena naivaiṣā kalpanātropapadyate|| 12

imāṃ punaḥ pravakṣyāmi kalpanāṃ yātra yojyate|
buddhaiḥ pratyekabuddhaiś ca śrāvakaiś cānuvarṇitām|| 13

pattraṃ yathā 'vipraṇāśas tatharṇam iva karma ca|
caturvidho dhātutaḥ sa prakṛtyā 'vyākṛtaś ca saḥ|| 14

prahāṇato na praheyo bhāvanāheya eva vā|
tasmād avipraṇāśena jāyate karmaṇāṃ phalam|| 15

prahāṇataḥ praheyaḥ syāt karmaṇaḥ saṃkrameṇa vā|
yadi doṣāḥ prasajyeraṃs tatra karmavadhādayaḥ|| 16

sarveṣāṃ visabhāgānāṃ sabhāgānāṃ ca karmaṇām|
pratisaṃdhau sadhātūnām eka utpadyate tu saḥ|| 17

karmaṇaḥ karmaṇo dṛṣṭe dharma utpadyate tu saḥ|
dviprakārasya sarvasya vipakve 'pi ca tiṣṭhati|| 18

phalavyatikramād vā sa maraṇād vā nirudhyate|
anāsravaṃ sāsravaṃ ca vibhāgaṃ tatra lakṣayet|| 19

śūnyatā ca na cocchedaḥ saṃsāraś ca na śāśvatam|
karmaṇo 'vipraṇāśaś ca dharmo buddhena deśitaḥ|| 20

karma notpadyate kasmān niḥsvabhāvaṃ yatas tataḥ|
yasmāc ca tad anutpannaṃ na tasmād vipraṇaśyati|| 21

karma svabhāvataś cet syāc chāśvataṃ syād asaṃśayaṃ|
akṛtaṃ ca bhavet karma kriyate na hi śāśvataṃ|| 22

akṛtābhyāgamabhayaṃ syāt karmākṛtakaṃ yadi|
abrahmacaryavāsaś ca doṣas tatra prasajyate|| 23

vyavahārā virudhyante sarva eva na saṃśayaḥ|
puṇyapāpakṛtor naiva pravibhāgaś ca yujyate|| 24

tadvipakvavipākaṃ ca punar eva vipakṣyati|
karma vyavasthitaṃ yasmāt tasmāt svābhāvikaṃ yadi|| 25

karma kleśātmakaṃ cedaṃ te ca kleśā na tattvataḥ|
na cet te tattvataḥ kleśāḥ karma syāt tattvataḥ kathaṃ|| 26

karma kleśāś ca dehānāṃ pratyayāḥ samudāhṛtāḥ|
karma kleśāś ca te śūnyā yadi deheṣu kā kathā|| 27

avidyānivṛto jantus tṛṣṇāsaṃyojanaś ca saḥ|
sa bhoktā sa ca na kartur anyo na ca sa eva saḥ|| 28

na pratyayasamutpannaṃ nāpratyayasamutthitaṃ|
asti yasmād idaṃ karma tasmāt kartāpi nāsty ataḥ|| 29

karma cen nāsti kartā ca kutaḥ syāt karmajaṃ phalaṃ|
asaty atha phale bhoktā kuta eva bhaviṣyati|| 30

yathā nirmitakaṃ śāstā nirmimītarddhisampadā|
nirmito nirmimītānyaṃ sa ca nirmitakaḥ punaḥ|| 31

tathā nirmitakākāraḥ kartā yat karma tatkṛtaṃ|
tadyathā nirmitenānyo nirmito nirmitas tathā|| 32

kleśāḥ karmāṇi dehāś ca kartāraś ca phalāni ca|
gandharvanagarākārā marīcisvapnasaṃnibhāḥ|| 33

Chapter Twenty-three

saṃkalpaprabhavo rāgo dveṣo mohaś ca kathyate|
śubhāśubhaviparyāsān saṃbhavanti pratītya hi|| 1

śubhāśubhaviparyāsān saṃbhavanti pratītya ye|
te svabhāvān na vidyante tasmāt kleśā na tattvataḥ|| 2

ātmano 'stitva..āstitve na kathaṃcic ca sidhyataḥ|
taṃ vināstitvanāstitve kleśānāṃ sidhyataḥ kathaṃ|| 3

kasyacid dhi bhavantīme kleśāḥ sa ca na sidhyati|
kaścid āho vinā kaṃcit santi kleśā na kasyacit|| 4

svakāyadṛṣṭivat kleśāḥ kliṣṭe santi na pañcadhā|
svakāyadṛṣṭivat kliṣṭaṃ kleśeṣv api na pañcadhā|| 5

svabhāvato na vidyante śubhāśubhaviparyayāḥ|
pratītya katamān kleśāḥ śubhāśubhaviparyayān|| 6

rūpaśabdarasasparśā gandhā dharmāś ca ṣaḍvidhaṃ|
vastu rāgasya doṣasya mohasya ca vikalpyate|| 7

rūpaśabdarasasparśā gandhā dharmāś ca kevalāḥ|
gandharvanagarākārā marīcisvapnasaṃnibhāḥ|| 8

aśubhaṃ vā śubhaṃ vāpi kutas teṣu bhaviṣyati|
māyāpuruṣakalpeṣu pratibimbasameṣu ca|| 9

anapekṣya śubhaṃ nāsty aśubhaṃ prajñapayemahi|
yat pratītya śubhaṃ tasmāc chubhaṃ naivopapadyate|| 10

anapekṣyāśubhaṃ nāsti śubhaṃ prajñapayemahi|
yat pratītyāśubhaṃ tasmād aśubhaṃ naiva vidyate|| 11

avidyamāne ca śubhe kuto rāgo bhaviṣyati|
aśubhe 'vidyamāne ca kuto dveṣo bhaviṣyati|| 12

anitye nityam ity evaṃ yadi grāho viparyayaḥ|

nānityaṃ vidyate śūnye kuto grāho viparyayaḥ|| 13

anitye nityam ity evaṃ yadi grāho viparyayaḥ|
anityam ity api grāhaḥ śūnye kiṃ na viparyayaḥ|| 14

yena gṛhṇāti yo grāho grahītā yac ca gṛhyate|
upaśāntāni sarvāṇi tasmād grāho na vidyate|| 15

avidyamāne grāhe ca mithyā vā samyag eva vā|
bhaved viparyayaḥ kasya bhavet kasysāviparyayaḥ|| 16

na cāpi viparītasya saṃbhavanti viparyayāḥ|
na cāpy aviparītasya saṃbhavanti viparyayāḥ|| 17

na viparyasyamānasya saṃbhavanti viparyayāḥ|
vimṛśasva svayaṃ kasya saṃbhavanti viparyayāḥ|| 18

anutpannāḥ kathaṃ nāma bhaviṣyanti viparyayāḥ|
viparyayeṣv ajāteṣu viparyayagataḥ kutaḥ|| 19

na svato jāyate bhāvaḥ parato naiva jāyate|
na svataḥ parataś ceti viparyayagataḥ kutaḥ|| 20

ātmā ca śuci nityaṃ ca sukhaṃ ca yadi vidyate|
ātmā ca śuci nityaṃ ca sukhaṃ ca na viparyayāḥ|| 21

nātmā ca śuci nityaṃ ca sukhaṃ ca yadi vidyate|
anātmā 'śucy anityaṃ ca naiva duḥkhaṃ ca vidyate|| 22

evaṃ nirudhyate 'vidyā viparyayanirodhanāt|
avidyāyāṃ niruddhāyāṃ saṃskārādyaṃ nirudhyate|| 23

yadi bhūtāḥ svabhāvena kleśāḥ kecid dhi kasyacit|
kathaṃ nāma prahīyeran kaḥ svabhāvaṃ prahāsyati|| 24

yady abhūtāḥ svabhāvena kleśāḥ kecid dhi kasyacit|
kathaṃ nāma prahīyeran ko 'sadbhāvaṃ prahāsyati|| 25

Chapter Twenty-six

punarbhavāya saṃskārān avidyānivṛtas tridhā|
abhisaṃskurute yāṃs tair gatiṃ gacchati karmabhiḥ|| 1

vijñānaṃ saṃniviśate saṃskārapratyayaṃ gatau|
saṃniviṣṭe 'tha vijñāne nāmarūpaṃ niṣicyate|| 2

niṣikte nāmarūpe tu ṣaḍāyatanasaṃbhavaḥ|
ṣaḍāyatanam āgamya saṃsparśaḥ saṃpravartate|| 3

cakṣuḥ pratītya rūpaṃ ca samanvāhāram eva ca|
nāmarūpaṃ pratītyaivaṃ vijñānaṃ saṃpravartate|| 4

saṃnipātas trayāṇāṃ yo rūpavijñānacakṣuṣāṃ|
sparśaḥ sa tasmāt sparśāc ca vedanā saṃpravartate|| 5

vedanāpratyayā tṛṣṇā vedanārthaṃ hi tṛṣyate|
tṛṣyamāna upādānam upādatte caturvidhaṃ|| 6

upādāne sati bhava upādātuḥ pravartate|
syād dhi yady anupādāno mucyeta na bhaved bhavaḥ|| 7

pañca skandhāḥ sa ca bhavo bhavāj jātiḥ pravartate|
jarāmaraṇaduḥkhādi śokāḥ saparidevanāḥ|| 8

daurmanasyam upāyāsā jāter etat pravartate|
kevalasyaivam etasya duḥkhaskandhasya saṃbhavaḥ|| 9

saṃsāramūlaṃ saṃskārān avidvān saṃskaroty ataḥ|
avidvān kārakas tasmān na vidvāṃs tattvadarśanāt|| 10

avidyāyāṃ niruddhāyāṃ saṃskārāṇām asaṃbhavaḥ|
avidyāyā nirodhas tu jñānasyāsyaiva bhāvanāt|| 11

tasya tasya nirodhena tat tan nābhipravartate|
duḥkhaskandhaḥ kevalo ´yam evaṃ samyag nirudhyate|| 12

Appendix B: Bibliographical Abbreviations Not Explained in the Notes

AK The Abhidharmakośa and Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu - See Abhidharmakośa and Bhāṣya of Ācārya Vasubandhu with Sphuṭārtha Commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitra, ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, Bauddha Bharati Series, vols. 5, 6, 7, and 9 Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973 and The Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu, ed. Prahlad Pradhan, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, vol. 8, Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1975 (2nd rev. ed.).

Akutobhayā In Dbu ma Tsa: D vol. 1; P vol. 95.

Ava Avalokitavrata's Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā. Chapters One and Two in Dbu ma Wa: D vol. 4; P vol. 96. Chapters Three through Sixteen (Part) in Dbu ma Zha: D vol. 5; P vol. 97; Chapters Sixteen (Part) through Twenty-seven in Dbu ma Za: D vol. 6; P vol. 97.

Bp Buddhapālita's Buddhapālita-Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti. In Dbu ma Tsa: D vol. 1; P vol. 95 and in Saito.

BPP Bhāvaviveka's Prajñāpradīpa. In Dbu ma Tsha: D vol.

2; P vol. 95.

C Co ne edition of *bstan ´gyur*, Dbu ma Tsha. Published on microfiche by the Institute for the Advanced Study of World Religions, Stony Brook, New York, 1974.

CPP Candrakīrti´s *Prasannapadā*. Sanskrit in *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā, Commentaire de Candrakīrti*, ed. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, Bibliotheca Buddhica, vol. 4, St. Pétersbourg: Académie Impériale des Sciences, 1913. Tibetan in Dbu ma ´a: D vol. 7; P vol. 98.

D *Sde Dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka Bstan Ḥgyur, Dbu Ma*, eds. K. Hayashima, J. Takasaki, Z. Yamaguchi, and Y. Ejima, 17 volumes and index, Tokyo: Sekai Seiten Kanko Kyokai, 1977.

LVP AK *L´Abhidhamakośa de Vasubandhu*, tr. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, 6 volumes, Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1923-31 (reprinted 1971-2 as vol. 16 of *Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques*).

MMK Nāgārjuna´s *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās*. Sanskrit in CPP. Tibetan in Dbu ma Tsa: D vol. 1; P vol. 95 and also in *Akutobhayā*, Ava, Bp, BPP, and CPP.

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